117. Eve Tuck and Rubén A. Gaztambide-Fernández, “Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity”

tuck and gaz first page.jpg

I decided to read “Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity,” by Eve Tuck and Rubén A. Gaztambide-Fernández, because I keep running across the term “settler futurity” and I wanted to get a clearer idea of what it means. It’s obviously a bad thing from the way it’s used, which makes me curious: Settlers have no future? How can that be? What does it mean to tell a group of people they have no future? It turns out that the term “futurity” isn’t synonymous with “future,” although how the two differ is still unclear to me.

The authors begins with James Fenimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking novels and their protagonist, Natty Bumppo, a child of European Settlers who is raised by an Indigenous nation, but who “grows to disdain both the Natives who raise him, whom he sees as barbaric and uncivilized, as well as the European settlers, whom he sees as incapable of surviving with nature” (72). “Natty Bumppo grows to be the true enlightened subject, who can learn from the ways of the primitive without becoming them, who remains civilized without succumbing to nature, and who can travers the boundaries that separate different groups with his cosmopolitan orientation,” Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández write. “In Natty Bumppo, the future of the settler is ensured through the absorption of those aspects of Indigenous knowledge that ensure survival, only to justify erasure and subsequent replacement” (72-73). Figures like Natty Bumppo, who are neither Indigenous nor Settler, who are both civilized and “one with nature,” saturate “the U.S. cultural imaginary” (73). “Natty Bumppo also resurfaces within the contentions over colonization and race that mar the politics of progressive fields such as curriculum studies,” the authors continue. “Here, the future of the settler is ensured by the absorption of any and all critiques that pose a challenge to white supremacy, and the replacement of anyone who dares to speak against ongoing colonization” (73).

“This article does the simultaneously blunt and delicate work of exhuming the ways in which curriculum and its history in the United States has invested in settler colonialism, and the permanence of the settler-colonial nation state,” Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández state. “In particular, we will describe the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, which aims to vanish Indigenous peoples and replace them with settlers, who see themselves as rightful claimants to land, and indeed, as Indigenous” (73). Of course, that project goes far beyond educational curricula, and the focus on education seems strange to me—but then again, I’m not really interested in educational research or scholarship, which is probably going to be a barrier for me in reading this essay. The authors will use the figure of Natty Bumppo “as an extended allegory to understand the ways in which the field of curriculum has continued to absorb, silence, and replace the non-white other, perpetuating white supremacy and settlerhood,” primarily through “a rhetorical move against identity politics” (73). “White curriculum scholars re-occupy the ‘spaces’ opened by responses to racism and colonization in the curriculum, such as multiculturalism and critical race theory, absorbing the knowledge, but once again displacing the bodies out to the margins” (73). The “various interventions” that have “tried to dislodge the aims of replacement, including multiculturalism, critical race theory, and browning . . . have been sidelined and reappropriated in ways that reinscribe settler colonialism and settler futurity” (73)

The idea of replacement comes through the work of Patrick Wolfe and his argument that settler colonialism operates through a logic of elimination; I’ve written about the article to which Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández refer here. The violence of invasion “is reasserted each day of occupation,” because as Wolfe argues, invasion is a structure, not an event (73). “Thus, when we write about settler colonialism in this article, we are writing about it as both an historical and contemporary matrix of relations and conditions that define life in the settler colonial nation-state,” the authors state (73-74). “In North America, settler colonialism operates through a triad of relationships, between the (white [but not always]) settlers, the Indigenous inhabitants, and the chattel slaves who are removed from their homelands to work stolen land,” they continue (74). (If their intention is to write about contemporary life in settler colonial nation-states, shouldn’t they concede that slavery has been abolished in North America?) “Several belief systems need to be in place to justify the destruction of Indigenous life and the enslavement of life from other lands, in particular the continent of Africa,” including “19th century ‘manifest destiny,’” “heteropaternalism—the assumption that heteropatriarchial nuclear domestic arrangements are the building block of the state and institutions,” and white supremacy (74). (I suppose “heteropaternalism” is included because Indigenous nations had other models of “domestic arrangements.”) “Settler colonialism requires the construction of non-white peoples as less than or not-quite civilized, an earlier expression of human civilization, and makes whiteness and white subjectivity both superior and normal,” they continue, suggesting that this makes both whiteness and “settler status” invisible, “only seen when threatened” (74). “Settler colonialism is typified by its practiced epistemological refusal to recognize the latent relations of the settler colonial triad; the covering of its tracks,” particularly through “the circulation of its creation story” (74). Such stories “conceal the teleology of violence and domination that characterize white settlement,” such as “the ‘Fort on Frontier’ as a signifier for the myth of civilization and modernity in the creation story of the Canadian nation-state,” they write, citing Dwayne Donald (74). In the U.S., the parallel signifier is “the ‘jeremiad’ of colonial Puritans who sought to establish a utopian society” (75). (Why that mythology is a “jeremiad” needs to be explained here; otherwise a word with a specific meaning simply turns into a term of abuse or opprobrium.)

Next, Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández turn to education and, in particular, curriculum. I’m going to summarize this section very quickly. “[S]chooling has served the purpose of promoting and imperialist view of the world that justifies colonization premised on European epistemological supremacy,” they write (75). Schooling “has been a white supremacist project” that is “premised . . . on maintaining symbolic logics through which to justify the theft and occupation of Indigenous land” (75). Education and “the field of curriculum studies” have always “played a significant role in the maintenance of settler colonialism” by seeing themselves “through logics of replacement in which the settler ultimately comes to replace the Native” (76). Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández trace this role from the seventeenth century onwards (76-77). They cite Lorenzo Veracini’s observation that “within settler colonialism, settlers and the settler-state must continuously disavow the existence and presence of Indigenous peoples and Indigenous accounts and histories of land,” since 

[f]or the settler, the recalcitrant continued presence of Indigenous peoples and the descendants of chattel slaves is disturbing, is disrupting. The settler-state is always already in a precarious position because Indigenous peoples and descendants fo chattel slaves won’t do what they are supposed to do, fade away into history by either disappearing or becoming more like the settler, the true description of the human. If they/we won’t fade away into history, then the whole ugly business of the founding of the settler-state can’t be surpassed, can’t be forgotten. (77) 

Settler colonialism therefore hides the evidence of its activities in order “to achieve the settler’s ultimate aim, which is to resolve the uncomfortable and precarious dis-location as usurper, and replace the Indigenous people as the natural, historical, rightful and righteous owners of the land” (77). (I need to read Veracini’s book, which is by all accounts an important account of settler colonialism.)

Here Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández return to Natty Bumppo, noting that the Leatherstocking novels tapped into “settlers’ imaginations of the vanishing Indian, the innovative Frontiersman, and the ill-fated Negro, the very cast of characters which animate settler colonialism, and much of American literature” (78). The Leatherstocking novels ignore the reality of the 1830 Indian Removal Act and the resulting Trail of Tears (1831-1837) “while imagining the Indian as already vanished, as already dead” (78). For Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández, these stories, together constitute “an allegory for what we call the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, which is intent on relieving the inherent anxiety of settler dislocation from stolen land” (78). (Why limit that project to curriculum?) “The anchoring themes of hybridity, extinction, inheritance, and whiteness that is more Indian (i.e more deserving of the land) than Indians from Cooper’s tales are the vertebrae of the ideological justification for the dispossession of Indigenous peoples and Black and brown peoples: ignoring that they may have an a priori claim to land, or a claim derived from reparation,” they continue (78). (Wouldn’t land for reparations also be Indigenous land? Doesn’t that suggestion lead to a scenario where there would be competing claims to land? Wouldn’t that transfer of land from White ownership to Black people as reparations still be an example of settler colonialism?) According to Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández, “Natty Bumppo-as-curriculum” is an allegory that “highlights the distraction offered by the pursuit of replacement, away from settler complicity in the erasure of Indigenous people toward fantasies fo the extinct or becoming-extinct Indian as natural, foregone, inevitable, indeed, evolutionary” (78). They note that nineteenth- and early-twentiety-century writers on education believed in that evolutionary idea (78-79). “[S]ettler futurity is ensured through an understanding of Native-European relations as a thing of the past, and the inclusion of Native history [is] a past upon which a white future is ensured,” they continue (79). 

Moreover, “contemporary progressive and critical approaches to curriculum act through the same ‘Fort on Frontier’ mythology and the same ‘errand into the wilderness’ Puritan jeremiad that ensure replacement and settler futurity” (79). “[T]he contemporary field of curriculum studies has not escaped its preoccupation with replacement,” Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández write. “We see this manifested in how non-white, non-settler contributions to curriculum studies, along with the scholars that make those contributions, are frequently replaced, renewing settler interpretations as central to the field and the history of fantasies of replacement in its founding” (79). Scholars of colour “are sometimes dismissed as too focused on identity politics” by White scholars “who have moved on to a post-racial analysis,” and “[t]hose who challenge the appropriation of Brown, Black, and Indigenous ideas and the renewed installment of white bodies are dismissed as essentialists, as saying that race matters more than it really should, and are called the true racists” (79). (This argument would be stronger if the authors presented examples of such dismissals.) “Replacement is both a molar and molecular project,” they state, citing Deleuze and Guattari: 

The settler colonial curricular project of replacement seems to happen organically, without intent, even though Indigenous erasure is the arch aim of settler colonialism. It happens generally, through the commonplace tendency of appropriation and commercialization of Indigeneity, but also specifically, through the removal of Indigenous bodies and the occupation of tracts of land by settler bodies. (79)

White scholars who are identified as experts on “multiculturalism—now refracted as diversity” become “the expert ‘backwoodsman,’ the allegorical Natty Bumppo who has gained expertise from ‘diverse,’ ‘indigenous,’ decolonizing,’ or ‘brown’ others, not further replaced by the new ‘native,’ no longer accountable to those who have been historically underrepresented in the academy,” they continue (79-80)

Finally, Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández arrive at a brief (three paragraph) explanation of settler futurity: “The settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what Andrew Baldwin calls the ‘permanent virtuality’ of the settler on stolen land” (Baldwin, qtd. 80). (“Why “virtuality”? I don’t understand.) “When we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future,” they continue:

To say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement is invested in both settler future and futurity. Futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness).” (Baldwin, qtd. 80)

Maybe I’m just stupid, but I’m not sure I follow the distinction being made here between future and futurity. They seem entangled in such a way that they cannot be separated. I could read Baldwin’s essay—I’ve located a copy—but why does the definition of settler futurity provided here have to be unclear? Without a clear definition, that term risks being taken as meaningless—and I’ve seen it used in so many texts on settler colonialism that it must mean something. Given the importance of the term and its omnipresence in this essay, it needs a better explanation. “[R]eplacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land,” Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández continue. “Anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate Indigenous peoples into the settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity” (80). “To be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an Indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of Indigenous land by non-Indigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies,” they write. “That is to say that Indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of Indigenous peoples” (80). So Settlers can remain on the land but without settler colonialism or settler epistemologies? Is that even possible? If so, how?

At this point, Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández turn to three attempts at intervening “upon the settler colonial curricular project of replacement”—“multiculturalism, critical race theory, and browning”—along with “another emergent attempt, rematriation” (80). Replacement, they contend, is “a function of whiteness and white ideology, because the interventions have been constructed as responses to structural racism; however, we maintain that white supremacy is supported and enacted through settler colonialism” (80). “[T]he settler colonial curricular project of replacement is relentless in its recuperation and absorption of such critiques—effectively replacing those who offered the critiques with (now) more informed white bodies,” they state (81). 

First, “[m]ulticulturalism is perhaps the most widespread response to white supremacy in the curriculum, and it has many manifestations and critiques, including how it operates to promote the narratives and the claims of descendants of slaves and setttlers of color at the expense of Indigenous people” (81). Multicultural curriculum is about inclusion; it grew out of the U.S. Civil Rights movement, which framed “inequity in relation to institutionalized racism and oppression,” and insisted “on the strengths and contributions of communities and families” (81). “As ‘tourist’ and other superficial approaches proliferated”—what do the authors mean by “tourist” in this context?—“educators of color grew disillusioned with multiculturalism” (81). Indigenous educators like Sandy Grande state that multiculturalism ignores “the significance of Indigenous (struggles for) sovereignty” and that inclusion “prevents Indigenous peoples from achieving decolonizing aims” (81). “When being inclusive, whitestream curriculum begins to absorb and contain, consuming and erasing the other, by always-already positioning the accumulated knowledge as other to, less refined, more subjective and less reliable than the whitestream,” Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández write:

The story is just a better story when there are more white people in it. Once the story is properly populated and the subaltern knowledge is absorbed, actual participation by Othered bodies is not necessary. Like Natty Bumppo, the whitestream can integrate what it needs—once the white settler learns to dance like the other, learns to eat like the other, learns to dress like the other, and to consume and even to make objects like the other, the other is no longer needed, discarded, replaced. (82)

“This is followed by a move away from the initial language of multiculturalism, to a language of diversity, which can more fully be reoccupied by white subjects,” they continues. “Under the banner of ‘we are all the same because we are different,’ the language of diversity completes the replacement, positioning white people as the tru diverse subjects, the new natives, and protectors of the value of human difference” (82).

