88. Garnette Cadogan, “Walking While Black”

cadogan

(image source: https://mlkscholars.mit.edu/event/garnette-cadogan-how-walking-while-black-reveals-possibilities-and-limitations/)

Michael Lapointe seems to suggest that Garnette Cadogan’s essay, “Walking While Black,” should have been included in Duncan Minshull’s anthology Beneath My Feet: Writers on Walking (one of the books Lapointe discusses in his recent review essay). “[J]ust how radical is the writer-walker resurgence that Minshull hoped for 20 years ago and has watched come to pass?” Lapointe asks. “Like protesting, walking ought to be among the most democratic of activities. Look closely at the genre, though, and you’ll find that the writer-walker has a way of claiming a surprisingly exclusive status” (Lapointe). That’s true of women who walk and write; they have to be careful about walking after dark. And it’s true of Cadogan, whose encounters with police officers and white racists make walking dangerous. Cadogan’s essay, Lapointe writes, “asks us to consider how a literary creation can germinate on a stroll when ‘the sidewalk [is] a minefield’” (qtd. in Lapointe).

Cadogan’s essay begins in childhood, when he began to love walking. His violent stepfather made it safer to be out of the house—not that the streets of Kingston, Jamaica, were safe. Indeed, they “were often terrifying—you could, for instance, get killed if a political henchman thought you came from the wrong neighborhood, or even if you wore the wrong color,” since certain colors were associated with specific political parties: “The wrong color in the wrong neighborhood could mean your last day” (Cadogan). It’s not surprising, then, that Cadogan’s friends “and the rare nocturnal passerby” called him crazy for taking “long late-night walks that traversed warring political zones” (Cadogan).

Those walks had a powerful effect on Cadogan. They changed his character: “I made friends with strangers and went from being a very shy and awkward kid to being an extroverted, awkward one” (Cadogan). He learned about navigating the streets from beggars, vendors, and poor laborers. “I imagined myself as a Jamaican Tom Sawyer,” he writes, “one moment sauntering down the streets to pick low-hanging mangoes that I could reach from the sidewalk, another moment hanging outside a street party with battling sound systems, each armed with speakers piled to create skyscrapers of heavy bass” (Cadogan). The streets weren’t frightening; they were full of adventure. Sometimes he walked with others who had missed the last bus, or he would lose himself in “Mittyesque” fantasies (Cadogan). “Walking became so regular and familiar that the way home became home,” he recalls (Cadogan). He learned the rules of the Kingston streets and mapped the city’s “complex, and often bizarre, cultural and political and social activity” (Cadogan). The nighttime streets were too dangerous for women to walk alone, he acknowledges, but Cadogan walked everywhere, through rich neighborhoods and poor ones, “cutting across Jamaica’s deep social divisions” (Cadogan).

In 1996, Cadogan moved to New Orleans to go to college. He wanted to explore that city on foot, and when university staff warned him about the city’s crime rate, he decided to ignore their concerns, because Kingston’s crime rate was much higher. “What no one had told me was that I was the one who would be considered a threat,” he writes. “I wasn’t prepared for any of this. I had come from a majority-black country in which no one was wary of me because of my skin color. Now I wasn’t sure who was afraid of me” (Cadogan). The police were a particular problem: “They regularly stopped and bullied me, asking questions that took my guilt for granted” (Cadogan). He quickly had to figure out how to survive those interactions, mentioning that he was a college student or accidentally pulling out his student ID when asked for his driver’s license. However, he continues, 

[i]n this city of exuberant streets, walking became a complex and often oppressive negotiation. . . . New Orleans suddenly felt more dangerous than Jamaica. The sidewalk was a minefield, and every hesitation and self-censored compensation reduced my dignity. Despite my best efforts, the streets never felt comfortably safe. Even a simple salutation was suspect. (Cadogan)

One night, he recalls, he waved to a passing cop: “Moments later, I was against his car in handcuffs” (Cadogan). When he asked why, he was told, “No one waves to the police” (Cadogan). His friends saw his behaviour as absurd: “‘Now why would you do a dumb thing like that?’ asked one. ‘You know better than to make nice with police’” (Cadogan).

Cadogan leaves New Orleans to visit his dying grandmother in Kingston right before Hurricane Katrina. “I hadn’t wandered those streets in eight years, since my last visit, and I returned to them now mostly at night, the time I found best for thinking, praying, crying,” he writes. “I walked to feel less alienated—from myself, struggling with the pain of seeing my grandmother terminally ill; from my home in New Orleans, underwater and seemingly abandoned; from my home country, which now, precisely because of its childhood familiarity, felt foreign to me” (Cadogan). He is surprised at how safe the streets felt: 

once again one black body among many, no longer having to anticipate the many ways my presence might instill fear and how to offer some reassuring body language. . . . I could be invisible in Jamaica in a way I can’t be invisible in the United States. Walking had returned to me a greater set of possibilities. (Cadogan).

Those possibilities are, he continues, the purpose of walking:

Following serendipity, I added new routes to the mental maps I had made from constant walking in that city from childhood to young adulthood, traced variations on the old pathways. Serendipity, a mentor once told me, is a secular way of speaking of grace; it’s unearned favor. Seen theologically, then, walking is an act of faith. Walking is, after all, interrupted falling. We see, we listen, we speak, and we trust that each step we take won’t be our last, but will lead us to a richer understanding of the self and the world. (Cadogan)

“In Jamaica, I felt once again as if the only identity that mattered was my own, not the constricted one that others had constructed for me,” he continues. “I strolled into my better self. I said, along with Kierkegaard, ‘I have walked myself into my best thoughts’” (Cadogan).

When Cadogan tried to return to New Orleans a month later, there were no flights, and his aunt encourages him to stay with her in New York instead. “This wasn’t a hard sell,” he writes:

I wanted to be in a place where I could travel by foot and, more crucially, continue to reap the solace of walking at night. And I was eager to follow in the steps of the essayists, poets, and novelists who’d wandered the great city before me—Walt Whitman, Herman Melville, Alfred Kazin, Elizabeth Hardwick. I had visited the city before, but each trip had felt like a tour in a sports car. I welcomed the chance to stroll. I wanted to walk alongside Whitman’s ghost and “descend to the pavements, merge with the crowd, and gaze with them.” (Cadogan)

He explores the city, from the West Village to his home in the Bronx, to Queens and Brooklyn: “The city was my playground” (Cadogan). He walks with a woman he had started dating: “My impressions of the city took shape during my walks with her” (Cadogan). “The city was beguiling, exhilarating, vibrant,” he writes. “But it wasn’t long before reality reminded me I wasn’t invulnerable, especially when I walked alone” (Cadogan). One night in the East Village, a white man punches him because “he’d merely assumed I was a criminal because of my race” (Cadogan). In addition, the “mutual distrust” between Cadogan and the police “was impossible to ignore” (Cadogan). “I returned to the old rules I’d set for myself in New Orleans, with elaboration,” he recalls: no running, no sudden movements, no hoodies, no objects in his hand, no waiting for friends on street corners (Cadogan). “As comfort set in,” though, “inevitably I began to break some of those rules, until a night encounter sent me zealously back to them, having learned that anything less than vigilance was carelessness” (Cadogan).

While jogging up the sidewalk, late to meet friends, Cadogan is approached by a police officer with a gun in his hand. “In no time, half a dozen cops were upon me, chucking me against the car and tightly handcuffing me,” he recalls (Cadogan). They ask a barrage of questions and Cadogan can’t answer them all. He tries to focus on one officer. That doesn’t work: “the others got frustrated that I wasn’t answering them fast enough and barked at me” (Cadogan). Nothing he did made any difference. “For a black man, to assert your dignity before the police was to risk assault,” he writes: 

In fact, the dignity of black people meant less to them, which was why I always felt safer being stopped in front of white witnesses than black witnesses. The cops had less regard for the witness and entreaties of black onlookers, whereas the concern of white witnesses usually registered on them. A black witness asking a question or politely raising an objection could quickly become a fellow detainee. (Cadogan)

Eventually a police captain tells the others to let Cadogan go. “Humiliated, I tried not to make eye contact with the onlookers on the sidewalk, and I was reluctant to pass them to be on my way,” he recalls (Cadogan). The police captain offers to drop him off at a subway station. “‘It’s because you were polite that we let you go,’” he tells Cadogan. “‘If you were acting up it would have been different.’” Cadogan nods and says nothing.

“I realized that what I least liked about walking in New York City wasn’t merely having to learn new rules of navigation and socialization—every city has its own,” Cadogan states. “It was the arbitrariness of the circumstances that required them, an arbitrariness that made me feel like a child again, that infantilized me” (Cadogan). “On many walks,” he continues, “I ask white friends to accompany me, just to avoid being treated like a threat,” although in New Orleans, walking with a white woman attracts more hostility (Cadogan). “Walking while black restricts the experience of walking, renders inaccessible the classic Romantic experience of walking alone,” Cadogan continues:

It forces me to be in constant relationship with others, unable to join the New York flâneurs I had read about and hoped to join. Instead of meandering aimlessly in the footsteps of Whitman, Melville, Kazin, and Vivian Gornick, more often I felt I was tiptoeing in Baldwin’s. . . . Walking as a black man has made me feel simultaneously more removed from the city, in my awareness that I am perceived as suspect, and more closely connected to it, in the full attentiveness demanded by my vigilance. It has made me walk more purposefully in the city, becoming part of its flow, rather than observing, standing apart. (Cadogan)

But this also means that he’s not at home in the city. Nor is he at home as a pedestrian: “Walking—the simple, monotonous act of placing one foot before the other to prevent falling—turns out not to be so simple if you’re black. Walking alone has been anything but monotonous for me; monotony is a luxury” (Cadogan). 

More than anything else, Cadogan concludes, “[w]e want the freedom and pleasure of walking without fear—without others’ fear—wherever we choose” (Cadogan). He has now lived for ten years in New York, and he continues walking its streets, which “has made it closer to home to me” (Cadogan). But at the same time, it’s not home, because “the city also withholds itself from me via those very streets. I walk them, alternately invisible and too prominent. So I walk caught between memory and forgetting, between memory and forgiveness” (Cadogan).

Cadogan offers a powerful account of the possibilities and realities of walking for a black man in a racist society. There’s no question that walking is easier for some than for others. As a white, straight, cis-gendered man, I don’t face the same racism that Cadogan and many others face. That is part of my unearned privilege; I acknowledge that. What to do about it, though, is another matter. I just don’t know. I don’t feel that I can do much about the racism of other white people (I’m unlikely to witness it) nor about the racism of police officers. Emma Battell Lowman and Adam J. Barker, and Clare Land, argue that it’s important to do something about white privilege. Land, for instance, argues that one also has “to consider ways to undo it,” to try to unlearn it and to be cognizant of it (31)—although it seems to me that there is a great gulf between awareness of white privilege and undoing it. Lowman and Barker are, I think, more realistic than Land in their discussion of “Settler privilege”:

As Settler Canadians, we are part of a colonizing collective, and there is no simple place we can go, or declaration we can make, that will sever us from our unearned benefits and privileges, insulate us from our fears of change, or abstract us from destructive practices on the land. No matter how hard it may be to envision, it is possible to forge different relationships to the land that are not rooted in the displacement and genocide of Indigenous nations, nor in fooling ourselves with the comfortable oblivion of indigenization and transcendence. (109)

And yet, they argue that collective action can, somehow, make change happen (109-10). It’s not clear to me, though, what kind of collective action could make the Garnette Cadogan’s walking experiences any easier, any less fraught. Perhaps some group walk, like a “Take Back the Night” event, focused on racism? I don’t know. I am sure, though, that I’m not the one to organize such an event. At the same time, though, I don’t think that for me to stay home, to abandon walking, as a way of pretending that my privilege doesn’t exist is the answer, either. That privilege will carry on whether I’m sitting at home or trudging down a grid road or along a sidewalk. So I feel caught between shock and sorrow at Cadogan’s experience, which I know is shared by many others, and a feeling of being helpless to do anything about it.

Works Cited

Cadogan, Garnette. “Walking While Black.” Literary Hub, 8 July 2016, https://lithub.com/walking-while-black/.

Land, Clare. Decolonizing Solidarity: Dilemmas and Directions for Supporters of Indigenous Struggles, Zed, 2015.

Lapointe, Michael. “The Unbearable Smugness of Walking.” The Atlantic, August 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/08/how-walking-became-pedestrian-duncan-minshull-erling-kagge-walking/592792/.

Lowman, Emma Battell, and Adam J. Barker. Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada, Fernwood, 2015.

85. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “Geophilosophy”

deleuze guattari what is philosophy

I really ought to be reading Anti-Oedipus, the massive tome Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari wrote in the 1970s and by which so many walking artists and postmodern geographers seem to be influenced. I’ll get there, eventually, but its length and difficulty encouraged me to spend part of the afternoon wrestling with one of their shorter texts, the essay “Geophilosophy,” included in the collection What is Philosophy?–a book which was, surprisingly, a best-seller in France when it came out: surprisingly, that is, because of its difficulty. I added “Geophilosophy” to my reading list because it was influential on the dissertation of another walking artist, Carolina Santo, who says that she was inspired by the essay to name her practice (and her recent dissertation) “geoscenography” (1). I must say that I’m not sure there’s a connection between “Geophilosophy” and my own work, but perhaps, after reading texts that look ahead to a future revolution, there is a link. The subject of “Geophilosophy” is philosophy itself, but as it is situated in history and in geography. And, as I always find when I’m reading Deleuze and/or Guattari, I always have the feeling that I’m just about to grasp what they’re talking about, but that I never quite get there. So this summary is, of necessity, going to rely on quotations (because I can’t possibly paraphrase their difficult prose) and my attempts at understanding those quotations will be confused and, perhaps, confusing. That’s the experience of reading their writing.

The essay begins with these words: “Subject and object give a poor approximation of thought. Thinking is neither a line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around the other. Rather, thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth” (85). Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the thinking of Kant and Husserl is grounded in this way; the work of those very different philosophers is in a relationship with the earth (85). “Yet we have seen that the earth constantly carries out a movement of deterritorialization on the spot, by which it goes beyond any territory: it is deterritorializing and deterritorialized,” they write (85). “The earth is not one element among others but rather brings together all the elements within a single embrace while using one or another of them to deterritorialize territory” (85).  In fact, “the process of reterritorialization is inseparable from the earth, which restores territories” (86)—so it both deterritorialized and reterritorializes. “Territory and earth are two components with two zones of indiscernibility—deterritorialization (from territory to the earth) and reterritorialization (from earth to territory)”—and it’s not possible to say which of those zones came first (86). 

From here they turn to “States” and “Cities,” which turn out to be distinctions between empires, on the one hand, and the political forms that characterized ancient Greece. States and Cities are often defined as territorial, “as substituting a territorial principle for the principle of lineage,” that that statement is inexact, because “lineal groups may change territory, and they are only really determined by embracing a territory or residence in a ‘local lineage’” (86). But, on the contrary, States and Cities “carry out a deterritorialization because the former juxtaposes and compares agricultural territories by relating them to a higher arithmetical Unity, and the latter adapts the territory to a geometrical extensiveness that can be continued in commercial circuits” (86). Both are forms of “a deterritorialization that takes place on the spot when the State appropriates the territory of local groups or when the city turns its back on its hinterland. In one case, there is reterritorialization on the palace and its supplies; and in the other, on the agora and commercial networks” (86). “In imperial states deterritorialization takes place through transcendence: it tends to develop vertically from on high, according to a celestial component of the earth” (86). This sentence is important, because it connects States and empires to hierarchy and religion. In contrast, in the city “deterritorialization takes place through immanence,” and it frees “a power of the earth that follows a maritime component that goes under the sea to reestablish the territory,” which they term an Autochthon (86). (I’m not sure why they use that word.) The “imperial Stranger” that reterritorializes the earth needs surviving Autochthons and “the citizen Autochthon calls on strangers in flight,” which makes the relationship between State and City more complicated (86). 

At this point I paused. The terms “earth” and “territory,” and the notions of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, are not being defined in this essay, so they must have been defined earlier in the book; I check the index. “We already know the importance in animals of those activities that consist in forming territories, in abandoning or leaving them, and even in re-creating territory on something of a different nature,” Deleuze and Guattari write in an earlier essay in the volume, “Conceptual Personae”:

All the more so for the hominid: from its act of birth, it deterritorializes its front paw, wrests it from the earth to turn it into a hand, and reterritorializes it on branches and tools. A stick is, in turn, a deterritorialized branch. We need to see how everyone, in the smallest things as in the greatest challenges, seeks a territory, tolerates or carries out deterritorializations, and is reterritorialized on almost anything—memory, fetish, or dream. (“Conceptual Personae” 67-68)

“We cannot even say what comes first, and perhaps every territory presupposes a prior deterritorialization, or everything happens at the same time,” they continue (“Conceptual Personae” 68). “The merchant buys in a territory, deterritorializes products into commodities, and is reterritorialized on the means of production; whereas labor becomes ‘abstract’ labor, reterritorialized in wages” (“Conceptual Personae” 68). “But are there not also territories and deterritorializations that are not only physical and mental but spiritual—not only relative but absolute in a sense yet to be determined?” they ask:

What is the Fatherland or Homeland invoked by the thinker, by the philosopher or artist? Philosophy is inseparable from a Homeland to which the a priori, the innate, or the memory equally attest. But why is this fatherland unknown, lost, or forgotten, turning the thinker into an Exile? What will restore an equivalent of territory, valid as a home? What will be philosophical refrains? What is thought’s relationship with the earth? (“Conceptual Personae” 68-69)

So in the terms “deterritorialization” and “reterritorialization,” Deleuze and Guattari seem to be talking about tangible things becoming evanescent and then returning to tangibility; or perhaps (to say it slightly differently) about the concrete becoming abstract and then concrete again. Objects—or perhaps concepts—become representations and then returning to being objects or concepts. At least, I think that’s what’s happening. Perhaps, then, in the movement from earth to territory, specific places become abstract spaces, idealized, mapped, represented, before becoming specific places again? Doesn’t the word “earth” suggest something grounded in that way? That was my first attempt at understanding their terminology, although because they abandon the term “earth” almost immediately, it’s not quite correct. My strategy in attempting to understand this essay became one of following the various (undefined) shifts in the terms “deterritorialization” and “reterritorialization.”

Back to “Geophilosophy”: the next paragraph considers ancient Greek city-states as developing “a particular mode of deterritorialization that proceeds by immanence; they form a milieu of immanence” (87). That milieu—a crucial word in this essay—“is like an ‘international market’ organized along the borders of the Orient between a multiplicity of independent cities or distinct societies that are nevertheless attached to one another and within which artisans and merchants find a freedom and mobility denied to them by empires” (87). Those city-states are different from the “imperial states” and perhaps similar to the “Cities” they discussed earlier (86)—or, as is more likely the case, identical to them. Those city-states are inhabited by “strangers in flight,” artisans, merchants, and philosophers who are emigres; and those emigres find three things in the Greek city-states, things which are “the de facto conditions of philosophy”:

a pure sociability as milieu of immanence, the “intrinsic nature of association,” which is opposed to imperial sovereignty and implies no prior interest because, on the contrary, competing interests presuppose it; a certain pleasure in forming associations, which constitutes friendship, but also a pleasure in breaking up the association, which constitutes rivalry . . . and a taste for opinion inconceivable in an empire, a taste for the exchange of views, for conversation. (87-88)

“We constantly rediscover these three Greek features,” they write: “immanence, friendship, and opinion” (88). Those are the historical features that enabled the creation of philosophy. At the same time, though, I sense perhaps a political emphasis (given the discomfort, if that’s the word, that European countries have with immigrants and refugees) on the importance of migrants and migration, although I could be completely wrong about that.

“Whether physical, psychological, or social,” Deleuze and Guattari continue, “deterritorialization is relative insofar as it concerns the historical relationship of the earth with the territories that take shape and pass away on it, its geological relationship with eras and catastrophes, its astronomical relationship with the cosmos and the stellar system of which it is a part” (88). That concept, “relative deterritorialization,” is opposed (or at least juxtaposed) to “absolute deterritorialization”:

But deterritorialization is absolute when the earth passes into the pure plane of immanence of a Being-thought, of a Nature-thought of infinite diagrammatic movements. Thinking consists in stretching out a plane of immanence that absorbs the earth. . . . Deterritorialization of such a plane does not preclude reterritorialization but posits is as the creation of a future new earth. Nonetheless, absolute deterritorialization can only be thought according to certain still-to-be-determined relationships with relative deterritorializations that are not only cosmic but geographical, historical, and psychosocial. There is always a way in which absolute deterritorialization takes over from a relative deterritorialization in a given field. (88)

Here they raise a question: does relative deterritorialization take place through immanence or through transcendence? Is it characteristic of philosophy, in other words, or of religion? “When it is transcendent, vertical, celestial, and brought about by the imperial unity, the transcendent element must always give way or submit to a sort of rotation in order to be inscribed on the always-immanent plane of Nature-thought” (88-89). (What “Nature-thought” means I have no idea.) “Thinking here implies a projection of the transcendent on the plane of immanence,” they continue. “Transcendence may be entirely ‘empty’ in itself, yet it becomes full to the extent that it descends and crosses different hierarchized levels that are projected together on a region of the plane, that is to say, on an aspect corresponding to an infinite movement” (89). This seems to align transcendence with empire and oppose it against the Greek city-states and immanence (89). Indeed, they continue, “the transcendence that is projected on the plane of immanence paves it or populates it with Figures”—and figures are “essentially paradigmatic, projective, hierarchical, and referential” (89). So this is about religion rather than philosophy, and the examples of figures they provide are all religious ones. I’m seeing how these ideas cluster together, and how religious transcendence is distinct from philosophical immanence.

The Greeks “invented an absolute plane of immanence,” Deleuze and Guattari state, but their originality “should rather be sought in the relation between the relative and the absolute” (90). “When relative deterritorialization is itself horizontal, or immanent, it combines with the absolute deterritorialization of the plane of immanence that carries the movements of relative deterritorialization to infinity, pushes them to the absolute, by transforming them,” and “[i]mmanence is redoubled” (90). The concept—and if I had read the first essay in this volume, I would be more certain that when they say “concept,” they are referring to philosophy—“comes to populate the plane of immanence. There is no longer projection in a figure but connection in the concept. This is why the concept itself abandons all reference so as to retain only the conjugations and connections that constitute its consistence” (90). The concept’s only rule, the only thing that governs or restrains it, is its “internal or external neighborhood” (90): “Its internal neighborhood or consistency is secured by the connection of its components in zones of indiscernibility; its external neighborhood or exoconsistency is secured by the bridges thrown from one concept to another when the components of them are saturated” (90). That suggests that the creation of concepts really means making connections between “internal, inseparable components to the point of closure or saturation so that we can no longer add or withdraw a component without changing the nature of the concept; to connect the concept with another in such a way that the nature of other connections will change” (90). In addition, they state, the concept is thus plurivocal, and its plurivocity “depends solely upon neighborhood (one concept can have several neighborhoods)” (90). Also, “[c]oncepts are flat surfaces without levels, orderings without hierarchy”—so they are opposed to the transcendent and to the imperial, which are vertical (90). So the questions “What to put in a concept?” and “What to put with it?” are important in philosophy (90). “The concept is not paradigmatic but syntagmatic; not projective but connective; not hierarchical but linking; not referential but consistent,” they claim (91). For that reason, “it is inevitable that philosophy, science, and art are no longer organized as levels of a single projection and are not even differentiated according to a common matrix but are immediately posited or reconstituted in a respective independence, in a division of labor that gives rise to relationships fo connection between them” (91).

Is the conclusion to take from this the notion that “there is a radical opposition between figures and concepts?” (91). I think so. Deleuze and Guattari argue that “disturbing affinities appear on what seems to be a common plane of immanence” (91)—so they may have similarities if not connections or relationships. However, correspondences between figures and concepts “do not rule out there being a boundary, however difficult it is to make out. This is because figures are projections on the plane, which implies something vertical or transcendent. Concepts, on the other hand, imply only neighborhoods and connections on the horizon” (91-92). “All that can be said is that figures tend toward concepts to the point of drawing infinitely near to them”—which suggests all the more reason to distinguish between them (92). The distinction between figures and concepts leads to the question of whether Christianity creates concepts, which is another way of wondering if there is a Christian philosophy, and despite the examples of Kierkegaard and Pascal, they suggest that it “only produces concepts . . . through its atheism,” because “[t]here is always an atheism to be extracted from a religion,” which they suggest is true in Jewish thought, in the work of Spinoza (92). (I don’t understand how atheism gets extracted from religion, but that doesn’t matter.) “And if it is true that figures tend towards concepts in this way,” they continue, 

the converse is equally true, and philosophical concepts reproduce figures whenever immanence is attributed to something. The three figures of philosophy are objectality of contemplation subject of reflection, and intersubjectivity of communication. It should be noted that religions do not arrive at the concept without denying themselves, just as philosophies do not arrive at the figure without betraying themselves. There is a difference of kind between figures and concepts, but every possible difference of degree also. (92)

In fact, they claim that religious philosophy is actually prephilosophical, because such “thinking takes place on a plane of immanence that can be populated by figures as much as by concepts” (93). 

There was no philosophy until the Greeks—although it was “brought by immigrants” (93):

The birth of philosophy required an encounter between the Greek milieu and the plane of immanence of thought. It required the conjunction of two very different movements of deterritorialization, the relative and the absolute, the first already at work in immanence. Absolute deterritorialization of the plane of thought had to be aligned or directly connected with the relative deterritorialization of Greek society. The encounter between friend and thought was needed. In short, philosophy does have a principle, but it is a synthetic and contingent principle—an encounter, a conjunction. It is not insufficient by itself but contingent in itself. Even in the concept, the principle depends upon a connection of components that could have been different, with different neighborhoods. The principle of reason such as it appears in philosophy is a principle of contingent reason and is put like this: there is no good reason but contingent reason; there is no universal history except of contingency. (93)

For this reason, “[p]hilosophy is a geophilosophy in precisely the same way that history is a geohistory”: the question of why philosophy arose in Greece is similar to the question of why capitalism arose in certain places and not others (95). “Geography wrests history from the cult of necessity in order to stress the irreducibility of contingency. It wrests it from the cult of origins in order to affirm the power of a ‘milieu’” (96).Geography also wrests history “from structures in order to trace the lines of flight that pass through the Greek world across the Mediterranean” (96). Finally, 

it wrests history from itself in order to discover becomings that do not belong to history even if they fall back into it: the history of philosophy in Greece must not hide the fact that in every case the Greeks had to become philosophers in the first place, just as philosophers had to become Greek. ‘Becoming’ does not belong to history. History today still designates only the set of conditions, however recent they may be, from which one turns away in order to become, that is to say, in order to create something new. (96)

However, they argue that 

[p]hilosophy cannot be reduced to its own history, because it continually wrests itself from this history in order to create new concepts that fall back into history but do not come from it. How could something come from history? Without history, becoming would remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but becoming is not historical. (96)

I think that argument comes from the idea that history is the realm of necessity: “[p]hilosophy appears in Greece as a result of contingency rather than necessity, as a result of an ambiance or milieu rather than an origin, of a becoming rather than a history, of a geography rather than a historiography, of a grace rather than a nature” (96-97). 

Philosophy and capitalism have parallel relationships to history, and capitalism involves deterritorializations and reterritorializations: “for always contingent reasons, capitalism leads Europe into a fantastic relative deterritorialization that is due first of all to city-towns and that itself takes place through immanence. Territorial produce is connected to an immanent form able to cross the seas,” and the two “principal components of capitalism,” labour and capital, are brought together and adjusted in the West: 

Only the West extends and propagates its centers of immanence. The social field no longer refers to an external limit that restricts it from above, as in the empires, but to immanent internal limits that constantly shift by extending the system, and that reconstitute themselves through displacement. External obstacles are not only technological, and only internal rivalries remain. A world market extends to the ends of the earth before passing into the galaxy: even the skies become horizontal. This is not a result of the Greek endeavor but a resumption, in another form and with other means, on a scale hitherto unknown, which nonetheless relaunches the combination for which the Greeks took the initiative: democratic imperialism, colonizing democracy. (97)

In other words, this combination consists of productive contradictions, since empire and democracy (in the terms in which they’ve discussed them), as vertical and horizontal, contradict each other. “Modern philosophy’s link with capitalism, therefore, is of the same kind as that of ancient philosophy with Greece: the connection of an absolute plane of immanence with a relative social milieu that also functions through immanence” (98).

