125. Zoe Todd, “An Indigenous Feminist’s Take On The Ontological Turn: ‘Ontology’ Is Just Another Word For Colonialism”

zoe todd

I ran across a reference to Métis anthropologist Zoe Todd’s essay “An Indigenous Feminist’s Take On The Ontological Turn: ‘Ontology’ Is Just Another Word For Colonialism” in Stephanie Springgay’s and Sarah E. Truman’s Walking Methodologies in a More-than-Human World: Walking Lab. Their summary of her argument states that Todd, “like other Indigenous scholars, insist[s] that ontological discussions of matter must take into consideration not only Indigenous worldviews but material legal struggles over matter and sovereignty” (9). When I read Bruno Latour’s book, Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime, I found myself wondering if Todd would consider his approach to the vitality of things to be colonial. Well, let’s take a look at Todd’s argument and see.

Well, the essay begins with a memoir of going to see “the great Latour” give a lecture in Edinburgh in 2013. “I was giddy with excitement: a talk by the Great Latour, live and in colour!” she writes. “Bruno Latour’s work was, in part, the reason that I switched my focus away from a pure science degree in Biology in my undergraduate studies. . . . Latour was (and is) very much a personal hero of mine” (4). Okay, I’m confused by Todd’s apparent sarcasm, directed either at Latour or her younger self’s credulity. Bruno was talking about “Natural Religion,” and he suggested that climate was “a matter of ‘common cosmological concern’” (5). He mentioned the notion of Gaia, and Todd expected that “he would reference Sila, the well-known Inuit concept that is today translated by many non-Inuit as climate but Sila is also ‘the breathe [sic] that circulates into and out of every living thing” (Qitsualik, qtd. 5). (Well-known? I had never heard of it, but it sounds interesting, and Qitsualik’s account might be worth reading.) “The infinitesimal bit of the concept of Sila that I can claim to understand is that it is bound with life, with climate, with knowing, and with the very existence of being(s),” Todd continues. “And, in some respects, it sounds an awful lot like the idea of Gaia to my Métis ears” (5). Todd notes the contributions of Inuit people to activism about and awareness of climate change, and, she writes, “I waited through the whole talk, to hear the Great Latour credit Indigenous thinkers for their millennia of engagement with sentient environments, with cosmologies that enmesh people into complex relationships between themselves and all relations, and with climates and atmospheres as important points of organization and action” (6-7). 

She waited in vain, of course (her narrative foreshadows that conclusion): Latour didn’t discuss Indigenous thinkers or worldviews. “I was left wondering, when will I hear someone reference Indigenous thinkers in a direct, contemporary and meaningful way in European lecture halls?” she recalls:

Without filtering ideas through white intermediaries—apologies to the vast majority of my anthropology colleagues—but by citing and quoting Indigenous thinkers directly, unambiguously and generously. As thinkers in their own right, not just disembodied representatives of an amorphous Indigeneity that serves European intellectual or political purposes, and not just as research subjects or vaguely defined “collaborators.” As dynamic Philosophers and Intellectuals, full stop. Rather than bequeathing climate activism to the Al Gores of the world, when will Euro-American scholarship take the intellectual labour of Inuit women like Rosemarie Kuptana and Sheila Watt-Clouthier seriously? (7)

Todd left before the end of the question period:

it appeared that another Euro-Western academic narrative, in this case the trendy and dominant Ontological Turn (and/or post-humanism, and/or cosmopolitics—all three of which share tangled roots, and can be mobilised distinctly or collectively, depending on who you ask), and discourses of how to organise ourselves around and communicate with the constituents of complex and contested world(s) (or multiverses, if you’re into the whole brevity thing)—was spinning itself on the backs of non-European thinkers. And again, the ones we credited for these incredible insights into the “more-than-human,” sentience and agency, and the ways through which to imagine our “common cosmological concerns” were not the people who built and maintain the knowledge systems that European and North American anthropologists and philosophers have been studying for over a hundred years, and predicating many of their current “aha” ontological moments (or re-imaginings of the discipline upon). No, here we were celebrating and worshipping a European thinker for “discovering,” or newly articulating by drawing on a European intellectual heritage, what many an Indigenous thinker around the world could have told you for millennia: the climate is a common organizing force! (7-8)

Todd states that what struck her about Latour’s talk was “the unintential (even ironic) evocation of theories about the climate as a form of aer nullius”—in an endnote, she states that this Latin term means “it belongs to no one (20)—“which it often becomes in Euro-Western academic discourses: where the climate acts as a blank commons to be populated by very Euro-Western theories of resilience, the Anthropocene, Actor Network Theory and other ideas that dominate the anthropological and climate change arenas of the moment” (8). 

Her concern, she continues, is less with Latour than with his audience, which “consumes Latour’s argument (and the arguments of others writing and thinking about the climate, ontologies, our shared engagements with the world) without being aware of competing or similar discourses happening outside of the rock-star arenas of Euro-Western thought” (8). “Was it entirely Latour’s fault, therefore, that he did not mention Inuit?” she asks:

If a European audience is not familiar with the breadth and depth of Indigenous thinking and how strongly it influences many of the current strands of post-humanism and the Ontological Turn, can a speaker be blamed for side-stepping a nod towards Inuit climate advocacy in a discussion of the “climate as common cosmological turn”? Should I welcome his silence: better that he not address Indigenous thinking than to misinterpret it or distort it? (8-9)

She cites Vanessa Watts’s article (which I blogged about here) as both a source for her claim that Indigenous thinking influences current thinking about post-humanism and the ontological turn (I’m not sure, though, that Watts’s essay establishes a chain of influence) and cites Watts’s argument that 

the appropriation of Indigenous thinking in European contexts without Indigenous interlocutors present to hold the use of Indigenous stories and laws to account flattens, distorts and erases the embodied, legal-governance and spiritual aspects of Indigenous thinking. So there is a very real risk to Indigenous thinking being used by non-Indigenous scholars who apply it to Actor Network Theory, cosmopolitics, ontological and posthumanist threads without contending with the embodied expressions of stories, laws, and songs as bound with Indigenous-Place Thought. (9)

She has observed, in the academy, Indigenous stories being “employed without Indigenous peoples present to engage in the application of them in European work” (9). Yet, she continues, “there is a risk as well, to Indigenous thinking not being acknowledged at all. How do we hold these two issues in tension and apply the accountably in anthropology?” (9). That’s a good question, and not just for anthropology as a discipline: what Todd describes as “tension” could quite easily slide into a double-bind, in which non-Indigenous thinkers are damned for not drawing upon Indigenous knowledge (assuming that they have any clue of its depth and breadth, or that they know the names of the thinkers Todd cites—we all have our blindnesses, even the great Latour) and then damned for appropriating that knowledge if they do draw upon it. Nobody wants to occupy that kind of space, or be forced into it, and if all you can offer someone is a space of negation, they will simply refuse to occupy it, and rightly so.

“I concede that there are elements of post-humanism, cosmopolitics and the Ontological Turn that could potentially be promising tools in the decolonial project, if approached with an attention to the structural realities of the academy,” Todd continues (9). She cites the work of Juanita Sundberg, who tries to use post-humanism “as a decolonizing tool kit” while acknowledging its Eurocentrism (9). Sundberg sounds like someone I will have to read: Todd suggests that Sundberg and Watts “both provide Euro-Western scholars with practical tools for employing Indigenous ontologies in their work with care and respect” (9). I’m not convinced that’s true of Watts, who (in my reading of her essay) would bristle at Todd’s use of the term “ontology,” but perhaps Sundberg’s notion of accounting for location would be useful. Or, to be fair, perhaps I will need to return to Watts’s essay and think further about her idea, “Indigenous Place-Thought” (9). 

According to Todd, the issue is structural: 

it is a critique of systems and practices that culminate in events such as the one I attended. It is a critique of a discipline and intellectual environment that currently claims to be striving for the worthy goal of “ontological self-determination” but failing to create the conditions wherein many of its practitioners respect our physical self-determination (and right to ensure Indigenous thinking is employed accountably) and intellectual presence as Indigenous peoples within its very own bricks-and-mortar institutions. (9-10)

Yes, there aren’t enough Indigenous scholars (yet) to establish an intellectual presence within the academy (although I would venture that the only people guaranteed of getting tenure-track jobs in Canada at the moment are Indigenous), and decolonization or self-determination are mere dreams in this country, given the progress that has been made (almost none) towards so-called “reconciliation” since the release of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s report almost five years ago. I completely agree. Helpfully, Todd eventually gives her readers a list of Indigenous thinkers they should be reading; without that list, many of us môniyâw wouldn’t know where to begin. 

Next, Todd tells another story to assure her readers “that the problem outlined in this essay is deeper than any single scholar associated with dominant thought in the European academy at the moment . . . but is due, rather, to the European academy’s continued, collective reticence to address its own racist and colonial roots, and debt to Indigenous thinkers in a meaningful and structural way” (10). She notes that on the day in 2014 that a grand jury decided not to indict the police officer who shot black teenager Mike Brown, the American Anthropological Association issued a press release calling for more discussion of structural racism in the United States. What, she wondered, is the Association of Social Anthropologists of the U.K. and Commonwealth up to? She discovered that the call for papers for the association’s upcoming conference used the phrase “going native” (10). She complained, and “a footnote clarifying the use of this term as intended to spark critical debate around historical relationships between anthropologists and the people they researched was added to the website” (10). But the experience left her thinking about how often she “witnessed racially charged phrases used in day-to-day exchanges in the UK academy” (10): all the time is the answer. 