Second, critical race theory, which “invites an analysis of how racism produces its own categories and institutional operations, such as the granting of citizenship and other legal rights,” “points to how forms of knowledge like literacy and numeracy are constituted as white property (property goes undetected as a settler construct), and the material benefits that this grants to those constituted as ‘white’” (82). (Is literacy really white property? How so?) “This analysis has led to an examination of how white supremacy produces an exalted category of whiteness, how certain groups vie for whiteness and gain ascendancy in the racial hierarchy on which colonization is premised,” the authors continue (82). This has led to the academic field of whiteness studies, which looks at white domination across society (82). However, “there has been a proliferation of far less considered approaches to whiteness studies, which do not address issues of privilege and power, often devolving into apologist accounts of the plight of white subjects” (82). Such accounts “serve only to bring whiteness to the center, giving space for white people to air their experiences of racialization, attempting to rescue themselves from the damages of racial thinking, and appropriating the language of critical race theory” (82-83). “In some circles, these white scholars are celebrated for their performances of critical reflexivity, but little else changes, and the cumulative effect is that white experience of the world resumes its place as the rightful and natural perspective,” Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández write. “Our allegorical Natty Bumppo carries on, fully vested in the glow of his own pride for having revealed that, after all, he is not quite white either and therefore not responsible—innocence retrieved” (83). (So white people should just shut up?) At the same time, scholars in curriculum studies “have waged complaints against the critical analysis of race, crying foul against the scholars of color who are cast as dupes for the mere act of invoking race itself” (83). (Again, this argument would be more persuasive if it provided examples.) “In the context of the academy’s competitive individualism, in which there is only one expert in a subject on a faculty”—that might be true in small faculties or institutions, but is it true in in larger ones?—“or only one chapter about a subject is needed in a volume or conference session, the bodies and works by scholars of color are frequently replaced by bodies and works of white scholars, reflecting a retrenchment of prior efforts to diversity, anemic as those efforts may have been” (83).

Finally, “browning” refers to deliberate efforts “to uncover and highlight the myriad of complicated ways in which white supremacy and colonization constantly manifest themselves in curriculum scholarship” (83). It critiques praise of “the ‘fathers’ of curriculum history without acknowledging their racist views” and the racism of citation practices that attribute ideas to white scholars (83). For instance, why do curriculum scholars “engaging with psychoanalysis know so little about Frantz Fanon and his analysis of subjecthood?” (83). (Again, examples please.) Browning, they write, interrupts “the dominant narrative by rudely inserting itself, reclaiming academic space, and calling the names of those who have been replaced and forgotten” (83). Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández suggest that browning the curriculum means 

to make it messy, to show how it is already dirty and stained, to refuse romanticized creation stories and fort pedagogies. Like pan-searing, browning brings out the flavor through charring. It can be experienced as an irreverent burn that dislodges the handle from the hand, it deliberately seeks to anger, to force the hidden hand of the racism that lurks at every turn of the curriculum studies discourse. Browning highlights the present absences and invokes the ghosts of curriculum’s past and futures, unsettling settler futurity. (83-84)

Some (presumably White) scholars have responded to browning’s disruption “by being positively unflappable” and by dismissing it “as a sideline—perhaps even a distraction, not central to the concerns of the field,” while others have responded with a “public cathexis of white guilt” which results in “a turn away from the relentlessness of browning toward the more flattering framing of diversity” (84). (The example given of the latter response is a rather inside baseball account of a town hall session at a conference.) 

Finally, Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández turn to “rematriation,” a term that “refers to the work of community members and scholars in curriculum studies who directly address the complicity of curriculum in the maintenance of settler colonialism” (84). Rematriation is not yet fully theorized, they acknowledge, but it intends “to undercut and undermine the legacy of settler colonialism in the curriculum” by not denying difference, seeking “to understand mutual implication,” putting “Indigenous epistemologies at the forefront,” and requiring “a more public form of memory” (84). Rematriation, they continue, “involves rethinking the aims of research in curriculum studies so that Indigenous communities and other over-researched but invisibilized communities can reject narratives and theories that have been used against us, and re-story knowledge and research to forward our own sovereignty and wellbeing” (85). Rematriation is premised on “the insistence that the academy does not need to know everything. Not everything, or even most things uncovered in a community-based inquiry processes need to be reported in academic journals or settings. There are some stories that the academy has not proved itself to be worthy of knowing” (85). The examples Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández provide show that rematriation is focused on Indigenous peoples: it is “a curricular project to be engaged by Indigenous peoples in participatory processes, the results of which may never feed back to the academy. It intends to break the loop of academic appropriation of Indigenous knowledge, and in doing so, challenges many of the assumptions about the inherent beneficence of the academic gaze” (85). “Though sometimes Indigenous scholars carefully articulate their frameworks so that they cannot be interpreted as separatist, there are no safeguards in place against this interpretation,” they write (85). (Are there any safeguards against misinterpretation anywhere?) However, rematriation therefore cannot “intervene upon the curricular project of replacement” (85). “As a framework invested in Indigenous futurity, and not in settler futurity, rematriation offers little in terms of lifeboats,” Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández write (85). (Why “lifeboats”? What ship is sinking? Settler futurity? How so? I don’t understand the metaphor.) “Instead, it insists that there are forms of knowledge that persist outside of the colonial territory, and says, no, you can’t have them,” they continue.Rematriation performs as a refusal in relation to the larger curriculum field” (85).

In their conclusion, entitled “Refusal,” Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández state,

One of the core reasons that each of the interventions we have described above has failed to interrupt settler colonialism and settler colonial replacement is that each has tried to make powerful shifts without alienating white settlers. In part, this is because of complaints by white settlers, such as “well, now what am I supposed to do?” and “how will I fit into this?” The expectation is that any viable alternative frame will account for the needs of the settler, address their anxieties, and assure them that nothing is going to require them to change or disrupt their lives. (85-86)

Does that conclusion follow from the examples of questions they present? Couldn’t “what am I supposed to do?” be a question about how Settlers need to change or “disrupt their lives”? How ought Settlers—or White people (the terms, as Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández acknowledge, are not synonymous) change? Isn’t that a relevant question? “Insofar as these and other interventions try to accommodate the affect of the settler, they cannot succeed in reshaping or reimagining curriculum studies” (86)—or any broader issues, I would suspect. “What is needed is a discourse of refusal, refusing to require that new works in curriculum studies soothe settler anxieties,” they continue:

There must be work inside curriculum studies that dis-invests in settler futurity, that refuses to intervene, that observes a writ of “do not resuscitate.” This refusal is not just a no, it is what is needed to generate work that is useful to us. But it is also not an invitation, it is an exaction. We exact expropriation; to speak without explication; to claim without settler colonial justification; to refuse any response or allegation. (86)

I’m not sure what it means to “exact expropriation,” but does “to refuse any response or allegation” mean refusing responses like this one, an honest attempt at understanding an essay, or does it mean to refuse to respond to questions? I don’t understand.

“Meanwhile, settlers in curriculum studies must hold one another accountable when they invade emergent work by requiring it to comfort their dis-ease,” Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández conclude. “That is as far we will go to provide instructions. There isn’t an easy ending. We anticipate that even with all of these refusals and exactions, this article is just as likely as any other to be incorporated and absorbed—our lines quoted, APA style, to either agree or dismiss, in some dusty footnote at the end of some argument about the proper way to do curriculum studies” (86). “The most cynical view,” they continue, “is that refusals will always be replaced as long as the vestiges of settler colonialism in curriculum studies go unobserved. Refusers will be erased, subtly written off the page as remnants of the past in a settler colonial future” (86).

That is the most cynical view, and I wonder whether some small sense of the limitations of any form of academic research in creating social change might not avoid the self-destructiveness of that cynicism. I don’t know. What I do know, however, is that as far as an explanation of settler futurity goes, this essay was not that helpful. Nor do I see any opening here for ways in which Settlers and Indigenous people or former enslaved people might be able to live together. I suppose that to search for that would be to miss the point, to replace their refusals with incorporation or absorption. That’s how such a statement would likely be taken by Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández. But that’s not how it’s meant. The project of replacement has failed, even as Settler society tries new ways to enact it; meanwhile, Settlers (and their descendants) aren’t going anywhere. Most of us have nowhere else to go. So we will have to find some way of sharing this place. I know that goes against Tuck’s definition of decolonization as the return of all Indigenous land, even though in this paper she and Gaztambide-Fernández acknowledge that Indigenous futurity has a space for Settlers in it, but to acknowledge that fact seems necessary. In any case, I’m still confused by the term “settler futurity” and will have to look elsewhere for a clearer explanation of what it means. Perhaps in Veracini? Perhaps in Baldwin? Although his essay is about Whiteness and futurity, perhaps his explanation is clearer? Or is there some other place from which both Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández on one hand, and Baldwin on the other, have taken this term? Given the ubiquity of the term “settler futurity,” that’s probably the case. But what’s the source? Does anyone reading this know?

Works Cited

Baldwin, Andrew. “Whiteness and Futurity: Towards a Research Agenda.” Progress in Human Geography, vol. 36, no. 6, 2012, pp. 172-87.

Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. “Decolonization is Not a Metaphor.” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, vol. 1, no. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40.

Tuck, Eve, and Rubén A. Gaztambide-Fernández. “Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity.” Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, vol. 29, no. 1, 2013, pp. 72-89.

Veracini, Lorenzo. Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Wolfe, Patrick. “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.” Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 8, no. 4, 2006, pp. 387-409. DOI:10.1080/14623520601056240.

106. Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized

albert memmi

Albert Memmi’s 1957 book Portrait du Colonisé précedé du Portrait du Colonisateur was first published in an English edition in 1965. Memmi was Tunisian, and since Tunisia was then a French colony, although one engaged in a struggle for liberation, he was one of the colonized. “I discovered that few aspects of my life and my personality were untouched by this fact,” he writes of being colonized in the book’s preface. “Not only my own thoughts, my passions and my conduct, but also the conduct of others towards me was affected” (viii). For this reason, he continues, “I undertook this inventory of conditions of colonized people mainly in order to understand myself and to identify my place in the society of other men. It was my readers—not all of them Tunisian—who later convinced me that this portrait was equally theirs” (viii). What Memmi was writing about “was the fate of a vast multitude across the world” (viii-ix). But The Colonizer and the Colonized goes beyond a description of colonized people:

The colonial relationship which I had tried to define chained the colonizer and the colonized into an implacable dependence, molded their respective characters and dictated their conduct. Just as there was an obvious logic in the reciprocal behavior of the two colonial partners, another mechanism, proceeding from the first, would lead, I believed, inexorably to the decomposition of this dependence. (ix)

It’s clear how Memmi could write about the colonized, since he would be drawing from his experience, but how could he understand the colonizer? “I know the colonizer from the inside almost as well as I know the colonized,” he writes (xiii), noting that even though he was Tunisian, he was Jewish, not Muslim, and the Jewish community in Tunisia “passionately endeavoured to identify themselves with the French,” thereby gaining some minor, “laughable” privileges (xiv). “The Jewish population identified as much with the colonizers as with the colonized,” he writes, and because of this ambivalence, he understood “the contradictory emotions which swayed their lives” (xiv). “All of this explains why the portrait of the colonizer was in part my own—projected in a geometric sense,” he continues (xv).

So Memmi’s book describes the colonized, but it is also a description of the colonizer, of the relationship between colonizer and colonized, and the process of decolonization; and Memmi relies on his own experience as a colonized person as the source of his understanding of these. Indeed, writing this book helped him to understand his experience. “The sum of events which I had lived since childhood, often incoherent and contradictory on the surface, began to fall into dynamic patterns,” he writes (x): 

I needed to put some sort of order into the chaos of my feelings and to form a basis for my future actions. By temperament and education I had to do this in a disciplined manner, following the consequences as far as possible. If I had not gone all the way, trying to find coherence in all these diverse facts, reconstructing them into portraits which were answerable to one another, I could not have convinced myself and would have remained dissatisfied with my effort. I saw, then, what help to fighting men the simple, ordered description of their misery and humiliation could be. I saw how explosive the objective relation to the colonized and colonizer of an essentially explosive condition could be. (x)

As I read these words, I wondered if after 60 years Memmi’s insights still have value, and if they might be applied to settler colonialism as it exists in Canada. The answer: yes, I think they can.