There is a relationship between capitalism’s deterritorialization and the reterritorialization of the State: “The immense relative deterritorialization of world capitalism needs to be reterritorialized on the modern national State, which finds an outcome in democracy, the new society of ‘brother,’ the capitalist version of the society of friends” (98). What’s missing here, though, is a recognition that capitalism is overpowering those states as it becomes more and more powerful. “The man of capitalism is not Robinson”—Robinson Crusoe, that is—“but Ulysses, the cunning plebeian, some average man or other living in the big towns, Autochthonous Proletarians or foreign Migrants who throw themselves into infinite movement—revolution” (98). Capitalism, in this argument, is revolutionary, which is true, I suppose, if the word “revolution” is purged of positive teleological connotations and understood as meaning radical change.

There is also a connection between contemporary philosophy and capitalism: “the connection of ancient philosophy with the Greek city and the connection of modern philosophy with capitalism are not ideological and do not stop at pushing historical and social determinations to infinity so as to extract spiritual figures from them” (99). In addition, while “it may be tempting to see philosophy as an agreement commerce of the mind,” that idea would turn it into marketing or advertising: “What is most distressing is not this shameless appropriation but the conception of philosophy that made it possible in the first case” (99). “But what saves modern philosophy is that it is no more the friend of capitalism than ancient philosophy was the friend of the city,” they argue. “Philosophy takes the relative deterritorialization of capital to the absolute; it makes it pass over the plane of immanence as movement of the infinite and suppresses it as internal limit, turns it back against itself so as to summon forth a new earth, a new people. But in this way it arrives at the nonpropositional form of the concept in which communication, exchange, consensus, and opinion vanish entirely” (99). I wonder if by “philosophy” here they are talking about Marx, or if they are talking about themselves and other postmodern philosophers. I’m really not sure. What is clear, I think, is that  philosophy is utopian; that’s what links it to its own epoch (99). “In each case it is with utopia that philosophy becomes political and takes the criticism of its own time to its highest point” (99). And yet philosophy (like utopia) needs to be wary of the return of transcendence:

In utopia (as in philosophy) there is always the risk of a restoration, and sometimes a proud affirmation, of transcendence, so that we need to distinguish between authoritarian utopias, or utopias of transcendence, and immanent, revolutionary, libertarian utopias. But to say that revolution is itself utopia of immanence is not to say that it is a dream, something that is not realized or that is only realized by betraying itself. On the contrary, it is to posit revolution as plane of immanence, infinite movement and absolute survey, but to the extent that these features connect up with what is real here and now in the struggle against capitalism, relaunching new struggles whenever the earlier one is betrayed. The word utopia therefore designates that conjunction of philosophy, or of the concept, with the present milieu. (100)

Utopia and revolution are connected, despite the failures of historical examples: “That the two great modern revolutions, American and Soviet, have turned out so badly does not prevent the concept from pursuing its immanent path” (100). 

Revolution or utopia is closely connected to the concept, which is to say (I think) to philosophy:

The concept frees immanence from all the limits still imposed on it by capital (or that it imposed on itself in the form of capital appearing as something transcendent). However, it is not so much a case of a separation of the spectator from the actor in this enthusiasm as of a distinction within the action itself between historical factors and ‘unhistorical vapor,’ between a state of affairs and the event. As concept and as event, revolution is self-referential or enjoys a self-positing that enables it to be apprehended in an immanent enthusiasm without anything in states of affairs or lived experience being able to tone it down, not even the disappointments of reason. Revolution is absolute deterritorialization even to the point where this calls for a new earth, a new people. (100-01)

At this point, Deleuze and Guattari return to the relationship between deterritorialization and reterritorialization: “Absolute deterritorialization does not take place without reterritorialization. Philosophy is reterritorialized on the concept. The concept is not object but territory” (101). (I’m not sure what that distinction means.) However, because we are “misled” by “Christian transcendence,” “we lack a genuine plane” where we could put our concepts (101). 

“Philosophical reterritorialization therefore also has a present form,” they continue, but not in the modern democratic state and human rights, because they are not universal (102). We do have concepts, but “possession of the concept does not appear to coincide with revolution, the democratic State, and human rights” (103). “If there is no universal democratic State,” they write,

it is because the market is the only thing that is universal in capitalism. In contrast with the ancient empires that carried out transcendent overcodings, capitalism functions as an immanent axiomatic of decoded flows (of money, labor, products). National States are no longer paradigms of overcoding but constitute the ‘models of realization’ of this immanent axiomatic. (106)

“It is as if the deterritorialization of States tempered that of capital and provided it with compensatory reterritorializations,” they suggest (106). While the “models of realization” of States might be diverse and heterogenous, “they are nonetheless isomorphous with regard to the world market insofar as the latter not only presupposes but produces determinate inequalities of development” (106)—so it’s the market that’s dominant, it seems, even though that market is bound to result in unequal development.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, human rights are merely axioms—which is to say, I think, that they are not concepts:

Human rights are axioms. They can coexist on the market with many other axioms, notably those concerning the security of property, which are unaware of or suspend them even more than they contradict them. . . . Who but the police and armed forces that coexist with democracies can control and manage poverty and the deterritorialization-reterritorialization of shanty towns? What social democracy has not given the order to fire when the poor came out of their territory or ghetto? Rights save neither men nor a philosophy that is reterritorialized on the democratic State. Human rights will not make us bless capitalism. A great deal of innocence or cunning is needed by a philosophy of communication that claims to restore the society of friends, or even of wise men, by forming a universal opinion of “consensus” able to moralize nations, States, and the market. Human rights say nothing about the immanent modes of existence of people provided with rights. (107)

This is the case not only in the extreme situations (genocide) described by Primo Levi, but also “in insignificant conditions, before the meanness and vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies, before the propagation of these modes of existence and of thought-for-the-market, and before the values, ideals, and opinions of our time” (107). 

Here they start to think about shame, perhaps the kind of shame the unwilling colonizer might feel—I’m not entirely sure. “We do not feel ourselves outside of our time but continue to undergo shameful compromises with it,” they write:

This feeling of shame is one of philosophy’s most powerful motifs. We are not responsible for the victims but responsible before them. And there is no way to escape the ignoble but to play the part of the animal (to growl, burrow, snigger, distort ourselves): thought itself is sometimes closer to an animal that dies than to a living, even democratic, human being. (108)

What is required, they suggest, perhaps as a way of overcoming or sidestepping shame, is a resistance to the present, which will, it seems, inevitably lead to revolution or utopia: 

If philosophy is reterritorialized on the concept, it does not find the condition for this in the present form of the democratic State or in a cogito of communication that is even more dubious than that of reflection. We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist. (108)

At this point, art-making makes a reappearance, as a potentially revolutionary act: “Art and philosophy converge at this point: the constitution of an earth and a people that are lacking as the correlate of creation” (108). However, there are limits to what art or philosophy can accomplish. They cannot create a people—by which I think they mean a nation:

The artist or the philosopher is quite incapable of creating a people, each can only summon it with all his strength. A people can only be created in abominable sufferings, and it cannot be concerned any more with art of philosophy. But books of philosophy and works of art also contain their sum of unimaginable sufferings that forewarn of the advent of a people. They have resistance in common—their resistance to death, to servitude, to the intolerable, to shame, and to the present. (110)

Works of art, like philosophy, are (or at least can be) acts of resistance, including to the shame of being complicit, and to the inequities in iniquities of the present.

Now Deleuze and Guattari return to deterritorialization and reterritorialization, which “meet in the double becoming” between “stranger” and “Autochthon”:

The Autochthon can hardly be distinguished from the stranger because the stranger becomes Authchthonous in the country of the other who is not, at the same time that the Autochthon becomes stranger to himself, his class, his nation, and his language: we speak the same language, and yet I do not understand you. Becoming stranger to oneself, to one’s language and nation, is this not the peculiarity of the philosopher and philosophy, their ‘style,’ or what is called a philosophical gobbledygook? (110)

Could “gobbledygook” be a self-reflective evaluation of their prose style?

In short,” they conclude, philosophy is reterritorialized three times: on the Greeks in the past, on the democratic State in the present, and on the new people and earth in the future. Greeks and democrats are strangely deformed in this mirror of the future” (110). That “mirror of the future” is, I think, a way of imagining what the present or past would look like from the vantage of a future utopia—although utopia is not “a good concept”:

Utopia is not a good concept because even when opposed to History it is still subject to it and lodged within it as an ideal or motivation. But becoming is the concept itself. It is born in History, and falls back into it, but is not of it. In itself it has neither beginning nor end but only a milieu. It is thus more geographical than historical. Such are revolutions and societies of friends, societies of resistance, because to create is to resist: pure becomings, pure events on a plane of immanence. What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self-positing as a concept, escapes History. (110)

History, as necessity, is not becoming or “coming about”: 

What is in the process of coming about is no more what ends than what begins. History is not experimentation, it is only the set of almost negative conditions that make possible the experimentation of something that escapes history. Without history experimentation would remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but experimentation is not historical. It is philosophical. (111)

What is the connection between experimentation and becoming, between experimentation and the concept, between experimentation and philosophy and art? Are philosophy and art forms of experimentation? Are they ways to potentially escape history? I don’t know. The text ends and I’m left feeling that I was on the brink of understanding something that didn’t quite materialize—or perhaps reterritorialize. In any case, after reading texts like Emma Battell Lowman’s and Adam J. Barker’s Settler and Clare Land’s Decolonizing Solidarity, both of which posit the possibility or indeed necessity of a revolution that will come out of political activism, it was in some ways helpful to read Deleuze’s and Guattari’s thinking about revolution and its connection to art and philosophy. Could art itself be a form of political resistance or activism? They seem to suggest that’s the case. That might be what’s useful about “Geophilosophy,” although to be honest, I’m left thinking that it was a mistake to include it on my reading list. I’m also left with the realization that it’s not enough to pull one essay out of a book like What Is Philosophy? because the ideas are developed throughout the book. On the other hand, I’m on a deadline, and reading all of What is Philosophy? might take more time than it’s worth, particularly since it seems to be somewhat outside my research. I’m also left with the realization (once again) that I’m going to have to tackle Anti-Oedipus, and that a shorter text like “Geophilosophy” isn’t going to be sufficient. Somehow, then, I’m going to have to find the time to read that notoriously difficult work.

Works Cited

Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. “Conceptual Personae.” What is Philosophy?, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 61-83.

——. “Geophilosophy.” What is Philosophy?, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 85-113.

Land, Clare. Decolonizing Solidarity: Dilemmas and Directions for Supporters of Indigenous Struggles, Zed, 2015.

Lowman, Emma Battell, and Adam J. Barker. Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada. Fernwood, 2015.

Santo, Carolina E. Geoscenography. Scenography from the milieu of Development-Forced Displacement and Resettlement (DRDR). PhD dissertation, University of Vienna, 2018.

84. Clare Land, Decolonizing Solidarity: Dilemmas and Directions for Supporters of Indigenous Struggles

clare land

In Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada, Emma Battell Lowman and Adam J. Barker suggest that it’s not possible for Settlers not to make mistakes when trying to show solidarity with Indigenous peoples (118). Despite that warning, though, when I saw the title of Clare Land’s Decolonizing Solidarity: Dilemmas and Directions for Supporters of Indigenous Struggles, I thought she might suggest ways those mistakes can be avoided. I think it was the word “Directions” that brought that idea into my head. And that first thought was incorrect. What Land does in her long book (and a long book inevitably means a long summary, for which I apologize) is suggest the complexity involved in Settlers attempting to show solidarity with Indigenous struggles. Her focus is on southeastern Australia, but those complexities exist elsewhere, too, above all in western Canada.

The book’s foreword, written by Dr. Gary Foley of Victoria University and the Gumbaynggirr Nation  in Australia, begins with these words: 

This is a book about a difficult topic that is rarely discussed in contemporary Australia. It addresses situations and ideas that few non-Aboriginal Australians who say they are supporters of Aboriginal peoples’ quest for justice ever really consider. And yet these issues are major problems for those who seek a role as empathetic and constructive allies for the Aboriginal cause. (ix)

In his work over nearly 50 years, Foley writes, “many of the most difficult conversations I have had have been with people who insisted that they were supporters of the Aboriginal struggle rather than with those who were opposed to our cause” (ix). These are cautionary words for any Settler who intends to show solidarity. The problem, Foley contends, is that non-Aboriginal activist supporters sometimes don’t “comprehend notions of Aboriginal agency and self-determination” (x). Foley believes that if Land’s book “can help to eliminate many of the unfortunate misunderstandings that invariably develop between Aboriginal groups and their white supporters then it will have served an admirable purpose” (xi). If that’s true in Australia, then it will be true in Canada as well.

In her introduction, Land notes the disconnects she has seen and experienced between Aboriginal people and white activists, which often go unnoticed by the latter group (1). In addition, “there is a discernible pattern in non-Aboriginal peoples’ journeys of involvement in the field”; after meeting with obstacles or problems, “[s]ome retreat to look in the mirror, adopt a questioning attitude and reaffirm their determination to stay involved,” while others “walk away thinking ‘It’s too hard” or “stalk away thinking Aboriginal people are ungrateful or unreliable” (2). “From an Aboriginal perspective, there can sometimes seem to be a revolving door of non-Aboriginal people,” some of whom will “rapidly reveal themselves as a missionary, a mercenary or a misfit” (2). “Is there anything to guide non-Indigenous people, a way of being beyond the limited repertoire of available subjectivities—guilty liberals, conservative nationalists, or honorary blacks—that could be more appropriate for cultivating a collective, political project?” she asks (2). “This book,” she responds, “provides an urgently needed new framework for action by non-Indigenous people in support of Indigenous struggles” and “sheds light on the dilemmas facing non-Aboriginal people seeking to play a role in addressing the situation in which Aboriginal people find themselves in Australia today, exploring ways Aboriginal community leaders and non-Aboriginal activists have negotiated relationships of solidarity” (2-3). The complexity of those relationships is the focus of Land’s book.

Land notes that Decolonizing Solidarity “was written and is situated historically and politically in a settler-colonial context in which Britain declared sovereignty illegally and against the interests of Indigenous polities on the continent now known as Australia” (3-4). That process of colonization, she continues,

is entrenched and continuing. Cognizant of these colonizing conditions, this book is concerned with interactions between Indigenous people and non-Indigenous people who are at once struggling against two things: these overarching structural conditions, and their interpersonal expression. This book sets out what kind of politics could frame this two-part struggle. Solidarity should be directed to decolonization; and the way solidarity is undertaken needs to be decolonized. (4)

Aboriginal peoples in the south-east of Australia have been engaged in a long struggle “against colonial invaders’ murderous possessiveness in relation to land, and, crucially, for survival as distinct peoples” (4). That is the context in which the conversation about the politics of solidarity takes place. That conversation, Land argues,

is not about being accused of being good or bad, right or wrong. In this, the generosity of people like Foley who invest so much in those who locate themselves as supporters or potential allies, but who inadvertently display their privilege and power, should inspire others engaged in the conversation to be similarly generous with each other, or at least to think about what the end goal is. One of the tactics for achieving the end goal is to build and nurture the support base, to get more people onside and get them to understand the issues and in turn become good, strong, well-informed, effective organizers. The work of educating those who are giving you headaches is debilitating—non-Aboriginal people should be helping Aboriginal people out by educating each other, taking responsibility for each other. (5)

Foley identifies “patronizing and paternalistic” treatment as a common experience, and suggests that white supporters don’t understand the importance of “Aboriginal control of aboriginal affairs” (7). That lack of understanding is a fundamental problem, both in Australia and in Canada as well.

Land’s book is based on interviews with activist leaders and supporters in south-east Australia (8). “Specifically,” she writes, 

I interviewed Aboriginal people who engage politically with and work to educate non-Aboriginal people, and non-Aboriginal people who are regarded by the Aboriginal people in my critical reference group, or whom I interviewed, as reflective about the issues at stake. They are members of a particular political community—Aboriginal people from south-east Australia who have pursued land rights, community control and sovereignty—and their supporters. The contradictions inherent in relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in the context of struggles for land rights, sovereignty and community control are particularly stark because people are positioned in opposition: as colonized and colonizer; as dispossessed and beneficiary; as community members or not. My focus on this particular context enables a consideration of the impact of colonizing societal conditions on interpersonal relationships in a context in which these conditions are explicitly the focus of critical attention. (8-9)

In this summary I will tend to skip over the details of those interviews and focus on the conclusions Land draws from them, if only in the interests of trying to keep it relatively short (even though, as I’ve admitted, it’s actually quite long). Because of its focus on southeastern Australia, Decolonizing Solidarity has a “grounded specificity to a particular place, struggle and practice,” which “provides a credible basis from which to theorize” and “gives the book the ability to be read from and be applicable to other contexts” (9). It also draws on her own experiences and reflections before and during the research, and discussions with activist and academic peers, along with responses from the examiners of the PhD thesis that is the basis of the book (10). 

The detailed historical context of the first two chapters is necessary because it shows “how the politics of solidarity outlined in later chapters are inflected by their context,” and because “it indicates what sort of contextual knowledge is needed for those wishing to come to grips with the politics of solidarity in different contexts” (11), and although I understand why that context is important, I must admit that I skimmed those chapters. They did leave me wondering if there is as rich a history of Settler solidarity with First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples in Canada as there appears to have been in Australia. Land cites Lynne Davis’s writing about the Canadian situation, which suggests that little has been written about relationships between Indigenous peoples and social movement groups (16). That’s not the case in Australia, where “there has been some important writing on relationships between Indigenous peoples and other political actors,” although that work is primarily historical and tends not to be “explicitly self-reflective” (16). “Davis’s observation in Canada that it is the people who are engaged in Indigenous-non-Indigenous political alliances who are contributing the most to understandings of it,” Land writes, and that seems to be true in Australia as well: “activists themselves continue to be the key theorists of their own practice” (16). Indeed, without her own activist involvement, she would not have been able to write this book, because no one would have talked to her (17).

Land suggests that this book “is particularly useful in suggesting ways for more recently involved non-Indigenous activists to come to grips with the politics of solidarity” (12). She notes that the reconciliation process and apology issued by the Australian government 

have worked to restore a sense of comfort to settler Australians but are empty of structural or material redress for Indigenous people. Working against this complacency, and striving for substantive change, a key strategy in Aboriginal struggles for land rights, self-determination and economic independence in south-east Australia is to nurture a critical and committed support base among settler Australians. (13)

That sense of comfort and complacency is no doubt present in this country as well. Land also envisages this book “as being supportive of this Indigenous strategy as it is expressed in the social justice activist community in south-east Australia” and notes that it is 

intended as a resource to support the efforts of Indigenous people who have had to contest with each new generation of non-Indigenous supporters the mode of their solidarity. Knowledge of genuinely productive and transformative modes has until now been discerned by individual actors largely through a process of repeating the mistakes of the past. The book clearly explains the modes of solidarity that Indigenous people have identified as problematic, and explains the alternative frameworks they offer. This includes a critique of romantic, sometimes ignorant, conceptions of Indigenous people that are expressed in the national settler pastime of worrying about Indigenous people and that underlie the impulse to “help them.” (13)

“The book is envisaged as a kind of reply to Indigenous people’s assertions about the nature of non-Indigenous support or engagement with their struggles,” she writes, suggesting that it is “part of an ongoing conversation directed towards understanding the challenges, dilemmas and even the impossibilities of this work and how these can be shifted, worked through or lived with” (20).

The politics of solidarity between Settlers and Indigenous peoples are complicated and difficult. “Through an early conversation with a member of my critical reference group, I came quickly to recognize that Indigenous people ‘put up’ with a lot from non-Indigenous people,” Land writes. “I have come to think of the forbearance of Indigenous people in dealing with their supporters as under-recognized work” (20). The need to challenge non-Indigenous supporters “is borne, of course, from the pain of dealing with supporters’ ‘whitely’ ways, ways of relating that are dominated by white stereotypes of Indigenous peoples” (20). To be “whitely,” she writes, is to behave in a way that reproduces white privilege (20), and she wonders if it’s possible to be a white critic of whiteness, if one can gain sufficient critical distance from the subject “to contribute usefully to its critique” (22). “My engagement with the workings of my own whiteness and my own colonial complicities in both my research and my attempts to contribute to Indigenous struggles is an informed and crucial element of my critique of whiteness,” she writes, suggesting the necessity of understanding that one is part of the problem one is trying to articulate (22). 

One of the issues she contends with is research itself. “The politics around research related to Indigenous peoples has significant implications for the way I thought about and went about my research,” she writes, quoting Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s comment that the word “research” is one of the dirtiest words in the Indigenous vocabulary (26). “Given the implication of research in the colonization of Indigenous peoples and the appropriation of Indigenous knowledges, the prospect of undertaking research in connection with Indigenous peoples is problematic,” she acknowledges (26). For that reason, she designed her research “to correspond with principles, where they have been articulated, for culturally appropriate research by non-Indigenous researchers,” and drew on her own sense of ethics “to establish additional boundaries” (26-27). She also “sought to be appraised of, cognizant of, informed by and working to promote, or at least not undermine, and Indigenous research agenda,” although she doesn’t imagine that her work “could necessarily advance that agenda” (27). “If non-Indigenous activist work supporting Indigenous rights is ideally located in parallel with, and informed by, the Indigenous decolonization agenda,” she continues, “then I see it as necessary, in a moral and intellectual sense, to have the same orientation to Indigenous research agendas in proceeding with my research” (27-28). She acknowledges the importance of Smith’s Decolonizing Methodologies in her research—another book I need to read—and suggests that her own book “is probably best understood as making a contribution to an imagined progressive non-Indigenous research agenda” that is “supportive of Indigenous agendas” and contributes to them indirectly (28-29). 

For Land, Settlers need to examine our complicity in colonialism, “including by interrogating who we are in terms of identity, culture and history, and the shape of our lives” (29). That examination, she continues, “is part of a practice of critical self-reflection and of dealing honestly with the impact of dominant culture on Aboriginal people. This is a non-Indigenous effort in parallel with the Indigenous project of indigenizing” (29). Her research looks for “Indigenous ways of addressing difference that innovate against imperialist ways of addressing difference”—this was a way of promoting “a recognition of Indigenous efforts at reframing” (30)—and “acknowledges the Indigenous project to restore Indigenous well-being,” challenging “the lack of understanding by non-Indigenous people of their/our collective and individual impact on Indigenous well-being, and their/our inherent privilege” (30).

Part of this project involves understanding white privilege, but understanding isn’t enough; one also has “to consider ways to undo it,” to try to unlearn it and to be cognizant of it (31). One needs to internalize “an Indigenous view of whiteness, a recognition of the historical and political specificities of the moment in which it is salient . . . and the struggle to overcome the self-hate that can flow from that,” she writes (33). Writing this book, she continues, “has changed me as much as it has generated the ideas set out. I now undertake to return these ideas to fellow activists and those who have challenged, worked with and educated me” (37).

Land’s first chapter, on land rights, sovereignty, and Black Power in south-east Australia, is primarily a history of developments since the 1960s, providing the context of her research, but also touching on events prior to that decade. A “self-conscious engagement with the history of non-Indigenous support for Indigenous struggles in any particular area is key to the contemporary politics of solidarity by those of colonial backgrounds with Indigenous struggles in that area” (50), an insight which leads in to her second chapter, “A Political Genealogy for Contemporary Non-Indigenous Activism in Australia.” “Non-Indigenous people attempting to support Indigenous struggles in Australia today do so in relation to a history of efforts by non-Indigenous groups and organizations to advance the cause of Aboriginal people; yet this is a history of which they may not be aware,” she suggests (51). Some of those efforts were paternalistic or undertaken without consultation with Aboriginal activists or intellectuals or any appreciation of their agendas (51). “While there are a lot of cautionary tales to be drawn from problematic ‘black-white’ interactions in past campaigns and organizations during recent history, there are also many inspiring and instructive histories,” Land writes (52), noting that it’s important to know about and celebrate “pro-Indigenous actions and efforts by non-Indigenous people” that were not paternalistic, because they show that paternalism was not inevitable, since “alternatives were being lived out publicly in the same period” (52). “It is important to be familiar with the work of those who have made significant contributions, and as well as those whose practices have been either particularly problematic or particularly positive,” she suggests (53). It’s also crucial to “foreground Indigenous peoples’ solidarity with each other’s struggles, and with anti-racist and anti-fascist struggles” as well (54). She provides examples of individuals, groups, and organizations that showed solidarity with Indigenous struggles (55-65), such as the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and the “infamous contest over Aboriginal control within the organization” (65). She also discusses the role of student activism in the late 1960s (71-72) and “the history of non-Indigenous women’s interactions and relationships with Indigenous people and non-Indigenous feminists’ political connections with Indigenous women in Australia” (72-75), as well as the creation of “white support groups” in the 1990s (75). “The boom in white support for reconciliation—of which the ‘bridge walks’ of the year 2000 are often invoked as the high water mark—has been greeted with both pleasure at its extent, and criticism at its lack of efficacy in bringing about substantive changes to Indigenous-state relations,” Land writes (75-76), noting that despite such critiques, “the willingness of non-Indigenous people to sign up in large numbers was also regarded as proof of a reservoir of goodwill held by non-Indigenous people towards Indigenous people” (76). However, after Prime Minister Kevin Rudd delivered an apology to Indigenous peoples in 2008, “community action in support of Aboriginal struggles lost urgency” (76). Land also touches on the difficult relationship between environmental groups and Indigenous struggles (76-78), and the collaborations between Indigenous activists and the anti-globalization movement and anarchist groups (79-81). 

All of that activity, Land writes, suggests that it is self-evident “that Indigenous people desire political support from non-Indigenous people” (81). “In general,” she continues, 

Indigenous people outnumbered in settler-colonial nation-states have worked hard to nurture their support bases, believing the realization of their political aspirations rely on the ability to win significant non-Indigenous support. Yet the question of how much to prioritize the project of engaging with and educating non-Indigenous people continues to be a subject of debate for Indigenous people. (81-82)

However, she points out, support is different from control: “to institutionalize Aboriginal control” of Indigenous political movements “seemed the only way to ensure that the efforts of non-Indigenous members of, or supporters of, the movement were directed to Indigenous priorities: economic justice, land rights and racism” (83). That distinction is central to the argument she makes in the rest of the book.

In chapter three, “Identity Categories: How Activists Both Use and Refuse Them,” Land explores the complexity of identity. “When non-Indigenous people and Indigenous people come together in pro-Indigenous, pro-land rights political spaces,” she writes, 

they are establishing a relationship based on a critique of colonialism. This is a setting in which individuals’ social locatedness in relation to colonialism is salient: for instance, Indigeneity matters in terms of who has a claim to restitution based on the theft of land. Therefore it makes sense to talk in terms of categories such as colonizers and the colonized, Indigenous and non-Indigenous, dispossessed and beneficiary. It also makes sense in these settings to be attentive to how structural categories are so often emulated in the way people interact and to use strategies to avert this. (84)

And yet, she continues, “one of the most powerful expressions of a colonial mindset is to establish and police a sharp divide between ‘Indigenous and ‘non-Indigenous’” (84): “It is not only that the idea of a discrete binary with total purity on each side is both ridiculous and impossible; the Indigenous-non-Indigenous distinction and the treatment meted out in accordance with that distinction is one of the most pernicious manifestations of colonialism,” and to think in those terms “is to be beholden to colonialist logic” (84-85). This argument immediately left me thinking about questions of appropriation, and the way that some Settlers pretend to be Indigenous. Doesn’t the distinction between “Indigenous” and “non-Indigenous” do important work? Is there a point to deconstructing this particular binary opposition?

“People engaged in decolonizing and pro-land rights politics negotiate this dilemma by at times using and at times refusing these categories,” Land continues, and “Indigenous theorists working in the academy, the community or both have offered crucial innovations against this dichotomy” (85). The “imperial binarism” that insists on “a distinction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous cannot be sustained,” and there are “many instances of interaction and intimacy between the two sides,” as well as “internal diversity within each” (85). Instead, Land advocates for a focus on “relationality”—“in particular the recognition that Indigenous people’s lives are shaped by interaction and change”—which challenges notions of those lives lived in separate realms (86). “I highlight new forms of relationality which go beyond a critique and dissolution of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ identity though of imperialist culture on that culture’s own terms,” she continues (86). 