Todd cites the idea of “anthropology as white public space” articulated by Karen Brodkin, Sandra Morgen and Janis Hutchinson in their work on racism in anthropology—an idea that has become central to Todd’s own work (10). “I experience anthropology as white public space,” she writes: “in the subtle but pervasive power afforded to white scholarship that distorts or erases or homogenises distinct Indigenous voices” (11). She notes that she is “a white-passing Indigenous woman” and therefore has “a curious access into spaces where people ‘say what they really think’ about Indigenous issues or People of Colour when they assume everyone in the room is Caucasian”: 

This is a space that must be acknowledged and problematised, for it is a space that deeply influences how Euro-Western thought is produced within the academy. the vast gulf between “what is” and “what can be” within a discipline like anthropology lies within those spaces where whiteness protects itself when it assumes there are no POC (and/or Indigenous peoples) to bear witness to its insecurities, hostilities. (12)

She has seen the ways that “‘white fragility’ manifests and pities and consoles itself when white supremacy is challenged within the academy” (12). This situation gives her “a front seat to the whole spectacle of whiteness—how it is practiced when it claims to be dismantling itself and in turn how it is practiced when it shores itself up against necessary critiques from Indigenous scholars and Scholars of Colour” (12). In such “underacknowledged spaces,” she continues, “official academic discourse and promises of decolonial ethos” mingle with “with the real practice, and prejudice, of our disciplines. Where racism and whiteness are reinforced and reproduced (but also where they can be challenged and dismantled)” (12). She cites Sara Ahmed’s claim that the term “white men” describes an institution “that reproduces itself in its own image” (12-13). She notes that “a critique of whiteness is meant to draw attention to the structural, routinised aspects of ‘white public space’” (13). According to Todd, Ahmed suggests that the reproduction of “white men” as an institution is citational: “one must cite white men to get ahead. In this way, we are conditioned to cite Al Gore before Sheila Watt-Cloutier; to reference Irving Hallowell before we engage with and acknowledge contemporary Anishinaabeg thinkers like John Borrows” (13). Okay, but that’s not my experience: I’ve never heard of Irving Hallowell, but I think John Borrows is fantastic. Perhaps I can credit my supervisors for that fact.

Todd notes that courses in Black Studies are absent in the UK; universities believe that they lack the ability to offer such programs because of a lack of black faculty. “But the inevitable postponing of critical scholarship about race, racialisation and racism forestalls the ability of Indigenous scholars and POC to invest our careers in these topics within the academy,” she writes. “If Universities are not yet ready to challenge white supremacy, will they ever be? And if a program on critical race thinking is not supported today, how can White Scholars advance claims that the academy is in fact a safe space for Indigenous scholars, let along claim that decolonisation is occurring within the halls of the academy itself?” (13). Todd suggests that she has developed coping strategies to deal with the “colonial and racist trends” she encounters “as an Indigenous person infiltrating the British academy” (13):

Therefore, as an Indigenous woman, I have tried, over the last few years, to find thinkers who engage with Indigenous thought respectfully; who give full credit to Indigenous laws, stories and epistemologies; who quote and cite Indigenous people rather than citing anthropologists who studied Indigenous people 80 years ago. This is not always easy. (13-14)

She names scholars who fit that description and thanks them for giving her hope “amidst the despair I’ve felt as the ‘Ontological Turn’ gains steam on both sides of the Atlantic” (14). 

In fact, she continues, “I think it is time we take the Ontological Turn, and the European academy more broadly, head on”:

To accomplish this, I want to direct you to Indigenous thinkers who have been writing about Indigenous legal theory, human-animal relations and multiple epistemologies/ontologies for decades. Consider the Indigenous and/or POC scholars referred to within this piece as a “cite this, not that” cheat-sheet for people who feel dissatisfied with the current Euro (and white, and quite often, male) centric discourse taking place in our disciplines, departments, conferences and journals. (14)

This shift in attention is important because of colonialism, which continues in Canada. “Canada is only now coming around to the realisation that through things like residential schools, and the deeply racist—and still legislated(!) Indian Act—that it, as a nation was built on cultural genocide and dispossession,” she writes. “Ask any Indigenous person, and you will hear that nobody from an Indigenous Nation has ever laboured under the fantasy that Canada is post-colonial, or benevolent” (15). British institutions, including universities, are still benefitting from colonialism. “We are enmeshed, across the Atlantic, in ongoing colonial legacies,” she continues. “And in order to dismantle those legacies, we must face our complicity head on. I firmly believe we can confront these legacies with a great deal of love and accountability, and build processes and structures that are attentive to and accountable for the ongoing impacts of colonial rule” (15). European thinkers are also “embedded in systems that uphold the exploitation and dispossession of Indigenous peoples,” and “[t]he academy plays a role in shaping the narratives that erase ongoing colonial violence” (15).

Can Europeans simply absolve themselves from any guilt over the genocide of Indigenous people, “[a]nd then . . . turn around and use Indigenous cosmologies and knowledge systems in a so-called new intellectual ‘turn,’ all the while ignoring the contemporary realities of Indigenous people vis-à-vis colonial nation-states, or the many Indigenous thinkers who are themselves writing about these issues?” (15-16). The answer to this rhetorical question is obviously “no”—but that’s what’s happening, according to Todd. I would still need to see evidence that the contemporary intellectual currents she is addressing are actually based on Indigenous knowledge systems and cosmologies; after all, it’s not impossible that systems of thought that begin in different places could arrive at similar conclusions. Todd’s reference to Watts isn’t enough for me. Of course, she could argue that the failure or refusal to cite Indigenous thinkers hides the origins of post-humanist thought, but there evidence for influence (or plagiarism) must be there somewhere. I’m not sure one can attack Eurowestern scholars for ignoring Indigenous thinkers and also attack them for borrowing from Indigenous thinkers without giving credit. Perhaps I’m misreading Todd, and that’s not what she’s doing.

Todd cites Zygmunt Bauman’s attack on sociology’s “role in narrating the Holocaust, and its role in erasing our collective guilt in the possibility for a future Holocaust to emerge” (16). The rhetoric of post-colonialism is as complacent as sociology:

it absolves the present generation of thinkers, politicians, lawyers, and policy wonks for their duty to acknowledge what came before, and, in keeping with Bauman’s insights, the possibility it could happen again—that within all societies lurk the “two faces” of humanity that can either facilitate or quash systemic and calculated human suffering and exploitation. The reality is, as Bauman asserts, that humanity is responsible, and humanity must be willing to face itself and acknowledge its role in these horrors. We must do so in order to ensure we never tread the path of such destruction again. (16)

Todd takes Bauman’s words to heart, she writes, and she asks her “non-Indigenous peers to consider their roles in the ongoing colonial oppression of Indigenous peoples” (16):

The colonial moment has not passed. The conditions that fostered it have not suddenly disappeared. We talk of neo-colonialism, neo-Imperialism, but it is as if these are far away things (these days these accusations are often mounted with terse suspicion against the BRIC countries, as though the members of the G8 have not already colonised the globe through neo-liberal economic and political policies). The reality is that we are just an invasion or economic policy away from re-colonising at any moment. (16)

Therefore, she continues, “it is so important to think, deeply, about how the Ontological Turn—with its breathless ‘realisations’ that animals, the climate, water, ‘atmospheres,’ and non-human presences like ancestors and spirits are sentient and possess agency, that ‘nature’ and ‘culture,’ ‘human’ and ‘animal’ may not be so separate after all—is itself perpetrating the exploitation of Indigenous peoples” (16). Can thought be decolonized if “the academic structures through which this decolonisation of thought is being carried out continue to reproduce the white supremacy of the academy” (16)? No: “the proponents of the discipline themselves” must be “willing to engage in the decolonial project in a substantive and structural and physical way, and willing to acknowledge that the colonial is an extant, ongoing reality” (17). 

“What I am critiquing here then, really, are the silences,” Todd writes:

It is not that current trends in the discipline of anthropology or the Euro-academy more broadly are wrong. It is that they do not currently live up to the promises they make. I do think many people making claims regarding the promise of current turns in anthropology have very good intentions. However, these cannot always easily translate into long-term structural change. Our interventions as Indigenous feminists are thus necessary to hold our colleagues up to the goals they define for themselves. (17)

“Why is there still a bias towards citing white male scholars?” she asks. “What are the political-legal implications for Indigenous peoples when our stories, our laws, our philosophies are used by European scholars without explicit credit to the political, legal, social and cultural (and colonial!) contexts these stories are formulated and shared within?” (17). She cites the work of Sarah Hunt on the “epistemic violence” of the use of Indigenous ontologies in erasing “the embodied, practiced, and legal-governance aspects of Indigenous ontologies as they are enacted by Indigenous actors” (17). In other words, “Indigenous thinking must be seen as not just a well of ideas to draw form but as a body of thinking that is living and practiced by peoples with whom we all share reciprocal duties as citizens of shared territories (be they physical or the ephemeral)” (17). She cites Borrows, Kahente Horn-Miller, Tracey Lindberg, and Val Napoleon to argue that “Indigenous thought is not just about social relations and philosophical anecdotes” (17). Rather, “Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies” represent “legal orders, legal orders through which Indigenous peoples throughout the world are fighting for self-determination, sovereignty” (18). Colonial dispossession is still happening: “It did not end with repatriation of constitutions or independence from colonial rule. Europe is still implicated in colonial exploitation, whether it likes it or not” (18).