In his introduction to the book, published in the 1957 edition, Jean-Paul Sartre writes that it “establishes some strong truths”:

First of all, that there are neither good nor bad colonists: there are colonialists. Among these, some reject their objective reality. Borne along by the colonialist apparatus, they do everyday in reality what they condemn in fantasy, for all their actions contribute to the maintenance of oppression. They will change nothing and will serve no one, but will succeed only in finding moral comfort in malaise. (xxv-xxvi)

Doesn’t that describe those of us who reject the premises of settler colonialism but are nonetheless caught in the position of colonizer? Those colonizers, Sartre continues, deny “the title of humanity” to the colonized, which isn’t difficult, “for the system deprives them”—that is, the colonized—“of everything” (xvi):

Thus oppression justifies itself through oppression: the oppressors produce and maintain by force the evils that render the oppressed, in their eyes, more and more what they would have to be like to deserve their fate. The colonizer can only exonerate himself in the systematic pursuit of the “dehumanization” of the colonized by identifying himself a little more each day with the colonialist apparatus. Terror and exploitation dehumanize, and the exploiter authorizes himself with that dehumanization to carry his exploitation further. The engine of colonialism turns in a circle; it is impossible to distinguish between its praxis and objective necessity. (xvi-xvii)

Thus, at some level, Canadians must not think that First Nations deserve clean drinking water, to take one egregious example, because they don’t already have clean drinking water. They must think that First Nations children deserve to be apprehended by social services at astonishing rates, because they can be apprehended by social services. At the end of his introduction, Sartre suggests that the colonizer regards the humanity in others “everywhere as his enemy. To handle this, the colonizer must assume the opaque rigidity and imperviousness of stone. In short, he must dehumanize himself, as well” (xxviii). Doesn’t that describe our federal government’s continuing behaviour towards First Nations, despite its fine words about reconciliation? Hasn’t it become dehumanized by denying the humanity of others? “A relentless reciprocity binds the colonizer to the colonized—his product and his fate,” Sartre continues, and yet colonialism contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction, because “[t]he excluded human beings will affirm their exclusivity in national selfhood. Colonialism creates the patriotism of the colonized” (xxviii). These are some of the insights Sartre has gleaned from his reading of Memmi’s work. But what have I learned from it?

Memmi begins the book’s first part, “Portrait of the Colonizer,” in the book’s first chapter, “Does the colonial exist?,” with the mythical image of this creature as “laboring selflessly for mankind, attending the sick, and spreading culture to the nonliterate,” a pose of “a noble adventurer” or “a righteous pioneer” (3). That image is belied by the economic motives of colonization, he continues: “The cultural and moral mission of a colonizer, even in the beginning, is no longer tenable” (3). Why do Europeans move to colonies? The reason, Memmi suggests, is simple: the colony is “a place where one earns more and spends less” (4). “You go to a colony because jobs are guaranteed, wages high, careers more rapid and business more profitable,” he suggests (4). Yet, despite finding life in the colony profitable, Memmi continues, “the colonizer has nevertheless not yet become aware of the historic role which will be his. He is lacking one step in understanding his new status; he must also understand the origin and significance of this profit” (7). That understanding is not long in coming: “For how long could he fail to see the misery of the colonized and the relation of that misery to his own comfort? He realizes that this easy profit is so great only because it is wrested from others. In short, he finds two things in one: he discovers the existence of the colonizer as he discovers his own privilege” (7). Thus the European living in the colony 

finds himself on one side of a scale, the other side of which bears the colonized man. If his living standards are high, it is because those of the colonized are low; if he can benefit from plentiful and undemanding labor and servants, it is because the colonized can be exploited at will and are not protected by the laws of the colony; if he can easily obtain administrative positions, it is because they are reserved for him and the colonized are excluded from them; the more freely he breathes, the more the colonized are choked. (8)

It is impossible, Memmi continues, for the colonial “not to be aware of the constant illegitimacy of his status,” a “double illegitimacy,” since by coming to the colony, “he has succeeded not merely in creating a place for himself but also in taking away that of the inhabitant, granting himself astounding privileges to the detriment of those rightfully entitled to them” (9). The colonized, of course, recognize this fact, but Memmi argues that the colonizer does as well: “he knows, in his own eyes as well as those of his victim, that he is a usurper. He must adjust to both being regarded as such, and to this situation” (9).

Memmi now sets out “a convenient terminology” which distinguishes between “a colonial, a colonizer and the colonialist” (10). A colonial, he suggests, “is a European living in a colony but having no privileges, whose living conditions are not higher than those of a colonized person of equivalent economic and social status” (10). However, such a creature “does not exist, for all Europeans in the colonies are privileged” (10). Such privilege is relative, he continues: “To different degrees every colonizer is privileged, at least comparatively so, ultimately to the detriment of the colonized” (11). All Europeans in the colony are thus colonizers or colonialists. The courts will be more lenient on the colonizer than the colonized; it will be easier for the colonizer to get help from the government; jobs will be more available. “Can he be so blind or so blinded that he can never see that, given equal material circumstances, economic class or capabilities, he always receives preferential treatment?” Memmi asks. “How could he help looking back from time to time to see all the colonized, sometimes former schoolmates or colleagues, whom he has so greatly outpaced?” (12). The colonizer “need only show his face to be prejudged favorably by those in the colony who count” (12). 

Other groups in the colony—“those who are neither colonizers nor colonized,” such as (in Tunisia) Jews, Maltese, Corsicans, Italians—are “candidates for assimilation” or “the recently assimilated,” will receive “small crumbs” of privilege which “contribute toward differentiating them—substantially separating them from the colonized” (13). “To whatever extent favored as compared to the colonized masses, they tend to establish relationships of the colonizer-colonized nature,” Memmi argues. “At the same time, not corresponding to the colonizing group, not having the same role as theirs in colonial society, they each stand out in their own way” (13-14). The Jews in Tunisia, for instance, despite “their enthusiastic adoption of Western language, culture and customs,” are not permitted to develop a resemblance to the colonizer “in the frank hope that he may cease to consider them different from him” (15). “Thus they live in painful and constant ambiguity,” Memmi writes. “Rejected by the colonizer, they share in part the physical conditions of the colonized and have a communion of interests with him; on the other hand, they reject the values of the colonized as belonging to a decayed world from which they eventually hope to escape” (15-16). Memmi might be describing the situation of newcomers to Canada—particularly people of colour—with these words.

Memmi concludes this first chapter on the colonizer with a series of “fundamental questions”:

Once he has discovered the import of colonization and is conscious of his own position (that of the colonized and their necessary relationship), is he going to accept them? Will he agree to be a privileged man, and to underscore the distress of the colonized? Will he be a usurper and affirm the oppression and injustice to the true inhabitant of the colony? Will he accept being a colonizer under the growing habit of privilege and illegitimacy, under the constant gaze of the usurped? Will he adjust to this position and his inevitable self-censure? (18)

The next chapter, “The colonizer who refuses,” addresses the possibility that colonizers will not accept colonization (19). If a new arrival to the colony vows not to accept colonization, Memmi argues, that vow, that sense of indignation, “is not always accompanied by desire for a policy of action. It is rather a position of principle. He may openly protest, or sign a petition, or join a group which is not automatically hostile toward the colonized. This already suffices for him to recognize that he has changed difficulties and discomfort” (20). 

Why are the refusing colonizer’s actions merely symbolic? Memmi has the answer: “It is not easy to escape mentally from a concrete situation, to refuse its ideology while continuing to live with its actual relationships. From now on, he lives his life under the sign of a contradiction which looms at every step, depriving him of all coherence and all tranquility” (20). What this colonizer renounces “is part of himself, and what he slowly becomes as soon as he accepts a life in a colony. He participates in and benefits from those privileges which he half-heartedly denounces” (20). If this colonizer continues to object to colonialism, “he will learn that he is launching into an undeclared conflict with his own people which will always remain alive, unless he returns to the colonialist fold or is defeated” (21). His fellow colonizers will see this person as “nothing but a traitor. He challenges their very existence and endangers the very homeland which they represent in the colony” (21). The colonizer who refuses must either submit to the demands of “the colonial community” or leave, Memmi suggests (22), although he notes that there is one other option: to “adopt the colonized people and be adopted by them,” to “become a turncoat” (22). But this is a problem: “To refuse colonization is one thing; to adopt the colonized and be adopted by them seems to be another; and the two are far from being connected,” Memmi writes (22-23). “To succeed in this second conversion, our man would have to be a moral hero,” he continues (23). The impossibility of this conversion seems to block Memmi. “But let us drop this,” he writes, noting that one can be, “while awaiting the revolution, both a revolutionary and an exploiter”: 

He discovers that if the colonized have justice on their side, if he can go so far as to give them his approval and even his assistance, his solidarity stops here; he is not one of them and has no desire to be one. He vaguely foresees the day of their liberation and the reconquest of their rights, but does not seriously plan to share their existence, even if they are freed. (23)

Racism is part of the reason for the impossibility of doing more than this, which does not surprise Memmi at all: “Who can completely rid himself of bigotry in a country where everyone is tainted by it, including its victims?” (23). But in fact the refusing colonizer simply realizes that, while “the colonized have suddenly become living and suffering humanity” and “the colonizer refuses to participate in their suppression and decides to come to their assistance,” at the same time “he has another civilization before him, customs differing from his own, men whose reactions often surprise him, with whom he does not feel deep affinity” (24). And, one might add, there’s no guarantee that the colonized want to accept this person into their community. There may be no way to cross the cultural, social, and linguistic barriers between them.

“I am quite willing to admit that excessive romanticizing of the difference”—that is, the differences between European colonizers and North African colonized—“must be avoided,” Memmi writes. “It may be thought that the benevolent colonizer’s difficulties in adapting are not very important. The essential factor is firmness of ideological attitude and condemnation of colonization” (27). If the “benevolent colonizer has succeeded in laying aside both the problem of his own privileges and that of his emotional difficulties,” Memmi continues, “[o]nly his ideological and political attitudes remain to be considered” (27). That will involve tackling the question of nationalism—difficult for socialists, with their “internationalist bent” (28). “For a number of historical, sociological and psychological reasons, the struggle for liberation by colonized peoples has taken on a marked national and nationalistic look,” Memmi points out, which is a problem for “the European left,” which “suffers from very intense doubts and real uneasiness in the face of the nationalistic form of those attempts at liberation” (29). This doubt and uneasiness “is distinctly aggravated in a left-wing colonizer, i.e., a leftist living in a colony and living his daily life within that nationalism” (30). Such a person will be uncomfortable with terrorism and political assassination, which are tools in the struggle of the colonized for freedom (30). The refusing colonizer will also worry about what will happen after liberation, whether “the liberated nation” will aspire “to be religious,” or to show “no concern for individual freedom” (32). “Again there is no way out except to assume a hidden, bolder, and nobler motive,” Memmi writes: to believe that “all the lucid and responsible fighters are anything but theocrats; they really love and venerate freedom” (32). Yet, “proclamations in the name of God” and “the Holy War concept” will throw “the leftist off balance” and, “fearing that he might be wrong again, he will retreat; he will speculate on a more distant future,” in which “the colonized will rid themselves of xenophobia and racist temptation” (33-34). So, while “every true leftist must support the national aspirations of people,” it may be that, “in fact, he is perhaps aiding the birth of a social order in which there is no room for a leftist as such”” no room for “political democracy and freedom, economic democracy and justice, rejection of racist xenophobia and universality, material and spiritual progress,” in other words (34). “These very difficulties, this hesitation which curiously resembles remorse, excludes him all the more,” Memmi continues. “They leave him suspect not only in the eyes of the colonized, but also in those of the left wing at home; it is from this that he suffers most” (35). 

All of these anxieties stand in the way of the rejecting colonizer’s adoption by the colonized. But Memmi also points out that, “[t]o succeed in becoming a turncoat, as he has finally resolved to do, it is not enough to accept the position of the colonized, it is necessary to be loved by them” (37). This second point is just as difficult as the first: 

In order truly to become a part of the colonial struggle, even all his good will is not sufficient; there must still be the possibility of adoption by the colonized. However, he suspects that he will have no place in the future nation. This will be the last discovery, the most staggering one for the left-wing colonizer, the one which he often makes on the eve of the liberation, though it was really predictable from the very beginning. (38)

After all, “the colonial situation is based on the relationship between one group of people and another,” with the “leftist colonizer” remaining “part of the oppressing group” and “forced to share its destiny, as he shared its good fortune” (38). “If his own kind, the colonizers, should one day be chased out of the colony, the colonized would probably not make any exception for him,” Memmi notes. “If he could continue to live in the midst of the colonized, as a tolerated foreigner, he would tolerate together with the former colonizers the rancor of a people once bullied by them” (38). “To tell the truth,” Memmi continues,

the style of a colonization does not depend upon one or a few generous or clear-thinking individuals. Colonial relations do not stem from individual good will or actions; they exist before his arrival or his birth, and whether he accepts or rejects them matters little. It is they, on the contrary which, like any institution, determine a priori his place and that of the colonized and, in the final analysis, their true relationship. . . . Being oppressed as a group, the colonized must necessarily adopt a national and ethnic form of liberation from which he cannot but be excluded. (38-39)

There appears to be no way for the refusing colonizer to remain in the colony after its liberation. “Through a de facto contradiction which he either does not see in himself or refuses to see, he hopes to continue being a European by divine right in a country which would no longer be Europe’s chattel; but this time by the divine right of love and renewed confidence,” Memmi writes (40). But, with the end of colonization will come “the overthrow of his situation and himself” (40). 