Beyond those questions, “non-Indigenous people who are relatively privileged” and who wish to show solidarity with Indigenous peoples “will either be asked, or will find it profoundly important, to come to terms with a number of propositions” (86). These include “coming to see and to deeply know our/their social location and its implications,” which are psychological, material, structural, and legal (86); “coming to see that how we see ourselves and those interests we share has been constructed and inherited” (87); and “coming to see how the idea of racial difference has been created and made real—as reflected in harsh lived realities” (87). “To come to terms with these propositions is to gain insight into the strategic and psychological dilemmas that colonization has created for those challenging it,” Land argues (87). “One part of the challenge for white people is to see ourselves/themselves both as individuals of conscious and as members of a group with unearned privileges and a history of colonialism with which to reckon” (87). This is the central point of her argument, I think. However, she continues, there are different ways “to approach, manage and resist internalized colonialist views of difference and identity” (87). One way is to recentre and listen for “Indigenous cultural resources and knowledge as they are deployed by Indigenous people engaged in this politics” (87). That means, in part, understanding and accepting the fact of one’s privilege (87-88). Settlers need “to learn from Indigenous people critiques of systems of white supremacy and the privilege that accrues to white people” as a strategy for challenging white privilege (88). “To understand one’s relation to Indigenous people or any other group is a process of locating oneself in the social relations of domination and oppression,” (88) although “people with access to multiple levels of privilege can also use their privilege in order to contribute to social change” (89)—a notion Land later complicates. We also need to be able “to take an intersectional view of privilege and oppression because it is true to lived realities, and because it informs a broad moral and political framework for non-Indigenous people’s support for Indigenous struggles” (89). Solidarity with Indigenous struggles, then, is part of working towards meaningful social change for everyone (89-90). In other words, non-Indigenous people need to see their work serving their own interests, not just helping Aboriginal people (90): “to change the system that oppresses Indigenous people is to change the system that also oppresses some non-Indigenous people in one dimension or more” (90). However, the tendency of white people “to appropriate the position of victim in order to avoid confronting complicity with colonial and racial oppression” has to be challenged (90). 

Land pays attention to the language she is using, and notes that using “the words ‘Indigenous’ and ‘non-Indigenous’ is far from neutral”: they can “reproduce stereotypes, do regressive discursive work, and create certain traps. The Indigenous/non-Indigenous binary imposed by colonialism has rightly been harshly critiqued by many scholars who have identified the inbuilt ideas of superiority and inferiority in such ways of thinking” (91). Nevertheless, she asks, “how can critics of colonialism talk about the politics and lived realities of colonialism without describing the contrast in treatment that the state has meted out according to these categories?” (92). “The terms ‘Indigenous’ and ‘non-Indigenous’ (which, to my mind, can be twinned with the structural categories ‘colonized’ and ‘colonizer,’ yet not with the racial categories ‘black’ and ‘white’) helpfully foreground the colonial relation of the two groups in Australia,” Land argues (93), although she notes that when she invokes this binary she is referring to “political and historical categories, not racial, biological ones” (93). Whiteness itself is a political category, rather than a biological one (93). 

“It is not possible to sustain an uncritical use of an indigenous/colonizer binary, and it is necessary to clearly identify the advantages and drawbacks of using these terms,” Land writes.  The term “Indigenous” can be a basis for collaboration and strength, despite its colonizing work in effacing national or tribal differences; in addition, the distinction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous “reflects a material, historical reality (a ‘social fact’) for many people: to use it keeps in view a socially constructed division that has real consequences for many people” (93). However, 

[a]n uncritical use of a binary distinction between Indigenous/non-Indigenous and colonized/colonizer is unsustainable. I maintain that it is necessary to invoke them and that when I invoke them it is as political, structural categories, not “natural,” “racial” ones. I also maintain that such a framework is appropriate for my study, which focuses on a political practice and space in which structural categories are less important in locating people than the way colonized and colonizer interests are identified and served. (96)

Land then considers alternative ways of thinking about this distinction, including the postmodern focus on hybridity (96), which she finds wanting:

non-white groups have been reluctant to let go of identity categories as central organizing principles. . . . The political/strategic danger associated with discussion of hybridity comes . . . from the way hybridity is postulated as inevitable. For one thing, this view forecloses agency by Aboriginal people, because hybridity is happening/will happen on someone else’s terms. Also, a deterministic view regarding the increase of hybrid subjectivities . . . is attended, politically, by the threat that the legitimacy of claims for measures of justice (redistribution of land and/or political power) on the basis of rights inherent to Indigenous people exclusively will be diminished. Further, demands that Indigenous people embrace a hybridist approach to identity appear as a double standard, given that ‘white’ people don’t have to. Hybridity in white people is not demonized in the same way as it is in Indigenous people in colonialist discourse. (97-98)

The “postcolonial orthodoxy”—the positing of hybrid subjectivities—neglects anti-colonial actors: “Supporters of Indigenous struggles in settler nations are likewise anti-colonial actors; focusing on how identity categories are used, refused and innovated against in such scenes brings helpful frameworks into view” (98-99). 

Neither option—“either habitually invoking the binary towards anti-colonialist ends or relying on the postmodernist hybridity approach to identity”—is satisfactory, Land suggests (99). She cites the work of Leela Gandhi, whose focus on British critics of the British empire as the ones who “stood with” external critics is “informative for a decolonized theoretical framework for solidarity” (99). “The collaboration between Indigenous critics of empire and the ones who stood or stand with them blur the colonizer-colonized boundary through their practices,” Land suggests. “When members of the colonizing culture act to further the interests of the colonized while standing to gain no material advantage from this themselves, their relationship to their structural location changes”—from one of loyalty to treason (99-100). “This transformation can also be understood through the notion of identifying and resisting or reducing complicity” (100). Land is interested not in borderlands (which suggest hybridity) but in the creation of new or different spaces which depart from the Indigenous/non-Indigenous binary (100). “Colonization created and then policed difference in its own interest,” she argues (100). “Indigenous peoples have used various strategies to respond to and manage the presence of outsiders—drawing, of course, on Indigenous culture and values to do so” (101). Colonialist approaches to difference have focused on assimilation, the eradication of Aboriginal people as peoples (101), but Indigenous peoples managed relationships with outsiders “through the expression of cultural ethics, diplomacy and political agency” (101). “In the face of the colonial encounter, Indigenous people continue to innovate in approaches to containing and/or accommodating incursive people,” Land continues (102). “A structural view of difference and colonial relations is crucial, yet so is a process of complicating this view. This is about making sense of lived experience and developing a practice for operating within a world in which the mechanical application of this view does not suffice” (103-04).

One example of a complication came out of her interview with Krauatungalung activist Robbie Thorpe, who told Land, “I don’t see it as Indigenous and non-Indigenous for starters. It’s: if you’ve got issues with the crime of genocide, well, I’d want to know you” (107). Thorpe considers non-Indigenous “allies” as “warriors,” language which “sidesteps the colonialist division ‘Indigenous’-‘non-Indigenous’” and therefore “functions to confuse, critique and transcend the binary between family (filial relationships) and friend (relationships with outsiders, strangers),” according to Land (108): “The warriors in this space are not united by filial ties (to blood/kin/caste), but are united by a loyalty to ideals that is filial in its degree” (108). “When non-Indigenous activists serve anti-colonial interests, they manifest a subjectivity that refuses the colonial logic that rigidly treated people according to the ascribed categories of Indigenous and non-Indigenous,” Land argues: 

In order to understand the logics and consequences of settler colonialism, it is necessary to see how this colonial formation metes out fundamentally different treatment to colonizers and indigenes, which is why I so often invoke these categories. Yet, within the social world of people pursuing social justice against the workings of settler colonialism in the south-east of Australia, these categories are at different times used, refused and critiqued, and, crucially, innovated against: not so much blurred as departed from. Their use reflects ‘social facts’: that is, their social and material consequences. The way that critics of empire negotiate their/our use of these terms reflects the struggle to resist such powerful discourses from within their force field (that is, the area in which they operate. (109)

“My way of addressing this binary,” she continues, 

is to see it as the object of critique, for the colonizing work such binaries have done, as well as to acknowledge the social facts in the colonizing context of south-eastern Australia. To sum up: I don’t resolve the tension by coming down on one side or by finding middle ground. . . . Rather, I see this tension as reflective of an imperfect (because colonizing) world and the challenges and dilemmas produced by it. I see its realities accepted by, and actively negotiated by, those I interviewed. (109-10)

Such negotiation, she continues, “is a difficult process of confronting ‘the state within the self’” (110). That process generates “a grounded, innovative set of possibilities for radicalized/transgressive ways to relate (and ways to understand relating)” which “includes non-Indigenous people seeing their interests as linked in with those of Indigenous people, though not in a way which appropriates Indigeneity” (110).

After this exploration of the surprisingly thorny issues around identity, Land moves on to her next chapter, which asks a surprising question: “Collaboration, Dialogue and Friendship: Always a Good Thing?” “Many positive-sounding words have come into use to describe relationships between Aboriginal people and communities and settler individuals, groups, organizations and governments and the processes that hold them together,” she begins. Partnerships, collaborations, alliances and coalitions might be sought, and they are seen to be held together by dialogue and especially by trust” (115). However, she continues,

“[i]deas informing white anti-racist practice and community organizing suggest how complexities relating to trust and accountability can be managed. In south-east Australia this could be more honestly described as a process of trying to do good work in disputed sovereign space, or transacting under colonizing condition.” (115)

Relationships can take many forms and “might be maintained for the purpose of communication between collective efforts made in parallel, rather than as part of directly working together” (115-16). “No matter what the form or function of the relationships, attentiveness to notions of representation, voice, difference, dialogue and power is key to reflective practice,” Land continues. “It is important to consider a variety of perspectives on collaboration, dialogue and difference in order to foreground the contradictions inherent in collaboration and dialogue across difference” (116).For instance, non-Indigenous supporters need to “locate themselves so that they may be challenged by those they are supporting” (116). And Indigenous people may manage relationships with supporters in different ways:

Some approaches are quite optimistic and risky, and others are more pessimistic, with risk managed through structures and boundaries which are put in place. There is a tension between the long track record of white untrustworthiness and the need for Indigenous people to be optimistic about the possibility of developing trusting relationships with allies. (116)

Such optimism, she writes, “keeps alive the promise of collaborations towards meaningful social change” (116).

At this point, Land asks a surprising and yet necessary question: “How could positive qualities like friendship, knowing and sharing possibly be a problem?” (117). The answer begins with the assumptions non-Indigenous people may bring to relationships of solidarity:

For example, they might assume that they will be gratefully and enthusiastically welcomed, and may not anticipate being held in suspicion by Aboriginal people initially, for quite some time or forever. They might think that they will gain friends among Aboriginal people they work to support politically, or work with towards some political goal. (117)

None of those assumptions may be grounded in reality. Friendship may not be part of cross-race ally relationships; instead, it might be an unexpected bonus coming out of years of work (117). That work needs to be done out of a sense of satisfaction from doing it, or as “an expression of love in a wider public sense,” not out of a desire for friendship or related desires that are ultimately about eliminating difference—wanting to be the same, or to inhabit “a self-identical reconciled community” (118). “In the context of contemporary Australian politics the desire of a non-Indigenous person to be friends with or to be loved by an Indigenous person (any Indigenous person) may be a depoliticized impulse associated particularly—though not exclusively—with the parliament-generated discourse of reconciliation,” Land contends, which is often seen “as an agenda to empty out or depoliticize Indigenous demands for justice and truth” (118). The failure of that discourse is becoming ever more apparent in this country as well.

In fact, Land argues, knowing the Other is itself suspect; it’s a “one-way sharing that benefits only non-Indigenous people” and could be read as an appropriative impulse; reaching an understanding with Indigenous peoples might rather involve learning about difference (119). After all, “[i]mperialist ways of addressing difference include indulging the urge to discover the strange and novel as familiar, or trying to erase or negate difference; aiming for unity or sameness, for self-identical community; even trying to get to ‘know’ the Other” (120). For that reason, she continues, “the radical possibilities of adopting a politics of friendship” which is motivated by political solidarity and a “principled distaste for racially exclusive worlds” are much more promising (120). “A politics of friendship in a settler colonial context is possible where Aboriginal people continue to assert radical title and continue to express concern for the rights of all people,” she suggests. “This generosity—this ethic of unconditional love—is evident and humbling for those who will see it” (121-22). Land suggests that, rather than inviting Aboriginal people as guests at dinner parties with her middle-class white friends, her objective ought to be changing the shape of her life by “spending and investing time and energies differently, so that over time my life and social world become more reflective of my values. An example of investing time and energies differently is to volunteer with anti-racist and non-white community initiatives”—but “spending time with people not of my ‘own kind’ needs to be on others’ terms, rather than on mine” (122-23). 

Some contexts for working relationships have been experienced by Aboriginal people as “anathema to friendship,” Land points out (123): for example, working with non-Indigenous people in government bureaucracies or universities (124). Often there are demands that Aboriginal people answer a barrage of questions mainstream organizations and individuals have about Aboriginal culture (123-25). Collaborations are particularly fraught; they generate questions about who wants and who benefits from collaboration, and often the benefits only accrue to one side of the relationship (125-26). There is also the question of whether dialogue can be sustained across differences (126). “To attempt dialogue across difference is not to presuppose either understanding or reconciliation; nor is the only goal of dialogue to reach a convergence of meanings,” Land argues:

To attempt dialogue is not to presuppose the attempt will succeed; nor is it to be naive regarding the risk of further harm. Failed dialogue or conflict might still produce greater understanding. Certainly it is not aimed at eliminating difference or the domination of one particular perspective. The politics of solidarity which this book discerns and discusses entails attentiveness to the many possibilities and limits in collaboration, dialogue and conflict. (128)

It’s not clear to me how a failed dialogue might produce understanding, unless it’s a negative understanding, one rooted in failure and frustration. Perhaps my lack of understanding is emblematic of a failure to comprehend the realities of difference. I don’t know.

Land asks how support relationships can be managed. It’s important, she suggests, to “learn from the existing repertoire of frameworks that are available for understanding our/their work. This includes questioning apparently unproblematic frameworks and values such as friendship and dialogue, as well as learning from Aboriginal people’s suggestions regarding how to manage dynamics that commonly arise within solidarity contexts” (128). Non-Indigenous supporters need to think about such issues as initiation, participation, and control, which means, in part that “you don’t do anything unless you’ve been asked to do it” (128). In other words, “Aboriginal people must initiate a project or collaboration”: this is “one of the three key ingredients of genuine community control” (129). “The principle of Aboriginal people initiating and being in control of their own struggle is politically, concretely important. It is not just arbitrary exclusion based on identity politics” (129). Rather, it is a way for them to solve their own problems, to add to pride and self-confidence in a context of denigration and oppression (129). In addition, conditions are not always right for dialogue and collaboration (130). “Alliances with non-Indigenous people and groups could be better negotiated and entered into on the basis of internal Indigenous community strength and organization,” Land suggests (130). “Depending on the conditions, separate work might be more appropriate than coalition, collaboration or dialogue” (131).

The ongoing history of colonialism affects attempts at dialogue or collaboration: “even within a situation of collaboration and solidarity, rather than forced dialogue, the workings of power and contrasting relationships to colonialism eventually reveal themselves” (132). That history also can make trust, cooperation, and inequality difficult: 

There is clearly much that precedes Indigenous-non-Indigenous interactions: the legacy of Australia’s colonizing past and present as it manifests in relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people working to transform relationships between each other and the state. . . . This context must be expected to prefigure possibilities for trust, which is elsewhere assumed to be a necessary starting point for working together. (132)

In practice, this context means “that non-Indigenous people must strive to be trustworthy (and enter into constructs for enforcing this), but not expect to be trusted in return. This acknowledges our colonizing past and present, as well as the riskiness of trust across colonizing power differences” (132). Deep-seated assumptions “will inevitably manifest in day-to-day interactions, despite non-Indigenous people’s . . . good intentions” (132), and the ongoing history of colonization “plays into present interactions” (133).

Land also argues that in relationships of solidarity there’s no such thing as partnership between equals: 

Aboriginal people have developed strategies for managing relationships with supporters across a range of contests, from activist settings to agencies and government. These can be seen in the way Aboriginal people negotiate deliberate but informal relationships, in the expectations placed on non-Indigenous people working within community-controlled organizations, in the adoption of formalized partnerships, agreements, MOUs (memoranda of understanding), contracts, protocols and treaties. (133-34)

“[T]he fundamental inequality in power between Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals or organizations that collaborate means that agreements must enshrine Indigenous rights rather than equal rights,” she continues (134). “It is important that Aboriginal people—as the non-dominant group—are the ones who dictate the terms of any partnership, agreement, contract, protocol, alliance or treaty and are believed when they say this has been breached” (136). Taking a secondary position would no doubt be difficult for Settlers, but Land argues that it’s absolutely essential, no matter how it might make Settlers feel. In addition, Land argues that deliberate arrangements “to ensure the accountability of members of dominant groups to members of marginalized groups” need to be created as a way to build trust (136). She cites the work of Robert Jensen, who “attributes his moral and political growth,” as a white man attempting “to operate in an anti-racist manner,” to “people across identity lines” who hold him accountable and help him move forward (137). “Accountability constructs can be formal or informal but must be real,” she continues (138).

There are benefits to Settlers developing relationships of collective responsibility with each other. For example, such relationships

potentially reduce the burden on Aboriginal people of such education work. In addition, this can increase allies’ political sophistication in both recognizing and dealing with racism through experiential learning; and crate a structure for critical self-reflection towards reflective ally practice, which should both encourage and extend this work. (139)

For that reason, Land suggests that “white people . . . take responsibility for other white people, a process which includes the perhaps uncomfortable step of acknowledging them as ‘my people,’” although there are dangers “in the practice of white people taking responsibility for each other’s developing practice” (139).“The whole point of accountability processes is to facilitate the responsibility of dominant groups to deconstruct their dominance,” Land states (139-40), but discussions within the dominant group could simply end up reinscribing privilege (140). “Anything occurring within the accountability process which works to replicate domination is to be guarded against,” she cautions (140). In addition, “the onus for monitoring should not fall only on the marginalized culture” (141).

All of this is difficult, and some non-Indigenous activists, because they don’t trust themselves to identify their own racism, end up withdrawing from working with Aboriginal communities (150). “This could be read as reflective of the ultimate privilege, which is for members of dominant groups to keep out of engaging with social justice struggles in order to avoid making mistakes,” although it can also be a concern to avoid hurting people (151). Critical self-reflection must go along with concrete political action, and yet holding oneself accountable by relying on self-reflection and guesswork can, for some non-Indigenous people, “lead to a sense that it is better not to engage with Indigenous people. I have suggested that collective approaches to accountability could offer possibilities in these situations. . . . A key feature of accountability processes is that they locate non-Indigenous people as challengeable by both Indigenous people and non-Indigenous people” (152-53). For Land, 

it seems that non-Indigenous people orient them/ourselves towards establishing relationships with Indigenous people as a condition of or as an aim of supporting Indigenous struggles. Non-Indigenous people derive a sense of legitimacy from having a connection with “the right” or even just “any” Aboriginal people or person. Non-Indigenous people crave the approval of Aboriginal people, and disassociate from other non-Indigenous people just in case they are one day accused of racism by an Aboriginal person. . . . In these ways non-Indigenous people resist responsibility for each other’s racism. (153)

How can all of this be avoided? Land suggests that the focus ought to be on the work itself, rather than potential ancillary benefits:

In working relationships between people of colonial backgrounds and Indigenous community leaders it is obvious that there should be useful work happening that supports Indigenous agendas. Utility is the raison d’être for these relationships, which, approached from the perspective of how friendships work, can also be understood as reflective of some kind of deal. The deal—the give-and-take—between friends is constantly, if silently, negotiated, and is really only understood from within the logic of the friendship, so that one friend might listen to another’s worries, and the other might provide company when needed. (154)

At times, Indigenous people might only find allies useful on a short-term basis; at other times, networking and engaging with non-Indigenous people might be an important tactic (154-55). Non-Indigenous people need to be honest about their motives: do they find pleasure in the work itself, or are they hoping for friendship, redemption, or some other “assumed dividend” (155)? “For some non-Indigenous people, activism could be experienced as fulfilling for the way it expresses love in a wider public sense” (155)—an idea to which she returns. I found it surprising to see this form of love invoked in Land’s argument, perhaps because it suggests a latent or hidden appeal to Christian ethics that never surfaces in her text.

Land notes that it is difficult to conduct conversations about race under racist conditions, and white people can end up demanding that people of colour “talk nicely about race” and make them feel safe when they raise issues of race (156). She also suggests that, for Indigenous people, relating to non-Indigenous people can be “an exercise in forbearance” that is difficult and stressful (156). “To expect Indigenous people to put up with relentless expressions of racism and ignorance is unjust,” she points out, and there can be a “tension between the pain of this and the need to continue the struggle through educating people” (156). One way to manage these tensions is through “benign faking”:

This is integral to the struggle to unlearn ways of thinking and being: that is, a struggle against those ‘unconscious habits of white privilege’ that they were coming to know in themselves. Knowing that one’s reactions are scripted by a racist world, it seems important to hold back from expressing them. This is a kind of faking, familiar as a strategy within friendships. . . . However, there is a more sinister type of faking: pretending to be a fantastic ally, but in other worlds conforming to whitely ways. This underscores the importance of personal integrity and courage: the importance of reckoning with complicity, of challenging racism in white settings, of admitting and interrogating the limits to what you are prepared to do in solidarity. . . . I suspect many existing relationships would be impossible without benign faking on both sides. Relating in activist relationships . . . involves pain and hard work, particularly for Indigenous people. (156-57)

“What is unsaid and what is let slide probably enable some activist relationships to exist,” she continues. “Even within accountability constructs, dissimulation of the kind that someone uses to hold him- or herself together when experiencing the pain of racism would still be needed to enable difficult conversations” (157). 

Chapter five, “Acting Politically with Self-Understanding,” begins with quotations from Albert Memmi and Steve Biko which suggest that white people cannot escape being identified as oppressors because they “are allowed to enjoy privilege whether or not they agree with white supremacy” (159). Nevertheless, Land writes,

it is possible for some white people to come to know the various ways in which their lives and actions are manifestations of white privilege and to start to reject or redeploy some of those privileges. Some work can be done from within the “oppressor camp.” But this relies on the ability of members of dominant groups to move from one place to another within their white, or colonizer, or other dominant subjectivity. (159)

Supporting Indigenous struggles doesn’t guarantee that your actions will be supportive (160). “There are politics around how to be a supporter,” Land contends (160). Part of those politics involve addressing white privilege:

Prevailing social relations cause unearned privileges to accrue to white people. This is something that white non-Indigenous activists are challenged to work at undoing, having realized that political support does not confer immunity from manifesting the privileges of whiteness. There is a range of responses to these challenges: to what extent to non-Indigenous people recognize our/themselves as addressed by such challenges? And to what extent to we/they accept and manage to work through such challenges? 

Non-Indigenous people are being asked to act politically, but to do this on the basis of self-understanding. (160-61)

“These two projects—acting politically and gaining self-understanding—are linked and must be maintained and held in balance over time,” Land writes (161).“Members of privileged groups must be [engaged in both] developing self-understanding through the practice of critical self-reflection and committed to collectivist and public political action if they are serious about working as allies of Indigenous struggles,” she continues. “Commitment to these ongoing projects is the basis on which members of privileged groups can work towards acting politically, with self-understanding” (161).

Understanding one’s complicity and/or privilege is difficult, but “this self-understanding is crucial for members of privileged groups who want to challenge discourses or practices in which they are implicated,” Land acknowledges (162). “For non-Indigenous people this can be thought of as the process of ‘decolonizing ourselves’—our own thinking, our own minds” (162). However, such self-understanding needs to be accompanied by collective and public political action that addresses structural privilege (162). “This ethic applies to institutions as well as to individuals who seek to manifest a commitment to anti-racism” (163). That is because racism can only be unlearned through activity, by “living out a commitment to end racism through contributing to anti-racist campaigns and causes” (163). 

Land presents a list of questions that can help Settlers develop self-understanding regarding their support of Indigenous struggles, including “What happened to Aboriginal people where you now live?” and “Why are you interested in being supportive of Aboriginal people?” (163). These questions can lead to critical self-reflection, which is one of the first steps non-Indigenous people should take if they are serious about being involved in the struggle for justice for Indigenous people (164). After all, Land suggests, “[f]or Aboriginal peoples’ status to change, non-Aboriginal people will all need to change” (164). (“All” is a huge word in this context.) “An engagement with the project of developing self-understanding as a non-Indigenous person will include interrogating one’s social location as a colonizer, albeit a reluctant one,” Land argues. “It should involve interrogating the workings of unconscious habits of white privilege,” habits that are deeply ingrained but that “are not natural and are possible to shift” (165). 

But Land emphasizes the fact that critical self-reflection needs to happen alongside “public political work”:

Each can be seen to inform the other. Some people from privileged groups have talked about how their public political activism developed self-understanding and resulted in a deeper level of understanding of the issues faced by oppressed groups. . . . Some have also described feeling that they have become less free to choose not to be involved (freedom to choose the level of activist involvement is understood as a privilege). (165)

In addition, she notes that “developing self-understanding can also help to direct public political work. Work that enables non-Indigenous people to see more clearly their/our complicity with the structures and logics which they/we purport to oppose can feed political strategy” (165). Public political work can take many credible forms, but it needs to be sustained: short-term involvement, Land writes, is “a source of frustration among many Indigenous people I interviewed”; it “may reflect non-Indigenous people wanting or expecting a situation to change quickly, and losing their staying power when they realize that it will be a long haul” (166). “Long-term struggles need long-term allies,” she argues (167). At the same time, long-term commitment can also become a problem, leading to “the phenomenon of people working for Aboriginal organizations who start to believe they are Aboriginal, or speak and make decisions on behalf of the community” (168-69). 

“Another key challenge for non-Indigenous people is accepting the complexities and boundaries around what they need to know and find out to inform their political actions,” Land suggests (169). In other words, some non-Indigenous activists may want to know too much. For instance, “there may be intra-Aboriginal politics relevant to a campaign that it is not strategically wise to make public, and that cannot therefore be shared widely with supporters” (169). “There can also be issues within Indigenous communities that make projects go slower, but it may be fair enough that the details of these are not shared with supporters”—including lived realities such as homelessness, poverty, incarcerated relatives, frequent funerals, or community processes that need to be followed (169). According to Land, “non-Indigenous people do not need to know the details of all the issues” (169). Furthermore, the sense of urgency non-Indigenous activists may feel can conflict with “the situation of Indigenous people running campaigns while also engaged in a day-to-day struggle to survive” (169). 

What, then, should Settlers who want to show solidarity with Indigenous struggles do? Land notes that actions can be as small as sharing with other white people what you have learned (173). Bigger actions are best taken alongside other people and groups already active in the work, rather than being attempted by individuals (173). She also suggests that Settlers be responsible for challenging racism despite the repercussions they may face from other non-Indigenous people (173). “Beyond challenging incidents of interpersonal or institutional racism are more sustained anti-racist practices,” she continues. “These are driven by the suggestion that non-Indigenous people—in particular white people—direct their activist energies towards anti-racism work and organizing among their own communities” (175). However, many non-Indigenous people perceive such work as “less exciting” than working with Indigenous people (177). “[T]he seemingly modest action of talking to friends or family about colonialism may reveal itself as a challenging task, and may lead to more insights, including the likelihood that the would-be ally does not know enough to be able to argue against the racist opinions of others,” she notes (178). 

In addition, being attentive to local struggles is crucial (179), because “[f]ocusing on ‘faraway places’ avoids a confrontation with more direct complicity” (180). Attending to the local, on the other hand, “resonates strongly with Indigenous epistemologies, and with the work of Indigenous and other educators who challenge conventional education” (182). Land cites David Gruenewald arguments on the need for a “critical pedagogy of place” that would “ground education in local social experience and ecological concerns (182). Gruenewald advocates asking two questions: What happened here? What will happen here? (182). “[T]he first question leads inevitably, in the critical tradition, to the second question about possible transformation,” Land suggests (183). “Supporting local struggles is key to the politics of solidarity,” she argues. “It is a decolonizing move and ethic because it resists the colonialist notion that land is an unknown wilderness and that its people are undifferentiated” and “it is interlinked with the projects of developing self-understanding and reckoning with complicity, as well as with self-education and sharing what you’ve learned with others” (183).

