78. Aimée Craft, Breathing Life Into the Stone Fort Treaty: An Anishinabe Understanding of Treaty One 

breathing life

Breathing Life Into the Stone Fort Treaty, which I read last summer along with other work on the treaties between Canada and Indigenous peoples, is an important book, and after reviewing my notes, I decided to include it as part of this project. Craft focuses on the negotiations that led to Treaty 1, but her insights likely apply to treaties negotiated in what is now Saskatchewan (particularly Treaty 4, given the presence of Anishinabe negotiators at Fort Qu’Appelle in 1874). Craft is a lawyer, and she is interested in inaakonigewin, or Anishinabe law, in the context of Treaty 1. According to Craft, two legal systems were involved in the negotiations, Anishinabe and settler law, and both are important to understanding the treaty. “Indigenous interpretations of treaties are needed,” Craft writes, “so that we can continue to breathe life into what are essentially relationship documents, while accepting that past interpretations have resulted in significant disagreement” (12). To understand the treaty requires attention to more than just the written text, she continues. “It may be that there was no meeting of the minds or common intention at the time of Treaty One, beyond the agreement to share the land in a spirit of peace and coexistence,” she writes, “and that we are now faced with elaborating an appropriate meaning of a treaty that both parties considered they had made” (12). Craft’s focus is on the Anishinabe understanding of the treaty, which was “rooted”—her word, and it’s an important word in this context—“in procedural and substantive norms derived from Anishinabe inaakonigewin” (12). To understand the treaty in that way requires attention to the oral history of the negotiations (13). What’s important, according to Craft, is that the understandings of both sides in the negotiations be taken into account. “In order to interpret and implement treaties as meaningful agreements, the different and differing understandings need to be addressed,” she writes. “Although the treaty parties may have understood that they each had differing perspectives, each was guided by its own understandings, including its own legal tradition and jurisdiction” (13).

The Supreme Court’s ruling on treaties—that the words of the written text “must not be interpreted in their strict technical sense nor subjected to rigid modern rules of construction,” but rather are to be understood “as they would have been construed by the Aboriginal signatories, and interpreted flexibly, with the use of extrinsic evidence” (qtd. in Craft 14)—suggests the importance of Craft’s approach, although she states that this approach has not led to “meaningful or complete understanding of Aboriginal-Crown treaties, nor has it achieved the court’s goal of remedying disadvantage” (14). Instead, treaty interpretation in the courts has tended to favour the Crown’s perspective, and has set tended to ignore Indigenous perspectives, and “[i]n practice, many court decisions have resulted in narrow understandings of treaties, often limiting the treaty rights in space and in time” (14). This leads to Craft’s primary research question: “How can years of uni-directional understanding based on a written text and privileging the Crown’s view, be reconsidered in order to give voice to the Anishinabe understanding of treaty?” (14-15). To answer this question, Craft triangulates between the written record of the negotiations, oral histories, and Indigenous knowledge (16). Her book discusses five distinct concepts: Anishinabe practices of treaty-making with Indigenous nations, fur traders, and the British Crown prior to Treaty 1; the particular context of the Treaty 1 negotiations; the reliance on and use of Anishinabe protocols in the negotiations, which “illustrates the use of Anishinabe procedural laws” in the negotiations “and informs the substantive expectations of the treaty,” including its sacredness; the importance of Anishinabe kinship norms; and finally, the Anishinabe understanding of their relationship to the earth, which “informed what could be negotiated in terms of sharing the land with the incoming settlers” (16). According to Craft, “[a]ll these concepts lead to the understanding that Treaty One was an agreement to share in the land, for the purposes of agriculture, in a spirit of ‘peace and good will’ with assurances of an ‘allowance they are to count upon and receive year by year from Her Majesty’s bounty and benevolence’” (16-17).