Her argument, she continues, is “that Indigenous peoples, throughout the world, are fighting for recognition-fighting to assert their laws, philosophies and stories on their own terms” (18). When they pick and choose the parts of Indigenous thought that appeal to them “without engaging directly in (or unambiguously acknowledging) the political situation, agency, legal orders and relationality of both Indigenous people and scholars,” social scientists (including anthropologists) “become complicit in colonial violence” (18). When European thinkers “who discuss the ‘more-than-human’” are cited, but “their Indigenous contemporaries who are writing on the exact same topics” are not, “we perpetuate the white supremacy of the academy” (18). “In order for the Ontological Turn, post-humanism, cosmopolitics to live up to their potential,” Todd writes,

they must heed the teachings of North American Indigenous scholars who engage similar issues such as Dwayne Donald, John Borrows, Val Napoleon, Audra Simpson, Kim TallBear, Chris Anderson, Rob Innes, Tracey Lindberg, Sarah Hunt, Vanessa Watts, Glen Coulthard, Leanne Simpson, Eve Tuck, Cutcha Risling Baldy, Violet Lee and so many other brilliant thinkers (this list is not exhaustive!). And they must heed the teachings of Indigenous and racialised scholars from all around the globe. (18)

Non-Indigenous thinkers “would do well” to incorporate Dwayne Donald’s notion of reciprocity, which he outlines in his work on “ethical relationality,” which “invokes a reciprocity of thought” (18-19). “Reciprocity of thinking,” she continues, “requires us to pay attention to who else is speaking alongside us. It also positions us, first and foremost, as citizens embedded in dynamic legal orders and systems of relations that require us to work constantly and thoughtfully across the myriad systems of thinking, acting, and governance within which we find ourselves enmeshed” (19). This ethical relationality, she writes, “means that more than just the Indigenous scholar in the room would have expected Latour to reference his Indigenous interlocutors on a topic as broadly discussed and publicised, and as intimately linked to political claims by many Indigenous nations and peoples, as climate change” (19). 

So, she concludes, “for every time you want to cite a Great Thinker who is on the public speaking circuit these days, consider digging around for others who are discussing the same topics in other ways” (19). Decolonizing the academy means considering our own prejudices and biases as expressed in systems like peer review and hiring processes. “Consider why it is okay for our departments to remain so undeniably white,” she writes. “And then, familiarise yourself with the Indigenous thinkers (and more!) I reference here and broaden the spectrum of who you cite and who you reaffirm as ‘knowledgeable’” (19).

I’m glad I read Todd’s article, and not only because it provides a starting point for reading Indigenous thinkers (some of whom I’ve already read or heard about, and some of whom are new to me). That reading list is a little daunting. Here I am, at the end of the reading for my comprehensive examinations, and yet there is so much I have not read or even known that I should read. I also appreciate the permission to read and think about Indigenous ontologies and epistemologies that she grants her readers—with the proviso that we acknowledge the political situation, agency, laws, and relationality of Indigenous peoples. I don’t think that means that Indigenous methodologies are simply available to Settler scholars; I agree with Kathleen Absolon that they aren’t. However, while I agree that scholars should read the work of Indigenous thinkers who are writing on topics related to their research, I’m not convinced that someone like Bruno Latour (or name some other post-humanist scholars) is borrowing from Indigenous thinkers without citing their work—plagiarizing them, to be blunt. I don’t think you can argue that someone is both ignorant of a body of scholarship and that they are stealing from it. But perhaps that’s not Todd’s argument; as with everything I read, I would have to go over it again to get the nuances. In many ways, this project has been a first attempt at understanding a broad range of texts, and a process of identifying what I want to go back to. Maybe that’s its purpose. In any case, I plan to take the weekend off; the semester begins on Monday and I’m still exhausted from the last one.

Works Cited

Absolon, Kathleen E. Kaandossiwin: How We Come to Know, Fernwood, 2011.

Latour, Bruno. Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime, translated by Catherine Porter, Polity, 2018.

Springgay, Stephanie, and Sarah E. Truman. Walking Methodologies in a More-than-Human World: WalkingLab, Routledge, 2018.

Todd, Zoe. “An Indigenous Feminist’s Take On The Ontological Turn: ‘Ontology’ Is Just Another Word For Colonialism.” Journal of Historical Sociology, vol. 29, no. 1, 2016, 4-22. DOI: 10.1111/johs.12124

122. Linda Hogan, Dwellings: A Spiritual History of the Living World

hogan dwellings

Writer and naturalist Trevor Herriot lent me his copy of Linda Hogan’s Dwellings: A Spiritual History of the Living World, a book of essays, and as I get close to the end of this project—or, at least, this phase of it—I thought I would turn to it, finally. Hogan is Chickasaw, and I wonder whether her sense of the living world might connect or relate to Bruno Latour’s sense of the world as made up of agents and actors rather than objects. Dwellings begins with a preface, in which Hogan explains the questions that motivated the writing of this book: 

As an Indian woman I question our responsibilities to the caretaking of the future and to the other species who share our journeys. These writings have grown out of those questions, out of wondering what makes us human, out of a lifelong love for the living world and all its inhabitants. They have grown, too, out of my native understanding that there is a terrestrial intelligence that lies beyond our human knowing and grasping. (11)

Hogan writes that her “lifelong work” has been “to seek an understanding of the two views of the world, one as seen by native people and the other as seen by those who are new and young on this continent” (11). “It is clear that we have strayed from the treaties we once had with the land and the animals,” she continues. “It is also clear, and heartening, that in our time there are many—Indian and non-Indian alike—who want to restore and honor these broken agreements” (11). It’s easy for a môniyâw like me to forget that First Nations peoples talk of their treaties with their animal relations and with the land. Their treaties with Settlers are just one part of the treaties they’ve made.

Hogan states that these essays are tempered by her work with animals, her love for earth, her “hunger to know what dwells beneath the surface of things,” and that “it also stretches te reflect the different histories of ways of thinking and being in the world” (11-12). The essays in this collection, she writes, “search out a world of different knowings, enter a doorway into the mythical world, a reality known by my ancestors, one that takes the daily into dimensions both sacred and present” (12). She is interested in exploring “the human place within this world,” but she also recognizes “that humankind is not separate from nature” (12). “Some of this work connects the small world of humans with the larger universe, containing us in the same way that native ceremonies do, showing us both our place and a way of seeing,” she writes (12). If only we recognized our connection with nature, and that our world is small compared to the universe; instead, we see ourselves at the centre of everything, as the only being that matters. Hogan concludes the preface by suggesting that these lessons have been learned from the land, and that the essays included in Dwellings are “both of and about this alive and conscious world. Its pages come from forests, its words spring from the giving earth” (12).

The first essay, “The Feathers,” begins with Hogan’s desire for an eagle feather: one from a living bird, because “[a] bird killed in the name of human power is in truth a loss of power from the world, not an addition to it” (15). Her first eagle feather was a gift from a traditional healer she had consulted when she was ill. He told her a story about how, after his childhood home burned down, the only things to survive the fire were eagle feathers. The feather he gave her was one of those survivors.

Hogan lives in a mountain canyon, she writes, and she often sees golden eagles there. One morning, after years of praying for an eagle feather, she dreamed of being inside a temple. The ceiling was “engraved with gold designs of leaves and branches” (16), and she told the others in the temple to look up at them. “I spoke these words out loud, and the sound of my own voice woke me up,” Hogan writes. “Waking, I obeyed my own words and looked up, seeing out the open window of my room. Just as I did, a large golden eagle flew toward the window, so close that I could see its dark eyes looking in at me for a moment before it lifted, caught a current of air, and flew over the roof of the house” (16). She ran outside. The eagle was gone, but a feather was lying in the road. She acknowledges the improbability of her story, that it takes a long time for falling feathers to reach the ground, and yet, she says, the feather was there. “I know there is a physics to this, a natural law about lightness and air. This event rubs the wrong way against logic,” she admits (16-17). How, then, can this incident be explained? “I can only think there is another force at work, deeper than physics and what we know of wind, something that comes from a world where lightning and thunder, sun and rain clouds live,” she writes. “Nor can I saw why it is so many of us have forgotten the mystery of nature and spirit, while for tens of thousands of years such things have happened and been spoken by our elders and our ancestors” (17).

Of course, there are physical explanations for lightning and thunder, for sun and rain, and coincidences exist. I have such trouble following people into spirituality. It’s not a place I can go. 

Next, Hogan tells the story of the birth of her granddaughter, and the way she kept and dried her granddaughter’s umbilical cord in a tall, black pot. A few months later, her parents visited, and during that visit, she discovered that the umbilical cord was missing from its pot. She searched the house for the cord, which she calls “the most valuable thing in our home” (17). She looked in the cedar box where she keeps her first eagle feather. It wasn’t there. While she was searching, a Blackfeet friend called from Montana to invite Hogan to a ceremony. She explained what was happening. Her friend told her about a ceremony that might work, and she went outside to make the offering. When she returned, she checked the cedar box again. This time, the feather was gone. It was lying under a chair, pointing at the umbilical cord, “so mysteriously on the floor I had already searched” (19). “It was the feather that took me to the baby’s umbilical cord,” she writes (19).

“Perhaps there are events and things that work as a doorway into the mythical world, the world of first people, all the way back to the creation of the universe and the small quickenings of earth, the first stirrings of human beings at the beginning of time,” Hogan writes. “Our elders believe this to be so, that it is possible to wind a way backward to the start of things, and in so doing find a form of sacred reason, different from ordinary reason, that is linked to forces of nature” (19). That “kind of mind,” like the feather, contains “the power of sky and thunder and sun, and many have had alliances and partnerships with it, a way of thought older than measured time, less primitive than the rational present” (19). Others have tried to use science to understand the world, but they have “not yet understood animals, finite earth, or even their own minds and behavior” (19). (Is that entirely true?) “The more they seek to learn the world, the closer they come to the spiritual, the magical origins of creation,” Hogan continues (19). 