Land refers to the “Pay the Rent” idea in Australia (183-85), something I only knew about from the reference to it in that Midnight Oil song from the 1980s. “There are many strengths to the Pay the Rent concept, and it certainly provides an opportunity for non-Indigenous people to ‘put your money where your mouth is,’” she suggests (185). I wonder why that idea hasn’t taken root in Canada. “Another strategy for settler populations looking for ways to act politically is to seek out Indigenous-led alliances,” she continues (185). Nevertheless, 

there are a number of issues to be attentive to. Indigenous people may have different ideas about how to address which particular problems, raising questions about which Indigenous people and which issues get support. Further, within a given Indigenous community there may be differing views on prevailing issues. . . . Within the collectivity I am concerned with, Indigenous people are working on a range of different levels, directing their activist work at a range of targets. Who, then, decides what issues non-Indigenous people will lend their support to? (186)

That’s an interesting question, but Land provides no answers. She goes on to raise the problem of non-Indigenous supporters who want to pursue their own ideas rather than focusing on what Indigenous people in Australia consider fundamental—the issues of genocide, sovereignty, and treaty (187). “One factor that might be turning non-Indigenous people off issues like genocide, sovereignty and treaty,” she writes, 

is a sense of powerlessness to address such fundamental issues, including a lack of knowledge of how issues such as genocide, sovereignty and treaty could be addressed strategically and practically, beyond just demanding that the government address them somehow. There are in fact practical steps one can take, such as supporting projects like Pay the Rent . . . and finding out what genocide, sovereignty and treaty mean for Aboriginal agendas. (187-88)

There might also be a deep, even unacknowledged, fear and reluctance to address those problems (188). That might be connected to a desire to avoid acknowledging the appropriateness of the word “genocide” itself, as Canadians saw in the media attention around the National Inquiry Into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls’s use of that word in its final report.

Another way to contribute is by directly assisting “individual Indigenous people in their activist work” (188). This might involve an apprenticeship, a cross-cultural learning experience, or an opportunity to accept an Indigenous person having power over oneself (189), but it can also be difficult and uncomfortable (191-92). “Servant-like support for Aboriginal people was understood differently among non-Indigenous people I interviewed,” Land writes. “Generally, an experience of sustained, intimate work directly supporting one or more Indigenous people was valued by non-Indigenous people as an opportunity for deep learning” (192-93). In addition, she continues,

[t]he practices and qualities of humility and an equivocal relationship with the practice of self-effacement are a great preoccupation for reflective allies. Humility underlies many of the behaviours of allies: not saying anything, listening, believing, doubting one’s own paradigm/relearning other ways, not thinking of oneself as “good” and “benevolent.” It is also connected to important issues such as realizing that many allies have come (and gone) before, realizing how much Aboriginal people know about white culture, and how prevalent racism is. (193-94)

Keeping silent is an aspect of humility:

Holding your tongue can be an appropriate way for a prospective ally to start out. It can be a strategy for limiting the harm that can be done by speaking from a place of ignorance and/or limiting the expression of ingrained habits of white privilege such as taking up too much speaking time or space. Given the importance of humility, it is worth exploring various views on the advisability of practising self-effacement and holding back one’s opinions versus the value of “talking straight” and being honest about what you think. (194)

I’m not sure that “talking straight” has many advantages if you don’t know what you’re talking about. However, Land continues, while “[h]umility is associated with some of the qualities of being a guest,” there is “a balance to be struck between the humility that is proper for a guest and an unhealthy subservience that stems from never disagreeing, even when key principles seem to be at stake” (194-95).

Another issue is anxiety about doing something wrong, which Land suggests can be seen “as reflecting a position of privilege in that white people don’t act or say anything because this leaves them vulnerable to criticism” (196). “[I]ronically,” she continues, “the attempt to ‘be the good anti-racist’ by questioning oneself and curtailing one’s own culturally specific and white-privileged conditioning” can be seen “as a disadvantage in relating in relating to Aboriginal people” (197). What she thinks happens frequently is that 

a non-Indigenous person is in a position of some power, knows enough to be aware of the possibility of getting into a political mess, yet does not know enough to navigate the situation, or is too scared to criticize an Indigenous person, or to ask more questions, or to take a risk. Instead, the strategy is to stall, to end up doing ‘nothing,’ which is essentially a form of passive aggression. (198)

I have to say that Land’s conclusion here is both unkind and unfair: confusion or apprehension are not the same as passive aggression. 

There are times, Land concludes, when 

it seems necessary for non-Indigenous people to manifest some kind of humility or self-effacement, and times when it seems necessary or possible to let go of self-consciousness, or to talk straight and be honest. This shows that everything is context-dependent, and that it is not possible to lay out rules to be followed universally. Instead, it is necessary to maintain a practice of critical self-reflection which enables competing priorities to be balanced, and to be brave about thinking for oneself when key principles seem to be at stake. (200)

Acting politically with self-understanding “means conducting critical self-reflection and committing to public political action,” and both of these “should be informed by a decolonizing ethic of attentiveness to place and local struggles” (200). She also returns to the relationship between critical self-reflection and public political action:

Critical self-reflection by non-Indigenous people is directed to knowing ourselves, understanding ourselves, interrogating where our focus should be, and developing cognizance of the workings of race and privilege. Public political action can take a variety of forms, and these may have some attendant challenges and dilemmas. It is the ability to apply and prioritize a range of sometimes contradictory principles in a particular context that is the mark of a sophisticated ally. (200)

While critical reflection is important, one also needs to retain a sense of humour: “To laugh at oneself as a non-Indigenous person is to eschew the pride of being ashamed . . . to acknowledge an uncomfortable truth, and to know that one has to get over it under one’s own steam,” she writes. “Another way in which this can work politically is that it does not demand an Indigenous person to help, forgive, approve of or make non-Indigenous people feel better” (201).

Chapter six, “A Moral and Political Framework for Non-Indigenous People’s Solidarity,” begins with the reasons Settlers want to express solidarity with Indigenous peoples. How is that expression in their own interest?  Land lists some “uninterrogated, suspect motivations for getting involved in pro-Aboriginal politics”: “dealing with some deep psychological problem; finding working with black people exciting; and wanting to make friends with or even have children with Aboriginal people” (204-05). “In some cases,” she continues, 

allies are operating on assumptions about receiving “incentives” such as access to Aboriginal knowledge and recognition from Aboriginal people. The main characteristics that make these motivations or assumptions ‘suspect’ are their seemingly unconscious nature (people don’t seem to be aware of them, show no ‘self-insight,’ and may see themselves as virtuous). (205)

Land insists that “helping” Indigenous people is not a good basis for ally work (205):

wanting to “help” usually indicates that the would-be helper has an under-articulated political analysis, and a lack of insight about their underlying desires and, probably, narcissism. It is important for non-Indigenous people to be clear about their reasons for wanting to be an ally. (206)

An ally, she argues, is a “change agent” not a “helper,” and one needs to be involved or engaged because it is in one’s own interest or because it is for the greater good (206). For that reason, “[n]on-Indigenous people who display an understanding of a broad agenda for social change, not just a focus on Indigenous people, are regarded as having a sound basis for supporting Indigenous struggles” (207).

“Indigenous people often describe their relationship with Indigenous struggles as one of inheritance,” Land writes (208). Non-Indigenous people often use similar language; they suggest they have no choice in being involved (210-11). “Experienced and reflective non-Indigenous people are generally able to articulate their interests and their personal sense of a framework for their activism,” she continues. “This includes an awareness of the basis for their involvement and their relationship to Indigenous struggles” (211). It is important that Settlers come to understand their interests as aligned with those of Indigenous people:

When the interests of Indigenous people and non-Indigenous people are understood as opposed, non-Indigenous people are understood as having “too much to lose” to be reliable allies of Indigenous people. It is not difficult to imagine that many non-Indigenous people would perceive our/their interests in land as opposed to Indigenous people’s interests in land, and conversely difficult to see those interests as congruent. For non-Indigenous people to support Indigenous interests (in land) would be to defy the central logic of the prevailing system, of which each of us is—individually—a constituent. (214-15)

Settlers, Land writes, “are part of the system, we are the system, we are colonialism” (215). For that reason, being a reliability is “to critique the system, to attempt to change the system, to reduce our level of colonial involvement, to undermine its logics, and to try to convince ourselves and others that the system—which does its most violent work on Indigenous people—is also not in our (enlightened) self-interest” (215). Supporting Indigenous struggles could serve non-Indigenous interests in a number of ways: “making us feel happier”; “increasing our sense of personal integrity as ethical beings”; match principles like justice or “more concrete beliefs such as the notion that ‘exterminating people is wrong’”; helping to undermine a system that creates ecological damage; “trying to undo the system that does oppressive work on all/most of us” (215). “The last point is perhaps the one through which non-Indigenous people might best come to see how our interests are served by our support of Indigenous struggles,” Land contends, because the ecological damage caused by colonial systems “is ultimately imperilling our survival” (216). 

“How can change committed to reconstructing the interests of members of dominant groups be achieved?” Land asks. This question is one of “the biggest questions of strategy in solidarity politics,” one engaged with by both Indigenous people and “experienced allies” (217). Those allies need “to find ways to use white privilege against itself,” partly by “trying to understand one’s own complex relationship—and complicity—with white privilege,” Land writes, quoting Shannon Sullivan (218). Being uncomfortable leads to deep learning, according to Paulette Regan (218-19). “Another strategy for tackling the reluctance of members of dominant groups to undo their privilege is to highlight the costs of not doing so,” Land suggests (219). There is, she contends, a downside to that privilege: “all people in Australia are diminished by white racism: both its victims and white people, through our/their apparent tolerance of racism, are diminished as ethical beings” (220). Settlers also experience a spiritual and ethical impoverishment from unsustainable relations to land (221). Nevertheless, while white people feel guilty about their unearned privilege, they tend not to be invested in changing things (223).

“For some members of privileged groups, involvement in supporting struggles for justice begins to reconstruct their subjectivity,” Land points out. “This can be permanent, such that a new sense of self makes it impossible not to remain committed to supporting struggles for justice” (223). That reconstruction can be marked by discomfort and anxiety, but for some, there is no way back to a previous state of comfort; in other words, some non-Indigenous people reach a point of no return (224). “A subjectivity structured around principles of justice and equality between fellow beings would mean it is hard to walk away from activist commitments” (224). However, a focus on the costs of whiteness can feed into the tendency of white people to make everything about themselves (225). 

The motivations of Settlers may involve both altruism and self-interest. “Altruism is seen as a more worthy, because generous, reason for members of dominant groups to support social justice struggles than self-interest,” Land writes. “On the other hand, with pragmatism in mind, educators and community practitioners have found that appealing to ‘ethical and moral arguments on their own’ may not provide members of privileged groups with enough motivation to overcome material interests linked to privilege” (225-26). However, altruism alone may not be enough to motivate change: “Acting in someone else’s interests does not seem to be enough to secure the commitment of a member of a privileged group in supporting the struggle of a dominated group” (226). “[I]f members of dominant groups really see that we/they are working to change a society that, in its colonialism, does oppressive work on (all/most of) us, then we/they are, ultimately, beneficiaries of that activism,” Land suggests (226). Reconstructing one’s sense of one’s own interests “is to change the basis of the relationship with others who struggle,” from being a relation based on a division between “us” and “them”—a connotation of the term “ally” (226). “[T]his change is not directed to denying differences which still divide those committed to achieving ‘meaningful social change’; nor does it avoid the central issue of land,” she contends. “However, reconstructing the interests of members of dominant groups does bear the potential for different modes of relating: modes marked by a greater sense of mutuality” (226).

For Land, focusing on the struggle to get to the same political destination opens up “the potential for a different personal interaction,” which might mean “that some of the problematic dynamics of paternalism, racism and dominance are less intrusive on relationships across Indigenous-non-Indigenous difference in the activist context” (227). However,  “if non-Indigenous people and white people simply reclassified ourselves as victims we would be forgetting that we are socialized by and transacting with a racist world and that this has material and relational consequences which we need to struggle against” (227). For that reason, Land argues, 

this is not about reclassifying ourselves at the level of discourse, but about redirecting our efforts and our energies towards serving reconstructed interests. Interests cannot be read objectively from structural location. It is germane to consider how a person’s actions and the shape of a person’s life serve the interests of the dominant group and whether this can be transformed. (227)

She quotes Albert Memmi’s suggestion that such a transformation is a process of “becoming a turncoat” (227). Such a transformation is essential. “Indeed, the predominant impulses that drive middle-class settler activists to support Indigenous people,” Land concludes, “cannot lead to successful and powerful alliances with Indigenous people and to meaningful social change unless they are significantly transformed through a process of reconstructing interests and undertaking both public political action and critical self-reflection” (228).

In chapter seven, “Reckoning With Complicity,”  Land argues that the necessity of understanding one’s complicity is “[a] key element of the politics of solidarity” (229). This necessity, she continues, “cuts across the projects of acting politically with self-understanding and reconstructing interests” (229). Specifically,

[n]on-Indigenous people are challenged to confront our complicity with colonialism and dispossession. This begins with being aware of complicity and for many involves dealing with discomfort about that. The challenge is to admit it, to resist it, to undo it, yet also to see how it provides us with opportunities to resist the workings of colonialism. (229)

Complicity is inescapable: “This is a contradiction that must be factored in and reflected upon continuously” (229). “The challenge around complicity is directly related to the need for non-Indigenous people to reconstruct their/our interests,” Land writes:

It instigates a questioning of how non-Indigenous people are bound up in the system, what we would “risk” or “lose” if we were to abandon it, and, from another perspective, what we would ‘gain.’ It also involves interrogating the range of contrasting actions that discomfort about complicity can prompt. . . . It cuts across the agenda of acting politically with self-understanding, because if discomfort is felt, dealing with it becomes an element of the work of critical self-reflection. A suggested strategy for avoiding its sometimes debilitating effects is to engage in public political action. . . . becoming actively involved in political projects can itself result in a different perception of one’s own self-interest, potentially generating new inspirations to confront complicity. (229-30)

“The hard work of reckoning with complicity springs from the recognition by non-Indigenous people that Australia is on Aboriginal land,” Land points out (230). That recognition, she continues,

should not only form our public political action . . . but should also be reflected in the shape of our lives. . . . Interrogating and reconstructing the shape of one’s life represent a project of reckoning with privilege, reckoning with being on the land of certain Aboriginal people. It is about reckoning with knowing that being there was enabled by their dispossession and displacement—or even extermination—and is enabled still by everything that keeps things that way. (230)

Such a recognition is difficult, of course, but it is also necessary.

In order to accept that settler colonialism involves genocide, it is helpful to think of settler colonialism as a process rather than an event (231). “Aboriginal spokespeople are clear about their struggle being one of survival, and survival as distinct peoples in the face of an amorphous but omnipresent process of settler-colonial genocide,” although a “[w]ider recognition of the ongoing process of genocide in Australia is a long way off” (231). There are ways to interrupt this process of genocide, and “the social location of non-natives implicates us in colonialism, providing us with ‘opportunities to disrupt it,’” Land writes, quoting Canadian activist and writer Tom Keefer (232). That genocide is foundational to settler colonialism:

Living on Aboriginal land is enabled by genocide, and genocide is recognized as ongoing, a process inextricable from the settler-colonial logic of Australia. A politics of solidarity in this context must recognize that Indigenous people ‘live among’ settlers whose colonization has brought genocide. Non-Indigenous people might as, in reckoning with complicity, how does the shape of my life keep the system intact? How does the shape of my life reflect the acknowledgement of sovereignty and/or the dismantling of privilege? (232)

According to Land, asking such questions “goes further than the critical self-reflection work . . . and the public political work. . . . It goes to actual material sacrifice, to questioning everything about our lifestyles. And it also goes to being—and being regarded as—a genuine ally” (232-33).

The discussion of material sacrifice involves very difficult questions. According to Land, there are “three key sites for non-Indigenous people’s work. Non-indigenous people are challenged to undertake critical self-reflection, to commit to public political action, and to do personal-material work: to change the shape of our lives” (233). That “personal-material work” involves “actual material sacrifice.” “In long-term relationships between non-Indigenous supporters of and Indigenous instigators of Indigenous struggles, politically salient differences in the shapes of their/our lives become more obvious,” Land points out. “For example, lives are shaped by unequal distribution of morbidity and mortality, and in the unequal distribution of wealth” (233). This is a challenge for non-Indigenous people: “our agency in relation to privilege and life choices becomes a site of interrogation” (234). Is it possible to abandon owning property or paying taxes to an illegal government “or to stop voting in elections (that is, cease reiterating, at regular intervals, our consent to being governed by an illegitimate sovereign)? Would these actions be politically effective?” (235). (Well, one might stop paying taxes if imprisonment for tax evasion were a useful strategy, as it was, however briefly, for Thoreau.) That’s the crux of the challenges made by the Indigenous activists Land interviewed (235). Is working outside of the system one wants to change politically useful? Or should one use one’s privilege in the service of others? (236). “There is a balancing act between rejecting the system and its privileges and taking this ‘too far,’ resulting in self-marginalization and losing the ability to deploy the privilege one does have for progressive ends,” Land suggests (237). “This contradiction (between surviving within the system but being an agent seeking to change it) is one of the things . . . that might be reflected on or negotiated by non-Indigenous people cognizant of the politics of solidarity” (237). “The contradiction between developing a critical analysis of a system that oppresses Indigenous people and recognizing one’s involvement in maintaining that system,” Land continues, “certainly raises questions for some non-Indigenous people. Coming to realize that unearned privileges accrue to white people reveals that as racism puts some at a disadvantage, its corollary is to put white people at an advantage” (238). Settler inaction in the face of that face, she continues, “enables the system to be maintained” (238).

Land cites an article by Adam Barker, where he argues that “there are two typical strategies employed by settler people to ‘restore comfort’ without having to sacrifice personally”: “empty apologizing” and limiting their engagement with injustices to those happening “somewhere else” (239). Feeling guilty or ashamed can allow settlers to feel better, to be proud of recognizing the brutality of their history, according to Sara Ahmed (241). “Affluent Westerners confronted by problems with settler society often feel discomfort,” Land continues. “Strategically, generating discomfort and distress among members of dominant groups can function to shift people out of their complacency and encourage a confrontation with complicity or privilege” (242). However, Barker goes further, advocating “actual personal sacrifice” (243). Land suggests that “it is important to wind back immoral levels of consumption and to reject wealth and status accumulation as the guiding logic for life,” and yet even living modestly is to remain wealthy “compared to most Indigenous people in Australia” (243). This contention leads to many questions. How should non-Indigenous people respond to this reality? By giving money to people? By refusing to buy property? By trying to match the wealth of people one has a relationship with? “Is there even any point (in strategic terms) in reshaping our lives on an individual basis, if there is not a critical mass of people doing so?” she asks. “Is developing personal integrity an unwise priority in the face of the argument that privilege can be used strategically for progressive ends?” (244).

Land has found Robert Jensen’s answer to the the problem of moral levels of consumption to be helpful. Jensen suggests that “people limit themselves to a level of consumption and wealth that is globally attainable according to the limits of the Earth’s resources”; for example, since there is not enough metal on Earth for everyone to own a car, doing so is immoral and cars should be shared (244). (Jensen clearly lives in a place with adequate public transportation; unfortunately, I do not.) “Clearly individual decisions must connect with work to generate collective action,” Land continues. “This underlines the importance of critical self-reflection, public political action and personal-material work, and their interrelatedness” (244). The demand that individual Settlers avoid owning property or automobiles, while it might make political or ecological sense, is probably too much to ask, particularly given the fact that, in Canada, our houses are typically our biggest financial asset and what we will end up relying on when we retire. If Land hopes to encourage Settlers to get involved in supporting Indigenous struggles, this is not the way to go about it. And, in addition, it smacks of a drive to purity—even a certain Puritanism—that undercuts her suggestions that Settlers get engaged in these issues out of self-interest. Nobody wants to wear a hair shirt, and nobody ought to trust anyone who claims to want that–at least, that’s been her argument throughout the book.

At this point, Land piles complicity upon complicity in a way that, while it might be honest, is also discouraging. “Even non-Indigenous people’s active political solidarity work may produce new complicities,” she writes. “They may benefit from their activism in support of Indigenous struggles in a variety of ways, while Indigenous people may remain no better off” (244). They may gain opportunities to identify as “good whites” or receive acclaim because of their work (244-45). They can end up being considered experts or gaining enhanced reputations (245). “In academic settings, in particular, I find problematic the element of ‘display’ entailed in my or any other non-Indigenous person discussing an Indigenous person with whom I have worked or interacted,” she states. “Displaying relationships with Aboriginal people may function as a crafty appropriation to bolster one’s own authority to speak and, especially, as a strategy for evading criticism” (245). Other tangible benefits include employment opportunities (246)—or graduate degrees, something she ought to have acknowledged, since this book came out of her PhD thesis. “A proposed Code of Ethics for Antiracist White Allies suggests donating a portion of any salary, speaker fee or other income received for challenging racism,” she writes (246). That idea suggests “the importance of non-Indigenous people being attentive to the ways in which privilege might be reinscribed through the very process of trying to bring about the societal change that would undo it” (246). “Reckoning with complicity,” Land concludes,

is multifaceted, involving admitting one’s embroilment in a society that provides unearned dividends to certain groups of people, and admitting that one operates from within the structures that one critiques. It involves confronting the fact that colonialism creates local problems, not just faraway problems. This more directly implicates the self, begging more urgent questions about what actual personal sacrifice might be needed to address such problems and injustice. (246-47)

That discussion of the thorny question of complicity leads into Land’s conclusion: “Solidarity With Other Struggles.” “[T]he practice of solidarity in other contexts is an active one: a practice of knowing the principles that apply and actively negotiating and balancing them when circumstances and questions of strategy throw them into conflict,” she writes (249-50). International community development workers, for instance, face “many of the same dilemmas as settler supporters of Indigenous struggles” (250), as do Israelis who wish to express support for Palestinians (251-53) and people working towards solidarity with refugees (253-55) and with trans-people (255-57). “In several interviews conducted for this book, people reflected on intersections between privilege and oppression in their own experience,” Land observes:

Specifically, notions of intersectionality connect to the importance of identifying a broader agenda for social change in which many non-Indigenous people’s interests are reflected; to questions about the way in which this research invokes a binary distinction between “Indigenous” and “non-Indigenous”; and to the politics of how people may at times problematically call on or disavow their experience of oppression and privilege. Importantly, this complicates the way people reflect on and live out their struggles and their solidarity, and provides another perspective on the applicability of solidarity politics in and between Indigenous struggles in the south-east of Australia and elsewhere. (257)

“An intersectional view is enriched by considering how oppression and privilege might play out in even more complex, contingent and shifting ways within and between distinct social worlds,” Land continues. “Key to this enriched understanding of intersectionality is the sense that aspects of identity may be valued differently in (and among) some Aboriginal social worlds from how they are valued in dominant culture” (257). In her interviews, “instances of difference were not only or always Indigenous-non-Indigenous difference, but were just as much about class, education, consumption of different media and diets, age, and status across distinct worlds. These factors cut across each other in complex and contradictory directions” (261). “This discussion of reflections on Indigeneity, class, sexuality, embodied privilege, gender and age which arose in my interviews shows how an intersectional approach—complicated through place, colonialism and culture—is an important part of a critical engagement relating under settler colonialism,” she argues (263).

Land’s conclusion suggests that it is important to broaden one’s involvement to other political struggles as well—for example, refugee solidarity work (263-64). “People with access to multiple privileges have the greatest responsibility to contribute to social justice struggles,” she argues (264). And that’s what this book has really been about—becoming engaged with the politics of solidarity: “this book is both a response to Indigenous people’s challenges and an attempt to draw non-Indigenous people into further conversations about the nature of such engagement” (264-65).

Decolonizing Solidarity leaves me with a lot to think about. Some parts of Land’s argument are easier to take than others, but I suppose that my discomfort with some of her ideas might be (or become) productive. To be honest, while I think my work is related to the issues of solidarity with Indigenous struggles that Land discusses, I’m not an activist. Maybe that’s a sign of a personal failing, or maybe it’s just the kind of person I am (pessimistic and introverted). I don’t know. I do know that the questions this book raises are ones I need to consider, both in my work and in my life. They aren’t going to be easy questions to think about, but they are necessary.

Works Cited

Land, Clare. Decolonizing Solidarity: Dilemmas and Directions for Supporters of Indigenous Struggles, Zed Books, 2015.

Lowman, Emma Battell, and Adam J. Barker. Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada. Fernwood, 2015.

81. John Borrows and Michael Coyle, eds.,The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historical Treaties

borrows right relationship

This anthology of essays on historical and contemporary treaties (the title’s focus on historical treaties is somewhat misleading, since it also covers recent treaty-making) is edited by the Anishinaabe legal scholar John Borrows and Settler (if he identifies that way) law professor Michael Coyle. It’s a big book, and because some of the essays are more applicable to my specific interests (the numbered treaties on the prairies) than others, I won’t discuss all of them in this summary. However, it’s worth pointing out that the introduction, written by Borrows and Coyle, begins with a statement of what I’ve come to see as the consensus, at least among historians, about the historical treaties:

For many Canadian government officials, the implications of those treaties are nicely contained within written documents drafted by Crown negotiators. However, for their Indigenous counterparts, who often spoke little English, the real importance of treaties was the relationship to which both sides had agreed. This relational aspect of the treaty-making venture is irrefutably manifested by the frequency with which, across the country, both sides’ negotiators used language of kinship in describing the intended goal of the treaty process. (3)

Again we see the distinction between treaty-making as relationship-building, and treaty-making as the production of a written text. Borrows and Coyle then lay out the four major questions the essays they have collected discuss: What role should history and historical promises play in shaping modern treaty relationships? If we seek healthy treaty relationships, what should the role of the courts be in resolving disputes, and what is their role in relation to political and public dialogue? What role, if any, should be played by Indigenous values and legal traditions in informing treaty implementation? And, finally, should we look to other forums—other than the courts, that is—to resolve treaty disputes? (5). The questions, Borrows and Coyle write, “go to the heart of Canada’s national identity,” and “will have to be addressed if Canada is to live in accordance with its highest aspirations as a country built on respect for the rule of law and democratic self-governance” (5).

In “Canada’s Colonial Constitution,” Borrows explores a variety of stories about Canada—stories which have legal and constitutional significance. For example, one story, which was told by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Sparrow (1990), was that underlying title to the territory occupied by Canada is vested in the Crown, because Indigenous peoples have an inferior legal status (18). “If Canadian law flows from this view, it revolves around a loathsome core,” Borrows writes, a core defined by discrimination, coercion, and inequality (18). “This story tells Canadians that our deepest political values are ultimately traceable to a denial of fairness, equality, and mutual respect,” he continues. “This builds Canada on a dishonourable foundation” (18). However, that story is also a lie, according to Borrows: 

The truth is that Canada’s formation does not just rest on racism, force, and discrimination. Canada is also rooted in doctrines of persuasion, reason, peace, friendship, and respect. While Canada’s ongoing creation is deeply flawed, it also contains various positive qualities which enhance many lives. These influences mingle together in complementary and inconsistent ways throughout our legal system. (19)

For instance, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (2014) denies the validity of the doctrine of discovery, and its decision in Haida Nation v British Columbia (2004) repudiates the notion that Canada was built on conquest (20). In addition, the treaties, and the principles they represent, create this country “on a foundation of mutual regard and respect” (21). The numbered treaties on the prairies are a particular example, and First Nations Elders speak of those agreements in sacred terms, as blessed by the Creator (22). 