Pre-contact Anishinabe diplomatic or treaty relationships that continue today include the Council of Three Fires (24), the Dish With One Spoon agreement with the Haudenosaunee (24-25), and peace treaties with the Dakota (25). The Anishinabe also had diplomatic relationships with fur traders, and these used Indigenous protocols, especially the pipe ceremony (25-26). Craft also argues that the Guswenta or Kaswehnta, known in English as the Two-Row Wampum, and the later Covenant Chain, informed Anishinabe relationships with the Crown as well (31-32). “The non-interference and mutual assistance that are illustrated by the Covenant Chain belt and the Two Row Wampum help further illustrate the perspective that the Anishinabe brought to the treaty and the mutual reliance of the treaty parties on the Anishinabe procedural and legal principles that informed Treaty One,” she writes (34). The importance of the Two-Row Wampum to Craft’s argument is another reason to revisit John Borrows’s essay on that treaty, sooner rather than later.

The context of the Treaty 1 negotiations included the 1817 Selkirk Treaty (38), Louis Riel’s call for treaties in his list of demands during the 1869-70 Resistance (42), and political uncertainty and instability, which led settlers in Manitoba to want a treaty as well (44). The negotiations for Treaty 1 began with assurances that hunting, fishing, trapping, and other harvesting would continue as before, and that the Queen would not force the Anishinabe to adopt white ways (such as agriculture) or interfere in existing Anishinabe ways (51). “Retention of autonomy, jurisdiction, and sovereignty over their actions was essential to securing the agreement with the Anishinabe,” Craft writes (52). However, there is no record of an explanation of the concept of surrendering land (54); had that concept been explained, Craft believes, the negotiations would have collapsed (64). In addition, it is clear in the documentary record that the Crown and the Anishinabe had different ideas about what was meant by “reserve” (54-55). Nevertheless, Craft argues that the Crown knew that “the Anishinabe were not approaching land issues using an acquisition and possession model” (60). “It is my view, based on the evidence taken as a whole,” she writes, “that the Anishinabe agreed to share the land with the settlers and allow them to use the land they desired for agriculture. The Anishinabe also understood that they could continue to use their territory for their traditional activities” (60-61). Neither party would interfere with the other, but, according to Anishinabe elders, they would share the land and its resources (61). “Even if the Anishinabe had a vague understanding of British or Canadian concepts of ownership, they likely did not perceive themselves as being bound by them” (65), because Indigenous and Canadian law systems co-existed (and continue to co-exist, according to John Borrows, among others) (67).

According to Craft, the Anishinabe were governed by their own laws, which focus on kinship between various animate beings, including animals, fish, plants, rocks and spirits, and the land (70). She rightly (in my opinion) dismisses the notion of “fictive kinship.” “There is no fiction in Anishinabe kinship,” she writes (70). Every relationship—including those with non-human things—carries with it mutual responsibilities and obligations (70-71). In addition, the reliance of the negotiators on Anishinabe protocols “invoked substantive normative expectations on the part of the Anishinabe, which informed the development of the Treaty One relationship,” even though this may not have been completely understood by the government negotiators (71). Perhaps the most important protocol was the pipe ceremony, which “was used to call upon the Creator to act as a third party to the negotiations and the agreement” (81). The resulting promises the two parties made were considered sacred (at least by the Anishinabe) (81). 

Crown negotiators spoke of the Queen and the Anishinabe as being in a mother-child relationship, which (for the Anishinabe) established a kinship relationship with the Queen (86). This mother-child relationship entailed obligations of love, kindness, and caring, such as in the relationship between Mother Earth and the Anishinabe (87). According to Craft, when the treaty negotiations became a kinship ceremony, the “Anishinabe pledged to the Creator to share the land with the Queen’s other children, in accordance with principles of kinship, equality, and reciprocity” (92-93). Moreover, it was clear during the negotiations that the Anishinabe—most of the chiefs present, anyway—described their relationship to the land as being one with “a living being, a mother” (95). For this reason, Craft argues, “[t]he Anishinabe did not surrender their land in the Treaty One negotiations. It was not in their power to do so, as they did not own it. In their eyes, they were in a sacred relationship with the land, endorsed by the Creator” (99). The Crown negotiators, however “viewed the treaty as a transfer of land” (99). These mutually exclusive ideas continue to inform the differing perspectives on the treaty (103). 