“One now understands a dangerously deceptive trait of the leftist colonizer, his political ineffectiveness,” Memmi writes:

It results from the nature of his position in the colony. His demands, compared to those of the colonized, or even of a right-wing colonizer, are not solid. Besides, has one ever seen a serious political demand—one which is not a delusion or fantasy—which does not rest upon concrete solid supports, whether it be the masses or power, money or force? (41)

The colonizers know what they want, as do the colonized, but the colonist who refuses is part of neither group. “Politically, who is he? Is he not an expression of himself, of a negligible force in the varied conflicts within colonialism?” Memmi asks (41). “The difference between his commitment and that of the colonized will have unforeseen and insurmountable consequences,” Memmi answers:

Despite his attempts to take part in the politics of the colony, he will be constantly out of step in his language and in his actions. He might hesitate or reject a demand of the colonized, the significance of which he will not immediately grasp. This lack of perception will seem to confirm his indifference. Wanting to vie with the less realistic nationalists, he might indulge in an extreme type of demagogy which will increase the distrust of the colonized. When explaining the acts of the colonizer, he will offer obscure or Machiavellian rationalizations where the simple mechanics of colonization are self-explanatory. Or, to the irritated astonishment of the colonized, he will loudly excuse what the latter condemn in himself. Thus, while refusing the sinister, the benevolent colonizer can never attain the good, for his only choice is not between good and evil, but between evil and uneasiness. (42-43).

The colonizer who refuses is bound to fail, Memmi states: “everything confirms his solitude, bewilderment and ineffectiveness. He will slowly realize that the only thing to do is to remain silent” (43). “If he cannot stand this silence and make his life a perpetual compromise, he can end up by leaving the colony and its privileges,” Memmi concludes (43). Memmi’s argument is like looking into a disturbing mirror, one that reveals the impossibility of rejecting settler colonialism while remaining, by birth and citizenship, a descendant of settlers. And yet, so many Canadians are in the same place: they reject our country’s continuing colonialism, but see no effective ways to put that rejection into practice. We end up engaging in symbolic acts; these might be valuable, but they aren’t tangibly contributing to the goal of decolonization, which Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang describe as “the repatriation of land” to Indigenous peoples (7). That’s perhaps because we don’t know how to effect such a repatriation, what it would look like, or what it might cost.

The next chapter, “The colonizer who accepts,” begins by acknowledging that “it is more convenient to accept colonization and to travel the whole length of the road leading from colonial to colonialist” (45). A colonialist, in Memmi’s definition, is “only a colonizer who agrees to be a colonizer. By making his position explicit, he seeks to legitimize colonization” (45). “This is a more logical attitude, materially more coherent than the tormented dance of the colonizer who refuses and continues to live in a colony,” Memmi writes. “The colonizer who accepts his role tries in vain to adjust his life to his ideology. The colonizer who refuses, tries in vain to adjust his ideology to his life, thereby unifying and justifying his conduct. On the whole, to be a colonialist is the natural vocation of a colonizer” (45). Because the most talented colonizers will tend to leave the colony for the metropole, either to pursue opportunities or for ethical reasons, only the mediocre remain (48). “It is the mediocre citizens who set the general tone of the colony,” Memmi contends, suggesting that “it is the mediocre who are most in need of compensation and of colonial life” (48). “It is between them and the colonized that the most typical colonial relationships are created,” he continues:

Accepting his role as colonizer, the colonialist accepts the blame implied by that role. This decision in no way brings him permanent peace of mind. On the contrary, the effort he will make to overcome the confusion of his role will give us one of the keys to understanding his ambiguous position. Human relationship in the colony would perhaps have been better if the colonialist had been convinced of his legitimacy. In effect, the problem before the colonizer who accepts is the same as that before the one who refuses. Only their solutions are different; the colonizer who accepts inevitably becomes a colonialist. (51-52)

The related features that spring from this acceptance form what Memmi calls “The Usurper’s Role (or, the Nero complex)” (52). In this role (or complex), the colonialist, 

at the very time of his triumph . . . admits that what triumphs in him is an image which he condemns. His true victory will therefore never be upon him: now he need only record it in the laws and morals. For this he would have to convince the others, if not himself. In other words, to possess victory completely he needs to absolve himself of it and the conditions under which it was attained. This explains his strenuous insistence, strange for a victor, on apparently futile matters. He endeavors to falsify history, he rewrites laws, he would extinguish memories—anything to succeed in transforming his usurpation into legitimacy. (52)

This bad conscience expresses itself in other ways: “the more the usurped is downtrodden, the more the usurper triumphs and, thereafter, confirms his guilt and establishes his self-condemnation. Thus, the momentum of this mechanism for defence propels itself and worsens as it continues to move” (53). The colonialist will even “wish the disappearance of the usurped,” as Patrick Wolfe (among others) has noted (53). As the colonialist engages in heavier oppression, he become an oppressor. “Nero, the typical model of a usurper, is thus brought to persecute Britannicus savagely and to pursue him,” Memmi states. “But the more he hurts him, the more he coincides with the atrocious role he has chosen for himself. The more he sinks into injustice, the more he hates Britannicus. He seeks to injure the victim who turns Nero into a tyrant” (53).  Memmi’s argument here suggests something I’ve often wondered about: whether one explanation for settler colonial racism might not be a hidden awareness that our possession of the land and resources is illegitimate.

Unlike Wolfe, though, Memmi argues that even if the colonialist wants to murder the colonized, doing so is impossible, because it would mean “eliminating himself” (54):

The colonialist’s existence is so closely aligned with that of the colonized that he will never be able to overcome the argument which states that misfortune is good for something. With all his power he must disown the colonized while their existence is indespensable to his own. Having chosen to maintain the colonial system, he must contribute more vigor to its defense than would have been needed to dissolve it completely. Having become aware of the unjust relationship which ties him to the colonized, he must continually attempt to absolve himself. He never forgets to make a public show of his own virtues, and will argue with vehemence to appear heroic and great. At the same time his privileges arise just as much from his glory as from degrading the colonized. He will persist in degrading them, using the darkest colors to depict them. If need be, he will act to devalue them, annihilate them. But he can never escape from this circle. The distance which colonization places between him and the colonized must be accounted for and, to justify himself, he increases this distance still further by placing the two figures irretrievably in opposition: his glorious position and the despicable one of the colonized. (54-55)

The colonialist, despite possessing personal virtues, “will surely be transformed into a conservative, reactionary, or even a colonial fascist” (55). And yet, “[n]othing and no one can give him the high praise he so avidly seeks as compensation: neither the outsider, indifferent at best, but not a dupe or accessory; nor his native land where he is always suspected and often attacked; not his own daily acts which would ignore the silent revolt of the colonized” (57). In fact, the colonialist “scarcely believes in his own innocence. Deep within himself, the colonialist pleads guilty” (57).

The colonialist will end up over-evaluating the importance of the mother country, while simultaneously devoting “himself to a systematic devaluation of the colonized,” even while realizing that without the colonized, the colony would lost its meaning (66). The colonialist rejects both the colony and the colonized, refusing to remedy its deficiencies, because “the colonialist never planned to transform the colony into the image of his homeland, nor to remake the colonized in his own image! He cannot allow such an equation—it would destroy the principle of his privileges” (69). That equality is impossible “because of the nature of the colonized,” and so “the colonialist resorts to racism. It is significant that racism is part of colonialism throughout the world; and it is no coincidence. Racism sums up and symbolizes the fundamental relation which unites colonialist and colonized” (69-70). According to Memmi, 

colonial racism is so spontaneously incorporated in even the most trivial acts and words, that it seems to constitute one of the fundamental patterns of colonialist personality. The frequency of its occurrence, its intensity in colonial relationships, would be astounding if we did not know to what extent it helps the colonialist to live and permits his social introduction. The colonialists are perpetually explaining, justifyng and maintaining (by word as well as by deed) the place and fate of their silent partners in the colonial drama. The colonized are thus trapped by the colonial system and the colonialist maintains his prominent role. (70-71)

Memmi argues that colonial racism has three main ideological components: “one, the gulf between the culture of the colonialist and the colonized; two, the exploitation of these differences for the benefit of the colonialist; three, the use of these supposed differences as standards ob absolute fact” (71). The first point “is the least revealing of the colonialist’s mental attitude”: the colonialist “stresses those things which keep him separate, rather than emphasizing that which might contribute to the foundation of a joint community. In those differences, the colonized is always degraded and the colonialist finds justification for rejecting his subjects” (71). But the differences between colonizer and colonized are removed “from history, time, and therefore possible evolution” by the colonialist (71). Those differences become “biological, or, preferably, metaphysical” (71). Even conversion to the colonizer’s religion would not be able to erase those differences, which is, Memmi suggests, “one of the reasons why colonial missions failed” (73). Racism is therefore “not . . . an incidental detail, but . . . a consubstantial part of colonialism. It is the highest expression of the colonial systema nd one of the most significant features of the colonialist” (74). 

“But there is one final act of distortion,” Memmi writes. “The servitude of the colonized seemed scandalous to the colonizer and forced him to explain it away under the pain of ending the scandal and threatening his own existence. Thanks for a double reconstruction of the colonized and himself, he is able both to justify and reassure himself” (75). The colonizer thus sees himself as a “[c]ustodian of the values of civilization and history,” one who brings “light to the colonized’s ignominious darkness” (75). And, “since servitude is part of the nature of the colonized, and domination part of his own,” colonization will never end: it is eternal, and the colonialist “can look to his future without worries of any kind” (75). “After this, everything would be possible and would take on a new meaning,” Memmi suggests:

The colonialist could afford to relax, live benevolently and even munificently. the colonized could only be grateful to him for softening what is coming to him. It is here that the astonishing mental attitude called ‘paternalistic’ comes into play. A paternalist is one who wants to stretch racism and inequality farther—once admitted. It is, if you like, a charitable racism—which is not thereby less skillful nor less profitable. (76)

“Having founded this new moral order where he is by definition master and innocent, the colonialist would at last have given himself absolution,” Memmi concludes. “It is still essential that this order not be questioned by others, and especially not by the colonized” (76). That last statement suggests something about the psychological fragility of the colonizer’s innocence; it will not survive scrutiny or questioning. 

Memmi now moves to the book’s second part, “Portrait of the Colonized,” with a chapter entitled “Mythical portrait of the colonized.” One element in that portrait is “the often-cited trait of laziness” (79). “Nothing could better justify the colonizer’s privileged position than his industry, and nothing could better justify the colonized’s destitution than his indolence,” Memmi writes (79). “By his accusation the colonizer establishes the colonized as being lazy,” Memmi continues. “He decides that laziness is constitutional in the very nature of the colonized. It becomes obvious that the colonized, whatever he may undertake, whatever zeal he may apply, could never be anything but lazy. This always brings us back to racism, which is the substantive expression, to the accuser’s benefit, of a real or imaginary trait of the accused” (81). The same analysis could be made of each of the features found in the colonized (81). So the colonized is weak, wicked and backward, inept, poor, ungrateful—all traits that justify the colonizer’s behaviour (81-82). “It is significant that this portrait requires nothing else,” Memmi notes. “It is difficult, for instance, to reconcile most of these features and then to proceed to synthesize them objectively. One can hardly see how the colonized can be simultaneously inferior and wicked, lazy and backward” (82-83). The lack of consistency in this portrait applies to the colonizer’s self-portrait as well (83). “The point is that the colonized means little to the colonizer,” Memmi writes:

Far from wanting to understand him as he really is, the colonizer is preoccupied with making him undergo this urgent change. The mechanism of this remolding of the colonized is revealing in itself. It consists, in the first place, of a series of negations. The colonized is not this, is not that. He is never considered in a positive light; or if he is, the quality which is conceded is the result of a psychological or ethical failing. (83-84)

So the fabled Arab hospitality is seen as “a result of the colonized’s irresponsibility and extravagance, since he has no notion of foresight and economy” (84). “Another sign of the colonized’s depersonalization is what one might call the mark of the plural,” Memmi continues. “The colonized is never characterized in an individual manner; he is entitled only to drown in an anonymous collectivity,” as in the phrase, “They are all the same” (85). “Finally, the colonizer denies the colonized the most precious right granted to most men: liberty,” Memmi states. “Living conditions imposed on the colonized by colonization make no provision for it; indeed, they ignore it. . . . The colonized is not free to choose between beign colonized or not being colonized” (85-86). At the end of “this stubborn effort” to dehumanize the colonized, little is left: “He is surely no longer an alter ego of the colonizer. He is hardly a human being. He tends rapidly toward becoming an object” (86). 