But, for Borrows, the preeminent example of what he calls “treaty federalism” (21) is the 1764 Treaty of Niagara, which promised First Nations that political dealings with settlers would be mediated by the Crown (22). “Throughout Canadian history, First Nations have largely held on to this idea,” Borrows writes. “In this view, First Nations’ political and legal life has been built around one central fact—colonial, and later, provincial governments were forbidden from legislating in their interests” (23). That story, however, is not entirely correct, because in fact the provinces have been instruments of colonization. “By dividing the Crown into constituent parts,” Borrows writes, referring to the federal and provincial Crowns, “the Privy Council eroded the promises of the Proclamation”—that is, the Royal Proclamation of 1763—“and Treaty of Niagara” (24). A number of Supreme Court decisions have continued down that path, including Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Natural Resources) (2014), which Borrows discusses in detail as a rejection of the principles expressed in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Treaty of Niagara. The Court, he writes, did not look at Treaty 3 as the Anishinabe First Nations whose chiefs signed the agreement would “naturally understand it” (31), something earlier decisions oblige it to do. “The legal and political bedrock which orients First Nations’ political life is savaged by this decision,” Borrows writes (31). In such a context, reconciliation means reconciling with colonialism, “hardly a cause for celebration” (33). Nevertheless, Grassy Narrows also creates a test as to whether provincial actions are unreasonable, cause undue hardship, or deny First Nations the preferred means of exercising their rights (33-34), and this constraint “might result in better outcomes for First Nations than federal interposition could accomplish,” Borrows states. “This narrative should not be overlooked” (34).

In his conclusion, Borrows returns to the idea of stories. “Any future,” he writes, “will be like our past: impure, conflicted, sullied, and imperfect. However, my point in this paper is to illustrate that some stories are better than others. We should seek to enhance those accounts which constrain the offensive uses of power most fully” (37). Canada’s “so-called evolution” from the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Treaty of Niagara has led to “a more deeply discriminatory and colonial state,” he concludes, although the point of his essay is to search for positive nuances even within what he describes as our country’s “dark story” (38). That “dark story,” I think, is the story of settler colonialism as described by Emma Battell Lowman and Adam J. Barker.

Michael Coyle begins his essay, “As Long as the Sun Shines: Recognizing that Treaties Were Intended to Last,” by noting that Canadian law governing treaties is in its infancy, and that it allows federal and provincial governments to interfere with treaty rights, although they have a duty to consult before doing so (41). Nevertheless, “huge gaps remain in our understanding of the legal principles that should be applied by Canadian courts to claims for remedies under historical treaties” (41-42). Coyle outlines at least three of these gaps: courts have tended to interpret treaties as not significantly different from contracts between individuals; they have not acknowledged Indigenous perspectives on the treaties; and they have yet to develop “clear remedial principles” to guide the treaty partners (45). For Coyle, the relational aspect of the treaties is crucial: that is the Indigenous understanding of their purpose, and without that understanding, they will be misinterpreted as contracts (47-51). But how can disputes between the treaty partners be remedied? For Coyle, clues can be found in the treaty-making process itself, which suggests the creation of a new normative order that all parties in the negotiations were capable of respecting (53-54). The symbolism of the Gus-Wen-Tah, or the Two Row Wampum, which was reaffirmed by the Treaty of Niagara, “can be understood as an effort to institutionalize relations between the Crown and its Indigenous allies” (55-56). 

Coyle discusses the so-called “taking-up” clauses in the Robinson Treaties and the numbered treaties as examples of the distinction between treaties as contracts and as statements of relationships that create a new normative order between the treaty partners: 

A literal, contract-based approach to the clause would favour the conclusion that one party to the treaty, conscious that the treaty relationship would last “as long as the sun shines,” was agreeing that the other party would ultimately have the exclusive power to eliminate, over time, their entire means of subsistence and to sever completely their social, cultural, and spiritual connection to virtually all their traditional lands. To adopt such an interpretive approach to the treaty arrangement would be to assume that the Indigenous partners in each of these treaties were utterly irrational. It would be to assume that the Indigenous treaty negotiators were not interested in protecting their economy and their spiritual home. (56-57)

On the other hand, one might think of the treaties as institutionalizing relationships between the treaty partners. Coyle’s example, again, is the Treaty of Niagara (57). “Our starting point must be that treaty-making was seen by both Indigenous peoples and the Crown as a worthwhile enterprise aimed at advancing both peoples’ interests through agreement, and not a meaningless charade intended only to deceive and mollify Indigenous peoples,” he writes. Coyle goes on to develop four principles that are “foundational elements of the new institutional legal order that was created through the historical land treaties” (65), and those principles are central to his argument about how those documents (oral and written) are to be interpreted. Those principles are:

  1. Both treaty partners possess an inherent and historically recognized right to make governance decisions in connection with, at the very least, the subject matter of the treaties;
  2. Both treaty partners would cooperate to ensure that there would be effective recourse should disputes arise about what had been agreed or what actions would amount to full compliance with the spirit of the treaty relationship;
  3. Both historical treaty partners to the historical land treaties are required to sit down in the fact of significant changes in circumstances over time to negotiate, in good faith, a new consensus as to how their treaty understandings should be renewed to address both sides’ contemporary needs and interests in relations to the treaty lands; and
  4. The historical land treaties shall not be interpreted or implemented in such a way as to render them an improvident arrangement for either partner. (65)

Of course, the way that Canadian courts have been interpreting these treaties has little to do with these principles, which Coyle describes as the minimum standards for the implementation of historical treaties (68), and there is nothing in the past century and a half of Canadian history that would suggest that these principles might be adopted. What should be, then, is not what is, and unfortunately Coyle doesn’t explain how the Crown might be persuaded to adopt these principles.

In “Bargains Made in Bad Times: How Principles from Modern Treaties Can Reinvigorate Historic Treaties,” Julie Jai argues that principles from modern treaties—that is, from the agreements that are being negotiated through the comprehensive land claims process—should be “read into historic treaties as implied terms based on the Crown’s legal obligation to act honourably” (109). The historic treaties were negotiated under duress, she argues, citing James Daschuk’s contention that hunger played a role in the completion of Treaty 4 (see Daschuk 95), and the imbalance of bargaining power between the parties to the historical treaties could now be remedied by borrowing from modern treaties (116-17). One of the key failings of the historical treaties, according to Jai, is that both parties to their negotiation had differing understandings of what they had agreed to. The Crown’s understanding is stated in the written texts of the agreements. The Indigenous negotiators, on the other hand, believed the principles to which they were agreeing were very different. They included:

  • mutual respect between peoples;
  • a relationship of peace;
  • understanding that the treaty was a sacred covenant with the other government and the Creator and all parties recognize the divine sovereignty;
  • recognition of First Nations’ right to maintain their relationship with the Creator, including the laws given by the Creator, which include the right to self-government, the right to use the lands and resources, harvesting rights and the right to maintain their way of life;
  • ongoing familial relationship—according to Indigenous traditions, entering into a treaty means entering into a relationship with your treaty partner and bringing them into a relation of kinship;
  • mutual sharing of resources;
  • continued right to livelihood and way of life; and
  • sharing—not surrender—of land. (128-29)

Those principles are important, Jai argues, and they are the reason the chiefs would have signed the historical treaties, and they are also the reason why Elders are proud of them now (130). Moreover, those principles are consistent with the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Treaty of Niagara (130).

So, how could the principles articulated in the modern treaties help to reconcile such vastly different conceptions of the historical treaties? First, Jai describes the agreements she helped to negotiate in the Yukon and their underlying principles: the need for reconciliation, which she defines as “the understanding that collectively, all parties need to work together to reconcile their differing needs and interests and build a new kind of society”; mutual consultation; recognition of co-management and reciprocity as a way to make sure that the perspectives of both parties to the agreement are considered; conservation; sustainable development; respect for all living things; the interdependency of all things; and, finally, “the spiritual and economic relationship of Indigenous people with the land, reflecting a holistic world view” (133-34). Co-management boards established by the Yukon agreements are one way to manage the ongoing relationships between the parties and encourage dialogue between them (134). The implementation of the agreements allows First Nations to gradually draw on self-government powers (134). The agreements recognize the distinctiveness of First Nations societies (134). And, unlike the historical treaties, the modern variety are carefully drafted and ratified by the communities they affect (134-35). Jai acknowledges that some First Nations people believe the modern treaties are actually worse than the historical ones, but she still contends the modern ones are superior, because the parties have similar understandings of what they are agreeing to; the written text accurately reflects the key terms of the agreement; and the agreements come closer to meeting the interests of both parties (135-36). The modern treaties, she continues, are more successful at fostering relationships between the parties (137-38). 

Jai identifies three principles that could be drawn from modern treaties and applied to historical treaties. First, the historical treaties could be seen as a framework for maintaining relationships of mutual respect and mutual benefit through, for example, the use of co-management bodies and impact-benefit agreements (138-40). So-called “most favoured nation clauses” (141) could be read into historical treaties, so that First Nations who negotiated treaties at times of minimal political and demographic power would benefit from improvements in treaties negotiated by First Nations at times of more equitable power (141-43). And, finally, a dispute resolution process, like the arbitration boards of modern treaties, could be established (143). Jai notes that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recommended that such a step be taken (144). Like Coyle’s essay, however, Jai does not explain how one might get the federal government to take up these ideas. 

In “What Is a Treaty? On Contract and Mutual Aid,” Aaron Mills/Waabishki Ma’iingan, an Anishinaabe PhD student at the University of Victoria, embarks on a lengthy and deeply philosophical discussion of the treaties from an Anishinaabe perspective. He rejects the notion of the social contract, as articulated by Thomas Hobbes and John Rawls, and of treaties as contracts, because these interpretations voice “a shared commitment to violence,” and argues that institutions based on notions of social contract, including the Crown and the Supreme Court of Canada, are “structurally committed to violence” (212). Instead, he argues that Anishinaabe constitutionalism and conceptions of treaty as relational rather than contract, as articulated by the Treaty of Niagara, suggest a different way of thinking about the link between treaty and constitutionalism, one based on mutual aid (211-21). He sees that Covenant Chain as an example of mutual aid that connects us and links us together, unlike the violence of contract (215). According to Mills, 

the cry of Indigenous peoples has consistently been that treaty is the only legitimate justification for the constitution of shared political community on Turtle Island. Treaty, we are breathless from saying, constitutes political community without predication on violence. Why wouldn’t settlers choose treaty over social contract as the foundation for our shared political community? (219)

The answer to that question, Mills writes, is fear: a fear of acknowledging the history of violence and dispossession to which settlers are heirs (219). 

For Mills, then, treaties are, or ought to be considered as, first-order constitutional matters (220). Because they aren’t—because they are seen as second-order matters of distributive justice—Canada is founded on domination over Indigenous persons, peoples, and lands (220-21). That’s because Canada continues, despite its participation in modern treaty processes, to claim “radical title to all of Turtle Island, knowing full well that Indigenous peoples were already living on it as persons, peoples, and confederacies of distinct constitutional orders before settlers arrived”—a claim supported by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case (222). Canadian courts are simply incapable of building a doctrine around treaties that would reflect a translation of Indigenous understandings, he writes, and rather than attempt this, the Supreme Court of Canada “consistently chooses to account for the unique political status of Indigenous peoples within the contract-confederation story,” instead of “situating treaties as the very things which empower settler legitimacy,” which is assumed without justification (224). “From an Anishinaabe constitutional standpoint,” he writes, “this is outrageous,” because treaties are the way “we constitute ourselves as communities of communities, across our difference” (225). 

For Mills, then, the change that needs to happen in the relationship between settlers and Indigenous peoples must be structural: “We have to transform that very structure to allow Indigenous legal traditions to stand within their own constitutional worlds, not contain and re-express them post-fact within the existing terms of the settler contract,” he argues (229). To accept Anishinaabe constitutionalism, he continues, would be to accept a sense of interdependence between individuals and the importance of mutual aid, which replaces the need for a theory of obligation (as articulated by the theory of social contract (230-36). For Mills, the Treaty of Niagara represents the intercultural achievement of an understanding of harmony as right relations, and a commitment to a relationship based on practices of mutual aid represented in the Covenant Chain wampum belt (237-38). The Treaty of Niagara, he continues, articulates a vision of a shared political community, of a living relationship between settlers and Indigenous peoples that creates a foundation for settler citizenship (241). That vision is what Canada needs to return to, he suggests, and the fact of Canada’s construction on the basis of domination needs to be abandoned. 

Mills’s take on these questions is radical, but it seems clear that if one is to abandon the doctrines of discovery and terra nullius, some other explanation for the presence of settlers on this land must be articulated, and that explanation will necessarily, I think, be a radical shift from domination to something else—perhaps the notion of mutual aid and right relations Mills advocates. I don’t know. As with other essays in this volume, I don’t see a path forward to making the radical and, to use his word, “unsettling” changes he is calling for (225). For Mills, “Canadians enjoy the incredible level of privilege they do because Indigenous peoples remain colonized. Indigenous suffering is the cost of the settler benefit that Canadian citizenship allows to be taken for granted” (245). If that’s true, and I think it is, then morally or ethically I cannot accept that situation. And yet, my sense is that most of my fellow citizens are far less squeamish about the domination that subtends their privilege, or their “benefits,” to use Lowman’s and Barker’s term. Perhaps I’m wrong about that; I certainly hope I am.

In “(Re)Defining ‘Good Faith’ through Snuw’uyulh,” Sarah Morales takes a more jaundiced look at modern treaties than Jai. For Morales, Canada is negotiating the modern treaties in bad faith—at least in the example of the negotiations between Canada and the Hul’qumi’num people, who are asserting their fundamental rights under international law—and what is needed is a process that engages the legal traditions of both sides (279-80). The federal government is negotiating in bad faith because it is disregarding the impact of colonialism on the Hul’qumi’num people and their land base (85 per cent of their traditional lands were expropriated without consent and granted to the Esquimault and Nanaimo Railway in 1884). Instead, the Crown wants to confirm that expropriation by obtaining “the complete extinguishment of Indigenous title over all but a few thousand hectares of their ancestral territories, where Hul’qumi’num people would have municipal-style Indigenous governance and limited authorities to administer some social services,” Morales writes (280-81). Both the federal and provincial governments are refusing to recognize or discuss Hul’qumi’num claims to restitution or compensation (281), and by allowing logging and mining in Hul’qumi’num territory, the environment there has been destroyed so that the Hul’qumi’num people cannot use their lands for subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering; importance ceremonies; and other customary practices (282-83). “Is it good faith to speak of reconciliation, when one party is knowingly left without an effective remedy for the majority of its interests?” Morales asks (283).

For Morales, the only way forward would be to recognize Hul’qumi’num legal traditions, including their definition of good-faith negotiations, dispute-resolution processes, and teachings about restitution (292-98). The goal of these legal traditions is to foster harmony within the community (298), which is very different from the BC treaty process, where governments have immovable mandates and power imbalances affect the negotiations. “As the Hul’qumi’num experience illustrates,” Morales concludes, “the British Columbia treaty-making process has become a tool for governments to expedite and extinguish land claims while overlooking the deeper issues surrounding Indigenous/non-Indigenous relations in Canada” (301). By comparing Morales with Jai, one comes to understand that the modern treaty negotiation process can be seen in very different ways, and that it may be the involvement of (or interference by) the province of British Columbia that is the crucial difference between the experiences of First Nations in British Columbia and the Yukon. However, it may also be the specific historical facts—facts which apparently the federal and provincial governments wish to ignore—that are making the Hul’qumi’num negotiations so difficult. I’m not sure, but clearly Jai’s optimism about what can be accomplished through the modern treaty negotiation process needs to be taken with a grain of salt.

Finally, Shin Imai argues in “Consult, Consent, and Veto: International Norms and Canadian Treaties” that “the Crown should obtain the consent of the First Nations concerned before authorizing extractive activity on traditional territories” (371). She notes that the private sector is in favour of the consent standard because community conflict creates significant costs (382), and that the “consult standard” leaves communities powerless (385). “It is through recognition of the necessity of consent that the Indigenous community will have the power that can be a balance to the superior economic power of the mining company and the superior political power of government,” she writes (385-86). Imai notes that recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions about the duty to consult have been contradictory and confusing, and that because the Canadian approach focuses on the Crown, it fails to provide sufficient agency and recognition to Indigenous peoples (391-92). Adopting the standard of consent, as first mentioned in Delgamuukuw (1997), rather than consultation, would enable courts to develop a way out of “this morass,” she argues. “At the present time, courts in Canada are lagging behind international and private industry standards, as well as practice on the ground,” she concludes. “Rather than focusing on the fact that Indigenous parties do not have a veto, courts should focus on the development of the concept of consent” (408). Of course, the numbered treaties make no allowances for consent or consultation on land that has been purportedly surrendered to the Crown, as Coyle notes, and the courts are obviously reluctant to impose the concept of consent, preferring the woolier concept of consultation. Again, what “should” happen is not necessarily what will happen, given the realities of power and colonial history in this country.

What I take away from The Right Relationship is just how imperative it is to recognize Indigenous perspectives on treaties and legal traditions if anything resembling reconciliation is to happen in this country. And yet, at the same time I wonder if Canadian courts or (especially) governments are willing to take that step. For that reason, The Right Relationship is, for me, a profoundly discouraging book.  At the same time, its footnotes are a fantastic source of material on the treaties, and I look forward to reading more from Borrows, particularly his essay on the Treaty of Niagara. Every writer who mentions the Treaty of Niagara hails it as a model for the relationship between settlers and Indigenous peoples, and perhaps Jai is correct when she suggests that such a relationship was only possible because the two parties had relatively equal levels of demographic, economic, and political power at the time (116-17). The political reality now, of course, is that First Nations appear to lack the power to get a fair deal from governments, if Jai’s analysis is correct. (On the other hand, perhaps the federal government lacks the ethical grounding to negotiate fairly with First Nations.) The description of the Hul’qumi’num people’s experience trying to negotiate with the federal and provincial governments is frankly shameful, and I would venture to bet that experience is closer to the normal way of conducting modern treaty negotiations in Canada than it is an aberration. It’s hard to believe, then, that Canada is likely to do the right thing, as that is described by the authors included in The Right Relationship. Perhaps if the decolonizing revolution that Lowman and Barker call for were to take place, then our governments–assuming they still existed after such a dramatic change–might behave in a good way. But right now, when they do, it’s a surprise. And, to be honest, that’s just not good enough.

Work Cited

Borrows, John, and Michael Coyle, eds. The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historical Treaties, University of Toronto Press, 2017.

Lowman, Emma Battell, and Adam J. Barker. Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada, Fernwood, 2015.

 

80. Emma Battell Lowman and Adam J. Barker, Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada

lowman and barker

I read Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada while I was travelling last month. It’s an important book, and not just for my project. I’d heard of settler colonialism, of course, and after reading Paulette Regan’s Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and Reconciliation in Canada and walking through the Haldimand Tract as part of my MFA work, I began identifying myself as a settler—or, as Lowman and Barker spell it, capitalized, as a Settler. However, I’d never read any sustained discussions of settler colonialism—they always stayed marooned on my “to-read” list—and I wasn’t aware of the ramifications of calling myself a Settler. Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada has opened up new pathways of research for me, and I’m convinced that the way to describe my current work would involve using the term Settler. (By the way, because this book is important, this post is very long. If I had time, I’d make it shorter.)

The book’s first chapter, “Why Say Settler?,” begins with the issue of naming: “The words we use to name ourselves are important. How we conceive of ourselves collectively is a part of wider, more complicated discussions about who is included and who is excluded from our society” (1). Canadians, Lowman and Barker write, “like to think of ourselves as being open and accepting of difference,” as being “polite and respectful and peace loving.” (1). Such characterizations are lies by omission, they continue, “because we do not talk about our country being built on the attempted destruction of many other nations. We do not talk about the questionable legal and political basis of our country, our history of profiting from invasion and dispossession” (1). In fact, while the word “Canadian” is hard to define, for some people—they don’t say who, but they clearly mean First Nations, Métis, and Inuit peoples—it “refers to an invasive people, a nation that violently displaces others for its own wants and desires, a state that breaks treaties and uses police and starvation to clear the land” (1). “We need a name that can help us see ourselves for who we are, not just who we claim to be,” they continue. “For that we need a term that shifts the frame of reference away from our nation, our claimed territory, and onto our relationships with systems of power, land, and the peoples on whose territory our country exists” (1). That word is “Settler.”

“Settler” entered common use during the Idle No More protests in 2012 and 2013 (1). It is used “to refer to non-Indigenous peoples, communities, states, and governments” (2). “Settler,” Lowman and Barker argue, does a number of things. It “voices relationships to structures and processes in Canada today, to the histories of our peoples on this land, to Indigenous peoples, and to our own day-to-day choices and actions”; it “turns us toward uncomfortable realisations, difficult subjects, and potential complicity in systems of dispossession and violence”; it “represents a tool, a way of understanding and choosing to act differently,” a tool that can be used “to confront the fundamental problems and injustices in Canada today” (2). “Settler,” they write, “is analytical, personal, and uncomfortable. It can be an identity that we claim or deny, but that we inevitably live and embody. It is who we are, as a people, on these lands” (2)—and it’s a word they use to describe themselves. “This book is an examination of the Settler identity in Canada, an identity shared by many but claimed by few,” they write. “This Settler Canadian identity is entangled both historically and in the present with the process of settler colonization, the means through which our state and nation have wrested their land base from Indigenous peoples” (2).

“Our construction of ‘Settler’ as an identity mirrors the construction of ‘Indigenous’ in contemporary terms: a broad collective of peoples with commonalities through particular connections to land and place,” Lowman and Barker state (2). However, for settlers, “those connections are forged through violence and displacement of Indigenous communities and nations” (2). The term “settler” is getting increasing attention and use because of “a curious double vision in Canada today,” they suggest: 

We stand at a crossroads where there is at least some willingness to admit that colonization happened, that it had devastating impacts on Indigenous nations and communities, and that a colonial legacy persists into the present in the form of socio-economic inequality, racism, and discrimination, and political marginalization of Indigenous communities. However, colonialism continues: Indigenous nations are still losing their land base, facing infringement from resource extraction and mining companies, property developers, and the pressures of urbanization. These nations struggle for self-determination against governments seemingly bound to the notion that Indigenous peoples should be constantly monitored and managed. And Indigenous peoples face constant racism and violence: from the epidemic of Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women (MMIW), to discrimination by social services, to incidents of brutality at the hands of police, Indigenous people confront the reality every single day that colonialism is far from a legacy. (2-3)

In Canada today, “[t]here is simultaneously a deep refusal to see colonization as occurring in the present, and blindness to the realities of how the distinct kind of colonialism operating in Canada today targets Indigenous peoples, and continues to define the lives of Canadians” (3). And yet colonialism is foundational to this country: 

Canada, as a nation and a state, is dependant on the land taken from Indigenous nations, land that those nations still contest, and colonialism is about the need to secure those lands at all costs. This positions Canada and Canadians directly at odds with Indigenous peoples, who have not just prior, but competing claims to the land. And despite what most Canadians would like to think, those claims are valid. Canada essentially has no legal grounds for its own sovereignty, which is to say, no reason in law as to why Canadian territory should be Canada’s to govern. (3)

Because Canada has no legal grounds for its sovereignty, Indigenous resistance to Canadian colonialism causes great political concern in this country (3). “The colonial history and the ways the legacies of colonial institutions and practices continue to disadvantage Indigenous people are not contested or commonly understood in Canada today,” Lowman and Barker write (3). That’s despite the attention that’s been paid to the history and effects of residential schools, or the recognition of poverty and the lack of infrastructure in First Nations communities—many Canadians excuse the policies of their government or blame First Nations themselves, and “even when Indigenous peoples’ concerns are acknowledged as legitimate, there is very little public impetus to act” (3-4). 

While responses to Canadian colonialism are divided across the political spectrum, no mainstream political position understands it. Conservative commentators—they cite Tom Flanagan and Conrad Black—advance widely accepted positions that are “rooted in assertions of primitive Indigenous under-development, the inevitability of European conquest, and the fiction that Indigenous lands were empty and therefore free to be claimed by newcomers”—ideas that are “both false and deeply racist,” and which have been rejected by international organizations, such as the United Nations (4-5). The liberal or progressive approach, on the other hand, is based on an appreciation and recognition of “the complexity of Indigenous politics, economics, international relationships, kinship and social structures, technologies and traditional knowledges, and oral and written histories and cultures,” and argues that Indigenous people have been “key national contributors—part of what makes Canada such a distinct, successful, and special country,” while seeing the wrongs of the past as a stain on the country’s “honour”: this position identifies Indigenous peoples “as deserving of ‘recognition,’ appreciation, and special rights,” and “seems to confront the ignorance and racism of the conservative discourse” (6). However, both the conservative and liberal or progressive approaches “rely on the same assumption”: “Indigenous peoples pose a ‘problem’ to Canada, one to be managed, accounted for, and ultimately dealt with so that Canadians can get on with the business of being Canadian” (6).

According to Lowman and Barker, “[t]here is a large and growing body of literature that reveals the ongoing and overwhelming impact of colonial ideologies at work in Canadian society,” and they cite the work of Taiaiake Alfred as an example (6). “The denial and obfuscation of Canada’s colonial present, and the unwillingness to even consider the involvement of everyday Canadians in creating or perpetuating harm against Indigenous peoples is a problem, but it is also a feature of the particular kind of colonialism at work in Canada today,” they continue. “It is in trying to come to grips with the historical legacy and present-day impacts of this form of colonialism—settler colonialism—that the use of ‘settler’ as a term to refer to many non-Indigenous Canadians has gained traction” (7). In fact, the increasing use of the term “settler” “can only be understood through the rise of Indigenous resurgence” (7). 

At this point, Lowman and Barker provide a brief history of the relations between Indigenous people and Settlers in North America: 

Indigenous peoples have a long history of welcoming newcomers. Indigenous peoples moved around their own territories and into each other’s long before European imperial colonization. These new relationships were not accidental or haphazard and ranged from individual adoptions into Indigenous nations, to the incorporation of whole societies into political confederacies. . . . Protocols for acceptance or engagement with outsiders were extended to the odd arrivals from Europe who began to appear in what would become Canada in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. (9-10)

The Royal Proclamation of 1763 “set new terms for how colonists could legally interact with Indigenous nations,” in an effort “to curb expansion of the colonies without Crown control,” but it was ignored by “the emergent American state” (10). “In the Canadian colonies,” however,  “settlement and expansion remained restrained by the British Crown, now even warier than before about uncontrolled growth of settlement colonies” (10). The War of 1812 marked “the end of effective restraint upon settlement and the rapid rise of settler colonization as the predominant form of colonialism on the continent” (11). While the “British commercial empire carried on, in the form of fur traders who remained among the few Europeans to regularly move through the northern reaches of the continent,” the creation of a boundary between the British colonies and the United States “prompted increased and more energetic interest in expanding across the continent” (11). 

That expansion required land, and the Crown set out to get it. In British Columbia in the 1850s, “[t]he Crown made no pretence of acquiring these lands legally—no treaties were signed or even pursued—but simply annexed a swath of land bigger than most European states” (12). Elsewhere, the numbered treaties were “approached by the colonial governments and negotiators as land-purchase agreements”; they were “designed to provide certainty of title for mass settlement. The burgeoning Canadian government began openly targeting Indigenous peoples for posing a threat to settlement and sovereignty now that they were no longer needed to maintain a balance of power” (12). That demand for land is not something we can assign to the past; “the contemporary conflicts between Canadian society and Indigenous peoples . . . are evidence that the process of land theft and Indigenous dispossession has not ended yet” (13). For this reason, Lowman and Barker write, 

we depart from the conservative or liberal positions on Indigenous peoples: the is no “Indian problem” in Canada, and in fact there has never been one. In asserting the need to discuss and understand who and what Canadians really are, instead we have a Settler problem, and that problem is woven into the very fabric of Canadian society, culture, and everyday life. (13)

We have met the enemy, in other words, and he is us.

Lowman and Barker note that identity is complex, and suggest that they want to “position” their “work with respect to Settler identities to foreground issues of agency, responsibility, and accountability with respect to Indigenous nations that is in part pursued through how we identify”; the issue of identification, they continue, “parallels important work on ‘Indigenous’ as a lived and embodied identity, which has inspired much of this work” (13-14). They “also encourage people to identify with and as Settler people as part of a process of transformative change”—they “want to focus on identity as something lived and embodied, as something that can be mobilized to shape everything from states to systems of capital, for better or for worse” (14). There needs to be a conversation about the “we” who is doing the colonizing, they argue: 

There are terms that have been used as stand-ins—more or less accurate—for colonizers in this context. “White,” “newcomer,” “non-Aboriginal,” “non-Indigenous,” or simply “Canadian.” If we try these on, some are uncomfortable and the fit is poor. Some are too comfortable, and tell us little we do not already know. We are not homogenously “white,” many of our families have been on the lands called Canada for generations so we are not “new,” and describing us by what we are not says little about what we are. (14-15)

Their approach is to use the capitalized word “Settler”: “Like Indigenous, we are using Settler as an identity that connects a group of people with common practices, a group to which people have affinity, and can belong either through individual identification or recognition by the group (or some combination)” (15).