There were problems with the implementation of the treaty, as there were with other numbered treaties. Outside promises were at first not included in the treaty, although they were added in 1875 (104). The Anishinabe also refused to abide by hunting and fishing regulations, which go against the treaty’s provisions (105). “The frequency and detailed nature of post-treaty complaints by the Treaty One chiefs can lead to the assumption that, in addition to the outside promises added to the treaty in 1875, there were other promises that may not have been recorded in Commissioner Simpson’s report,” Craft writes. “The negotiated agreement was likely far more nuanced than the reported terms of a treaty rooted in surrender of land in exchange for annuities and goods” (106).

For Craft, a better understanding of Treaty 1 can be achieved by considering the Anishinabe perspective on the negotiations, including substantive and procedural legal principles that helped make the treaty. There was no hybrid or “intersocietal law” at the negotiations; rather, there were two distinct systems of law in operation, and by adopting both the procedural and substantive forms of Anishinabe law during the negotiations, the Crown representatives engaged the legal framework of the Anishinabe, even if they didn’t understand that they were thereby operating according to Anishinabe law (107). For that reason, it’s not acceptable to consider the implementation and interpretation of the treaty only in terms of Canadian common law (108). She quotes elder Victor Courchene, who suggested that the treaty invited settlers “to come and eat from that plate together with the Anishinabe” (110)—to share the land and the resources together, in other words. There was no cession, release, or surrender of land, but rather “compromise and coexistence” (112)—or at least that’s the deal the Anishinabe thought they were making. Moreover, the treaty is not a finalized document. Rather, in Anishinabe inaakonigewin, relationships continue to be fostered, redefined, re-examined, renegotiated, tended, fuelled, and nurtured; a treaty frozen on paper is, for the Anishinabe, an alien concept (113). This is important, she concludes, because “[t]reaties are agreements between two parties in which neither perspective should be privileged over the other” (113), and therefore the Anishinabe perspective she describes needs to be considered foundational when the treaty is discussed.

Craft’s brief book is important, because it focuses directly on one treaty in detail, although doubtless its argument could apply to other numbered treaties as well (and if not its argument, its methodology). It’s true that she relies on conjecture throughout the book, but no doubt that’s because of the difficulty in reconstructing what the Anishinabe negotiators were thinking. That’s where oral history comes into play, although Craft seems somewhat cautious in applying it. Nevertheless, the perspective Craft outlines is important, because the standard government interpretation of the treaties as a surrender of large tracts of land in exchange for smaller ones makes no logical sense, and seems to rely on an assumption that the First Nations negotiators could not bargain on their own behalf successfully. If, on the other hand, the treaties were promises to share the land and its resources, then they begin to make sense. There is no way to understand the numbered treaties without taking the perspective of the First Nations negotiators into account, and for that reason books like Craft’s are essential.

Work Cited

Craft, Aimée. Breathing Life Into the Stone Fort Treaty: An Anishinabe Understanding of Treaty One, Purich, 2013.

77. Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties 

bounty and benevolence

Bounty and Benevolence, a collaboration between three historians, was originally commissioned as a research report for Saskatchewan’s Office of the Treaty Commissioner, along with Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized As Nations, by Harold Cardinal and Walter Hildebrandt, an oral history of the treaties that is intended to be complementary to Bounty and Benevolence’s focus on documentary history. Bounty and Benevolence is structurally similar to and covers much of the same territory as Miller’s later Compact, Contract, Covenant, although the focus is on Saskatchewan. That means the commercial compacts with the Hudson Bay Company are discussed first, followed by the Selkirk Treaty of 1817, treaties in eastern Canada that were precedents for the numbered treaties in Saskatchewan, and earlier numbered treaties in Manitoba and northwestern Ontario. After discussing the treaties that affect this province—numbers 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10—there is a chapter on the problems of treaty implementation, followed by a conclusion. Perhaps it’s unnecessary to read both Compact, Contract, Covenant and Bounty and Benevolence because of their similarities, although the focus on one province means that the discussion in Bounty and Benevolence is somewhat more detailed. I read Bounty and Benevolence last summer, as part of a course on the treaties, but I thought it would be useful to revisit the book for this project. After reviewing my notes, I think it’s worthwhile including Bounty and Benevolence here.