Memmi suggests that it is surprising that this image excites “an echo . . . in the colonized himself”:

Constantly confronted with this image of himself, set forth and imposed on all institutions and in every human contact, how could the colonized help reacting to his portrait? It cannot leave him indifferent and remain a veneer which, like an insult, blows with the wind. He ends up recognizing it as one would a detested nickname which has become a familiar description. The accusation disturbs him and worries him even more because he admires and fears his powerful accuser. . . . Willfully created and spread by the colonizer, this mythical and degrading portrait ends up by being accepted and lived with to a certain extent by the colonized. It thus acquires a certain amount of reality and contributes to the true portrait of the colonized. (87-88)

The “adherence of the colonized to colonization,” then, “is the result of colonization and not its cause. It arises after and not before colonial occupation” (88). “In order for the colonizer to be the complete master, it is not enough for him to be so in actual fact, but he must also believe in its legitimacy,” Memmi concludes, and in order “for that legitimacy to be complete, it is not enough for the colonized to be a slave, he must also accept this role” (88-89).” The bond between colonizer and colonized is thus destructive and creative,” Memmi continues. “It destroys and re-creates the two partners of colonization into colonizer and colonized. One is disfigured into an oppressor,” and the other, “into an oppressed creature, whose development is broken and who compromises by his defeat” (89). “Just as the colonizer is tempted to accept his part,” in other words, “the colonized is forced to accept being colonized” (89).

In the following chapter, “Situations of the colonized,” Memmi argues that this mythical portrait “becomes what can be called a social institution. In other words, it defines and establishes concrete situations which close in on the colonized, weigh on him until they bend his conduct and leave their marks on his face” (90). These situations, he continues, “are situations of inadequacy. The ideological aggression which tends to dehumanize and then deceive the colonized finally corresponds to concrete situations which lead to the same result” (91). Moreover, that mythical portrait is “supported by a very solid organization: a government and a judicial system fed and renewed by the colonizer’s historic, economic and cultural needs” (91). “Even if he were insensitive to the calumny and scorn, even if he shrugged his shoulders at insults and jostling, how could the colonized escape the low wages, the agony of his culture, the law which rules him from birth until death?” Memmi asks (91). It is impossible for the colonized to “avoid those situations which create real inadequacy” (91).

“The most serious blow suffered by the colonized is being removed from history and from the community,” Memmi argues. “Colonization usurps any free role in either war nor peace, every decision contributing to his destiny and that of the world, and all cultural and social responsibility” (91). The colonized carries the burden of history, but he is not its subject, merely an object (92). Because the colonized does not govern, “he ends up by losing both interest and feeling for control. How could he be interested in something from which he is so resolutely excluded?” (95). In addition, “[t]he colonized enjoys none of the attributes of citizenship; neither his own, which is dependent, contested and smothered, nor that of the colonizer. He can hardly adhere to one or claim the other” (96). According to Memmi, “[t]his social and historical mutilation gives rise to the most serious consequences. It contributes to bringing out the deficiencies in the other aspects of the colonized’s life and, by a countereffect which is frequent in human processes, it is itself fed by the colonized’s other infirmities” (96-97). The society either revolts, or it calcifies (98). “Colonized society is a diseased society in which internal dynamics no longer succeed in creating new structures,” Memmi writes. “Its century-hardened face has become nothing more than a mask under which it slowly smothers and dies (98-99). The colonized’s “institutions are dead or petrified,” and the colonized “often becomes ashamed of these institutions, as of a ridiculous and overaged monument” (103). The “few material traces” of the colonized’s past are erased, and replaced with those celebrating the colonizer (104). 

Memmi discusses the place of language—in his argument, Arabic—in the colony. “If only the mother tongue was allowed some influence on current social life, or was used across the counters of government offices, or directed the postal service; but this is not the case,” he notes. “The entire bureaucracy, the entire court system, all industry hears and uses the colonizer’s language” (106). This argument reminds me of something my friend Art told me once: Indigenous languages need official recognition if they are to survive. Without such recognition, “bilingualism is necessary,” although such bilingualism symbolizes, to Memmi, two worlds in conflict (107). Colonized writers need to be able to use European languages in order to be published, and it is only in those language that such writers can advocate for their own languages (110). 

Memmi then turns to the question of what might have happened to the colonized without the experience of colonization, and the reason colonization happened in the first place. Such questions, he states, are not important: 

What does count is the present reality of colonization and the colonized. We have no idea what the colonized would have been without colonization, but we certainly see what has happened as a result of it. To subdue and exploit, the colonizer pushed the colonized out of the historical and social, cultural and technical current. What is real and verifiable is that the colonized’s culture, society and technology are seriously damaged. He has not acquired new ability and a new culture. One patent result of colonization is that there are no more colonized artists and not yet any colonized technicians. (114)

Memmi’s claim about technicians might be true in Canada, although I’m not sure that it is, but his claim about artists is definitely not. Of course, he wasn’t writing about Canada, but I need to be cautious about borrowing too freely from his analysis. In any case, he continues, “colonization weakens the colonized and . . . all those weaknesses contribute to one another” (115). For instance, the country’s lack of industrialization leads to “a slow economic collapsed of the colonized” (115). Meanwhile, the colonizer “enriches himself further by selling raw materials rather than competing with industry in the home country” (116). There are few educational opportunities for the colonized as well, and even if universities and apprenticeships existed, their graduates would find it difficult to apply their training (116). “Everything in the colonized is deficient, and everything contributes to this deficiency—even his body, which is poorly fed, puny and sick,” Memmi writes. “Many lengthy discussions would be saved if, in the beginning, it was agreed that there is this wretchedness—collective, permanent, immense. Simple and plain biological wretchedness, chronic hunger of an entire people, malnutrition and illness” (117). Memmi concludes the chapter by asking how a social system which perpetuates such distress endure: “How can one dare compare the advantages and disadvantages of colonization? What advantages, even if a thousand times more important, could make such internal and external catastrophes acceptable?” (118).

The next chapter, “The two answers of the colonized,” begins with the recognition that “[t]he body and face of the colonized are not a pretty sight,” because they display the damaged caused by “such historical misfortune” (119). “The colonized does not exist in accordance with the colonial myth, but he is nevertheless recongizable,” Memmi writes. “Being a creature of oppression, he is bound to be a creature of want” (119). There are two “historically possible solutions” to this situation which may be tried: the first is to assimilate, “to become equal to that splendid model and to resemble him to the point of disappearing in him,” a step through which the colonized “rejects himself with the most tenacity” (120-21). “That is to say that he rejects, in another way, the colonial situation,” Memmi writes. “Rejection of self and love of another are common to all candidates for assimilation. Moreover, the two components of this attempt at liberation are closely tied. Love of the colonizer is subtended by a complex of feelings ranging from shame to self-hate” (121). However, “[t]he candidate for assimilation almost always comes to tire of the exorbitant price which he must pay and which he never finishes owing” (123). Moreover, the colonizer never accepts the colonized who tries to assimilate (124). Assimilation, in other words, is impossible (125). “To say that the colonizer could or should accept assimilation and, hence, the colonized’s emancipation, means to topple the colonial relationship,” Memmi argues (126). 

If assimilation and colonization are contradictory (127), what option is left? Revolt (127). “Far from being surprised at the revolts of colonized peoples, we should be, on the contrary, surprised that they are not more frequent and more violent,” Memmi writes (127). The colonizer guards against revolts in many ways, including using corruption and police oppression to abort “all popular movements” and cause “their brutal and rapid destruction,” but the colonized as well, by admiring their conquerors, “hope that the almighty power of the colonizer might bear the fruit of infinite goodness” (127). “The colonial situation, by its own internal inevitability, brings on revolt,” Memmi continues. “For the colonial condition cannot be adjusted to; like an iron collar, it can only be broken” (128). Once assimilation is abandoned, 

the colonized’s liberation must be carried out through a recovery of self and of autonomous dignity. Attempts at imitating the colonizer required self-denial; the colonizer’s rejection is the indispensable prelude to self-discovery. That accusing and annihilating image must be shaken off; oppression must be attacked boldly since it is impossible to go around it. After having been rejected for so long by the colonizer, the day has come when it is the colonized who must refuse the colonizer. (128)

Considered by the colonizer as a homogenous mass, the colonized responds “by rejecting all the colonizers en bloc. The distinction between deed and intent has no great significance in the colonial situation. In the eyes of the colonized, all Europeans in the colonies are de facto colonizers, and whether they want to be or not, they are colonizers in some ways” (130). Their economic and political privileges, for instance, or their participation “in an effectively negative complex toward the colonized,” make them colonizers (130). “If xenophobia and racism consist of accusing an entire human group as a whole, condemning each individual of that group, seeing in him an irremediably noxious nature,” Memmi continues, “then the colonized has, indeed, become a xenophobe and a racist” (130). And yet, he writes, it must be acknowledged that “the colonized’s racism is the result of a more general delusion: the colonialist delusion” (131). In other words, the colonized becomes to accept the colonialist’s racist, Manichean division of the colony and, indeed, the whole world (131). “Being definitely excluded from half the world, why should he not suspect it of confirming his condemnation?” Memmi asks. “Why should he not judge it and condemn it in its turn?” (131). Such a response, Memmi suggests, is “not aggressive but defensive racism” (131). 

The colonized has been excluded from universal human values, and “[t]he same passion which made him admire and absorb Europe shall make him assert his differences; since those differences, after all, are within him and correctly constitute his true self” (132). The young intellectual, Memmi writes, rediscovers a previously rejected religious faith: “Assigning attention to the old myths, giving them virility, he regenerates them dangerously. They find in this an unexpected power which makes them extend beyond the limited intentions of the colonized’s leaders” (133). The colonized’s language is also revitalized (134). “This must be done no matter what the price paid by the colonized,” Memmi writes. “Thus he will be nationalistic but not, of course, internationalistic. Naturally, by so doing, he runs the risk of falling into exclusionism and chauvinism, of sticking to the most narrow principles, and of setting national solidarity against human solidarity—and even ethnic solidarity against national solidarity” (135). But, he continues, “to expect the colonized to open his mind to the world and be a humanist and internationalist would seem to be ludicrous thoughtlessness. He is still regaining possession of himself, still examining himself with astonishment passionately demanding the return of his language” (135).

Even though the colonized people reject the colonizer’s myths, they still admit that they correspond, to some extent, to that picture of themselves. “He is starting a new life but continues to subscribe to the colonizers’ deception,” Memmi notes, because “his situation is shaped by colonization. It is obvious that he is reclaiming a people that is suffering deficiencies in its body and spirit, in its very responses” (137):

He is restored to a not very glorious history pierced through with frightful holes, to a moribund culture which he had planned to abandon, to frozen traditions, to a rusted tongue. The heritage which he eventually accepts bears the burden of a liability which would discourage anyone. He must endorse notes and debts, the debts being many and large. It is also a fact that the institutions of the colony do not operate directly for him. The education system is directed to him only haphazardly. The roads are open to him only because they are pure offerings. (137)

But to go through with the revolt, the colonized must “accept those inhibitions and amputations” (137). “[T]he rebellious colonized begins by accepting himself as something negative,” Memmi writes, and this “negative element has become an essential part of his revival and struggle, and will be proclaimed and glorified to the hilt” (138). “Suddenly, exactly to the reverse of the colonialist accusation, the colonized, his culture, his country, everything that belongs to him, everything he represents, become perfectly positive elements,” Memmi continues, a “countermythology” born from protest (138-39). “In order to witness the colonized’s complete cure”—the colonized’s emergence from this countermythology into an authentic sense of self—“his alienation must completely cease. We must await the complete disappearance of colonization—including the period of revolt” (141).

In his conclusion, Memmi suggests that “the colonizer is a disease of the European, from which he must be completely cured and protected. There is also a drama of the colonizer which would be absurd and unjust to underestimate”: a “difficult and painful treatment, extraction and reshaping of the present conditions of existence” (147). “Colonization disfigures the colonizer,” Memmi contends (147). The colonizer who rejects colonization’s role “is unlivable” and “cannot long be sustained” (148). The colonial situation itself must disappear (148). The two propositions made by colonization—the extermination of the colonized or their assimilation—will also have to disappear (148). “Extermination saves colonization so little that it actually contradicts the colonial process,” Memmi contends, confusingly offering the genocide in the American west as an example (149). He also argues that assimilation is “the opposite of colonization,” because it “tends to eliminate the distinctions between the colonizers and the colonized,a nd thereby eliminates the colonial relationship” (149-50). If the colonizer “refuses to abandon his profitable sicknesses, he will sooner or later be forced to do so by history,” since “one day he will be forced by the colonized to give in” (150). Revolt—successful revolt—is inevitable: “The refusal of the colonized cannot be anything but absolute, that is, not only revolt, but a revolution” (150). That’s because “colonization materially kills the colonized,” and “it kills him spiritually. Colonization distorts relationships, destroys or petrifies institutions, and corrupts men, both colonizers and colonized. To live, the colonized needs to do away with colonization” (151). And then, once “he ceases to be a colonized—he will become something else” (153). “Having reconquered all his dimensions, the former colonized will have become a man like any other,” Memmi concludes. “There will be the ups and downs of all men to be sure, but at least he will be a whole and free man” (153).