“There is a still place, a gap between worlds, spoken by the tribal knowings of thousands of years,” Hogan writes. “In it are silent flyings that stand aside from human struggles and the designs of our own makings. At times, when we are silent enough, still enough, we take a step into such mystery, the place of spirit, and mystery, we must remember, by its very nature does not wish to be known” (20). The power of a feather, of something living within that feather, “is perhaps in its dream of sky, currents of air, and the silence of creation” (20). That feature “carries our needs and desires, the stories of our brokenness. It rises and falls down elemental space, one part of the elaborate world of life where fish swim against gravity, where eels turn silver as moon to breed” (20). Hogan’s prose turns poetic here, and she seems to be suggesting that there are relationships between human “needs and desires” and “the elaborate world of life” which includes weather, birds in flight, and fish beneath the water.

The essay ends with questions: “How did the feather arrive at the edge of the dirt road where I live? How did it fall across and through currents of air? How did the feathers survive fire?” (20). Hogan cannot answer these questions: “I know only that there are simple powers, strange and real,” she concludes (20).

The next essay, “The Bats,” begins with a memory of seeing mating bats in a zoo. A few years later, she found a bat in a park in Minneapolis on a cold spring day. She stopped to look at it: “At first I thought it was dead, but as I reached toward it, it turned its dark, furrowed face to me and bared its sharp teeth. A fierce little mammal, it looked surprisingly like an angry human being. I jumped back” (22). Then she found another bat lying on the ground. “[T]he recent warm spell had been broken open by the cold and the bats, shocked back into hibernation, had stopped dead in flight, rendered inactive by the quick drop in temperature,” she writes (23). She found a box and took both bats home. When she arrived and opened the box, the bats were mating. She left them in a warm corner outside, “nestled safe in dry leaves and straw,” and checked on them several times a day (23). The bats mated at least three more times. On the fourth day, the male, “thin and exhausted,” died, “and the female flew away with the new life inside her body” (24). She told the neighbourhood boys about the bats, and they stayed out of her yard; in that way, her house escaped being vandalized.

Hogan’s family lived in Germany when she was a child, and one day, while exploring a forest with a friend, they found a cave filled with bats. Later they were told that the cave had been used to store ammunition during the war, and that the American military had tried to use bats to carry bombs. The experiment failed, because the bats’ flights could not be predicted or controlled, and they “gave up on their strategy of using life to destroy life” (25). Recently, she visited a cave near San Antonio with another friend. Since people began visiting the cave, the bats had left, but it was still full of guano.

“Bats hear their way through the world,” Hogan writes. “They hear the sounds that exist at the edges of our lives. Leaping through blue twilight they cry out a thin language, then listen for its echo to return. It is a dusky world of songs a pitch above our own. For them, the world throws back a language, the empty space rising between hills speaks an open secret then lets the bats pass through, here or there, in the dark air” (25-26). Everything answers the bats; everything talks back to them. Their world is “alive in its whispering songs, the currents of air loud as waves of an ocean, a place rich with the music of trees and stones” (26). “It is no wonder that bats have been a key element in the medicine bundles of some southern tribes,” she continues. “Bats are people from the land of souls, land where moon dwells. They are listeners to our woes, hearers of changes in earth, predictors of earthquake and storm. They live with the goddess of night in the lusty mouth of earth” (26). The bones found in those medicine bundles come from bats that had been found dead, rather than bats that had been killed or trapped.

“I believe it is the world-place bats occupy that allows them to be of help to people, not just because they live inside the passageways between earth and sunlight, but because they live in double worlds of many kinds,” Hogan contends. “They are two animals merged into one, a milk-producing rodent that bears live young, and a flying bird. They are creatures of the dusk, which is the time between times, people of the threshold, dwelling at the open mouth of inner earth like guardians at the womb of creation” (27). Bats are holy, and “they are intermediaries between our world and the next. Hearing the chants of life all around them, they are listeners who pass on the language and songs of many things to human beings who need wisdom, healing, and guidance through our lives, we who forget where we stand in the world” (27). 

Hogan sees bats at night, out of the corner of her eye. They are secret creatures. “What an enormous world,” she writes. “No wonder it holds our fears and desires. It is all so much larger than we are” (28). She sees them, but she cannot hear “the high-pitched language of their living”; she doesn’t know “if they have sorry or if they tell stories longer than a rainstorm’s journey” (28). How can humans get to the centre of the world, she wonders, “to the place where the universe carries down the song of night to our human lives” (28). “How do we learn to trust ourselves enough to hear the chanting of earth?” she asks. “To know what’s alive or absent around us, and penetrate the void behind our eyes, the old, slow pulse of things, until a wild flying wakes up in us, a new mercy climbs out and takes wing in the sky?” (28).

The third essay, “The Caves,” begins at a cave on a rainy evening. There is a creek flowing there; its water “smells of iron and tastes of earth’s blood” (29). Hogan notes that before caves and springs were privately owned, “they were places of healing for Indian people, places where conflict between tribes and people was left behind, neutral ground, a sanctuary outside the reign of human differences, law, and trouble” (29-30). Hogan enters the cave. She describes it as “a sacred place, one of land’s quiet temples where hot water journeys upward after years of travel through deep earth” (30). “Barefoot, naked, I go down the stone pathway and lowermyself into the hot water,” she writes. “Surrounded by stone, this body of mine is seen in the dim light for what it is, fragile and brief” (30). She writes that she loves “what will consume us all, the place where the tunneling worms and roots of plants dwell, where the slow deep centuries of earth are undoing and remaking themselves” (30).

Hogan recalls a family trip when they stopped near the Continental Divide in the Rocky Mountains. Hogan went for a walk. She saw a cave in the rocks above her. An African lion was in the cave’s mouth. She told her father, and he went up to investigate. He looked inside and shook his head. No lion. “But he did not go in,” she states. “He didn’t enter the dark” (31). She smelled the lion on her father, and concludes that even if he didn’t see the lion, the lion saw him. “I must have known, even then, that caves are not the places for men,” she continues. “They are a feminine world, a womb of earth, a germinal place of brooding. In many creation stories, caves are the places that bring forth life” (31). Since then, she has dreamed about caves; in one dream, the cave’s mouth was guarded by a skull with light shining from its eyes, and inside the cave “was warm, steaming water and chambers where women were working, sewing together bodies, stitching legs and arms, making life” (32). In that dream, she was looking for her mothers: “the earth, my human mother, my own life as a women” (32). Hogan returns to the hot spring in the cave. She sees, or imagines, animals in the cave, as in a creation story: rabbits, deer, owls, a puma, eagles. “There are the fetal beginnings of life to come, of survival,” she writes. “I want this to be true” (33). She’s not the only one: another woman, real or imagined, “felt the earth’s heartbeat” and left offerings of sage and tobacco.

Next, Hogan considers the bombing of Hiroshima. The city was made of clay bricks; the clay came from nearby mountains. She tells a story of a woman who went to Hiroshima after the bombing looking for her daughter and son-in-law. When she saw the pain of the survivors, she went into the mountains and lived in a cave for a year. “She returned bony and wise,” Hogan writes. “From her eyes shone a light. She was the first woman to become a Shinto priest. What she knew she had learned from the cave, heard spoken by it, she had seen in the darkness” (33-34). She writes of a cave in Spain where burned offerings and paintings were found. The paintings depicted a man, and facing him, a lion. She remembers the day she saw a lion outside a cave. “There was something deeper than human that day, I think now, something of the world of myth,” she continues, and she believes that her father would now say that a lion lived in that cave (34).

Hogan returns to the hot spring one last time. Other women enter; some are Indigenous, others are Japanese tourists. One of the women begins to sing, “a long clear not that fills the whole tunnel” (34). From the men’s cave she hears “the howling of wolves” (35). “I think that these are the songs of lives struggling against extinction, even translated through human voices, they are here inside the earth, inside the human body, the captive, contained animals,” she writes (35). One of the Indigenous women talks about rediscovering “the medicine ways” (35). “I love this inner earth, its murmuring heartbeat, the language of what will consume us,” Hogan concludes. “Above is the beautiful earth that we have come from. Below is heat, stone, fire. I am within the healing of nature, held in earth’s hand” (35).

The fourth essay is called “All My Relations.” It begins in a kitchen, an Indigenous household where food is being prepared. “I am asked if I still read books and I admit that I do,” Hogan recalls. “Reading is not ‘traditional’ and education has long been suspect in communities that were broken, in part, by that system, but we laught at my confession because a television set plays in the next room” (36-37). There are beds in the living room for guests. She talks to the man who will “put together the ceremony” Hogan has “come to request” (37). She offers him tobacco and explains about the help she is seeking. Telling her story, she says, “is the first part of the ceremony, my part in it” (37). She is sent home to prepare: to make 50 tobacco ties, prayer ties, and to get wood and food. On the day of the ceremony, the man and his wife pick her up in town. He doesn’t speak: “He is moving between worlds, beginning already to step over the boundaries fo what we think, in daily and ordinary terms, is real and present. He is already feeling, hearing, knowing what else is there, that which is around us daily but too often unacknowledged, a larger life than our own” (38). They see an eagle and stop to watch it. They arrive at the place where the ceremony, a sweat lodge, will take place. The fire is already burning. Her tobacco ties are placed inside the lodge, on its cottonwood framework. The hot stones are brought into the lodge. Water is poured on them and steam rises. “In a sweat lodge ceremony, the entire world is brought inside the enclosure,” Hogan writes. “The soft odor of smoking cedar accompanies this arrival. It is all called in. The animals come from the warm and sunny distances. Water from dark lakes is there. Wind. Young, lithe willow branches bent overhead remember their lives rooted in ground, the sun their leaves took in” (39). The wind and sky arrive. “It is a place grown intense and holy,” Hogan continues. “It is a place of immense community and of humbled solitude; we sit together in our aloneness and speak, one at a time, our deepest language of need, hope, loss, and survival. We remember that all things are connected” (40).