The first person they heard use the term was historian Paulette Regan—and I ought to reread Unsettling the Settler for this project—and that, they recall, “sparked us to rethink how we understood colonization in Canada” (15). “We develop the Settler identity as situated, process-based, and pervasive in Canada but also in the United States, Australia, and other settler societies world-wide,” they write. “Our focus is, then, on the community to which we most closely belong, that being Settler people whose identities intersect with Canadian national and state boundaries” (15). What do “situated,” “process-based,” and “pervasive” mean in this context? “When we say that the Settler identity is situated,” Lowman and Barker write, “we mean that Settler identity is based on location-specific relationships to the lands we occupy and in relation to Indigenous peoples” (15). By “process-based,” they continue, 

we acknowledge that Settler people do not strictly identity with one codifiable set of cultural practices, political or economic institutions, embodied expressions, or even particular languages or religions. Rather, Settler people come to identify through ways of doing things—particular processes—that bind them to the lands on which they intend to stay, ways whose expression changes over time while maintaining the same assumptions and end goals. (15)

This identity is also pervasive, even if it is refused or disavowed. “The Settler identity is often disavowed” because of “resistance and reluctance to acknowledging Canada’s colonial present” (15); such disavowal, they write, 

is a key part of the Settler identity and marks Settler people as benefitting from the dispossession and destruction of Indigenous peoples while at the same time vehemently denying complicity in the events and processes that make that happen. In this, Settler identity operates differently to Indigenous identity. Indigenous identity has been the subject of struggle for many years to articulate an empowering identity against attempts to eliminate Indigenous practices, communities, and people. Settler identity, rather, is denied even as people attach themselves to the processes of becoming and being Settler. (15-16)

“Settler Canadian identity . . . is reliant on the ongoing exercise of colonial power to provide attachment to and legitimacy on the land,” they continue, but while 

most Settler people in Canada participate in colonial domination, their involvement is not guaranteed. At least theoretically, there are many different ways to be a Settler. Those various ways of being are often foreclosed by powerful structures and systems, whether officially recognized powers of the capitalist state or more diffuse structures like whiteness and individualism. (16)

Lowman and Barker don’t expect “any individual Settler Canadian to successfully transcend these structures on their own,” but they argue that “individual choices and efforts building to collective action are required to create change” (16). Those choices and efforts are the focus of the book’s final chapter.

Individual action is important, but “[a]ll the same, systems and structures should never be abstracted from society,” Lowman and Barker contend:

All of these systems and structures are occupied and operated by people, and they function because of many people operating in concert, agreeing actively or passively on certain principles (such as who owns the land and as such who has the right to make decisions over what kind of society should exist on the land). No one—including us—can simply step outside of these structures and systems, but we can begin to become aware of our own surroundings, our own complicity, and to make choices about how and why we will struggle against them (or not). (16)

They position Indigenous and Settler as identities “always in relationship,” drawing from philsopher Anne Waters’s work on Indigenous linguistic traditions which suggests “a conceptual framework for how we can understand entities in relationship through ‘non-discrete, non-binary dualism’” (16). “Indigenous and Settler, as identities, function in this relational way,” they argue: 

What this means is that Indigenous and Settler identities exist in tension between each other, even as these identities interpenetrate each other, and with other identities that cannot be accounted for within the Indigenous-Settler construct. The groups are non-discrete in the sense that they overlap with each other and there are many people caught between Settler and Indigenous identities, and therefore subject to conflicting social treatment based on how they are subjectively perceived and/or claimed by other Settler or Indigenous people(s). They are also non-binary in a number of ways. First and most obvious, is the existence of people living on the lands of Indigenous nations, but not doing so as settler colonizers or in a way recognisable to the Settler identity, and most importantly, not in opposition to indigeneity. (16-17)

They suggest that this formulation is similar to Patrick Wolfe’s “heretical binarism” or the “Indigenous-colonizer” dichotomy of Franz Fanon and Albert Memmi, “but with a greater degree of flexibility and nuance” (17). Crucially, they continue, “Indigenous and Settler peoples are not defined by their distances and differences, but rather their relationships to each other and to the land” (17). Both identities are “extremely heterogenous and diverse,” and many people “have a foot in both worlds,” and these identities “do not account for all peoples living in Canada” (17). The notion that these identities are non-discrete acknowledges “that Indigenous and Settler peoples interact constantly with each other, and that all cultures and communities within those broad identity categories are impacted by the actions of the others” (17). “To say that Indigenous and Settler identities are non-binary is to take into account the complexity around these identities,” they contend. “Canada does not exist as a container, with Indigenous and Settler Canadians within, and the world without. There are many people who do not quite fit either category”: refugees, visitors, enslaved people and indentured workers (17-18). “All of this is to say that in non-binary relationships Indigenous and Settler identities are not exclusive or exclusionary,” they continue. “There remains a tremendous and changing variety of other peoples who will pass through these lands and come into contact with Indigenous and Settler communities, and all of them relate to both Indigenous and Settler peoples in multiple and dynamic ways” (18). However, for Lowman and Barker, Indigenous and Settler identities “coalesce around an observable, general, and crucial difference: relationship to the land. These relationships to the land have often brought Indigenous and Settler peoples into conflicts that have played out as “colonization, dispossession, and domination of Indigenous peoples by Settler colonizers,” but they are hopeful that “there are other possibilities, other ways that this flexible and malleable duality can play out” (18). 

“Settler” is not intended as an insult, they write (although, as they note later on, it is often taken as one): 

When we say Settler we recognize that being a Settler Canadian in the present is inherently bound up with the settler colonization of these lands. However, we also recognize that settler colonialism is collective in nature. We identify ourselves as Settler Canadians and understand that, in so doing, we are declaring that we benefit from and are complicit with settler colonialism and therefore are responsible, as individuals and in collectives, for its continued functioning. (18)

To recognize “that settler colonialism is a shared burden means that it is only through collective action that we can make the choice to be colonizers, or to be something else,” they continue. “This choice can only be made if we are honest about who we are, collectively, and how we mutually contribute to each other’s sense of belonging on the land” (18). Rather than pejorative or derogatory, Settler is “an interrogative identity”: 

When we say we are Settler people, we are recognizing that our stories are different, and when we ask others to identify as Settler people, we are likewise asking them: How do you come to be here? How do you claim belonging here? And, most importantly, can we belong in a way that doesn’t reproduce colonial dispossession and harm? (18-19)

Lowman and Barker hope that “by addressing individual complicity and responsibility” in their work, “Settler people will come to see opportunities for making positive and decolonizing change. When colonialism and oppression are understood only as powerful structures, it can be difficult to perceive how any one of us can make a difference, leading to apathy and cynical disengagement” (19). They “hope to provoke and energize”; they “want people to understand that things are how they are only because we do not collectively organize to challenge and change them” (19).

It is hard work for Settlers to understand what settler colonialism means. For one thing, Settlers and Indigenous people have “vastly different ontological frameworks and philosophies,” which means that Settlers “must grapple with things that we do not understand—perhaps things that we cannot understand—as part of challenging taken-for-granted colonial ‘truths’” (19-20). We need to take seriously “Indigenous peoples’ relationships to the land as alive,” and to realize that “the political, economic, social, cultural, and spiritual aspects of those relationships all matter” (20). “In order to find new ways of living together respectfully on this land,” Lowman and Barker argue, 

Settler people need to take up the responsibility of learning about Indigenous ontologies. This means broad-based understandings of Indigenous worldviews, but also the understandings and worldviews of the specific peoples on whose lands Settlers live. This is how we can create respectful spaces of knowing, and as Settlers, learn how we might relate in non-dominating, non-colonial relationships. (20)

“Understanding the disjuncture between Indigenous and Settler worldviews is not easy,” they continue:

It is also not likely something that can happen alone. We continue to struggle with concepts and unpack ideas that challenge and change how we think after over a decade of work in this field as our primary preoccupation. Our work is informed by our experiences with and learning from Indigenous communities, and especially Indigenous scholars and academics who have made important inroads in challenging the innate colonial functions of universities and educational systems. . . . Our mentors have come from diverse traditions and backgrounds, from anthropologists to political scientists to historians, all under the broad umbrella of what is probably best described as critical Indigenous studies. We are heavily influenced by scholarship on Indigenous resurgence, especially as it has been articulated by Taiaiake Alfred, Jeff Corntassel, and Leanne Simpson, and before them, Vine Deloria, Jr., Patricia Monture, Leroy Little Bear, and many others. . . . We are also intellectually indebted to a wider community of Indigenous activists, practitioners, and community leaders who deserve respect and thanks for developing articulations of Indigenous thought alongside movements for social change.(20)

“This book is a holding of ourselves and each other to account not as subjects of empire or citizens of a state, but as communities and families,” they write, a process that is neither easy nor comfortable. However, they continue, by making moral and ethical arguments,

we are inherently asking Settler people to see that they are personally and collectively involved and responsible for indefensible acts of cruelty and greed, even if these acts occur at such a remove that most of us never perceive our connections to them. When we ask Settler people to understand Indigenous peoples’ resistance and resurgence movements, we are asking them to connect with movements fuelled by a great love of the land, but also a very valid anger towards the systems and people who have actively or passively targeted them for generations. This book, then, takes up difficult subjects and both reader and writer will be united in experiencing discomfort as well as a range of reactions and emotions. (21)

“ This is key to the project of engaging and challenging the colonial aspects of Canadian worldviews,” they suggest (21).

Because they are taking on difficult and uncomfortable subjects, Lowman and Barker note that the “unsettling reactions” the book may provoke could include “feelings of guilt, shame, anger and outrage, or fear and despair,” and that these “are important elements of the effort to create just and respectful futures on these lands” (21). That is part of the reason they have chosen 

to approach these issues simultaneously at the level of structures and individuals, and why we refuse to exempt ourselves from any of the critiques we make here. If we learn to see ourselves and our roles in the systems and structures of settler colonialism—to “identify” with the kinds of settler colonial thought and action we describe—then we create an incredible opportunity. (21-22)

“Our motivation to act and to write in this way comes from our understanding of our responsibilities to the Indigenous communities to whom we are accountable,” they continue. “First and foremost, we must take responsibility for ourselves as Settlers and for engaging in uncomfortable and difficult conversations and the wider Settler Canadian community. . . . The discomfort that results, though important, is not action, but it is required to perceive both the necessity and the possibility for positive change” (22). They don’t intend “to prescribe a simplistic antidote to the fundamental problems in Canada today that arise from ongoing settler colonialism and its disavowal” (23). Moreover, their book isn’t “a guide to being an ‘ally,’ nor is it a manual to help Canadians understand what Indigenous people ‘want’” (23). Instead, they write, “[i]n this book, we speak as and to Settler Canadians, and hope others will see their own lives and experiences reflected in the arguments we make and the stories we tell. And most importantly, we make space—even just a little—for thinking beyond this present colonial conflict, to a future defined by reciprocity, responsibility, and resititution” (23).

After that introductory chapter, Lowman and Barker move to explore what settler colonialism means in Canada. “Colonialism is such an important part of Canadian identity and yet it is so little understood,” they write. “It is not too bold to claim that colonialism more than any other force drove the creation and shape of Canada, and that it continues into the present” (24). Their second chapter explores “settler colonialism and its relationship to identity in Canada, including how it manifests in daily life, informing acts of appropriation and racism, and defining many strongly held national myths. The political identity of Canadians—as citizens, as a nation—is necessarily bound up with the spaces, systems, and stories built on stolen land” (24). “Settler colonialism is a way of thinking about power and migration that allows us to better understand the nature of contemporary Canadian society,” they contend (24). It rejects the “salt water thesis”: the claim that once overseas colonies like Canada, Australia, and South Africa “were freed from the control of European imperial powers” they had become decolonized, “even if imported populations remained in control of local governmental structures” (24). While Canada has not built or maintained formal overseas colonies nor remained a formal colony of an imperial power, its colonialism is directed internally, against an Indigenous population essentially captive within the borders of the state” (24). That’s the reason former Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s claim that Canada has no history of colonialism met with such disbelief.

According to Lowman and Barker, anthropologist Patrick Wolfe argues that settler colonialism is “characterised by specific ways of thinking about heritage, belonging, race and difference, and power” (25). It is a form of colonialism “directed towards justifying and supporting settlement and its pre-emptive claim to sovereignty on the land itself, which requires enormous buy-in and receives nearly unquestioned public support” (25). Settler colonialism has three main pillars. First, as Wolfe suggests, is the idea that “invasion is a structure not an event”: “it continues to happen because the social, political, and economic structures built by the invading people endure,” structures which include “cultural norms and practices that develop into institutionalized laws and social taboos,” such as patrilineal descent (25). 

Second is the idea that “settlers come to stay”: political theorist Lorenzo Veracini “has developed a nuanced theory of settler colonial political belonging and narrative that differentiates settlers from other colonizers and imperial agents,” because the settlers come to stay and the others intend to return home at some point (25). “As a people, our occupancy is intended to be permanent,” Lowman and Barker point out, “and as such our claims to the land have to be beyond question. In order to stamp down the challenge from Indigenous nations to our right of occupancy, we often insist that history begins with our national inception—with explorers, pioneers, soldiers, and traders, not the incredible span of Indigenous histories” (25). That is absolutely true in Saskatchewan, where in many communities the arrival of settlers is considered the Year Zero, the beginning of everything. “[W]hen they move to new places, settlers carry their sovereignty with then and then after selecting a place to live, [they] justify asserting sovereignty—their power of governance over that territory—through narratives of progress and racial or cultural superiority,” Lowman and Barker write (26). In order to succeed, they must “deny Indigenous presence in (or at least the legitimate claim to) places targeted for settlement” (26). 

Finally, the end goal of settler colonialism is “transcending colonialism”: “Indigenous peoples are eliminated and the presence of this new people—the settler society—becomes so deeply established that it is naturalized, normalized, unquestioned and unchallenged” (26). “In order to obscure the violence of persistent invasion and dispossession,” they write, 

the histories of the new people are whitewashed. Sanitized emphasis on practices of benevolent or philanthropic colonialism involving peacemaking, treaties, and the giving of “gifts” (technologies, medicines, institutionalized education, etc.) is used to overwrite the realities of how the new nation was formed through warfare, terrorism, subjugation, and theft. (26)

These processes are all different, but they all “initiate and rely upon earlier ‘transfers’ of Indigenous land to settler colonial control,” including “necrocolonial transfer,” in which Indigenous people are killed through warfare, murder, starvation, or disease, and narrative transfers, “in which stories are told and retold until they are taken as truth and used to undermine Indigenous peoples’ claims to land” (26). “These transfers show how the development of settler societies and their associated social, economic, and political practices both require and facilitate the displacement, marginalization, and destruction of Indigenous peoples,” Lowman and Barker write. “Transfer of the land—claiming it as ‘ours’ and building laws to justify the claim—is exercised as a right by the new settler society. As Indigenous peoples are physically and conceptually displaced, settler society grows into the (perceived) open space created by their (perceived) absence” (27).

As settler colonies grow and root themselves in their new place, they “often come to see themselves as “different” or “special” and deserving of independence from the imperial core”: 

For settler colonization, this process, called an isopolitical shift, is a necessary precondition for people legally and politically detaching from originating political institutions and reinvesting in the new settler society and its associated political structures and authority—the same structures of invasion necessary to effect the transfer of lands from Indigenous peoples. (27-28)

Over time, “[a]s settler collectives exercise their sovereignty,” they develop narratives and stories “that construct that particular settlement territory as ‘special’—particularly beautiful or productive—and Settler people come to identify themselves through residency and belonging in this special locale,” differentiating themselves from their societies of origin “by intensely identifying and focusing on the aspects of their new homelands that are ‘unique’ and also by committing violent or displacing acts against Indigenous peoples who have competing claims to these unique, special places” (28). 

A set of “triangular relations” is developed, “premised on the perception of three subjectivities created by settler colonialism”: settler colonizers, Indigenous Others, and exogenous Others (enslaved people, imported labour, or marginalized immigrants) (28). “The goals of settler colonialism regarding each of the three perceived groups in this three-way relationship are different,” they continue. “Settler people are the primary beneficiaries of settler colonial structures designed to ensure that the intent to stay is supported by both material structures and also by discourses that reflect settler colonial ontological understandings of land and place” (28). This “trialectic” is “fluid and varied,” and there are “constant tensions around the ‘belonging’ of racialized groups” (28), but it means that the benefits of being a settler are distributed unevenly, depending on things such as nationality, class, gender, migration status (29). In any case, they continue,

[u]nder settler colonialism, all three categories are intended to eventually collapse down into one. What this means is, ultimately, all problematic Others will be managed out of existence. Exogenous Others will either be disciplined to fit into the dynamics of the settler collective as a whole . . . or they will be excluded permanently through legal dehumanization or actual removal from the settler state. . . . Meanwhile, Indigenous Others are not targeted for incorporation. Rather they and their competing claims to the land are targeted for elimination. (29-30)

That elimination is not always physical, but it always requires that Indigenous peoples no longer exist as peoples: 

Indigenous sovereignty, which cannot be assimilated into and under settler colonial sovereignty, cannot survive. Indigenous relationships to the land cannot be allowed to pre-empt and undermine colonial claims to the land. And Indigenous histories and creation stories cannot be allowed to compete with heroic origin stories of brave pioneers and frontier individualism. (30)

“It is not enough that Indigenous peoples no longer exist to challenge Settler sovereignty,” Lowman and Barker argue; “Indigenous peoples have to disappear in the past as well as the present or Settler societies like Canada would be exposed as illegal and unjust” (30). One example is the dynamiting of Mistaseni Rock in Saskatchewan, which was sacred to Cree peoples, because it was in the way of the Gardiner Dam project: “[s]oon after, all ‘official’ memory or records of the rock’s existence disappeared. . . . This is the logic of elimination in action: first, a physical erasure, then a conceptual forgetting” (30). 

“An exclusive monopoly on the narrative as well as physical landscape, were it to be achieved, would do several things at once,” Lowman and Barker write: 

It would put to rest any legal doubt about where Settler sovereignty comes from. By erasing competing prior histories and stories, Settler societies possess and maintain the only legitimate claims to their territories. It also frees Settler peoples of the moral and ethical conundrum of membership in a nation founded on genocide, racism, and dispossession. The end of the settler story is the clearing of the ground to begin a new story, one where colonialism is simply something that happened in the past, possibly regrettable but inevitable, and certainly not worth critiquing given the overwhelming benefits of our ‘great nation.’ This is a sort of inward-looking invisibility, where the violent force, racism, and destruction of land that accompany colonization are made invisible to the Settler society itself through long-term social processes and generation of powerful myths.( 30-31)

“Of course, the violence and illegitimacy of settler colonization is never invisible to Indigenous peoples,” they continue, “and that is why so long at Indigenous nations remain—and remain in resistance—the settler colonial story cannot be finished” (31).

According to Lowman and Barker, settler colonialism has “three intertwined goals: elimination, indigenization, and transcendence” (31). “Canadian structures of invasion come in three types: spaces, systems, and stories,” they write, and all three of these are ultimately about the land:

First, settler colonial spaces displace and replace Indigenous spaces. Spaces in this sense are social—they are the animate geographies of our everyday lives. Spaces are not predetermined but empowered by collective agreement that they exist. Settler colonial society ignores Indigenous spiritual spaces, for example, and asserts their own “secular” spaces premised on dividing up and owning land. (31)

When Settler Canadians buy a suburban tract house, for example, 

we are doing more than engaging in a private financial transaction: we are purchasing the idea of that land as ours—our own circumscribed space with attendant amenities like a backyard and privacy fences. Our purchase is a benefit of our placement on the inside of the structures of settler colonialism, and also a denial of Indigenous claims to those same lands. (32)

The second structure of invasion, systems, is more fluid. “[S]ettler colonial systems can be defined as the processes by which Canada runs and through which settler colonization is asserted and adapted over time”: examples include residential schools, public education, or political and legal systems “in which traditional Indigenous forms of justice are displaced” while Indigenous people are incarcerated at rates far beyond their percentage of the population (32-33). The third structure of invasion, stories, 

underpins the other two and is perhaps the most powerful and pervasive: the narratives that are the means through which violent colonization is transformed into the story of heroic struggle and the inevitable establishment of an exceptionally successful, just, and distinct society. These are the narratives that form the basis of the stories Settler Canadians tell ourselves and each other about who we are as a people. (33)

“What is important to understand here are the common ways that Settler people interact with these stories, forging a national identity that is welded to settler colonialism at its core,” they write: 

Such stories are key to defining our belonging in Canada, and the narratives that normalize Settler people on the land and exclude or eliminate Indigenous peoples and Indigenous presence on the land further the end goals of settler colonization. The narratives and the stories we tell are often attempts to justify our own histories and actions by retroactively re-writing the history of how we came to be on the land, and under what authority we, as a country, make our claim. We tell these stories because we want to feel good about ourselves and our pasts, which is understandable. However, these stories, and the exclusions or untruths they rest upon, refuse to acknowledge was was required to create colonial spaces of opportunity: disease, warfare, incarceration, forced relocation, abduction, and assimilation. And this obscures that many early settlers only survived because of the generosity, knowledge and skills of Indigenous communities, whose knowledge of both edible and medicinal plants and work as military allies and protectors were crucial to the survival of new settlements. (34-35)

These three processes have not ended. “Colonialism in Canada is not just a legacy of earlier times, but an ongoing ideology and practice that is critical to defining the sense of both nation and self,” Lowman and Barker argue. “Settler colonial structures combine to influence and involve nearly everything about life in Canada” (35). However powerful those spaces, systems, and stories are, though, “they only exist because of the actions and decisions of people—from elites to everyday actors. This should not be read as a blanket and inevitable condemnation of Settler Canadians. Rather, in understanding that we all bear some responsibility for settler colonization, this means that we [are] all capable of making a positive difference as well” (35). This is a crucial point for Lowman and Barker—resistance and change are possible:

Settler people are tied together by common histories and by participation and membership in various structures of invasion that we have described; they also share similar possibilities for relating to the land differently. . . . there are avenues through which Settler people could try to relate to land and place in ways that do not depend on settler colonialism and the displacement of Indigenous peoples. By contrast, settler colonizer is not an identity. It is someone who pursues a relatively narrow range of actions and social participation following the dictates of colonial institutions. A settler colonizer is always, by definition, a part of a group that seeks to transfer land from Indigenous peoples to their own control, exerting sovereignty over territory and wrapping particular narrative forms around this transfer. (38)

Despite those possibilities, however, 

in any practical sense in Canada today, almost all non-Indigenous people—with the notable exception of those excluded for being perceived as “exogenous”—are Settler people and are also settler colonizers. In Canada, the structures of invasion that have been built through five hundred years of colonial settlement are pervasive, and almost impossible to avoid. Almost everything we think about as being Canadian or associated with Canadian identity is caught up in the process of building, expanding, or maintaining the invasive structures of Canada. (39)

 The vast majority of people who live within the structures of invasion participate in them, benefit from them, and are complicit in colonial dispossession and elimination through them (39). 

“[B]eyond the well-documented drive to extract resources from Indigenous lands,” Lowman and Barker contend, “one of the most common ways that Settler Canadians perpetuate colonialism is through appropriation” (39). “Appropriation can be understood as the removal of an element of culture, a concept or idea, or a symbol or practice out of its original context,” they write, “and its redeployment in a new cultural or social context for the gratification or profit of the appropriating person or group” (39-40). “In Canada, the Settler identity is closely bound up with symbols, objects, and practices appropriated from Indigenous nations”: the inukshuk, the canoe, maple syrup, snowshoes, dream catchers, and so on (40): 

All of these are Indigenous inventions and technologies, all shared by multiple nations with different meanings and uses in many traditions, and yet they are all taken out of context and claimed by Canadians as part of a homogenizing national culture. These claims are accompanies by deep resistance to addressing the power imbalances that have allowed us to take these objects and techniques as our own while at the same time denying and contesting Indigenous claims of ownership on the grounds that no one can ‘own’ symbols of our heritage. (40)

I’m sure that’s true, but I’m not going to stop putting maple syrup on pancakes. Perhaps the point is to be aware of where these things come from? I’m not sure.

Appropriation goes beyond canoes and condiments; it also applies to ideas and concepts.  “Indigenous ways of knowing are myriad and complex, and have the potential to reveal a great deal about human-environmental relationships, social practices, and time and space,” Lowman and Barker write. “Some Settler Canadians perceive a value in Indigenous thought and, often without intending to ‘offend’ or cause harm, exert their power as part of a dominating society to take these concepts for themselves” (40). Here they seem to be referring mainly to “New Age and mystical movements which rely on Indigenous symbols such as the medicine wheel, knowledge of medicinal plants and herbs, and rituals and spiritual practices like the sweat lodge” (40), but I wonder what distinguishes those forms of appropriation from their own learning about Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies, which they discuss later in the book. Perhaps this New Age appropriation is particularly harmful because it involves spiritual practices: it “has to be seen agains the historical backdrop of efforts by Settler peoples to wipe out Indigenous ways of knowing and spiritual practices” (40). “Appropriation relies on the belief that Indigenous peoples, as colonized and subjugated, do not have the power to refuse,” they continue (40). There are ethical ways to engage with Indigenous cultural symbols and objects, but they are rare (41). According to Lowman and Barker,

more than anything else, Canadians appropriate Indigenous symbols, objects, and knowledge because we feel that these things are already a part of our national identity. The settler colonial claim to the land comes along with a claim to all the parts of it. Indigenous cultures are seen not as the lived expressions of people but as things on the land, and therefore available to Settler Canadians to claim. In this way, appropriation is a method of building and differentiating a national identity. It is a part of the process through which Canadian society is created, set apart, and rooted in the landscape. Appropriated symbols and objects become a taking-on rather than a putting-down of roots. (41-42)

Related is the claim to having Indigenous ancestry (42). All of these appropriations reinforce  “the mutual contract of settler colonialism” (42). While I think Lowman and Barker are correct, I’ve also heard Elders suggest that using sage and sweetgrass is something that is available to Settlers as well, and I’ve seen how smudging before an activity can centre and focus the participants. Would that be contained within the rubric of appropriation? I don’t know. I need to read more about this issue.

Racism is another way Settlers participate in settler colonialism: 

Colonialism and racism are not coterminous, though one is often deployed in the service and context of the other. In Canada, settler colonialism involves the taking of land, power, and symbols, and the building of a new society in place of Indigenous nations. Race-based prejudice and discrimination are used to justify these colonial actions. (42)

Racism against Indigenous people can be structural, involving “institutions and processes that we take for granted in everyday Canadian life” which are “designed in a way that inherently marginalizes or mis-serves Indigenous people”—such as the educational system, social services, policing (42-43), but racism can be the result of individual actions as well (43-44). “What ties all of these acts together, from the institutional to the individual, is the dehumanization and oppression of Indigenous individuals and peoples,” they continue: 

These acts all rely on the belief that Indigenous peoples do not have the same right to life or to defend their cultures and homelands that we would expect for ourselves. As such their assertions of sovereignty or even just attempts to survive in a hostile society are met with contempt, violence, and degradation. (44)

We’ve all heard or seen many examples of such contempt and violence; they are not isolated actions, Lowman and Barker argue, but rather part of the fabric of settler colonialism.