I can’t tell whether Memmi’s depiction of the colonized is accurate; it appears to be, but I don’t have enough knowledge to know for sure. I do think his representation of the colonizer is right on the money, however. His argument is so powerful that it is hard to find points where I disagree. I would have to say that his claims that extermination undercuts the colonial relationship is belied by the experience of Indigenous people in North America, and by settler colonial theorists like Wolfe, who note that elimination of the native is one of the options available for securing the land for settlers. I think he’s wrong about assimilation as well, although I’m less certain of that, since the various methods of forced assimilation in Canada, such as residential schools, did such a terrible job that one wonders if assimilation was really their intention, rather than just cultural and linguistic extinction without assimilation. I’m not sure. Part of the reason for my confusion here is the different ways colonialism has been expressed in Canada and in Memmi’s Tunisia. But Canadians can learn from Memmi’s work, and although it’s not an easy or a happy read, The Colonizer and the Colonized is an important text that I’ll return to in the future.

Work Cited

Memmi, Albert. The Colonizer and the Colonized, expanded edition, Beacon, 1991.

Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. “Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor.” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, vol. 1, no. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40. https://www.latrobe.edu.au/staff-profiles/data/docs/fjcollins.pdf.

Wolfe, Patrick. “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.” Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 8, no. 4, 2006, pp. 387-409. DOI:10.1080/14623520601056240.

95. Eve Tuck and C. Ree, “A Glossary of Haunting”

handbook-of-autoethnography

In my last blog entry, I wondered whether some of the strange justifications Eva Mackey describes settler descendants making about their occupation of Indigenous land—the claim, for instance, that there were no Indigenous people living on the land when settlers  first arrived—might come from “a deeply buried recognition that the claims Settlers make about Crown sovereignty and the rightness of their presence on Indigenous lands are, frankly, specious.” I wondered if there might be any evidence to support that suspicion. That’s the reason I decided to read Eve Tuck’s and C. Ree’s strange, short text (it’s not an essay), “A Glossary of Haunting.” I was hoping it might suggest something about the effect such hidden recognitions might have on settlers. I was disappointed, though; that’s not what Tuck and Ree are thinking about in this text. I might have to return to Gabriele Schwab’s book Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and Transgenerational Trauma to find evidence of those kinds of hidden recognitions, since Schwab talks about the transgenerational effects of the trauma perpetrators experience, if I’m serious about following up my hunch. Or perhaps I might find some discussion of that idea somewhere else. I’m sure I’m not the first person to wonder if it’s a possibility. 

In any case, Tuck and Ree begin by stating that their text presents an alphabetized glossary about justice, but more specifically, “about righting (and sometimes wronging) wrongs; about hauntings, mercy, monsters, generational debt, horror films, and what they might mean for understanding settler colonialism, ceremony, revenge, and decolonization” (640). The authors describe this glossary as “a fractal,” because “it includes the particular and the general, violating the terms of settler colonial knowledge which require the separation of the particular from the general, the hosted from the host, personal from the public, the foot(note) from the head(line), the place from the larger narrative of nation, the people from specific places” (640). “This glossary is a story, not an exhaustive encyclopedia,” “a story that seethes in its subtlety,” they write (640). Strangely, they state, “In telling you all of this in this way, I am resigning myself and you to the idea that parts of my telling are confounding. I care about you understanding, but I care more about concealing parts of myself from you. I don’t trust you very much. You are not always aware of how you can be dangerous to me, and this makes me dangerous to you” (640). It seems, then, that they are writing in the voice of one of the monsters they describe in their text. The adoption of the voice of that monster–of the colonized subject–occurs at other points in this text as well.

Such monsters are similar to the creatures one sees in American or Japanese horror films, although they explain that there are important differences between horror films produced in those two countries. “Mainstream narrative films in the United States, especially in horror, are preoccupied with the hero, who is perfectly innocent, but who is assaulted by monstering or haunting just the same,” they write (640). Audiences “are meant to feel outrage in the face of haunting, we are beckoned to root for the innocent hero, who could be us, because haunting is undeserved, even random,” and “[t]he hero spends the length of the film righting wrongs, slaying the monster, burying the undead, performing the missing rite, all as a way of containment” (641). Japanese horror films are very different; they invoke, instead, “a strategy more akin to wronging, or revenge” (641). “The difference between notions of justice popularized in the US horror films and notions of justice in these examples of horror films from Japan,” they explain,

is that in the former, the hauntings are positioned as undeserved, and the innocent hero must destroy the monster to put the world in balance again. . . . In the latter, because the depth of injustice that begat the monster or ghost is acknowledged, the hero does not think herself to be innocent, or try to achieve reconciliation or healing, only mercy, often in the form of passing on the debt. (641)

Japanese horror films, then, recognize past injustices, while American horror films pretend that those injustices don’t exist.

The particular form of injustice Tuck and Ree are interested in is colonialism. “Colonization is as horrific as humanity gets,” they write, noting that it inevitably involves genocide (642). Because settler colonialism is a structure (following the work of Patrick Wolfe) “and not just the nefarious way nations are born,” it is “an ongoing horror made invisible by its persistence” (642). Settler colonialism, in particular,

is the management of those who have been made killable, once and future ghosts—those that had been destroyed, but also those that are generated in every generation. . . . Settler horror, then, comes about as part of this management, of the anxiety, the looming but never arriving guilt, the impossibility of forgiveness, the inescapability of retribution. (642)

I wonder if the same thing couldn’t be said of other forms of colonialism as well: they all seem to be about what Tuck and Ree call “making-killable,” a way of “making subhuman, of transforming beings into masses that can be produced and destroyed, another form of empire’s mass production” (648). In any case, if settler horror is part of the management of the anxiety produced by the genocidal actions of settlers, haunting, on the other hand, “is the relentless remembering and reminding that will not be appeased by settler society’s assurances of innocence and reconciliation. Haunting is acute and general; individuals are haunted, but so are societies” (642). “The United States is permanently haunted by the slavery, genocide, and violence entwinted in its first, present and future days,” they write (642). “Haunting doesn’t hope to change people’s perceptions, nor does it hope for reconciliation. Haunting lies precisely in its refusal to stop. . . . this refusal to stop is its own form of resolving. For ghosts, the haunting is the resolving, it is not what needs to be resolved” (642). “Haunting is the cost of subjugation,” they continue. “It is the price paid for violence, for genocide” (643).

Tuck and Ree retell the Homeric story of Cyclops, making her into an anti-hero who only wants to be left alone: “Her enormous eye sees through deceptive Odysseus who feigns codes of hospitality to receive the sheep as gifts. She will keep her land and sheep out of reach, a thing of myth. She does things that are monstrous to violate the colonizer and to wage vengeance for future ghosts, none of which is legible to Homer” (644). Cyclops, in this version, “walks the vastness of [Odysseus’s] kingdom, slowly becoming a ghost. . . . Her revenge feeds her, making her opaque, anti-gravity, a black hole. . . . She will strand Odysseus in constant unease, bereft of his cherished and clever reason” (644). “Revenge requires symmetry with the crime,” they argue:

To the (purported) (would-be) hero, revenge is monstrous, heard but not seen, insatiable, blind with desire, the Cyclops robbed of her eye. To the self-designated hero, revenge hails a specter of something best forgotten, a ghost from a criminal past.

To the monster, revenge is oxygen. (644)

In this reading, then, Cyclops stands in for the colonized, for the Indigenous or enslaved peoples whose genocide formed the basis for the existence of the American nation-state, while Odysseus is a paradigmatic figure for the greedy and heedless colonizer, taking what is not his.

What, then, of decolonization, the subject of Tuck’s and K. Wayne Yang’s essay “Decolonization Is Not A Metaphor”? “Decolonization must mean attending to ghosts, and arresting widespread denial of the violence done to them,” Tuck and Ree write (647).  But decolonization isn’t really about social justice (a claim Tuck and Yang make in their essay):

Decolonization is a (dearly) departure from social justice. . . . Listing terrors is not a form of social justice, as if outing (a) provides relief for a presumed victim or (b) repairs a wholeness or (c) ushers in an improved social awareness that leads to (a) and (b). That is not what I am doing here, saying it all so that things will get better. Social justice is a term that gets thrown around like some destination, a resolution, a fixing. “No justice, no peace,” and all of that. But justice and peace don’t exactly cohabitate. The promise of social justice sometimes rings false, smells consumptive, like another manifest destiny. Like you can get there, but only if you climb over me. (647)

There’s little hope here, or elsewhere in the essay, about the possibilities of decolonization. The effects of colonization, instead, are ongoing and irreparable.

Next, Tuck and Ree describe “damage narratives,” adopting the perspective of the colonized to do so. “Damage narratives are the only stories that get told about me, unless I’m the one that’s telling them,” they write. “People have made their careers on telling stories of damage about me, about communities like mine. Damage is the only way that monsters and future ghosts are conjured” (647). Instead of damage, this voice prefers to speak of desire, “a refusal to trade in damage; desire is an antidote, a medicine to damage narratives” (647). Desire is 

a recognition of suffering, the costs of settler colonialism and capitalism and how we still thrive in the face of loss anyway; the parts of us that won’t be destroyed. When I write or speak about desire, I am trying to get out from underneath the ways that my communities and I are always depicted. I insist on telling stories of desire, of complexity, of variegation, of promising myself one thing at night, and doing another in the morning. (647-48)

Desire “is productive, it makes itself, and in making itself, it makes reality” (648). Narratives of desire, then, are better than narratives about the damage done by colonization.

The only way that decolonization can occur, it seems, is through an act of mercy towards the colonizer by the colonized, although the version of mercy that Tuck and Ree provide is complicated:

Mercy is a temporary pause in haunting, requiring a giver and a receiver. The house goes quiet again, but only for a time. Mercy is a gift only ghosts can grant the living, and a gift ghosts cannot be forced, extorted, seduced, or tricked into giving. Even then, the fantasy of relief is deciduous. The gift is an illusion of relief and closure. Haunting can be deferred, delayed, and disseminated, but with some crimes of humanity—the violence of colonization—there is no putting to rest. Decolonization is not an exorcism of ghosts, nor is it charity, parity, balance, or forgiveness. Mercy is not freeing the settler from his crimes, nor is it therapy for the ghosts. Mercy is the power to give (and take). Mercy is a tactic. Mercy is ongoing, temporary, and in constant need of regeneration. Social justice may want to put things to rest, may believe in the repair in reparations, may consider itself an architect or a destination, may believe in utopic building materials which are bound to leak, may even believe in peace. Mercy is not any of that. Mercy is just a reprieve; mercy does not resolve or absolve. Mercy is a sort of power granted over another. Mercy can be merciless. (648-49)

I have to admit that while I recognize the rhetorical move in the last sentences of that quotation, the authors’ desire to express a paradox, I honestly don’t understand how mercy is merciless. Are all forms of power merciless? Is that the suggestion? 

“People who deny the persistence of settler colonialism are like the heroes in American horror films, astonished that the monster would have trouble with them,” Tuck and Ree continue (649). But those monsters have been wronged, they seek justice, and there is no way to permanently defeat them: “monsters can only be deferred, disseminated; the door to their threshold can only be shut on them for so long” (649). This argument returns to their earlier discussions of decolonization and mercy. “Unruly, full of desire, unsettling, around the edges of haunting whispers revenge,” they continue. “The rage of the dead, a broken promise, a violent ruin, the seeds of haunting, an engine for curses. It can and cannot be tolerated. Not like justice. Everyone nods their head to justice. Who can disagree with justice?” (651). Revenge, however, “is necessarily unspeakable to justice. We have better ways to deal with revenge now. But revenge and justice overlap, feed and deplete the other” (651-52). “Revenge is one head of the many-headed creature of justice,” they claim (652). They suggest that we are always told that revenge is wrong, that it is “wronging wrongs, a form of double-wronging” (654). (Two wrongs don’t make a right—that kind of thing.) “At the same time, righting wrongs is so rare,” they continue. “Justice is so fleeting. And there are crimes that are too wrong to right” (654). But “wronging wrongs” is the work of monsters:

Wronging wrongs, so reviled in waking life, seems to be the work of nightmares and hauntings and all the stuff that comes after opportunities to right wrongs and write wrongs have been exhausted. Unreadable and irrational, wronging wrongs is the work of now and future ghosts and monsters, the supply of which is ever-growing. You’ll have to find someone to pull on your ears to bring you out of the nightmares, to call you home and help you remember who you are, and to hope that the ghosts will be willing to let you go. (654)

If I’m understanding this conclusion correctly, only an act of mercy on the part of the wronged monster(s) can end the “nightmares” that settlers experience.