The chapter on commercial relationships between First Nations and the Hudson Bay Company notes the importance of protocol and ceremony in those relationships, and the continuity between trade relationships with the HBC and the later numbered treaties: “all the major components of pre-trade gift-exchanges—the calumet rite, the presentation of outfits of clothing to Aboriginal leaders, and the distribution of food—were carried over into the treaty-making process in the late nineteenth century” (9). Ceremony and protocol were also important in the negotiation of the Selkirk Treaty, which in some ways became a bridge between earlier commercial negotiations and the later numbered treaties (31). Moreover, like the later numbered treaties, the Selkirk Treaty was marked by confusion over what the two parties actually agreed to (30).

The discussion of other treaties in eastern Canada includes the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Two-Row Wampum that records the negotiations concluded at the 1764 Niagara Conference. According to the authors, in the 1990s John Borrows “made a strong argument that the proclamation, when read together with the solemn agreement made shortly thereafter at Niagara, constituted a treaty between First Nations and the Crown that positively guarantees First Nations the right of self-government” (33). Borrows’s essay is important and I ought to re-read it. (Borrows is an essential writer on treaty issues and I have several of his books on my reading list.)

The more pertinent forerunners of the numbered treaties are the Robinson Treaties, which, like the later treaties, allowed First Nations economic rights on all ceded lands (outside of reserves) that were not developed by settlers. As the authors point out, “This right included the subsistence and commercial use of fish, fur, and game resources on the understanding that this justified offering the Aboriginal people much lower annuities than they had demanded in treaty negotiations” (44). The later numbered treaties made similar promises. However, it’s not clear to me whether the Crown negotiators in the 1870s understood that the agricultural use of land would make hunting and gathering difficult, if not impossible. That was the experience of First Nations in Nova Scotia (according to Daniel Paul) and in Ontario (according to Miller and Donald Smith): the impact of settlement on populations of game animals left First Nations in those territories starving early in the settlement process. It’s hard to know if the Crown negotiators were just ignorant or acting in bad faith.

Ray, Miller, and Tough make an interesting argument about the first three numbered treaties: the federal government “was soliciting information from locals and providing negotiators with ‘large powers,’” and this fact “indicates that the dominion government did not have an inviolable draft treaty.” Therefore, First Nations negotiators “had scope to influence the relationship created by treaty negotiations” (63). This situation is perhaps different from later numbered treaties, where the federal treaty commissioners had a clearer sense of the kind of agreement they wanted, and entered negotiations with drafts of treaties already prepared.

Nevertheless, the authors argue that the first three numbered treaties were forerunners for the later numbered treaties, and in this their arguments parallel Miller’s later book. Kinship metaphors, they suggest, were not just paternalistic but were symbolic language—an idea other writers will develop further (66). Specifics about reserves were not made explicit (67), and First Nations were assured that their traditional livelihood would continue after the treaty was negotiated (67). Moreover, they argue that “[t]reaty-making involved an unequal meeting of two property systems” (69). In 2000, when this book was published, this aspect of treaty-making had received little attention, they suggest, and the fact that “the terms describing ownership, land use, and occupancy are used in an imprecise way in the historical records,” as well as “conflicting scholarly theories about the nature of Aboriginal tenure systems,” has caused much confusion (69-70). Much of the research in the area since this book was published has set out to clarify these questions, and oral history has been, I would argue, invaluable in this work. Nevertheless, the documentary record does make clear “that Indian chiefs were well informed about land and resource issues, both in terms of their own needs and of the values Whites placed on them. Significantly, Indians wanted to establish treaty relations with the Crown to address their Aboriginal interest in the land” (69-70). According to the authors, the documentary record can also be used to establish, to a certain extent, the views of First Nations negotiators, at least as far as Treaties 1, 2, and 3 are concerned, using both government records and newspaper accounts (74). Moreover, “[d]ecades of fur trade bargaining gave Indians considerable experience in dealing with European commercial impulses and in seeking the satisfaction of their livelihood needs. Ultimately, Morris was forced to limit the scope of the negotiations by placing the treaties on the basis of some kind of trust: a belief in the Queen’s good intentions” (75). The way I read those sentences, it seems that in the first three numbered treaties, Crown negotiators found themselves being outmatched by their First Nations counterparts. As with other numbered treaties, there are controversies about the differences between oral and written versions of the agreements in Treaties 1, 2, and 3 (77, 81), and “the dominion government sought refuge in the written version of the treaties (81). First Nations used political pressure to get some of the so-called “outside promises” included later in the 1870s (83-84). The authors therefore acknowledge the importance of going beyond the written text of the treaties by examining the context in which they were negotiated in order to understand what the negotiators actually thought they were agreeing to (86).