Another aspect of settler colonialism are national myths that “explain how we came to be and justify our claims to belonging on the land. Particularly important to Canadian collective identities are narratives of multiculturalism, peacekeeping, socially progressive politics, and hard-earned prosperity” (44). The “peacemaker myth,” for example, is 

the story of Canada as founded in treaty-making and honourable dealing, where Indians welcomed French, British, and Canadian people as mutually beneficial partners, a story where no Canadian has the blood of Indigenous people on their hands. This is a story often told in direct contrast to the violence of American colonization. The peacemaker myth is tightly entangled with the perception of Canada as a multicultural mosaic. It is a story of a Canada that, while once troubled by racial strife, has achieved enlightenment, and now welcomes all people as equals, with the same rights and responsibilities, the same respect and dignity, regardless of where they may come from or how and why they have come to the lands we all now share. And it underpins the idea of Canada as an international leader. (45)

In actual fact, though, “Canada did . . . rely on violent tactics and displacements to dispossess Indigenous peoples,” and “Plains nations . . . were intentionally starved to make them more pliable in treaty negotiations” (45). (I think that comment is something of a misreading of James Daschuk’s work, which suggests that starvation, as a tactic, happened after the treaties were negotiated, but let it pass.) Such historical facts “should put paid the notion of Canada as a peacemaker nation,” particularly the fact that these acts “were known and discussed among Settler Canadians at the time that they were happening” (45)—for example, Dr. P.H. Bryce’s reports on residential schools, which led to the federal government terminating his employment (45-46). 

“What does it mean to say that Canada is a colonial nation or, as is increasingly common in academic research, a ‘settler state’?” Lowman and Barker ask, as a way of summarizing this chapter: 

Let us start with the historical recognition that Canada was forged by settler colonialism, and as a contemporary settler state maintains legal, political, and economic systems rooted in the settler colonial usurpation of Indigenous lands and the dispossession and disappearance of Indigenous peoples. More simply, Canada’s present laws, politics, economic systems, cultures, and social practices are all to some extent rooted in the ideologies, practices, and histories of settler colonization. (47)

“Settler Canadians and settler colonialism are two sides of the same coin: a process-based identity and the process that currently produces the identity,” they conclude. “The identity comes to shape the process too, and so all Settler identities have their specificities” (47). No matter how comforting its national myths, Settler Canada remains “a society based on violent dispossession of Indigenous nations that is unable—as of yet—to complete the Settler colonial trajectory and remains bent on appropriating, assimilating, or disappearing any aspects of Indigenous identity that threaten our claims to the land” (47).

In their third chapter, “It’s Always About the Land,” Lowman and Barker argue that

Land is at the root of any issue or conflict you would care to name involving Indigenous and Settler peoples in Canada. The land is what sustains Indigenous communities and identities. The land is what Settler people need in order to have a home and economic stability. The land is what colonialism seeks to turn into a commodity for power and profit. The land is what is contested, what is shared, what is danced, and what is discussed without words. (48)

The purpose of settler colonization is “to transfer land from Indigenous peoples to Settler control. Land, in this sense, refers to something akin to ‘place’: territories imbued with social meaning that form the basis of social life, sustaining political economies and informing cultural and community practices” (48). They recognize that “Indigenous and Settler people have attachments to land,” but those attachments, they argue, 

must be understood as having very different kinds of relationships with the places that they call home. Some of this is a function of settler colonialism, and some of it is not; we must disentangle the two from each other to discover what land means to the Settler identity, and how particular relationships to land contribute to producing and reproducing settler colonialism in Canada. (48-49)

That suggestion brings them back to the ontological tensions they discussed in the first chapter: 

We must think carefully and deeply about a settler colonial worldview, contrasted with Indigenous place-thought in order to emphasize that the ontological understanding of land and belonging—the basic ways that concepts like ‘home’ and ‘place’ are articulated and positioned in Indigenous and settler colonial philosophies and cultures—prevents simple political or economic solutions to settler colonial dispossession and displacement. (49)

In brief, non-Indigenous ways of thinking about place separate ontology and epistemology, whereas in Indigenous traditions, “ontology and epistemology are inseparable. The way of thinking about the land and the experience of relating to it are essentially the same” (49). Lowman and Barker cite Sarah Hunt’s call for us to embrace “‘the shifting relationality, complexity and circularity of Indigenous knowledge as productive and necessary’” (50)—I will need to read her essay on the ontologies of indigeneity. I certainly think it’s true that if our society possessed Indigenous ontologies and epistemologies, we would not be in an extinction nor a climate crisis.

What Lowman and Barker are attempting to do in this chapter, they write, is “to bring Indigenous knowledges into conversation with what Mark Rifkin has called ‘settler common sense,’” a term that “refers to the way that the logics of settler colonial domination are woven through almost every aspect of contemporary Settler societies” (50). Their goal is “to expose and de-normalize that common sense” (50) by juxtaposing it to Indigenous ways of knowing. “As expressed in creation stories and oral histories, economic practices and systems, Indigenous nations are rooted in land and place,” they write:

This is not a myth or a metaphor, but an established fact and also an important and powerful way of understanding how Indigenous people understand themselves and their societies. It is essential that we appreciate just how complex these place-based relationships are, particularly if we do not understand the specific details. Indigenous relationships to the land are the sources of intricate systems of thought and vast stores of knowledge, dynamic and durable systems of governance, ecological and resource management systems, and cultural and spiritual traditions of incredible power and profound meaning. (50)

They draw from a number of sources that have informed their thinking: the writing of the late Lakota philosopher Vine Deloria, Jr., whose work has helped them understand the spiritual relationships between Indigenous peoples and sacred places (50-51); Leroy Little Bear, who “has articulated this relationship as centred on the need to maintain balance by consistently visiting and interacting with sacred sites in a ceremonial way, which ensures that both the land and people can continue on in a sustainable fashion” (51); Mohawk-Anishinaabe scholar Vanessa Watts, who argues that “Indigenous identities and histories are shaped by ‘place-thought,’ the inseparable relationship between how Indigenous peoples understand and interact with the world as a living entity, with will and agency of its own, and how the living, intelligent elements of the world shape Indigenous thinking, culture, and social practice” (51); and Cree and Saulteaux writer Margaret Kovach, who suggests that 

land relationships are what link Indigenous people with the past, with collective Indigenous identities, and with kinship groups and communities. The land becomes the source of stories that children learn about values and cultural precepts; by the time they become adults, they transmit those same stories of the land to the next generation, linking generations of family across time through the same practice, in the same place. (51)

Kovach also argues that “it is particular relationships with land and specific places that differentiates Indigenous peoples from one another and also differentiates them from other groups in settler societies” (51). In practice, Lowman and Barker admit, “it can be difficult for those of us not trained in Indigenous worldviews and traditions to understand how these place-relationships inform the lives of Indigenous individuals and communities”; after all, Settlers also understand the importance of land in their own way (as homeland or property) (51). For that reason, they turn to Indigenous political theorists Taiaiake Alfred (Mohawk) and Jeff Corntassel (Cherokee), who argue “that being Indigenous means living a ‘place-based, oppositional’ identity, rooted in defending relationships to particular places against colonial imposition” (51). This statement “is a description of a social condition of being constantly in struggle,” and it “carries through the lives of Indigenous peoples and communities” (52).

Nevertheless, despite their research and reading, they admit that, as Settler Canadians,

we found it difficult to understand what is meant by a ‘place-based’ identity. During our time as researchers and students of Indigenous politics, geography, and history, we developed an intellectual understanding of the central role of land in Indigenous identity. But to understand the lived reality of having a place-based identity, constantly under assault, to be continuously striving against colonial dispossession to enact and reassert relationships to the land—as is the case for Indigenous peoples all across Canada today—was a different and more difficult process. . . . It was Nuu-Chah-Nulth scholar, storyteller, and leader Chaw-win-is who, over the course of many conversations, arguments, and shared experiences, taught us to know better. Each time we got carried away, Chaw-win-is told us firmly, ‘No, it’s not about that—it’s always about the land.’ Through storytelling and conversation, involvement in events and action, and nuanced analysis of colonialism at work on Turtle Island, Chaw-win-is helped us to learn . . . slowly. Land in the context of Indigenous cultures and colonial appropriation is far more than property or territory. It is the water, the air, the living things like plants and animals, the rocks and earth that have thoughts of their own, and the spirits that bind all of it—including people—together. When Chaw-win-is talked about the land, she was talking about everything that surrounded her people, made them into who they are, and was at risk if colonialism turned that land int property or territory. We also learned how deep, complex, and profound her relationship to the land is through hearing her share stories with her grandfather, as he told her where their people came from on the land, and then we heard her tell those same stories to her children so that they too could visit those places and know them. The land sustains her physically, culturally, and spiritually, and connects her to family and nation across generations. (52)

Perhaps it’s not surprising that learning about an ontology based in relationships to land required relationships to people:

Indigenous peoples have powerful, longstanding relationships to particular places, relationships which cannot be easily or simply articulated but have time and again proven profound, staggeringly complex, and critical to identity, nationhood, and survival. It is these relationships which settler colonization seeks to sever in order for colonizers to achieve undisputed claim to the land. Before understanding the role of settler colonialism on the land, we need to understand the ways that the Settler identity relates to land and place. (52-53)

Settler identity also involves relationships to land, but those relationships are categorically different from the relationships Indigenous peoples have to land:

A key component of the Settler identity is the intent to find a homeland and settle there, to stay long term, and to build a sense of belonging through social and political structures, such as citizenship in a state, or stories of personal and familial struggle and success. Settler identities are also forged in relationship to land: it is the location and basis for security, opportunity, and identity as a new people. (53)

Settlers might have roots in another place, but they don’t have another homeland to which they can return, and so they come to identify with the settler colonial society to which they belong (53). In other words, “Settler sovereignty is essentially ‘portable’ anywhere inside the Settler’s perceived domain” (53).

But what is the key difference between the ways that Indigenous and Settler identities understand place? One is integrated into the land, Lowman and Barker argue, and the other is imposed upon it:

There is a difference between a relationship with the land, in the case of Indigenous peoples, and a relationship to the land, in the case of settler societies. Indigenous societies include all elements of land and place as part of the community, from rocks, water, and air to plants and animals. This means that Indigenous peoples relate to land as part of an integrated network of personalities and powers, all of which gives rise to a dynamic social identity. Settler people, by contrast, relate to the land as the site on which their society is built. We create potent stories about the land—as sites of conquest, as hard-won property, or even as ‘natural’ places that inform our national identities, and can even form strong emotional and historical attachments to these places that become our home. but these investments still treat places as territories or objects, not as alive. (53)

“Indigenous and Settler conflicts over land have been discussed in some senses as a clash of sovereignties,” they continue. “However, we have shown that these ‘sovereignties’ are not at all alike. Indigenous sovereignties are bounded by sacred responsibilities to interact with particular places while Settler sovereignties are ‘carried with us’ until we decide to root them somewhere” (55). Moreover, “Indigenous peoples cooperate with the land as an extensive community of diverse beings in order to increase their collective capacity for sustainable and balanced co-existence” (56). The difference is in the kind of relationship Indigenous peoples and Settlers have with the land:

Indigenous relationships to land are balanced by what the people give to, and do for, the land, and how the land cares for and provides for the people. By contrast, Settler Canadian identities require the creation of social and cultural structures which need to be constantly rebuilt in a material sense as the land is adapted to the uses that Settler societies desire, and in a conceptual sense as Settler people generate histories and stories and political and legal systems that anchor them in place. These are human-centric relationships: they are about what the land can be made to give and how it can be made to give it. As such, it is directly at odds with the relationship between Indigenous peoples and their sacred places and home environments. (56)

“When Indigenous people assert that the land itself is important, beyond value as property or the source of resources for extraction, they are derided for being ‘mystical’ or ‘nostalgic’ or ‘essentialist,’ all of which are deflections to avoid actually taking seriously the challenging relationships with the land asserted in Indigenous identities,” Lowman and Barker write (57). That’s because 

Settler colonizers encounter the land through their own filters, including traditions of property and ownership, and human-centric understandings of sovereignty and relational responsibility. These complexes of tradition, expectation, perception, and interaction form what are called “imagined geographies,” which necessarily differ from the spatial perceptions and relationships of Indigenous peoples. Before settler colonial collectives construct obvious legal and political relationships that bind them to the land, they first construct narratives that justify their being on the land at all, and that begin the process of shifting their identity from rootedness in original homelands to the new settlement. (58-59)

I think this discussion of the different kinds of relationship that are possible with the land is central to understanding the differences between Indigenous ontologies and epistemologies and Settler ontologies and epistemologies. It’s hard to imagine, for instance, that Indigenous people here would have willingly destroyed the grassland that sustained them, the way that Settlers have done. Agriculture itself—at least, large-scale, industrial agriculture—might require a different way of relating to the land than other ways of living.

One of the most important and powerful and common Settler Canadian narratives is that of being forced out of a prior homeland, Lowman and Barker write (59). Such stories often ignore “the agency of Indigenous peoples in letting early settlers stay and helping them survive, or that the present bounty and opportunity of Canada are rooted in profits from lands unjustly taken from Indigenous nations” (59). Narratives of “victimization and escape from a prior homeland, and opportunity and redemption in the settlement colony, become a powerful narrative that displaces Indigenous peoples’ histories, and even stories of interaction between settlers and Indigenous communities” (59). Another common and important narrative that justifies settler colonial belonging on the land: terra nullius, the notion that the land was empty, or that it was “occupied in a fashion not worthy of respect or legal recognition,” which therefore gave colonizers the moral justification and legal basis on which to take the land and make it their own (60). Terra nullius “is a narrative and practice of erasure, but it is also a way of rooting and justifying settler colonial societies on the land” (60). The notion of the state itself affirms the legitimacy of Settler society: “Westphalian sovereignty, the political doctrine that, since the mid-1600s, has defined the nation state as the highest order of political territorial authority, should not be read in isolation from settler colonialism. The development of the modern state and the development of Settler Canadian society have been connected for centuries” (61). The Canadian Constitution also affirms Settler legitimacy. While Section 35 of the Constitution seems to recognize the legitimacy and importance of Indigenous peoples’ claims to land, it is “part of a much larger colonial legal tradition, which includes both treaty relationships and important decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada on ‘aboriginal title.’ Consider, first, that many treaties between Indigenous nations and the Crown do not exist in a form easily integrated into Canadian law,” such as the Two-Row Wampum or treaties signed between Indigenous nations but not directly with the Crown, such as the Dish With One Spoon treaty between the Haudenosaunee and the Anishinaabe. They are not included within Section 35 (62). In addition, the relationship between what the courts call “aboriginal title” and the Crown’s claim to “underlying title” is unclear, with the Canadian government reserving the right “to simply ignore Indigenous claims if it is in the national interest (broadly defined) to do so” (62).“It is clear both in wording and in practice that Settler Canadian governments consider Indigenous belonging on the land at best a minor concern and at worst a major nuisance,” Lowman and Barker write. “The Constitution of Canada exists not to balance Indigenous and Settler relationships, but to ensure Settler Canadian sovereignty over the land, and subsume Indigenous belonging within that category” (62).

For Lowman and Barker, three things about Canada must change: 

First, Canadian sovereignty—constructed as absolute, invested in a state territory, and codified in the Constitution, common law, and regimes of property—cannot stand. In present form it simply has no legal or ethical basis and needs to be reformulated. Second, Settler Canadians must exist in a system that does not perpetuate narratives that marginalize Indigenous presence, generating contemporary excuses echoing the fiction of “empty land.” Third, the spaces that Settler people occupy cannot be based on the imagined geographies of settler colonialism, but instead should correspond to spaces of Indigenous political and social life on the land. That is the barest set of conditions that must be met in order for Settler people to find ways to belong on the land that do not rely on the structures of settler colonialism. (63)

Those things do need to change, but it’s hard to imagine how this “barest set of conditions” could become a reality, given the power of settler colonialism and the economic imperatives of Canada’s resource-based economy. There is an abyss between the goals Lowman and Barker describe and our current situation.

Nevertheless, our authors note that historical examples of respectful, cross-cultural relationships between communities of settlers and Indigenous nations do exist (63), such as the Two-Row Wampum or “Guswenta Treaty,” which codifies “a relationship of mutual respect” between the Haudenosaunee and the Dutch settlers in what is now the state of New York (64). “However, for the majority of Settler history, these sorts of nuanced treaty relationships have not informed Settler belonging,” they acknowledge. “Instead, treaty has been used as a strategy to extinguish Indigenous peoples’ claims to land in order to extend the sovereign control of the Settler state” (64). Part of the problem is the way that Indigenous peoples and Settlers understand treaties: “in Indigenous perspectives treaties are long-term frameworks for equitable relationships rather than documents detailing land surrender or political alliance-making,” and “when treaties are not understood and embodied in this way, the result can be more than the violation of domestic or international law: breakdowns in respectful relationship can subvert Indigenous nationhood in a profound way” (65). The numbered treaties in Ontario and western Canada, for example, “constitute a case study in the extent to which government officials and treaty negotiators twisted treaties from their inception” (65). 

“‘We are all treaty people’ is a rallying call that has become increasingly popular of late in progressive political circles and among social justice advocates,” Lowman and Barker write: 

It is a positive step to see Settler Canadians developing awareness of treaties with Indigenous peoples, and understanding that the treaties signed by the state imply responsibilities for both Indigenous and Settler peoples. For far too long, treaties were considered by many Canadians to be at most a legal construct under which Indigenous people could make limited claims on the government. There is now some popular recognition that treaties also form the basis for Settler people to belong on the land in a more ethical and legitimate fashion. However, caution is necessary: the full meaning and import of “being a treaty person” is still too often ignored or misunderstood. (66)

This misunderstanding arises from the fact that “treaties in Indigenous contexts are living covenants,” and so claiming belonging as a treaty person 

means accepting and practicing a dynamic set of responsibilities that will be specific to a given treaty, on the territory of a given nation, determined in an open-ended fashion through dialogue with that host nation (or nations in the case of territories where more than one Indigenous nation overlap). This is not the same as developing a set of codified laws and procedures that give certainty or finality. . . . A respectful treaty person has to throw out what they think they know abut any given treaty and engage with the many potential other meanings beyond the “official” version. This includes the imperative to understand how the language of treaty—which can be encompassed in written documents that (imperfectly) represent Indigenous languages or concepts, in symbols like wampum belts, and in the oral histories and political traditions of Indigenous communities themselves—cannot simply be translated into English or French, and incorporated into common terminology without misrepresenting or oversimplifying the meaning of the treaty. Understanding must be relational. Treaties understood according to the Indigenous perspectives and respectful relationships raise fundamental questions about Canadian sovereignty, the authority of the state, and the meaning of citizenship, as well as official and popular narratives of Canadian history. Claiming an identity as a treaty person cannot be done without a deep critique of one’s own relationship with Settler Canadian society and present-day settler colonialism. (66-67)

Moreover, we are not all treaty people: in many parts of the country, there are no treaties (67). For these reasons, they write,

[c]laiming status as a treaty person cannot be a panacea for Settler Canadian uncertainty, discomfort, or guilt. The critical difference between treaties as respectful bases for co-existence, or colonial frameworks that justify Settler Canadian claims to land resides in which comes first. Either Indigenous relationships to land are centralized and Settler social structures must be developed respective of these place-relationships, or settler colonial structures of invasion such as constitutions and state boundaries are prioritized and Indigenous place-relationships are treated as a problem to be managed. This is, of course, the basis of Indigenous and Settler Canadian political conflicts, and the root of Indigenous struggles for sovereignty. (67-68)

This discussion of treaties confirms my sense that Treaty 4 is an appropriate subject for my research, as does their contention that the land is the centre of settler colonialism. However, their description of what it would mean to be a treaty person as a Settler is daunting—in fact, it sets the bar so high as to be nearly impossible. I think that’s partly a rhetorical strategy—they want Settlers to identify as Settlers and think that a too-easy understanding of being treaty people will enable an evasion of the difficulty of negotiating the Settler identity—but at the same time, it’s quite discouraging.

In the fourth chapter, “‘Settling’ Our Differences,” Lowman and Barker begin by acknowledging that 

Settler Canadians are a multi-ethnic people, encompassing vast disparities of wealth and economic opportunity, huge ranges of education and experience, and a massive variety of identifying with respect to gender, sexuality, and other overlapping markers of identity who, all the same, are complicit in settler colonialism and identify strongly with settler colonial national myths, understandings of public and private space, and systems of government and economy. (69)

This chapter, they write, focuses on those complexities and diversities and considers “how settler colonialism, as a flexible and durable ideology of relationship to the land, has adapted and continues to adapt to challenges and shifts in the social make-up of Canadian society” (70). “How we experience the world as Settler people is . . . shaped by our experiences of race and racism, wealth and social mobility, gender and sexuality, and many other very real differences,” they continue. “Understanding the diverse manifestations of the Settler identity as intersectional helps make sense of the varied and at times conflicting manifestations of Settler identity” (70). I’m sensing something of a contradiction here; earlier they suggested that “exogenous Others” were not necessarily Settlers, but now those racialized or marginalized groups seem to be included within the Settler identity.

“White supremacy has been a feature of Canada since its inception,” Lowman and Barker suggest (70), and therefore “[r]acialized groups have historically been and continue to be marginalized and oppressed in Canadian society” (71). “On one hand,” they write, 

Canadian hallmarks such as multiculturalism, anti-racism, and equality have repeatedly been co-opted to serve the settler colonial agenda. On the other, even radical anti-capitalist actions relying on direct action and raising fundamental questions about the political economy of Canada have not escaped settler colonialism. The risk of equating the struggles of Indigenous peoples against settler colonialism to struggles against racism or capitalist exploitation is pressing. (73)

Multiculturalism is inadequate to the task of dismantling settler colonialism. There is a paradox in the coexistence of official multiculturalism and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms alongside “an openly racist and race-based piece of legislation,” the Indian Act (74). Moreover, 

Multiculturalism in Canada has little to say about relationships to land and place. Culture is constructed as a set of practices, something that one does wherever one is, and rights as the freedoms and privileges of individuals, guaranteed by the state and protected by law. However, Indigenous peoples have very different notions of how rights function: collectively rather than individually, and with a far greater responsibility on responsibilities to one’s community, to the land, to ancestors and future generations. (75)

Considering Indigenous people within the notion of multiculturalism and the Charter treats their own systems of government as invalid, “and Indigenous sovereignty is subsumed under the state” (75). Therefore, 

“[m[ulticulturalism that does not recognize the difference between racism deployed against Indigenous people in order to dispossess them of the land, eliminate Indigenous identity, and disappear them as autonomous nations, and racism deployed against immigrants and minority populations in order to ‘discipline’ them and uphold white supremacy, risks reinforcing settler colonialism through a flattened, colonialism-blind notion of equality. (75)

In a similar way, focusing on capitalism cannot dismantle settler colonialism. While capitalism and settler colonialism are related, “settler colonialism also functions in the absence of capitalism,” such as in Soviet Siberia in the twentieth century (76). Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang point out that colonialism isn’t a symptom of capitalism; rather, capitalism and the state “are technologies of colonialism, developed over time to further colonial projects” (qtd. 77). Our focus, therefore, needs to be on settler colonialism.

Here, Lowman and Barker acknowledge that they “have painted a rather unflattering picture”:

Canada is a state founded on stolen land, predicated on the elimination of Indigenous peoples, and a nation steeped in racism, violence, and denial. Even social justice movements, from widely accepted multiculturalism to radical anti-capitalist campaigns, may fall into the trap of reinforcing this immoral, unethical society of domination and dispossession. Settler colonialism requires that Settler people, in exchange for many purported but often immaterial benefits, submit themselves to systems that commit genocide and erasure of Indigenous identities in their name, while also profoundly limiting the possible ways that Settler people can pursue their economic and political interests. Settler colonialism monopolizes the potential ways that Settler people can be Settler. If the cost of belonging is so high, it is awfully hard to see why anyone would want to be a member of Settler Canadian society. And yet, Settler society continues to grow and continues to be seen as natural and normal. (79)

How are people recruited into the settler colonial project, they ask? (79). 

First, though, before they answer that question, they remind readers that settler colonialism requires “the elimination of Indigenous identity and peoplehood,” the severing of the connections between Indigenous people and sovereignty and the land (79). And yet, despite all of the efforts of settler colonialism,

Indigenous peoples have found multiple, creative ways to maintain connections to land, to practice land-based cultures in urban environments, and to reaffirm urban spaces as Indigenous spaces. All of which is to say that historical attempts at assimilating Indigenous people through education, removal of status, relocation, and enforced socio-economic change have not been successful, though the toll these imposed systems have taken on Indigenous societies is enormous. (80-81)

Lowman and Barker use the term “aboriginalism” to refer to the ongoing assimilationist effort by the Canadian government “to circumscribe and define Indigenous peoples in a way acceptable to Settler Canadian society” (81). “Through aboriginalism,” they write,

“Canada’s aboriginal people” are given a pride of place within the colonial system, their competing relationships to land ended. This is effectively an ending of Indigenous ways of life and the triumph of settler colonialism. Severed from the land and subsumed in the state, Indigenous identity can be slowly assimilated and disappeared, a form of cultural genocide through governmental “recognition” that denies the most vital parts of Indigenous lifeways. (82)

That statement reminds me of Glen Coulthard’s contention (I read the introduction of Red Skin, White Masks during my MFA research) that recognition is not enough; that’s another book I need to read in a serious way.

Now they return to the question of how settler colonialism recruits people, focusing on “exogenous Others.” “Settler identity must be understood as an aspirational identity,” they write. “Canadians are proud and often very vocal about the benefits of being part of Canadian society” (83). “Established Settler Canadians manage difference with respect to exogenous Others by disciplining people in both official and informal ways, in order to ensure that newcomer or newly accepted communities buy into and reinforce the colonial systems of Settler Canadian society”: through citizenship tests, employment in resource industries, and the “model minority syndrome” (83). On the other hand “[s]ome of the most powerful challenges to established Settler Canadian systems of oppression have come from intersectional solidarity work between Indigenous peoples and marginalized immigrant communities and communities of colour,” such as the work of No One Is Illegal, which argues for migrant rights (84). “It is important to recognize that there are major perceived benefits to being Settler Canadian,” they contend, but it is important to note that there is a relationship between expecting advantages, or benefits, and actually possessing privilege in the settler colonial context (85). They cite sociologist Stuart Hall’s argument “that identities coalesce around layers of privilege—as people experience privileges, they come to identify with particular groups whose lives are typified by the same energy-saving devices and convenient insulators” (85-86). “When we say the ‘benefits’ of identifying as a Settler, we are talking about both real privileges but also aspects of being a Settler Canadian that are just assumed to be better than a ‘nasty, brutish and short’ existence in the wilderness,” Lowman and Barker write (86). One benefit is mobility: “This purported benefit inheres in the understanding that, theoretically, any Settler could move, could relocate to a different part of the country, without appealing for permission” (86-87). However, “[u]nstated in the benefit of Settler mobility is that Settler Canadians must also surrender attachments to other places of belonging” (87). “The second benefit of being Settler Canadian is the benefit of not knowing, or the ability to claim a soothing ignorance about, the negative impacts of settler colonialism and the moral turpitude rightfully due to its collaborators,” they continue (87-88). “When evidence of colonial harm is presented that cannot simply be ignored, Settler Canadians tend to reframe the discourse, admitting that the harm exists but transferring the cause—and responsibility—to other people, usually to the communities who are being harmed” (88). “Settler people avoid questioning the centrality of settler colonialism in our lives by refusing to even consider settler colonialism as an historical and ongoing project of dispossession and usurpation,” they write. “We also avoid talking about or pursuing in any great details other possible ways of relating to the land or to Indigenous peoples. Settler colonialism structures all lives in Canada, not just Indigenous ones” (88-89). And yet, “Settler Canadians must come face to face with the fear of looking beyond the limits of settler colonialism, and consider what life could look like without it” (89). Only then can settler colonialism be dismantled.