I’ve left a lot out of this summary—all of the descriptions of Ree’s installation artwork, and the strange appendix, “The Haunting of the Form O.” Like many attempts by social scientists to appropriate creative forms in the expression of scholarly arguments, the result here is odd and not entirely effective, I think, but it’s an interesting and potentially useful text. It’s certainly pessimistic about the possibilities of settler decolonization, which is more or less the way I would read “Decolonization Is Not A Metaphor” as well. Tuck and her collaborators don’t hold out many possibilities for settler decolonization, I think. Perhaps that’s correct; perhaps decolonization (as a way to end the haunting this text describes) would have to be an act of mercy on the part of the colonized (and decolonizing) subject. I don’t know. I would like to know more about the haunting this text talks about, though. What form does that haunting take? That question remains unanswered. Perhaps I do need to reread Gabriele Schwab’s book, or do some more research into haunting and colonization, if I’m going to be able to substantiate my hunch, to turn it into something more than just a hunch.

Works Cited

Schwab, Gabriele. Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and Transgenerational Trauma, Columbia University Press, 2010.

Tuck, Eve, and C. Ree. “A Glossary of Haunting.” Handbook of Autoethnography, edited by Stacy Holman Jones, Tony E. Adams, and Carolyn Ellis, Routledge, 2013, pp. 639-58.

Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. “Decolonization Is Not A Metaphor.” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, vol. 1, no. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40.

93. Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, “Decolonization Is Not A Metaphor”

tuck yang

My walking is finished, and even though I ought to be exploring the sights here in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, I’m in the hotel room, working. These texts won’t read themselves, after all, and I’m not going to hit my goal of 100 texts by the end of August. I’ve just been having too much fun walking!

“Decolonization Is Not A Metaphor” is one of the key texts in the study of settler colonialism, and for that reason it’s important that I read it. It begins with two epigraphs from Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth on decolonization, which in Fanon’s case meant the departure of the imperial power (France, since Fanon wrote The Wretched of the Earth in Algeria during that country’s struggle for independence) from a colony and the creation of an independent national government. (The Wretched of the Earth is the next thing I’ll be reading for this project, mostly because one of my supervisors suggested that it would be valuable.) The first epigraph suggests that decolonization is “a program of complete disorder” (qtd. 2), which reflects (I think) the authors’ argument that the goal of decolonization is open-ended and undetermined, and that it is a historical process, which cannot be understood unless we “discern the movements which give it historical form and content” (qtd. 2). The second epigraph, which suggests that “the settler knows perfectly well that no phraseology can be a substitute for reality” (qtd. 2), reflects the authors’ contention that the word “decolonization” needs to be understood literally rather than rhetorically.

Tuck and Yang begin by noting that their area of research is education, and in particular the ways that “settler colonialism has shaped schooling and educational research in the United States and other settler colonial nation-states” (2). That work requires an engagement with the meaning of decoloniation, “what it wants and requires” (2). Tuck and Yang object to “the ease with which the language of decolonization has been superficially adopted into education and other social sciences, supplanting prior ways of talking about social justice, critical methodologies, or approaches which decenter settler perspectives” (2). Decolonization must not be subsumed by those projects, they argue, noting that decolonization is often discussed without mentioning Indigenous peoples or their struggles for sovereignty or “the contributions of Indigenous intellectuals and activists to theories and frameworks of decolonization” (3). “[T]his kind of inclusion is a form of enclosure, dangerous in how it domesticates decolonization,” they write. “It is also a foreclosure, limiting in how it recapitulates dominant theories of social change” (3). The rhetorical use of the word “decolonization” is therefore “another form of settler appropriation” (3). 

This essay, published in the first issue of a journal called Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, & Society, is an attempt “to clarify that decolonization is not a metaphor”: “When metaphor invades decolonization, it recenters whiteness, it resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future” (3). “Our goal in this essay is to remind readers what is unsettling about decolonization—what is unsettling and should be unsettling,” they suggest (3). The notions of unsettling (of theory, of politics, of identity), of decentring whiteness, of denying both innocence to settlers and a future to the settler identity, are central points in this essay. So is the notion of difficulty: anything that seems to be too easy is, according to Tuck and Yang, a wrong approach to or misunderstanding of decolonization.

“There is a long and bumbled history of non-Indigenous peoples making moves to alleviate the impacts of colonialization,” Tuck and Yang write. “The too-easy adoption of decolonizing discourse (making decolonization a metaphor) is just one part of that history and it taps into pre-existing tropes that get in the way of more meaningful potential alliances” (3). Those tropes are “moves to innocence” for settlers; they “problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity” (3). A discussion of those moves to innocence is at the core of this essay. Those moves to innocence include:

  1. Settler nativism
  2. Fantasizing adoption
  3. Colonial equivocation
  4. Conscientization
  5. At risk-ing/Asterisk-ing Indigenous peoples
  6. Re-occupation and urban homesteading[.] (4)

“Such moves ultimately represent fantasies of easier paths to reconciliation,” they write:

attending to what is irreconcilable within settler colonial relations and what is incommensurable between decolonizing projects and other social justice projects will help to reduce the frustration of attempts at solidarity; but the attention won’t get anyone off the hook from the hard, unsettling work of decolonization. (4)

For that reason, they continue, they have also included “a discussion of interruptions that unsettle innocence and recognize incommensurability” (4).

First, though Tuck and Yang distinguish between external colonialism (colonial activities outside the borders of the imperial nation) and internal colonialism (colonial activities within the borders of the imperial nation). However, neither of these definitions adequately describe the form of colonialism in countries where the colonizers have come to stay. “Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony,” they write. “The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments” (5). What makes settler colonialism different from other forms of colonialism is the fact that “settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain” (5). That homemaking means that the most important concern of settler colonialism is land, “both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence” (5). They cite Patrick Wolfe’s famous dictum: settler colonialism is a structure rather than an event (5). That structure remakes land into property and restricts human relationships to land to property ownership. “Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward,” they write. “Made savage” (5). 

“In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there,” Tuck and Yang write:

For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts. (6)

They also suggest that “settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves,” a claim that is not true of all settler colonial states; while slavery was legal in what is now Canada until the early 19th century, for example, it was not a central part of the economy there as it was in Spanish colonies in Central and South America, as well as in the United States. Perhaps that distinction doesn’t matter. It’s true that the settler “sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species” (6). (That way of thinking is the root of the planet’s current ecological crises.) “The settler is making a new ‘home’ and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit,” Tuck and Yang continue. “He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because ‘civilization’ is defined as production in excess of the ‘natural’ world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world)” (6). For Tuck and Yang, that excess production requires slavery, although in the part of Canada where I live it actually required mechanized agriculture. Moreover, “[s]ettlers are not immigrants,” Tuck and Yang contend. “Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies” (6-7). That is, I think, Harold Johnson’s point in his book Two Families: Treaties and Government: when the Cree chiefs who negotiated Treaty 6 engaged the Crown representatives in a pipe ceremony, they were adopting them (and the settlers who would follow) and expecting they would behave like the immigrants Tuck and Yang describe here, rather than like settlers.

Decolonization in settler colonial situations is complicated, Tuck and Yang contend, “because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context—empire, settlement, and internal colony—make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires” (7). Thinking of decolonization in metaphorical ways “allows people to equivocate these contradictory desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts” (7). For Tuck and Yang, 

decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. (7)

“Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone,” they conclude (7).  I agree that repatriation of land is central to decolonization, and that idea certainly unsettles me, because although I was born on stolen land, it’s also the only home I’ve ever known, and I have nowhere else to go. The notion that “all of the land” must be repatriated is a political impossibility for that reason. Yes, that’s what must be done for decolonization to take place in a settler colonial context; but it is also what will not happen, because the settler majority will not stand for it. That contradiction implicates all of us and ought to unsettle us as well.

“Everything within a settler colonial society strains to destroy or assimilate the Native in order to disappear them from the land,” Tuck and Yang argue. That is the reason Settler society can have “multiple simultaneous and conflicting messages about Indigenous peoples, such as all Indians are dead, located in faraway reservations, that contemporary Indigenous people are less indigenous than prior generations, and that all Americans are a ‘little bit Indian’” (9). These fantasies constitute desires to erase Indigenous peoples, “because the death of pre-modern ways of life is thought to be inevitable,” and that erasure would provide a resolution to the colonial situation “through the absolute and total destruction or assimilation of original inhabitants” (9). The failure of that destruction “prompts multiple forms of settler anxiety,” because the presence of Indigenous peoples, “who make a priori claims to land and ways of being,” is “a constant reminder that the settler colonial project is incomplete” (9). The metaphorical use of the term “decolonization” is “a form of this anxiety, because it is a premature attempt at reconciliation”; it is “one way the settler, disturbed by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable searchlight of complicity, of having harmed others just by being one’s self” (9). “The desire to reconcile is just as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native,” they continue: “it is a desire to not to have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore” (9).

Tuck and Yang take the idea of settler moves to innocence from the work of Janet Mawhinney. These moves to innocence are the result of a desire “to find some mercy or relief in the face of the relentless of settler guilt and haunting” (9). “Directly and indirectly benefitting from the erasure and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is a difficult reality for settlers to accept,” they contend, and so Settlers “hurry toward any reprieve” (9). “Settler moves to innocence are those strategies that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all,” they continue. “In fact, settler scholars may gain professional kudos or a boost in their reputations for being so sensitive or self-aware. Yet settler moves to innocence are hollow, they only serve the settler” (10). Their discussion of these moves to innocence may make their Settler readers embarrassed or uncomfortable or feel implicated, and it seems that’s the point. Their goal in this discussion “is to provide a framework of excuses, distractions, and diversions from decolonization” (10). That framework is intended to make us “more impatient with each other, less likely to accept gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence” (10).

Tuck and Yang then discuss the moves to innocence they listed earlier in the essay. The first move is claiming to have an Indigenous ancestor. This “is a settler move to innocence because it is an attempt to deflect a settler identity, while continuing to enjoy settler privilege and occupying stolen land” (11). “Settler nativism, through the claiming of a long-lost ancestory, invests in these specific racializations of Indigenous people and Black people, and disbelieves the sovereign authority of Indigenous nations to determine tribal membership,” Tuck and Yang argue. “Ancestry is different from tribal membership; Indigenous identity and tribal membership are questions that Indigenous communities alone have the right to struggle over and define, not DNA tests, heritage websites, and certainly not the settler state” (13). “Settler nativism is about imagining an Indian past and a settler future,” they continue, while “tribal sovereignty has provided for an Indigenous present and various Indigenous intellectuals theorize decolonization as Native futures without a settler state” (13).

The second move to innocence is settler adoption fantasies. “These fantasies can mean the adoption of Indigenous practices and knowledge, but more, refer to those narratives in the settler colonial imagination in which the Native (understanding that he is becoming extinct) hands over his land, his claim to the land, his very Indian-ness to the settler for safe-keeping,” Tuck and Yang write. “This is a fantasy that is invested in a settler futurity and dependent on the foreclosure of an Indigenous futurity” (14). They discuss James Fenimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking Tales as an example. “In the unwritten decolonial version of Cooper’s story, Hawkeye would lose his land back to the Mohawk,” they write. “Hawkeye would shoot his last arrow, or his last long-rifle shot, return his eagle feather, and would be renamed Natty Bumppo, settler on Native land. The story would end at the moment of this recognition” (17). That ending, though, would leave a number of questions open: “Would a conversation follow after that between Native and the last settler? Would the settler leave or just vanish? Would he ask to stay, and if he did, who would say yes? These are questions that will be addressed at decolonization, and not a priori in order to appease anxieties for a settler future” (17). Is it likely, though, that settlers would “just vanish”? Where would they—we—go? Isn’t that a rather tidy resolution to a pretty big problem for decolonization?

It seems to me that Tuck and Yang are merging two separate ideas here. Isn’t the adoption of Indigenous practices and knowledge different from the narratives in which land and identity are given to Settlers “for safe-keeping”? Is reading Indigenous writers, not a way of adopting, or at least learning about, Indigenous knowledge? Isn’t it necessary to acquire that kind of knowledge in order to understand settler colonialism and its effects? Moreover, I’ve heard some Elders describe some ceremonies as open to anyone. For instance, I recently had a conversation with an Elder in which she was surprised to hear that I was reluctant to smudge on my own, even though I find it helpful and grounding. “Why not?” she asked. “I don’t want to appropriate customs that aren’t mine,” I answered. She didn’t think that was a good reason. Clearly not everyone is focused on issues of appropriation or adoption.