Remembering that connection is the ceremony’s purpose: “It is part of healing and restoration. It is the mending of a broken connection between us and the rest. The participants in a ceremony say the words ‘All my relations’ before and after we pray; those words create a relationship with other people, with animals, with the land” (40). Ceremonies restructure the human mind; in ceremony, “we bring together the fragments of our lives in a sacred act of renewal, and we reestablish our connections with others. The ceremony is a point of return. It takes us toward the place of balance, our place in the community of all things. It is an event that sets us back upright” (40). But the real ceremony begins when “the formal one ends, when we take up a new way, our minds and hearts filled with the vision of earth that holds us within it, in compassionate relationship to and with the world” (40-41). 

During the ceremony, “the animals and ancestors move into the human body, into skin and blood. The land merges with us. The stones come to dwell inside the person” (41). “We who easily grow apart from the world are returned to the great store of life all around us, and there is the deepest sense of being at home here in this intimate kinship,” Hogan writes. “There is no real aloneness. There is solitude and the nurturing silence that is relationship with ourselves, but even then we are part of something larger” (41). After the ceremony, everyone goes home. The tobacco ties are placed in nearby trees. “Everything returns to ordinary use,” she concludes. “It’s evening. The crickets are singing. All my relations” (41).

“What Holds the Water, What Holds the Light” is Hogan’s fifth essay. It begins with the author climbing a damp hill in the hot sun. She is walking with a friend. On the way, they stopped to drink rain water collected in a bowl of stone. Hogan thinks about “how earth and sky are generous with their gifts, and how good it is to receive them” (43). She recalls how friends had once filled a Mexican clay jar with water for her. She thinks about the time when Mexico City was called Iztapalapa, about the invasion of that place by Cortez’s army, the destruction that followed. She thinks about De Soto’s murderous rage and his “relentless, ongoing war against land” (44). “Humans colonizing and conquering others have a propensity for this, for burning behind them what they cannot possess or control, as if their conflicts are not with themselves and their own way of being, but with the land itself,” she writes (44). She thinks about how looters stole artifacts from the Spiro burial mounds in Oklahoma during the 1930s; two men dynamited the mounds when they were forbidden to continue stealing. “It seems, looking back, that these invasions amounted to a hatred of life itself, of fertility and generation,” Hogan continues:

The conquerors and looters refused to participate in a reciprocal and balanced exchange with life. They were unable to receive the best gifts of land, not gold or pearls or ownership, but a welcome acceptance of what is offered. They did not understand that the earth is generous and that encounters with the land might have been sustaining, or that their meetings with other humans could have led to an enriched confluence of ways. (44)

But she sees a similar way of thinking and behaving when men from the Department of Fish and Wildlife stock the Colorado River with rainbow trout: rather than using nets, “they poured the fish into the bed of their truck, kicked them out and down the hill, and then into the water. The fish that survived were motionless, shocked, gill slits barely moving, skin hanging off the wounds” (45). Treating the lives of those fish “with dignity and respect” would have taken only a few minutes more (45). 

“These actions, all of them, must be what Bushman people mean when they say a person is far-hearted,” Hogan suggests. “This far-hearted kind of thinking is one we are especially prone to now, with our lives moving so quickly ahead, and it is one that sees life, other lives, as containers for our own uses and not as containers in a greater, holier sense” (45). “Even wilderness,” she continues,

is seen as having value only as it enhances and serves our human lives, our human world. While most of us agree that wilderness is necessary to spiritual and psychological well-being, it is a container of far more, of mystery, of a life apart from ours. It is not only where we go to escape who we have become and what we have done, but it is also part of the natural laws, the workings of a world of beauty and depth we do not yet understand. It is something beyond us, something that does nto need our hand in it. As one of our Indian elders has said, there are laws beyond our human laws, and ways above ours. (45).

Our language of trade, “of laws that can be bent in order that treaties might be broken, land wounded beyond healing,” is “a language that is limited, emotionally and spiritually, as if it can’t accommodate such magical strength and power” (45-46). “The ears of this language,” Hogan writes,

do not often hear the songs of the white egrets, the rain falling into stone bowls. So we make our own songs to contain these things, make ceremonies and poems, searching for a new way to speak, to say we want a new way to live in the world, to say that wilderness and water, blue herons and orange newts are invaluable not just to us, but in themselves, in the workings of the natural world that rules us whether we acknowledge it or not. (46)

Hogan imagines that the Mexican clay jar “might have been made of the same earth that housed the birds of Iztapalapa,” that the trout might have lived in water it contained (46). It was not just “a bridge between the elements of earth, air, water, and fire,” but it was also “a bridge between people, a reservoir of love and friendship, the kind of care we need to offer back every day to the world as we begin to learn the land and its creatures, to know the world is the container for our lives, sometimes wild and untouched, sometimes moved by a caretakers hands” (46). Until we learn to be guests in the world, “the land will not support us, will not be hospitable, will turn on us” (46). That water jar reminds Hogan that “water and earth love each other,” “dissolving in each other, in the give and take that is where grace comes from” (46).

The sixth essay, “A Different Yield,” begins with listening. It starts with a woman’s description of a friend “as being such a keen listener that even the trees leaned toward her, as if they were peaking their innermost secrets into her listening ears” (47). Hogan remembers listening to the sounds of corn plants in the wind as a child. Pigs, too, could hear the corn: at the end of the season, when they were let into the field to eat any corn left behind, they would “make straight for any plant that still held an ear of corn, bypassing the others. They would listen, it seemed, to the denser song of corn where it still lived inside its dress of husk” (48). This memory leads to Barbara McClintock, a biologist who won the Nobel Prize for her work on corn genetics. “Her method was to listen to what corn had to say,” Hogan writes, “to translate what the plants spoke into a human tongue” (48). Hogan cites Evelyn Fox Keller’s book A Feeling for the Organism, which describes McClintock’s intimate knowledge of corn. “Her approach to her science was alive, intuitive, and humane,” Hogan states. “It was a whole approach, one that bridged the worlds of woman and plant, and crossed over the boundary lines between species” (48). McClintock’s “respect for life allowed for a vision expanded enough, and sharp enough, to see more deeply into the mysteries of matter than did other geneticists who were at work on the same problems. . . . She saw an alive world, a fire of life inside plants, even plants other than the corn” (48). In Adam’s Task, Vickie Hearne writes about the same kind of approach, only in relation to animals. In fact, Hogan writes, in recent years scientific research “is in search of a new vision, and of renewed intuitive processes of discovery that go beyond our previous assumptions about knowledge” (49).

Hogan recalls meeting a Jamaican artist, Everald Brown, who is “what Jamaicans call an ‘intuitive artist,’ though he himself says only that the doves have taught him his craft” (50). “Many creative people have called their inspiration ‘the muse,’” she notes. “Often they say their ideas come from a spirit world, from a life other than their own human life. Even the Bible is a work so described by its authors; it is the voice of God” (50). She cite’s Paul Klee’s suggestion “that we must return to the origins of things” (50). “This organic center, the center of creation, comes down to us through long traditions of learning the world’s own songs,” she writes. “In American Indian traditions, healers are often called interpreters because they are the ones who are able to hear the world and pass its wisdom along. They are the ones who return to the heart of creation” (50). But listening can also be found in Western traditions: Orpheus could communicate with animals, plants, water, and minerals; Psyche was given the solution to an impossible task by the ants and by the river reeds. Many traditions speak of stones that give guidance.

“In recent times, the term ‘myth’ has come to signify falsehood, but when we examine myths, we find that they are a high form of truth,” Hogan continues. “They are the deepest, innermost cultural stories of our human journeys toward spiritual and psychological growth” (51). Myth allows for a return to creation; it lets us “hear the world new again” (51). In mythic time, there was no gap between a word and the thing it represented, according to Octavio Paz. Now that connection has been broken, not only in language but in “our philosophies of life” (52). “There is a separation that has taken place between us and nature,” she writes. “Something has broken deep in the core of ourselves” (52). But, as we lose the planet’s wild spaces, that wilderness is entering our minds, resulting in “a spiritual fragmentation that has accompanied our ecological destruction” (52). But in a time of such destruction, our lives depend on listening to the earth; the world’s voices “infuse our every act,” and “give us back ourselves, point a direction for salvation” (52-53). Sometimes, she writes, those voices “even shake us down to the bedrock of our own human lives” (53). When chimpanzees were taught American Sign Language in the early 1970s, for instance, becoming fluent, our relationships as human beings to other creatures were revealed. “[I]f we are forced to accept that animals have intelligence, language, and sensitivity to pain, including psychological trauma, this acceptance has tremendous consequences for our own species and for our future actions,” she states (53). The unsettling results of those language experiments might suggest a potential liberation, “for not only the animals of the earth, but for our own selves, a freedom that could very well free us of stifling perceptions that have bound us tight and denied us the parts of ourselves that were not objective or otherwise scientifically respectable” (54). She notes that scientists who showed compassion for animals undergoing painful experiments are considered to lack objectivity: “We have arrived despairingly at a time when compassion and care are qualities that do no lend themselves to the world of intellectual thought” (55). “Not only have our actions revealed us to ourselves, and sometimes had dire results, but among many peoples educated in many European philosophical traditions, there has been an intense reaction to the bad news that cruelty is cruelty,” Hogan continues (55-56). It is simple to feed people, to work for peace, she writes, yet we are unable to do these things (56-57): “And even when animals learn to speak a language, and to communicate their misery, we still deny them the right to an existence free from suffering and pain” (57).