Both the Crown and First Nations faced challenges when they negotiated Treaty 4. Epidemics of smallpox, buffalo scarcity, and difficult relationships between Métis and First Nations were causing political and military instability, and the federal government was informed of these problems by senior HBC officials and missionaries. For its part, Canada feared the military strength of the Cree and Saulteaux, and did not want to fight (104). Moreover, First Nations were still angry over the transfer of Rupert’s Land from the HBC to Canada without consultation. As a result, Treaty 4 negotiations happened without a pipe ceremony or other rituals (107-08). According to the authors, there is a sharp contrast between accounts of the negotiations provided by Morris and First Nations elders (111), and Morris’s language in speeches was vague compared to the precise language of the treaty document (112). These facts may lead one to assume that Morris was not being truthful in the negotiations, an argument that Michael Asch repudiates but that Sheldon Krasowski seems to support. Nevertheless, most of the terms of Treaty 4 ended up being identical to Treaty 3 (113). Reserves would be small, but hunting, trapping, and fishing rights off reserve were promised, with limitations for land taken up by settlement or other purposes (115). The relationship with the Queen promised First Nations protection and equal justice (117). The chiefs present at the negotiations asked for copies of the written treaty (118), a sign, perhaps, that they did not entirely trust the Crown to hold up its end of the bargain.

The Treaty 5 negotiations affected only three First Nations in northern Saskatchewan, and it left First Nations with reserves that were much smaller than in Treaties 3, 4, or 6. Treaty 6, however, covered a large area in Saskatchewan and Alberta. The First Nations chiefs won more emphasis on famine relief and medical assistance because their people were suffering from the continuing decline of the bison and the severe effects of the smallpox epidemic. The clauses they negotiated, according to Ray, Miller, and Tough, were compatible with the assistance First Nations had received from the Hudson Bay Company previously (130). Morris presented the treaty to First Nations as a gift from the Queen: “They would have the use of their lands ‘as before,’ but with the addition of presents, annuities, and other benefits” (130). Unlike the Treaty 4 negotiations, Treaty 6 talks began with a pipe ceremony, and it appears that the federal commissioners didn’t quite understand the significance of this (133). “Treaty 6 was the culmination of the treaty-making tradition in western Canada,” the authors state, perhaps because it is the treaty in which the most concessions were wrung from the federal negotiators (146-47). Later treaties reduced the commitments of the federal government, and as Asch notes, Morris lost his job for making concessions in the Treaty 6 negotiations.

Treaty 8, which covers part of northern Saskatchewan, was negotiated 20 years later, with a great deal of haste and carelessness. The Crown wanted to open up northern areas of the western provinces to prospectors, and that was its rationale for beginning the negotiations, which First Nations had been requesting for some time. There are no records of the discussions, just the final text. First Nations sought more explicit protection for hunting, fishing, and trapping rights, because they were aware of what was happening on the prairies south of the boreal forest (the pass system, for example). The government tried to assure the chiefs that First Nations people would not be restricted to their reserves. Treaty 8, the authors write, “allowed for the peaceful economic development of the region at a time when federal and provincial policing powers were stretched thin. . . . It is certain that the economic development of the Athabasca, Mackenzie, and Peace River districts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries could not have been accomplished peacefully without Treaty 8” (168). However, the oral histories of Treaty 8 people make it clear that the promises of guarantees of fishing, hunting and trapping rights were not kept (169). Like Treaty 8, Treaty 10 was negotiated because of pressure of economic development, and because the creation of the province of Saskatchewan resulted in pressure to bring northern First Nations into treaty (171-72). Treaty 8 served as a model (186), and the concerns raised by First Nations echoed those raised in previous negotiations (186). Again, First Nations were looking for the same kinds of benefits they had previously received from the HBC (186).