The third move to innocence is colonial equivocation, by which Tuck and Yang mean “the homogenizing of various experiences of oppression as colonization” (17). They want to separate those experiences of oppression from colonization. The “logical endpoint” of antiracism, they suggest, “the attainment of equal legal and cultural entitlements, is actually an investment in settler colonialism,” presumably because it accepts the authority of Settler society. “Indeed, even the ability to be a minority citizen in the settler nation means an option to become a brown settler,” they continue. “For many people of color, becoming a subordinate settler is an option even when becoming white is not” (18). They also distinguish between anti-colonial critique and “a decolonizing framework”: 

anti-colonial critique often celebrates empowered postcolonial subjects who seize denied privileges from the metropole. This anti-to-post-colonial project doesn’t strive to undo colonialism but rather to remake it and subvert it. Seeking stolen resources is entangled with settler colonialism because those resources were nature/Native first, then enlisted into the service of settlement and thus almost impossible to reclaim without re-occupying Native land. Furthermore, the postcolonial pursuit of resources is fundamentally an anthropocentric model, as land, water, air, animals, and plants are never able to become postcolonial; they remain objects to be exploited by the empowered postcolonial subject. (19)

I’m not sure I follow the shift from anti-colonial critique to resource exploitation here, particularly since the rest of the argument in this section of the essay focuses on the inadequacy of multicultural approaches to oppressions, which do not address Indigenous sovereignty or rights. Perhaps the shift to resource exploitation comes from the need for decolonization to include “unsettling/deoccupying the land” (19). Any arguments short of that recognition, they argue, are equivocations: “That is, they ambiguously avoid engaging with settler colonialism; they are ambivalent about minority/people of color/colonized Others as settlers; they are cryptic about Indigenous land rights in spaces inhabited by people of color” (19). 

Conscientization, a focus on “decolonizing the mind,” is the fourth move to innocence. Tuck and Yang note that Fanon argues that decolonizing the mind was a first step, not the only or final one. “Yet we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land,” they write (19). “[T]he front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful that it can feel like it is indeed making change,” they continue (19). Decolonization will only happen when “stolen land is relinquished” (19). And yet, isn’t the development of that “critical consciousness” necessary to relinquishing that stolen land? Wouldn’t developing a collective understanding that the land has been stolen and needs to be returned be an essential step in the decolonizing process? Besides, how would that stolen land be relinquished? What would happen afterwards? I realize that Tuck and Yang argue that there is no Settler futurity—that we ought to have no future on the stolen lands we occupy—but that is an extraordinary thing to ask people to accept, especially if they have not yet developed a “critical consciousness” regarding settler colonialism. 

Tuck and Yang describe that project of developing critical consciousness as settler harm reduction” (21). This project, they write, “is intended only as a stopgap”:

As the environmental crisis escalates and peoples around the globe are exposed to greater concentrations of violence and poverty, the need for settler harm reduction is acute, profoundly so. At the same time we remember that, by definition, settler harm reduction, like conscientization, is not the same as decolonization and does not inherently offer any pathways that lead to decolonization. (21-22)

All of this would be easier to understand, or perhaps accept, if Tuck and Yang were able to offer concrete examples of pathways that would lead to decolonization, defined as the return of stolen land. How do we get there from here?

The fifth move to innocence, “A(s)t(e)risk peoples,” has to do with the ways that Indigenous people are rendered invisible by social science research, either by being defined as “at risk” peoples, “on the verge of extinction, culturally and economically bereft, engaged or soon-to-be engaged in self-destructive behaviors which can interrupt their school careers and seamless absorption into the economy” (22), or by being left out or “represented by an asterisk” in statistical data sets because of small sample sizes (22). I’m not sure how to respond to this argument. On the one hand, it’s important that Indigenous peoples not be defined only by the social problems caused by colonization, but on the other, it would be foolish to pretend that such problems do not exist. Those self-destructive behaviours don’t just interrupt the “seamless absorption into the economy” of Indigenous youth, for instance; they can end their lives. Yes, becoming part of the economy may not be the resolution Tuck and Yang would like to see for those youth, but it’s better than some of the alternatives, and I don’t think it’s the role of privileged academics to tell people struggling to survive what their goals ought to be. The other problem appears to be without a solution: sample sizes need to be large to be statistically valid, and where a population is small—their example is urban Indigenous youth in schools—it is likely to be submerged in the data. Perhaps the answer would be to engage in more qualitative research than quantitative research, but that’s not where Tuck and Yang end up. Rather, they argue that because most Indigenous youth live in cities, “[a]ny decolonizing urban education endeavor must address the foundations of urban land pedagogy and Indigenous politics vis-a-vis the settler colonial state” (23). That may be true, but it doesn’t address the problem of large-scale population surveys which make “collecting basic education and health information about this small and heterogenous group” so difficult, or how those difficulties can be overcome in order to “counter the disappearance of Indigenous particularities in public policy” (22).

The last move to innocence, “Re-occupation and urban homesteading,” has to do with the failure of the Occupy movement to acknowledge that its occupations took place on stolen land, or that the source of the wealth that Occupy demanded be redistributed was that stolen Indigenous land (23). “For social justice movements, like Occupy, to truly aspire to decolonization non-metaphorically, they would impoverish, not enrich, the 99%+ settler population of [the] United States,” they write. “Decolonization eliminates settler property rights and settler sovereignty. It requires the abolition of land as property and upholds the sovereignty of Native land and people” (26). Again, that would be an extremely difficult proposition to sell to that settler majority. Tuck and Yang compare the Occupy/Decolonize movements to the French and Haitian Revolutions of the late 18th century. They note that Haiti was the richest French colony before its revolution, and the poorest afterwards, due to the French demand for reparations as a condition of recognizing Haitian independence. This comparison is a way of introducing the notion of incommensurability: the Occupy and Decolonize movements are incommensurable, because while Occupy sees the United States as composed of 99% Occupiers (I doubt Occupy ever claimed that 99% of the population was participating in the movement) and 1% Owners, the Decolonize movement sees the primary distinction as between the 0.9% Indigenous peoples and the 99.1% Settlers (27). “Occupation is a move towards innocence that hides behind the numerical superiority of the settler nation, the elision of democracy with justice, and the logic that what became property under the 1% belongs to the other 99%,” they write (28). They also connect Occupy’s demand to “occupy everything” to what they call “urban homesteading,” which I think is another way of thinking about the gentrification of poor neighbourhoods. Surely there is a radical distinction to be made between the Occupy movement and gentrification? Perhaps not. “In contrast to the settler labor of occupying the commons, homesteading, and possession, some scholars have begun to consider the labor of de-occupation in the undercommons, permanent fugitivity, and dispossession as possibilities for a radical black praxis,” they write, citing Fred Moten and Stephano Harney (28). I’ve tried to read Moten’s and Harney’s book The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, but I ran aground on the impossibility of their ideas, and frankly their unappealing nature. Who would want the instability of “permanent fugitivity” or of “dispossession”? Perhaps I need to return to Moten’s and Harney’s work and try harder to understand it. I found this section of the essay to be quite weak, with the excursion into the history of Haiti an unnecessary detour, and I think that Craig Fortier’s book Unsettling the Commons: Social Movements Within, Against, and Beyond Settler Colonialism to be a much clearer discussion of the contradictions between the Occupy movement and decolonization.

The last section of the essay, “Incommensurability is unsettling,” presents 

a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements—efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses—as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements. These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts. (28)

They describe what they call “an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects” (28). There are, they continue, “portions of these project that simply cannot be speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied” (28). Those portions are incommensurable. They suggest “unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled in three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies” (28-29). For each area, they provide “a bibliography of incommensurability” (29).

First is the discussion of Third World decolonizations. “The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish ‘global’ solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complexities and complications” (29). They invite their readers “to consider the permanent settler war as the theatre for all imperial wars,” and provide a bibliography of texts that address a number of issues, such as “discovery, invasion, occupation and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty,” “heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality,” and “U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism” (29).

Second is a discussion of the abolition of slavery. They note that freed slaves in the United States were promised 40 acres of land that belonged to Indigenous peoples as reparations. “[W]e urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies),” they write. “Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies). Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation” (30). I find the word “repatriation” rather ominous here; what of the formerly enslaved Africans in the United States who did not choose to be repatriated? What would happen to them? And why is this discussion of the abolition of slavery, something that happened in 1865, being considered a contemporary issue? I am missing something in this argument.

Third is critical pedagogies, something that engages Tuck and Yang, since they are professors of education. They suggest that place-based, environmentalist, and urban pedagogies are incommensurable with land education, and suggest several resources. So far, though, they have not explained how “opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable” (28). Perhaps that is the reason they provide a lengthy, italicized explanation of incommensurability. It is, they write, “an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world” (31):

This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad—a break and not a compromise. (31)

“There is,” they continue, “so much that in incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved” (31). From this point the essay becomes a list of those apparently impossible to resolve issues: “Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe. Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms” (31). What is the connection between settler colonialism and oil? Isn’t settler colonialism a feature of places (I’m thinking of New Zealand) that don’t have oil reserves? Why bring salt into the discussion? Do Settlers have sovereignty over the air? Yes, the uranium mined near the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico was used to build bombs, and yes, the radioactive debris has poisoned the land, but how is that incommensurable? With what? How are the borders of the U.S. examples of incommensurability? How is the high rate of incarceration in Louisiana an example of incommensurability? There’s no question that prison farms and private prisons are contemporary forms of slavery, but how are they incommensurable? I don’t understand the connections Tuck and Yang are expecting their readers to make; nor do I understand how issues that are impossible to resolve can become the grounds of solidarity. That idea seems to have been dropped entirely.

Finally, Tuck and Yang provide a short conclusion that begins with this statement: “An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence” (35). Reconciliation, they continue, “is concerned with rescuing settler normalcy,” and with “rescuing a settler future” (35). Reconciliation asks questions like “what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler?” (35). “Incommensurability,” Tuck and Yang write, “acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework” (35). But won’t decolonization require an engagement with Settlers, given their sheer numbers (which Tuck and Yang have discussed)? How could such an engagement take place without answering those questions, or at least acknowledging that they are legitimate? My questions, however, are the wrong ones to ask, and my suggestion that Settlers need to be engaged is off-topic: “decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity,” Tuck and Yang write. “Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity” (35). Moreover, they argue, the answers to the questions Settlers might ask “are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated my metaphor” (35). I’m not sure that argument makes sense; one can imagine giving back stolen land without resorting to metaphor, and the questions Settlers would ask about their future would still exist. The authors’ next point makes more sense: “The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics—moves that may feel very unfriendly” (35). The point, I think, is that uncommonality is built into this issue; that decolonization will be a struggle between Indigenous peoples and Settlers, not a coalition that includes both parties. The unfriendliness they acknowledge is simply part of the structure, and the struggle, of decolonization. 

“To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples,” Tuck and Yang write:

It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone—these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability. (36)

“Decolonization is not an ‘and,’” they write, not something that can be made a part of other human or civil rights approaches to justice. “It is an elsewhere” (36). 

After reading and summarizing “Decolonization Is Not A Metaphor,” I have mixed feelings. I see the need to give back the stolen land that I—we—live on. I see the moves to innocence that Settlers use to protect themselves from the knowledge that despite their enlightened qualities and their apparent lack of innocence they are actually part of the colonial problem. But I am confused by what Tuck and Yang mean by “an ethic of incommensurability” (36), or how incommensurability can be the grounds of solidarity. It’s just not clear to me. I’m not sure how one can deny anyone anyone’s future, either, although denying settler futurity is not uncommon in texts about settler colonialism, perhaps because this essay has been so influential. (I think denying Indigenous futurity is a crime.) Certainly that’s not a way to get many Settlers onside with the decolonizing project, although perhaps the way this essay begins and ends with Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth is a clue to what Tuck and Yang mean by decolonization—that, like the anti-colonial revolution in Algeria, it will be a violent struggle in which alliances between Settlers and Indigenous peoples will become null and void. That interpretation, though, runs aground on their apparent insistence that alliances between decolonization and other social-justice movements is possible, apparently through incommensurability. And while I understand their reluctance to offer any pathways towards decolonization—probably because they don’t actually know how it might play out, or how one might begin to set the process of returning land in motion—isn’t it a serious weakness to suggest that conscientization (consciousness raising might be a better word) or gestures towards decolonization are insufficient, without providing any positive alternatives? I don’t think the work of Moten and Harney is likely to lead to workable alternatives; like Tuck and Yang, their thinking is too utopian and not grounded in the unpleasant reality of politics in settler colonial states to be of practical use. I suppose what I ought to do is take what is useful from the essay and leave the rest behind, although some of what I would have to leave behind is frankly baffling. I must be misunderstanding something central to their argument, but I honestly don’t know what it might be. So I’m left confused and frustrated—probably not for the last time, either. Some of the stuff I’m reading is confusing and frustrating. I need to get used to it.

Works Cited

Fortier, Craig. Unsettling the Commons: Social Movements Within, Against, and Beyond Settler Colonialism. ARP Books, 2017

Harney, Stefano, and Fred Moten. The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, Minor Compositions, 2013.

Tuck, Eve, and K. Wayne Yang. “Decolonization Is Not A Metaphor.” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, vol. 1, no. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40.