“I want to make two points here,” Hogan states. “One is about language and power. While we can’t say what language is much beyond saying that it is a set of signs and symbols and communicates meaning, we know it is the most highly regarded human facility” (57). But there are non-linguistic forms of communication: “We read one another via gesture, stance, facial expression, scent. And sometimes this communication is more honest, more comprehensible, than the words we utter” (57). These “inner forms of communication” might be “the strongest core of ourselves. We have feelings that can’t be spoken” (57). That speechlessness leads to poetry, painting, music, and to the “inner language that Barbara McClintock tapped for her research” (57). 

“Another point that needs to be made is that when issues become obscured by distorted values or abstract concepts, we lose a clarity that allows us to act even in our own best behalf, for survival not just of ourselves but of the homeland which is our life and our sustenance,” Hogan continues (58). We are searching for a language that heals our relationship with the natural order, “one that takes the side of the amazing and fragile life on our life-giving earth. A language that knows the corn, and the one that corn knows, a language that takes hold of the mystery of what’s around us and offers it back to us, full of awe and wonder” (59). This language “is a language of creation, of divine fire, a language that goes beyond the strict borders of scientific inquiry and right into the heart of the mystery itself” (59). “We are looking for a tongue that speaks with reverence for life, searching for an ecology of mind,” she writes. “Without it, we have no home, have no place of our own within the creation” (60). We want a language that “returns us to our own sacredness, to a self-love and respect that will carry out to others” (60). She notes that Indigenous peoples sing to their growing corn, which they call their grandmother. She wears a bracelet made of 49 kernels of corn, and imagines that when she dies, that corn will germinate: “My life inside the green blades of corn, the stalks and tassels and flying pollen? That red corn, that corn will be this woman” (61). Perhaps a woman scientist will listen. “Cornmeal and pollen are offered to the sun at dawn,” Hogan continues. “The ears of the corn are listening and waiting. They want peace” (61-62). At night, “you hear the plants talking among themselves. The wind passes through. It’s all there, the languages, the voices of wind, dove, corn, stones. The language of life won’t be silenced” (62). “Do you remember the friend that the leaves talked to?” Hogan asks at the end of the essay. “We need to be that friend. Listen. The ears of the corn are singing. They are telling their stories and singing their songs. We knew that would be true” (62).

Hogan’s seventh essay, “Deify the Wolf,” begins in northeastern Minnesota in February. It’s wolf country, and Hogan is with a group of people searching for timber wolves, “those howling ones the Anishnabe people say human beings descended from long ago, back in the days when animals and people spoke the same tongue” (64). One member of the party wants to see the threatened animals before they are extinct; another is a trapper; a third, a woman, thinks seeing wolves “would be ‘like in the movies’” (64). “I can’t say why I am here, but I have followed a map in the blood, an instinct I don’t know,” Hogan writes (64). But everyone in the group is keen on seeing, or at least hearing, wolves.

“The land cries out the thefts that have taken place,” Hogan states: the forests cut down and shipped to Europe, the iron ore mined and smelted to become, among other things, bear traps (65-66). “A holdover from the iron mining days is ‘the dump pack,’ a group of wolves that grew accustomed to the presence of miners and were tame enough to accept balogna sandwiches from the men’s hands,” she continues. “Recently the lives of wolves and men have begun to cross in new ways. A group of wildlife biologists is here to conduct a study of wolf populations. The townspeople, uncertain about what the biologists are up to, worry that they are here to save the wolves” (66). They complain that environmentalists want to “‘Deify the wolf,’ to make it holier, they say, than the sacred cow of India, a perception both extreme and irrational” (66). It’s a long-term conflict, based on the belief that wolves and human cannot co-exist: 

The local sentiment ‘there is no wolf like a dead wolf’ does not seem likely to change, no matter what the researchers  find, and there is very little assurance that this last substantial population of timber wolves will survive. The leading cause of death for wolves is contact with the human world. Our presence means tragedy to them. They are shot by hunters, trapped, poisoned, and hit by logging trucks as they travel the human roles. (67)

Not long ago, wolves could be shot from aircraft, and trappers baited animal carcasses with strychnine, killing not only wolves but birds and other animals. Once a group of Nakota people in South Dakota, starving when food promised by treaty did not arrive, were poisoned after eating poisoned meat that had been set out for wolves. 

The biologists set traps for the wolves, to immobilize them so they can be studied. They try to make the traps safe, but there are sometimes casualties. Some wolves chew off their legs rather than remain trapped. “There is a mystique about these wolves that lose a leg,” Hogan suggests. “Because they fight for live, they are worthy of human respect. They are called ‘Ghost Leg’ and ‘Phantom’ and other names that give these wolves significance because they want to live and we can identify with that; these wounded wolves are like us, freedom and life mean something to them, something important, as it does to us” (68-69). The biologists take blood samples, and a radio telemetry collar is attached to the animal, which allows the biologists to track it. The wolves have learned to chew the collars off each other; one pack even taught another how this was done. “A few of us wonder if the interference of this study isn’t as bad for the wolves as the ongoing presence of hunters and trappers has been,” Hogan continues. “The biologists share that concern” (69). They know their activity is stressful for the wolves, but they hope that the outcome of their study will be the wolves’ long-term survival. Some of their findings have helped to dispel myths about wolves: the idea that wolves are responsible for declining deer populations, or that they kill domestic animals.

One of the biologists brings wolf carcasses from his truck for the group to look at. One had been hit by a truck after being caught in a trap—a fox trap, he lies. Hogan forgives the honesty: “His tact, his opinion on either side, is liable to have a serious effect on the wolves” (71). That’s because environmental research tends to generate a backlash from the local community:

This situation is especially fragile, complicated by the psychological fact that wolves carry much of the human shadow. They contain for us many of our own traits, ones we repress within ourselves. More than any other animal, they mirror back to us the predators we pretend not to be. In that way, we have assigned to them a special association with evil. (71)

Close up, the wolves are beautiful. Hogan recalls seeing a photo in a newspaper in Colorado—a woman walking a captive black wolf on a leash. It looked afraid. Passersby wanted to touch it. “What need we humans have, a species lonely and lacking in love,” she writes. “These are gestures reserved for animals because the distance between one human and another is often too great to bridge” (72). The biologists pose with the dead wolves for photographs, and Hogan sees “the wolf invaded even in death” (73). It reminds her of the way American soldiers treated the bodies of the Indigenous people they killed.

“I’ve worked with death and I respect it, so it is hard to understand these human beings, let alone come close to knowing the inner terrain of the wolf,” Hogan states. “I believe people fear their own deaths, so they must belittle it. There are lessons to be learned in our behaviour” (73). She realizes she won’t learn about the wolves: “They are too complex for that” (73). She returns to the way people want to touch wild animals. “Something wild must hold such sway over the imagination that we can’t tear ourselves away from any part of wilderness without in some way touching it,” she writes (73).

The next day, the group flies in a plane, hoping to spot wolves from the air. They see three: “They are curled up like dogs, sleeping beside the enormous moose they have killed” (74). The wolves ignore the plane: “They have forgotten, or they have given up” (74). For Hogan, “[f]lying above them this way is like being part of a destruction” (74). The airplane is part of what separates humans from animals and from each other. 

That evening, Hogan is still thinking about that separation: “This far into the animal we find the human, and this far into the human we find the animal. Thinking long and hard about wolves, I feel as if they have possessed me—taken me in. I feel lost, transported” (74). The group is outside in the cold darkness, listening to the sounds around them, walking the road near the dump. “I’m thinking of how the elaborate ritual of one wolf greeting another is called a ceremony,” she writes. “It’s ceremony we want a share of. We are walking here to speak with the wolves. That’s what we want. We want to reach out to them, to tell them we are here. We want them to answer, acknowledge us, maybe even to like us. We think they will see our souls” (75). She looks up and sees the northern lights: “Magic is above us. Underneath us, beneath these lakes and islands, is some of the oldest rock in the world, more than three billion years old” (75). The group hears one wolf howl. A man answers “[i]n a language he only pretends to know” (76). “We wait. We are waiting for the wolves to answer. We want a healing, I think, a cure for anguish, a remedy that will heal the wound between us and the world that contains our broken histories,” Hogan writes. “If we could only hear them, the stars themselves are howling, but there is just the man’s voice, crying out, lonely. Not even those of us standing behind him answer. It is a silence we rarely feel, a vast and inner silence that goes deep, descends to the empty spaces between our cells” (76).

“We have followed the wolves and are trying to speak across the boundaries of ourselves,” Hogan concludes. “We are here, and if no wolf ever answers, or even if no wolves remained, we’d believe they are out there. And they are” (76).

At the start of the eighth essay, “Creations,” Hogan is travelling: “It is the day after spring equinox, and as we near the ocean, whiteness is the dominant feature. Salt beds stretch out at water’s edge. Beaches, made of sea-worn limestone and broken-down coral, are nearly blinding in the early spring light” (77-78). They are in the Yucatán, “a hungry place with dwindling resources” (78). With the end of the henequen industry, “a plant used to make hemp rope,” rope replaced with nylon and polypropylene, “the people have been relocated without consideration for what their presence would mean in this region, or how they would make a living out of the land” (78). 