In the book’s fifth chapter, “Fear, Complicity, and Productive Discomfort,” Lowman and Barker acknowledge that they have tended to focus on how settler colonialism enhances the lives of Settlers, but “there is both carrot and stick to Settler belonging in Canada”: “Scratch the surface of Settler Canadian identity, and there is a deep well of anxiety and even terror of what it might mean to be cut off from the structures of invasion that define us” (90). I’ve often wondered if that “deep well of anxiety” is the source of some of the racism Settlers in this country express. “Fear results when we have been unsettled, which is to say, when Settler people are discomforted in the process of confronting how much and how profoundly our lives are structured by colonialism,” they continue. “Being unsettled means confronting that colonialism is a real, active part of Settler Canadian life and also requires the imagination of something beyond the settler colonial situation” (90). When “we recognize our participation in settler colonialism,” we may fear the loss of “our simultaneously free and insulated existence”: 

The realisation and the associated need to respond in some way to the evidence of our colonial complicity shakes the Settler colonial identity to the core. It challenges the invisibility and taken-for-granted nature of settler colonialism, and disrupts settler colonial indigenization and normalization. With the recognition of Settler complicity with colonialism comes the revelation—sometimes sudden—of a potential moral or ethical imperative to challenge the structures of colonialism. (90-91)

“The fear that disciplines Settler people into continuing to support and collaborate with settler colonialism has two sources: external and internal,” they contend (91). External fear comes from a belief that if they don’t collaborate with settler colonialism, powerful institutions will take away their privileges (91). “Most Canadians will never experience this kind of fear because they do not seek to contradict the powerful elites or their vision of Canadian society”—they are afraid of reprisals (91). Internal fears involve “the existential fear that comes from the potential loss of belonging on the land, the return to ‘rootlessness,’ the nightmarish recollection of stories of being expelled or having to leave that lurk in the background of frontier and peacemaker narratives” (92). “[T]he recognition of complicity and personal benefit in a settler society based on the active oppression and dispossession of Others necessarily raises the uncertainty of what confronting colonialism might mean,” they contend (92), and that leads to a fear of “what an end to colonial privilege might mean for the Settler” (92). These fears can create a “strong, emotional, and defensive reaction” that “shuts down conversations of how relationships on the land could be different and what that might mean for everybody, not just Settler people” (92). In part, that’s because “Settler people have a deep unspoken fear of losing privileged positions within colonial hierarchies” (93), but it also 

stems from an inability to comprehend Indigenous relationships to the land, and in that incomprehension lies a fear of the unknown. Connections between Indigenous peoples and the land itself are a source of extraordinary power and incredible responsibility—to maintain balance, to respect the agency of all elements of a place, to care for sacred sites—which contradicts the short-sighted and environmentally extractive relationships that Settler Canadians have with the land. (93)

At the same time, they write, 

[e]xposure to our own settler complicity, and the overwhelming uncertainty of imagining life without our settler colonial benefits, provokes an unpleasant emotional reaction which can and frequently does manifest as fear—in this case, fear of being exposed and further illegitimated, or a fear of having to confront a painful disjuncture between our self-image and the evidence of our action. (94)

The point is that 

it is difficult to reconcile the cognitive dissonance between how we see ourselves and the harsh reality—we are discouraged from questioning too deeply the well-springs of our national pride. This emotional disciplining is the “stick” to the “carrot” of Settler benefits. Because Settlers react with fear to being confronted with their colonial complicity, Settler people act to restore the feeling of security and exceptionalism that comes with being Settler Canadian. (95)

All of this explains the obvious, I suppose—the angry response students sometimes have when I use the word “Settler” in class. 

However, Lowman and Barker argue that it’s possible to “focus on that moment of seeing the indefensibility of colonialism, the dishonesty of defining national narratives, the threat of being illegitimate on the land, and the fearful reaction it provokes” (95). That focus would be positive, or at least potentially so, but resolving the crisis sparked by a realization of our settler colonial identity often involves an immediate desire for a restoration of a state of comfort, a signal that the crisis is over (99). Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang write of “moves to innocence”—“Settler intellectualizations of our relationships to settler colonialism that free us from responsibility” (99)—but Lowman and Barker suggest that they are talking about something different, “moves to comfort” (99). “Rather than rationalizations,” they write, 

these are emotional shifts inspiring often irrational or illogical statements designed to dispel fear and unsettling and restore the comfort of not knowing even once ignorance is not possible. As well, many of these moves to comfort do not necessarily involve an attempt to claim innocence; if anything, several of them dwell in guilt and self-punishing confessional as a method of proving—if only to ourselves—that we are doing everything we can and therefore have nothing to feel bad about, really. In this, it is possible to group these moves to comfort . . . into two types: resolution and exception. Delving into the motivations and commonalities of these responses helps to clarify the often-unstated end goals of such actions. (99)

Seeking resolution is rooted in the ideas that settler colonialism can actually be finished and  that Settler Canadian society has all the answers; it ignores the fact “that Indigenous peoples might have their own answers for how to address their struggles—ones which may or may not involve Settler Canadians, or might actively displace them from positions of power—or that Settler Canadian society as such may in fact be the problem” (100). Indeed, the resolution to the critiques of Indigenous peoples “reinforces the absolute validity and universality of Settler spaces” (100). Seeking exception, on the other hand, means Settlers attempt “to escape from their complicity in settler colonial harms by positioning themselves as a special case” who ought to escape blame (100). Some responses are centred on feelings of guilt. “Guilt can be useful if it is part of a journey toward critical acceptance of responsibility, but not as an end goal in itself,” Lowman and Barker argue. “Guilt is not a motivating state, but it can be used as an opportunity to identify and move towards accountability and action” (101). However, Settlers can get stuck on guilt (101). I realize that this is true, but at the same time, I’m not sure how one is supposed to obviate feelings of guilt, which are, I would think, normal when one is acknowledging one’s complicity in a system that perpetuates horrible acts. 

Settlers use a variety of ways other than guilt to seek “to escape complicity in and responsibility for settler colonial processes” (103). One response, identified by Albert Memmi, is removal of oneself “from participation in colonialism, but more accurately from spaces where one might be implicated in settler colonialism,” although such withdrawal “is itself a privilege” (103). “Individual moves to ‘opt out’ of settler colonialism do nothing to address the systemic nature of settler colonization and its continuing operation,” Lowman and Barker write (104). Another is anger, which insists “on having the last word on the subject, achieving finality in the debate by shutting it down—that is, substituting the end for the means. Comfort is restored because the unsetting has stopped—both internally and externally—and therefore the discomforted person has been proven right (in their own mind) (104). Whatever the avoidance mechanism might be, 

[w]hen individuals experiencing fear as a result of encountering their own colonialism move to comfort themselves and alleviate the discomfort of fear . . . even those actions that involve accepting settler colonial responsibility or entanglement can contribute to settler colonial power by supporting its end goals of Settler indigenization and elimination. Ultimately the Settler who seeks comfort remains too embedded in colonial structures and practices to seriously challenge colonial power, and so are complicit with it through tacit endorsement and acceptance of Settler benefits. The feeling of being unsettled—experiencing fear and discomfort when confronted with one’s own colonial complicit, experiencing uncertainty over what to do in response to that fear—is something that runs counter to our expectations as Settler people that will will be insulated from or able to move away from threats to our legitimacy. (104-05)

Moves to comfort are, they continue, 

moves to re-establish a barrier or remove ourselves from proximity to our own colonial identities, to disavow ourselves as settler colonizers, sometimes paradoxically by admitting that we are colonizers, in the expectation of being contradicted by others. Our arrogance, our anger, our guilt and shame can all be used to rebuild the comfortable spaces of settler colonialism that we are used to residing in. But there is another way. (105)

That way involves facing the fact of discomfort: 

Settler people wanting to confront the colonialism pervasive in our lives and societies must accept that this process will be uncomfortable and unsettling. In fact, following discomfort, going further into situations and conversations that are unsettling, can be a useful strategy because it helps to identify points of contention in our lives where settler colonialism exerts pressure on us through our particular, personal vulnerabilities. (105)

“The experience of discomfort,” they continue, “can work as a compass, pointing away from settler colonial security” (106). We need to recognize “that good intentions are not necessarily matched by ‘happy feelings.’ Rather, well-intentioned Settler Canadians must be driven to seek discomfort or risk falling into complacency and self-congratulations for hard work already done, missing the vast struggle that remains before us” (106). It’s not easy to learn to stop expecting comfort and to face our fear “as a matter of finding the path we need to walk,” they acknowledge:

We must start by realizing that the instinct to pull away, or to preserve comfort, has been instilled in us, imposed on us through our upbringing, through the culture that we have been raised in, by the dreams we have inherited from our Settler Canadian narratives that tell us if we work hard we can expect a comfortable, privileged life. Learning to face fear of uncertainty, learning to dwell in discomfort from not being in control, is an ongoing project that requires the support and help of others, a great deal of critical reflection and the time and energy. (106-07)

Being uncertain and uncomfortable is part of grappling with a difficult problem: “Any time an answer to a complex problem seems too easy, or too obvious, it probably is. . . . there are no simple, comfortable, easy ways to confront settler colonialism. Any strategies making those promises are suspect” (107).

All of this is to say that “[c]olonialism cannot be easily expunged from our lives” (107). Even productive discomfort isn’t the answer: 

Simply getting used to feeling unsettled is not the same as engaging in active struggle against colonialism. There is no magic that removes us as Settler Canadians from our settler colonial relationships to the land and to each other; there is only the potential for transformative change through hard work. The first step in challenging settler colonialism and the colonizer that is part of our identities as Settler Canadians is the acceptance that this is not going to be comfortable, nor will it be easy. But what comes after that first step is . . . much bigger, broader and frankly, more exciting and empowering. (107)

What comes next is the topic of their sixth and last chapter, “Decolonization and Dangerous Freedom.” They begin with this acknowledgement: “To choose to identify as Settler Canadian today is as good as declaring, ‘I am aware that I am illegitimate on the land, and I know that I am complicit with and benefit from settler colonialism.’ This admission can result from a feeling of unsettlement, and provoke the same in others” (109). However, they continue,

Choosing to identify as a Settler and choosing how one will act on that identity are two different concerns. As Settler Canadians, we are part of a colonizing collective, and there is no simple place we can go, or declaration we can make, that will sever us from our unearned benefits and privileges, insulate us from our fears of change, or abstract us from destructive practices on the land. No matter how hard it may be to envision, it is possible to forge different relationships to the land that are not rooted in the displacement and genocide of Indigenous nations, nor in fooling ourselves with the comfortable oblivion of indigenization and transcendence. (109)

Because settler colonization is collective, they continue,

undoing settler colonialism will also necessarily be a collective effort. If we, as Settler-identifying people in the present, wish to be other than settler colonizers, we must undertake an archaeology of the future: an excavation of the possible. We have to challenge ourselves to imagine relationships differently and then figure out how to try and embody them. We cannot change who we are as Settler people alone, so we must work to create a broad base, to build communities—with our friends, our families, our colleagues—to undertake these efforts together. And this experimentation will run counter to everything that settler colonial Canadian society is premised on, which means it will be opposed. If we want to be different, we have to struggle to change. (109-10)

That struggle to change will mean great discomfort (110). Knowing about settler colonialism is important, but it is only a step, not a destination: self-education and self-reflection 

can become a distraction from struggle in that it allows people to feel that they are doing something revolutionary—because in identifying themselves with the problem, and learning about the extent of the challenge, their world shifts—while running the risk of substituting awareness for engagement and action. We need to create a critical mass of people not only willing to admit their complicity with settler colonialism but also willing to commit to doing something about it. 

That “something” is decolonization. (110)

Settler decolonization is the ultimate goal. It is more than anti-colonialism; it is “an ethic and guiding principle for collective struggle” that “is both the ending of colonialism and the act of becoming something other than colonial” (110-11). “[W]e use decolonization here to describe an intensely transformative process with the goal of regenerating Indigenous nationhood and place-relationships while dismantling structures of settler colonialism that oppose or seek to eliminate Indigenous peoples from the land,” Lowman and Barker write (111). The scope of the project of Indigenous decolonization is 

no less than a call to replace the totalizing, sovereign authority of the Canadian state with multiple, negotiated, and contingent Indigenous governance structures. It is also a call to shatter the hegemony of capitalism and established ideas of race and heritage that dictate how we understand belonging on the land. This is a revolutionary concept in the truest sense. (112)

Decolonization is “a call to fundamentally change how we generate political power and conceive of land” (112). It is ideally “embodied in the creation of social movements and communities that sustain themselves on the land, revitalize traditional trade and treaty networks, promote Indigenous cultural expression, and challenge narrow identity binaries, all of which can combine to make the structures of settler colonialism irrelevant and impotent” (112). “Decolonization is open ended and multiple, creating more and more different possibilities as it is pursued,” they continue (112). It is 

a transformative process, one that cannot be fully revealed or understood until it is practiced, and even then, it will comprise a shifting and moving set of goals, always responding to the needs of Indigenous communities and the ruthless re-applications of colonial power and domination. Decolonization with respect to Indigenous nations means the replacement of colonial authority as the lodestone of Settler society with responsibilities to Indigenous peoples as articulated through treaties, confederacies, alliances, and other political arrangements. In Canada, that means and end to settler colonial relationships to land, the dismantling of the spaces, systems and stories of invasion that root Settler people to the nation and state, and the simultaneous restoration of Indigenous ways of knowing and being on the land. (112)

Decolonization “involves actual social upheaval, restitution, and political and economic struggle” (112). 

“The decolonization struggle for Indigenous peoples takes the form of resurgence,” of “regeneration of Indigenous nationhood” (112), and that resurgence “demands and requires ‘a massive transformation’ based on revitalized Indigenous political systems based in land-relationships” (113). “Resurgence articulated like this is a necessary part of decolonization—it is, in fact, the heart of it—but it is clearly not for Settler people,” Lowman and Barker write. “Rather, Settler people need to find our own ways of building decolonizing practices, engaging in transformative struggle, and supporting the resurgence of Indigenous nationhood without claiming or pretending to possess a connection to the spiritual and material practices of Indigenous identity” (113). This will mean “a deep and transformative struggle” (114). Moreover, because decolonization “is a practice rather than a goal to be achieved,” it is a process that “will require different efforts and produce different outcomes for everyone” (114). Preparation and training is the first step: “Settler people need to start by knowing whose land they are on, knowing the histories of the treaties and agreements that predate the histories of colonialism and settlement, and knowing the land itself, understanding the features of places that make them unique” (114). “But,” they continue, 

in addition to histories, Settler decolonization is about moving forward. We need to ask: What is my hope for the future? What kind of person do I want to be and what kind of life do I want to live? How will my life (and my family’s lives) be made better through a difficult struggle? What am I willing to do to get there? These are big questions, but it is in asking the unsettling questions and the hope that comes with them that we find the possibilities for positive and transformative change. (114)

“This change must start with Settler people taking responsibility”—responsibility for their own learning, rather than asking Indigenous communities to take time out of the struggle for survival to teach them (114-15). Settle people “must take responsibility for cleaning up our own mess if we wish to put an end to our moral and ethical debt. In reality, that can be more complicated than it might seem. Figuring out how to struggle is a barrier to actually taking effective decolonizing action” (115). 

In addition, Settlers “have to overcome the ally fetish, the belief that we can declare ourselves exempt from settler colonialism through some relationships or personal actions in isolation from the rest of our involvement in settler colonialism”—and the way to do that is by “seeking through actions, words, and relationships to be a decolonizing Settler” (116). The question of what kind of action and support is one they don’t answer, because they cannot:

Settler people who would ally with Indigenous and decolonizing efforts answer it again and again as our abilities and capabilities change. We have to embrace an ethic of mutual aid that is open-ended and founded on the understanding that we will make mistakes and need to ask for guidance, but that the main thrust of how we conduct ourselves has to be based on our deep engagement with respectful relationships. It is important to support Indigenous resurgence and to work with Indigenous communities. For Settler Canadians, this is new ground, and we are likely to fail as often as we succeed. (116)

Such failures are often the result of Settler arrogance, the product of a failure “to continue the processes of self-critique and collective struggle” (116). “Settler colonialism is not monolithic,” Lowman and Barker argue:

[r]ather, it is the result of a multitude of acts, from exceptional power imposed by elites, to banal and everyday lived dynamics of average Settler peoples. If we can see settler colonial structures as dynamic and contested, we can also begin to see that Settler people can decolonize, participating in struggles against the domination and elimination of Indigenous nations. These same struggles are also necessary for Settler people to find their own liberation from the settler colonial structures that limit and control our lives. However, it should be clear that Settler decolonization is only meaningful if it is collective. (116-17)

The place where individual Settlers start may be “questioning and interrogating their own lives,” but in order to act they will have to “seek ways to link their own specific circumstances, abilities, and realities to larger movements and social mobilizations” (117).

“The key guiding principle for Settler Canadians is that decolonization is and must be ‘Always in Relationship.’” Lowman and Barker write. “Remember that Settler and Indigenous identities relate in complex and multiple ways, and we can only fully make sense of them in relationship to each other, to settler colonialism, and to the land” (117). “Decolonization has to be about changing relationships and making them healthy, supportive, and safe, not just in spite of colonial power, but actively against it,” they continue, an act that is inherently prefigurative, because “the pursuit of an end goal and the actual end goal are the same. That is to say, pursuing decolonizing relationship-building can be a form of ‘direct action’ against settler colonialism that prefigures whatever broad social and societal changes are being more widely envisioned” (117). Settlers engaged in decolonization will need to listen deeply, especially when people are telling us what we’ve done is wrong or that our assumptions are wrong or that what we value is wrong (117). “Actively pursuing different kinds of relationships starts with Settlers learning to think relationally,” they contend. “Thinking relationally may not come naturally, but an important first step is to begin trying to see the world as networked together, and to understand how various actions and decisions will impact on the world around us” (117-18). And at the centre of decolonization, if it is to support Indigenous resurgence, we need to place “the knowledge and needs of Indigenous nations” (118). “We must look at the web of relationships and try first to learn about what matters to Indigenous nations to whom we are obliged without waiting to be taught”; we must try “to figure out where to contribute our time, effort, or resources where they will be welcomed in support of Indigenous efforts”; we must 

organize in our own community, be it among friends, across the dinner table, with our church groups, work colleagues, or neighbours, to support Indigenous struggles more proactively and prefiguratively. This means looking for ways to be responsible, trying to avoid mistakes knowing it is likely impossible, framing our struggles towards better living on the land through obligations under treaty, or expectations of us as [a] person who intends to live on this land in a respectful way. It means looking for lessons, thinking deeply, and then trying in our own personal lives. (118)

All of this sounds more than difficult; to me, it sounds impossible. When I read this chapter, in fact, I felt crushed by the demands Lowman and Barker make on their readers (assuming their readers are interested in decolonization). Besides, the political winds are blowing in a very different direction. How can any of this be carried out?

Lowman and Barker suggest that one way is to work with others. Because these struggles are necessarily collective, they will require “building networks of people we can mutually rely on”—groups of people who can learn together, who can help us reflect on what we have done and see our successes and failures (118). “Then we need to reconstitute strategies, reconstruct relationships to people and places, and try—as Settler people—to be responsible for ourselves” (118). “Groups, self-consciously in struggle together, can be vital for providing sounding boards and caring critical perspectives on our very personal work,” they continue. “Further, we have to remember that the commitment that we make to be in decolonizing struggle brings with it no foreknowledge of resolution, and most certainly does not mean we always get to win. We may lose or make mistakes . . .  and many times we lose because we did not do the right thing” (118-19). Those failures will hurt, but as long as we continue trying, they are lessons rather than dead ends (119). “Working among Settler people and in Settler communities is important for Settler Canadian decolonization, but relationships with Indigenous communities is also needed,” they state. “Our Settler responsibilities lie with working for change in Settler society, but these efforts have to be constantly informed by the work of Indigenous communities and people” (119). However, we need to recognize that as Settlers we cannot automatically take positions of leadership and control: “It is how we respond to Indigenous agendas that will determin[e] our effectiveness in supporting decolonization and resurgence, which is not always a clear task” (119). The Guswenta Treaty, or Two-Row Wampum, is a model: the canoe and the ship are travelling side by side, neither controlling the other, but they are on the same river: need to develop relationships premised on boundaries and respect and trust (119). 

Respect, Lowman and Barker note, means accepting when offers of help have been refused (120):

we never get to own the struggles of someone else. We do not get to dictate where or how Indigenous peoples pursue resurgence. Our role is to mitigate the harm of ongoing colonialism, support Indigenous efforts, and dismantle colonial structures of invasion. The ability to displace colonialism from our lives as Settler people only becomes possible because of the fact that Indigenous peoples, struggles, literatures, and ways of thinking become centred in our ways of thinking and doing. (120)

Decolonization is a story, but not one Settler Canadians are used to telling: “[i]t is a story that is multiple, that is experimental, that has many failures but also inspirational successes, and the weight of clear-eyed ethical foundations” (120). It is a story that “inspires us the challenge the very idea of what the settler colonial story is, and as we tell these stories, we have to interrogate them,” asking questions about our role in colonization (here and elsewhere), how colonialism structures our lives, whether we can live the lives we want “without contributing to the oppression, displacement, and genocide of Indigenous peoples,” what our responsibilities are, whose land we live on and what their “traditional laws and practices” are (120). “Decolonization is attempting to find an answer that addresses all of these questions simultaneously, and the only way to find that answer is to try and live it. . . .  The way we struggle will inevitably shape who we are and who we can become” (120).

“We approach all of these difficult and serious questions with critical hope,” Lowman and Barker write. “Hope must be critical. It must be rooted in the recognition of possibility despite obstacles, not the belief that a path free of obstacles exists. Taking up the Settler identity and working to create decolonization in our own lives is no simple thing. Beyond the emotional barriers of fear and discomfort, we do not yet have a clear map, a plan, or a blueprint” (120). Decolonization means rejecting the notion of stories with triumphant, happy endings, along with “stories of nationalism and progress, peacemaker myths and terra nullius, and the notion that Canada, as it is, is all there is. The true struggle, though, is figuring out what kind of story we intend to live in its place” (120). “Stories make us who we are,” they suggest. “That is why it is so important to think about and talk about being Settler Canadians. We have to be aware of more than just what the stories are that we currently tell about ourselves, and how they shape our lives. We also need to think about how we are changing stories for the future, trying to pursue different ways of living” (120-21). 

Decolonization demands two things, they write: 

First, that we commit to no single method for confronting colonialism—this makes sense if we recognize that colonialism overlaps with many hierarchies of power, and so decolonization must be pursued on intersectional lines. Second, that decolonization is a transformative process, with no clear or homogenizing end goals, and in which it is the responsibility of individuals and communities of all kinds to figure out how they fit. This means that we have to accept that when Settler people pursue the transformative process of decolonization, it may mean our eventual elimination as Settler people. (121)

In other words, Settlers must conceptualize their own end: that is “the challenge that must lie at the core of Settler Canadian engagements with decolonization” (121). “Settler Canadians, aware of complicity with and benefit from settler colonialism, aware of illegitimate residency on the land, and aware of roles in the ongoing violent displacement and attempted genocide of Indigenous peoples, must accept that among the possible end-points of decolonization is one in which everything we know changes” (121). We need to acknowledge our fears of the unknown and understand them (121), but we also need to understand that decolonization offers 

a different story that does not follow the expected script of Canadian national exceptionalism, banal and friendly multiculturalism, and heroics at hockey. And as much as the story of decolonization must be about Indigenous nationhood, it is not only for Indigenous peoples. The story of decolonization is one that has room for many voices, one where many people can find ways to belong on the land without dominating, destroying, and displacing Indigenous societies. It is a story in which Settler people can become something more than merely colonizers, not by ignoring their status on the land, but by accepting, owning, and reshaping it. It is a story that may change the teller, it is a story that may change in the telling. It is not one story, but many. (121)

Lowman and Barker imagine a future 

in which Indigenous nationhood is resurgent and regenerated, and “Indigenous” as a collective identity falls by the wayside. All that remains are the many nations, the new and old confederacies and treaty territories. At that point, maybe “Settler” loses any meaning too. In this future, maybe there are just the individual terms by which each Indigenous nation or community refers to “people who come to stay.” (121-22)

That, I think, is what they mean by suggesting that Settlers need to accept that decolonization might mean the end of “Settler” as an identity.

“It is time to step into the ‘space of dangerous freedom,’” they write, using a term they learned about from Haudenosaunee geography. Traditionally, villages were built with a surrounding palisade wall, and a clearing between that wall and the forest. “No one could approach the village and cross the clearing without being seen,” they write. “Taiaiake Alfred has referred to this space as a metaphor for how we approach decolonization struggles, drawing parallels between committing to these struggles and stepping into ‘the clearing,’ the space between the village and the woods, between home, family, safety, and the dangerous space of freedom” (122). That space is free because it contains choices: approach the village, return to the forest, stay where we are and wait (122). All of those choices have consequences, and the unseen villagers have the power: 

This is a different situation than most Settler people are accustomed to, being the one in the open, observed and vulnerable. We can choose to stay in this uncomfortable, unsettled space—a space with no guarantees, where we will have to constantly learn and adapt—or we can go back to the woods. But that will be our choice, not one made for use by colonial elites and state authorities. (122)

The “space of dangerous freedom is more than a metaphor: 

We reflect on this practice in the decision to actively identify as a Settler person. When we write or speak in public, when we meet new people in Canada and abroad and they ask where we are from or how we identify, we centralize our relationships with the land, our entanglements with colonialism. Our being Settler Canadian. This is a small but significant effort that permeates our lives. Owning Settler Canadian as our real identity on these lands is our first step into the clearing. When we say Settler, it is a reminder to us to rethink our own positionality, to consider what the word means and what it implies for our relationships to the land. (122)

In fact, it is a declaration that “is a reminder for us, a m[e]mento that we carry. We say Settler in part because it helps prevent our thoughts from turning towards settler colonial normalization. It reminds us that we can be co-opted into settler colonialism at any point and that we remain constantly complicit. In the clearing, we are also visible to each other and ourselves” (123). Being in that clearing necessarily leads to engagement and action, to conversations and experiments about how we organize ourselves (123). “We hope to invite others into these conversations by making ourselves visible by saying Settler, Settler Canadian, and Settler people,” they write. “We see the impacts that speaking this word can bring—sometimes frightening, sometimes difficult, and sometimes very positive—and we believe it is worth the risk of engaging on those terms” (123). Their hope is that “claiming our Settler identities can be a part of working to address the many shortcomings of our people and re-establishing the trust of Indigenous nations and communities”—that identifying as Settler Canadian “can signal to others that we are ready and committed to honestly addressing settler colonialism in Canada. It is an indication that we are refusing one of the pillars of settler colonialism—the disavowal that props up invisibility and drives towards erasure and indigenization—and embracing honest self-reflection” (123).

“We say Settler because it’s a place from which we can determine how we live on these lands,” Lowman and Barker conclude:

We say Settler to signal that we’re ready to do the work. We say Settler because we believe ethical and exciting decolonial futures are possible. We say Settler because we have seen the identification shake how people feel about themselves and their belonging, and how it has been the start of decolonizing awareness and action. 

We say Settler because it is who we are. We say Settler because it is not everything we could be. (123)

I agree that Settler is who we are, and I would hope (despite all the evidence to the contrary) that it is not everything we could be. And while I think I’ve already been putting into practice some of the decolonization strategies Lowman and Barker enumerate, I do feel discouraged by the monumentality of the task—and by the demand that collective action is the only way forward. That demand leaves me wondering whether there’s a place for introverts (of course I’m introverted: how else could I sit at home and read and write these summaries all day?) in the decolonization movement. I’m not sure where I might fit in or what I might be able to contribute, and I’m also not sure that my larger project does much, if anything, towards decolonization as Lowman and Barker define it. It’s not a bad thing to have these questions, of course, and I’m going to keep thinking about them as I continue reading.

I am certain of one thing, though. I’ve been asked to participate in a panel highlighting Indigenous research in my faculty, even though I’m not Indigenous. I’m interested in treaties, and walking, as an embodied practice, is an Indigenous methodology, I’ve been told—although there are other theoretical frameworks I’d be more comfortable using, such as phenomenology—and so I belong there. I’ve never been comfortable with that idea, and this book has given me a way to formulate my discomfort: my research is Settler research, not Indigenous, and so participating in that panel would be taking space that isn’t mine. That’s one thing that has come out of reading this book. Another is the need to adjust my reading list. I’m going to have to take a close look at Lowman’s and Barker’s list of references, with a view to adding to (or changing) my reading list. That’s always an effect of reading scholarly work: it gives you so much more to read. Sometimes it feels that scholarship, like decolonization, is an open-ended process with no determinate ending. 

Works Cited

Coulthard, Glen. Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. University of Minnesota Press, 2014.

Daschuk, James. Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics of Starvation, and the Loss of Indigenous Life, University of Regina Press, 2013.

Lowman, Emma Battell, and Adam J. Barker. Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada, Fernwood, 2015.

Regan, Paulette. Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and Reconciliation in Canada, University of British Columbia Press, 2011.