The chapter on treaty implementation tells a familiar and terrible story. There were problems about the way the treaties were implemented almost immediately, and in 1878 the First Nations that signed Treaty 4 threatened to refuse their annuities, thereby repudiating the treaty (187-88). Complaints were made by First Nations to Lord Lorne, the Governor General, in 1881 (188). The differences between the written text and oral promises were a large part of the problem. Meanwhile, Sir John A. Macdonald and Edgar Dewdney were cutting government spending on the Indian Department while diverting its budget to residential schools (190). There was little direct resistance, however; the authors cite the Yellow Calf incident of 1884 as one of the few examples of armed resistance to the failure of the government to live up to its treaty promises (190). It is clear, they write, from the lists of grievances written by First Nations chiefs that Treaty 4 included a guarantee of government assistance sufficient to enable First Nations to maintain themselves when settlers arrived and interfered with their ability to live by traditional methods (192)—guarantees that were ignored by the government. In Treaty 6 territory, similar issues arose: the government failed to provide farm implements and cattle (196), and First Nations demanded control over their own affairs (196). After 1885, the implementation of the pass system, along with the “peasant farming” and severalty policies later in the 1880s, made the situation worse in southern Saskatchewan (200-01). “All these retrograde policy developments help to explain both the serious problems with treaty implementation that southern First Nations experienced in the 1880s and 1890s and the heightened suspicions with which northern Nations approached treaty-making in the 1890s and first decade of the twentieth century,” Ray, Miller, and Tough write (201). In Treaty 10 territory, there were conflicts over the right to fish, hunt, trap, and gather (201). Part of the problem was the 1876 Indian Act, which led to policies of political control, enforced economic transition, and cultural subjugation and assimilation that bore no resemblance to the attitudes the treaty commissioners displayed in the 1870s (202-03). According to Ray, Miller, and Tough, “This study belongs to the unfolding process of reinterpreting the genesis, contents, and impact of the treaties that is still going on” (204).

Unlike Asch, the authors don’t seem to like Morris very much, referring to the “complacent self-satisfaction” his book on the treaties reveals (204). They suggest that Harold Cardinal’s The Unjust Society (another important book, also on my reading list) played a key role in changing the attitudes of historians towards the treaties, and cite the work of Gerald Friesen, Jean Friesen, and John Tobias as central to creating a viewpoint that, by the late 1990s, “could legitimately be described as the new, more critical orthodoxy” (208). Although their book focuses on the documentary record, they write that these texts “cannot provide a complete and finished historical version of the meanings of a treaty relationship between First Nations and the Crown” (214). They argue that their study has uncovered important findings regarding the continuity of the relationship between First Nations and the HBC, and First Nations and Canada; the Crown’s consistent position during negotiations of various treaties; promises to ensure First Nations livelihood; and the problems of treaty implementation (214). “In the immediate treaty-signing era, problems arose that reflect on the different understandings of the treaties and/or the failure to implement the treaties in good faith,” they write (214). So much waffling is contained in that phrase “and/or”! I would have hoped for a much clearer conclusion regarding this crucial issue. Did the government implement the treaties in good faith? No. Did the two sides understand the treaties differently? Yes. But did the Crown negotiators act in good faith? That’s a central question that’s left open here. It might be the central question of the history of the numbered treaties.

Bounty and Benevolence is an important work, but it is now somewhat out-of-date, I think, especially given the importance of works by First Nations writers like Aimée Craft and Harold Johnson, as well as the Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan book. After all, if the documentary record is incomplete, and if oral history can fill in the gaps in that record, then it’s important to use that testimony as well. In fact, I tend to find the books that rely on oral history more useful than works like Bounty and Benevolence, although as Sheldon Krasowski’s No Surrender indicates, there are resources in documentary history that previous historians have ignored. In any case, despite its limitations, Bounty and Benevolence is a useful overview of treaties in Saskatchewan.

Work Cited

Ray, Arthur J. Jim Miller, and Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties,McGill-Queen’s UP, 2000.