Hogan shifts to the Mayan creation account. “In nearly all creation accounts,” she writes, “life was called into being through language, thought, dreaming, or singing, acts of interior consciousness” (80-81). For the Maya, time is alive and the world around them is sacred. Humans were first created from clay, which dissolved in the rain. Then, in the second creation, they were made from carved wood, but those people became hollow and, forgetting compassion, “transformed the world to fit their own needs,” leading the world to turn against them (81). Finally, the people were made from corn, “the substance of the gods,” and they saw what the gods saw; in order to make them more human, less god-like, “some of this vision was taken away so there might be mystery, and the mystery of creation and of death inspired deep respect and awe for all of creation” (82). Hogan suggests that the story of the hollow people “speaks against human estrangement from land” (82). “Emptiness and estrangement are deep wounds, strongly felt in the present time,” she writes:

We could have been split from what we could nurture, what could fill us. And we have been wounded by a dominating culture that has feared and hated the natural world, has not listened to the voice of the land, has not believed in the inner worlds of human dreaming and intuition, all things that have guided indigenous people since time stood up in the east and walked this world into existence, split from the connection between self and land. (82)

“Like the wooden people, many of us in this time have lost the inner substance of our lives and have forgotten to give praise and remember the sacredness of all life,” Hogan continues. “But in spit of this forgetting there is still a part of us that is deep and intimate with the world. We remember it by feel. We experience is as a murmur in the night, a longing and restlessness we can’t name, a yearning that tugs at us” (83). “For,” she writes, “it is only recently, in earth time, that the severing of the connections between people and land have taken place. Something in our human blood is still searching for it, still listening, still remembering” (83).

Hogan is in the Yucatan because of “this deep, unspoken remembering” (83). She is “searching out my own beginnings, the thread of connection between old Maya cultures and my own Chickasaw heritage” (83). Some oral traditions of the Chickasaw say that they originated in Mexico and paddled dugout canoes to Florida. “Here, there is a feel for the mystery in our being in all ways, in earth and water,” she writes. “It is a feel for the same mystery that sends scientists to search for the beginning of the universe. We seek our origins as much as we seek our destinies” (84). And, she continues, “we desire to see the world intact, to step outside our emptiness and remember the strong currents that pass between humans and the rest of nature, currents that are the felt voice of the land, heard in the cells of the body” (84). It’s “the same magnetic call” that brings sea turtles back to Yucatán’s beaches every year (84).

“In the traditional belief systems of native people, the terrestrial call is the voice of God, or of gods, the creative power that lives on earth, inside earth, in turtle, stone, and tree,” Hogan writes. “Knowledge comes from, and is shaped by, observations and knowledge of the natural world and natural cycles” (85). Beliefs like this are sometimes inventions of the mind; other times, Hogan contends, “they are inventions of the land” (85). “The Western belief that God lives apart from earth is one that has taken us toward collective destruction,” she continues. “It is a belief narrow enough to forget the value of matter, the very thing that soul inhabits. It has created a people who neglect to care for the land for the future generations” (85-86).

Not far from where Hogan is, Fray Diego de Landa tortured and killed Maya people and burned their libraries of knowledge: history, sacred stories, medical knowledge, mathematics, astronomy. Perhaps those books held a clue to our own survival. “This burned and broken history is part of the story of the land,” she notes. “It is the narrative of the past by which we still live. But the memory of an older way remains. It is stored in the hearts and blood of the people and in the land” (86-87).

Hogan now turns to the coast itself, the estuary and the wetlands and mangrove swamps, which they explore by boat. “This red estuary is alive and breathing, moving with embryonic clay and silt,” she says (87). She describes the mangroves and their importance to the ecosystem. A white egret steps along the edge of the water; on the other side of the water’s edge a solitary blue heron stands. Herons sometimes die of stress, like the Hmong men, “forced to leave their country and rootless in America” who “die of no apparent cause when they are sleeping” (89). “I understand the loss that leads to despair and to death,” Hogan writes. “It has happened to us and is happening to land, the breaking of the heart of creation” (89). Still, land is being returned to Indigenous peoples, and animal species are coming back: buffalo, flamingos. Then the group sees the flamingos, “red as volcanic fire breaking open from black rock” (90). The flock stretches for a mile along the shore. “We are drawn to these birds the way air is pulled into fire,” she says. “They are proof of how far blood will travel to seek its beginning” (90). 

The group sees a termite nest in a mangrove. The nest “is a contained intelligence, made up of lives that work together with the mind of a single organism” (91). The termites “break down wood, forming rich soil in a place that would otherwise be choked” (92). They step onto the shore to explore the mangrove swamp on foot, looking for a place where an underground river rises to the surface: 

here, where the underground river ends, other beginnings are fed, other species and creations. If it were time, instead of space, scholars would call it zero date, that place where, as for the Maya, the end of one world is the beginning of another. As they interpret the world, time is alive and travels in a circle. There were other creations and worlds before the one we now inhabit; the cosmos re-forms itself.

For those who know only this one universe, to think of its origins is an overwhelming task. It means to think before time, before space, all the way back to the void that existed before creation. And for people of science, as for those of religion, the universe in its cosmic birth originated from small and minute beginnings. There was nothing and then life came into existence. (93)

“If endings are foreshadowed by their beginnings,” Hogan continues, “it is important that we circle around and come back to look at our human myths and stories” (93). The Maya believed time was cyclical; “the Western tradition of beliefs within a straight line of history leads to an apocalyptic end. And stories of the end, like those of the beginning, tell something about the people who created them” (93). We can imagine endings, extinctions, but not continuations. “From this position, fear, bereavement, and denial keep us in the state of estrangement from our natural connection with land” (94). Not surprisingly, then, Hogan states, “[w]e need new stories, new terms and conditions that are relevant to the love of the land, a new narrative that would imagine another way, to learn the infinite mystery and movement at work in the world” (94). “Indian people must not be the only ones who remember the agreement with the land, the sacred pact to honor and care for the life that, in turn, provides for us,” she continues. “We need to reach a hand back through time and a hand forward, stand at the zero point of creation to be certain that we do not create the absence of life, of any species, no matter how inconsequential they might appear to be” (94-95).

For Hogan, the world is a mystery, and that’s important: “The immeasurable quality of this world has depth and breadth we can’t measure. Yet we know it’s there, and we believe in it, the whole of it has been revealed only a small piece at a time. Cosmologists now surmise there are other universes. Creation is still taking place. As the story becomes larger, we become smaller. Perhaps that is why we shape belief around mystery” (95). “We come from the land, sky, from love and the body. From matter and creation,” Hogan continues. “We are, life is, an equation we cannot form or shape, a mystery we can’t trace in spite of our attempts to follow it back to its origin” (95-96): 

We do not know the secrets of stars. We do not know the true history of water. We do not know ourselves. We have forgotten that this land and every life-form is a piece of god, a divine community, with the same forces in creation in plants as in people. All the lives around us are lives of gods. The long history of creation has shaped plankton, and shaped horseshoe crabs, has shaped our human being. Everything is Maker; mangroves, termites, all are sources of one creation or another. Without respect and reverence for it, there is an absence of holiness, of any God. (96)

“The face of the land is our face, and that of all its creatures,” she writes. “To see whole is to see all the parts of the puzzle, some of which have not even been found. . . . What grows here and what grows within us is the same” (97). “What does god look like?” Hogan asks at the essay’s conclusion. “These fish, this water, this land” (98).

In her ninth essay, “Stories of Water,” Hogan writes, “[e]arth is a water planet. It is a world of salt oceans, cloud forests, underground springs, and winding rivers” (99). Water has made caves and, in the form of glaciers, has remade landscapes. Water shapes the mountains where she lives. It carves canyons. It pushes stones out of the topsoil. “Everywhere water travels, life follows,” she states (100). Indigenous peoples “have ceremonies to bring rain clouds to arid lands,” she continues, and there are stories about water (100-01). She recalls a trip to the Caribbean—the journey to the Yucatán she writes about in the previous essay?—where, either snorkeling or scuba diving, she saw colourful fish, barracuda, jellyfish. “It was a world apart from our world,” she writes. “I was taken in by it, taken almost away, surfacing to find no sight of shore, no memory of how I had arrived in this suspension of life” (101). Hogan recalls how, when she was a girl, a creek she often visited flooded, and that afterwards the earth was changed: “We had no choice but to bend down before water’s will; it was stronger than ours” (102). 

A man recently told Hogan about a journey by canoe along a river to Hudson Bay. The travellers were tormented by clouds of mosquitoes; the days were hot; the nights were freezing. But they also saw freshwater beluga whales playing underneath their canoes. This story leads to a recollection of Charles Olson’s Call Me Ishmael, a story about a whaling boat sunk by a whale. Why do men take such risks? “Perhaps they knew that water would carry them full circle face-to-face with themselves, or maybe they searched for a light stronger than that produced by barrels of sperm whale oil,” Hogan writes. “The sea is a primal magnet, and maybe theirs were journeys into mystery and wilderness, a pull toward healing, toward a baptism in the enormous world of life, a coming together of land creatures with the holy waters of earth that carry not only ships and giant fish, but also our own hidden treasures” (104).

The previous summer, Hogan travelled across Lake Superior to Isle Royale, “an island most well known for its wolf and moose population” (104). The boatman told her a story about a luxury liner’s shipwreck. He and his father participated in the rescue efforts; witnessing the disaster caused him to lose his memory. “His first recollection, a few weeks later, was of a room in his home that was filled with sweet-smelling fruit,” Hogan writes. The ship “had carried a cargo of fresh fruits, and the water of Lake Superior was the precise temperature needed to preserve the fruit in the hull of the capsized boat” (104-05). For months after the wreck, divers brought fruit up from the depths, perfectly preserved.

“The last traces of older civilizations are beneath the water,” Hogan continues. She once found a tile on the beach which she imagined came from Atlantis. “But after all these stories, the most amazing tale of all belongs to water’s own voice, telling a story of it’s [sic] unbroken orbit from itself to itself” (105-06). The amount of water on the planet is always the same: “This is a story of circular infinity, of a planet birthing itself” (106). Someone told her a story about travelling the Amazon River and encountering a tree covered with what appeared to be pink blossoms but that turned out to be flamingos perched on the branches. Stories about the rainforest, she continues, seem supernatural, and those forests are endangered, even though they “are the place our air is born” (107). And as the forest is destroyed, the people who live in it die: “Since 1900, more than half of the tribal people of Brazil have become extinct” (107). “The journey of water is round, and its loss, too, moves in a circle, following us around the world as we lose something of such immense value that we do not yet even know its name,” she writes (107-08). Outside, the ice is melting on a spring day. Hogan thinks about the places that water has been. The water’s protean nature “reminds us that we are water people,” and that “everything [is] a round river, in a circle, alive and moving” (108).

Hogan’s tenth essay, “The Kill Hole,” begins with an ancient people who once lived in New Mexico, the Mimbres. “Like the Anasazi and other ancient nations, these were people of the mystery, having abandoned their place and vanished into a dimension that has remained unknown to those of us who have come later,” Hogan writes. “But before they disappeared into the secret, the Mimbres ‘killed’ their pots by breaking a hole in the center of each one. It is thought that the hole served to release the spirit of the pot from the clay, allowing it to travel with them over land and to join them in their burial grounds. It is called a ‘kill hole’” (109-10).

The third funeral Hogan attended made her think about the kill hole, “how life escapes the broken clay of ourselves, travels away from the center of our living” (100). The woman died in California, near the place “where Ishi, the last Yana Indian, was found in 1911” (110). The Yana had hidden themselves from Settlers, but as logging progressed, they were discovered, “finally, by surveyors who must have believed he was not a man in the way they were men, for they carried away his few possessions as souvenirs for their families” (110). For four years, Ishi was a living exhibit in a museum, studied by experts, until he died of tuberculosis, “one of the diseases of civilization” (111). Ishi’s story tells us about the flaws of civilization, the “loss and emptiness that will never again be filled, of whole cultures disappeared, of species made extinct, all of these losses falling as if through a hole, like a spirit leaving earth’s broken clay” (111). 

Hogan thinks (again) about how apes were taught sign language, creating “a dialogue that bridged the species barrier” (111). The animals “spoke a world of emotion, of feelings similar to our own,” until the project ended and they were “sold into scientific research” (112). “From these studies, we learned that primates have a capacity for love and resistance, that they not only have a rich emotional life, but that they are also able to express their pain and anguish,” Hogan writes. “This is an event whose repercussions astonish us with their meaning, whose presence throws us into an identity crisis equal to that in Galileo’s time when the fabric of belief was split wide open to reveal that Earth was not the center of the universe” (112). It speaks of “our responsibility to treat with care and tenderness all the other lives that share our small world” (112). Many scientists ignored the importance of the research, taking refuge in new definitions of intelligence that excluded apes. For Hogan, this “armor of defense” might come from “the downfall of our beliefs about who and what we are as human beings” (113). “One by one, in our lifetimes, our convictions about ourselves and our place within the world have been overturned,” she writes (113). Using tools, altruism, even art-making, have been discovered to be practiced by animals. Animals even have humour. “Still wanting a place of our own, a place set aside form the rest of creation, now it is being ventured that maybe our ability to make fire separates us, or perhaps the desire to seek revenge,” she continues. “But no matter what direction the quest for separation might take, there has been a narrowing down of the difference between species, and we are forced to ask ourselves once again: what is our rightful place in the world, our responsibility to the other lives on the planet?” (114). She acknowledges that this question, this time, is strange and confusing, but she is certain of something: “We are of the animal world. We are part of the cycles of growth and decay. Even having tried to hard to see ourselves apart, and so often without a love for even our own biology, we are in relationship with the rest of the planet, and that connectedness tells us we must reconsider the way we see ourselves and the rest of nature” (115). 

“A change is required of us, a healing of the betrayed trust between humans and earth,” Hogan writes:

Caretaking is the utmost spiritual and physical responsibility of our time, and perhaps that stewardship is finally our place in the web of life, our work, the solution to the mystery of what we are. There are already so many holes in the universe that will never again be filled, and each of them forces us to question why we permitted such loss, such tearing away from the fabric of life, and how we will live with our planet in the future. (115)

Ishi is one of those losses, one of those holes. Hogan notes that “ishi” means “man” in the Yana language, that Ishi kept his real name to himself: “It was his only possession, all that remained for him of a lost way of life” (115). “The kill hole where everything falls out is not just found in earth’s or the body’s clay,” Hogan continues. “It is a dusky space between us and others, the place where our compassion has fallen away, our capacity for love failed” (115-16). “What we are,” she writes, “lives in that abyss” (116). Some of us, though, have taken steps to create “a bridge across that broken world,” like those who enabled communication between apes and humans (116). The essay concludes with the California condors and their return from the brink of extinction: “A mending is taking place, a life emerging like the thread out of a Navajo rug’s pattern of loss” (116).

Next is the title essay, “Dwellings,” a series of fragments about the places where beings live, particularly the places they construct for themselves. It begins with a meditation on an eroded hill where bees live. She discovered those bees one summer day. “Sitting in the hot sun, watching the small bees fly in and out around the hill, hearing the summer birds, the light breeze, I felt right in the world,” Hogan writes. “I belonged there. I thought of my own dwelling places, those real and those imagined” (118-19). She remembers living in a town called Manitou, where a hot mineral spring “gurgled beneath the streets and rose up into open wells” (119). “A few years after that, I wanted silence. My daydreams were full of places I longed to be, shelters and solitudes,” she continues. “And how often I’ve wanted to escape to a wilderness where a human hand has not been in everything. But those were only dreams of peace, of comfort, of a nest inside stone or woods, a sanctuary where a dream or life wouldn’t been invaded” (119).

Years before, a man lived in a cave in a nearby canyon, “like a troglodite” (119). He became lonely and found a wife, but she tired of living in the cave. First they installed a door, then heat, then air-conditioning, “and after that the earth wanted to go about life in its own way and it didn’t give in to the people” (120). Once houses were built from trees felled in one part of a forest so that “the house would hold together more harmoniously” (120). An Italian immigrant in Chicago built marvelous birdhouses like cathedrals. One afternoon, Hogan “waited for barn swallows to return from their daily work of food gathering” (120-21); she thinks about their nests, “perfect as a potter’s bowl” (121). Abandoned housed begin to sag without occupants. Hogan recalls raking the gravel floor of a flight cage at the raptor rehabilitation facility where she works and finding two fetal mice in a pile of bones. They were being bitten by ants, screaming, and Hogan tried to save them by drowning the ants: “I was trading one life for another, exchanging the lives of ants for those of mice, but I hated their suffering, and hated even more that they had not yet grown to a life, and already they inhabited the miserable world of pain” (122). There are other lives than the mice in those rooms—wasps, spiders, ants—but she thinks most of the mice and their nests. “The mice have adapted to live in the presence of their enemies, adapted to living in the thin wall between beak and beak, claw and claw,” she writes (123).

Hogan recalls how tourists at the corn dance at Zia Pueblo began picking up shards of the old pottery that had been made and broken there: “The residents of Zia know not to take the bowls and pots left behind by the older ones. They know that the fragments of those earlier lives need to be smoothed back to earth, but younger nations, travelers from continents across the world who have come to inhabit this land, have little of their own to grown on” (123). Those fragments of pottery, she continues, “provide the new people a lifeline to an unknown land, help them remember that they live in the old nest of earth” (123).

Hogan remembers a hike in February, during the mating season of great horned owls. She wanted to hear the owls, “the voices so tender, so deep, like a memory of comfort” (123). Halfway up the trail, she found a fallen nest: “Holding it in my hand in the rosy twilight, I noticed that a blue thread was entwined with the other gatherings there” (123-24). It was from one of her skirts. She liked the way “that a thread of my life was in an abandoned nest, one that had held eggs and new life,” and she took the nest home. There, studying it more closely, she found that it held “a gnarl” of her daughter’s hair (124). She didn’t know what kind of bird had made that nest:

It didn’t matter. I thought of the remnants of our lives carried up the hill that way and turned into shelter. That night, resting inside the walls of our home, the world outside weighed so heavily against the thin wood of the house. The sloped roof was the only thing between us and the universe. Everything outside of our wooden boundaries seemed so large. (124)

She lists the beings living outside: wild grapes, “burrowing ones,” horned owls, mice, skunks, fox, porcupine, bees (124). “The whole world was a nest on its humble tilt, in the maze of the universe, holding us,” she concludes (124).

The twelfth essay begins with a memory of Hogan lying “on the moist spring earth” beside her mother, looking up at the night sky (125). “There seemed to be two kinds of people; earth people and those others, the sky people, who stumbled over pebbles while they walked around with their heads in clouds,” she writes:

Sky people loved different worlds than I loved; they looked at nests in treetops and followed the long white snake of vapor trails. But I was an earth person, and while I loved to gaze up at night and stars, I investigated the treasures at my feet, the veined wing of a dragonfly opening a delicate blue window to secrets of earth, a lusterless beetle that drank water thirstily from the tip of my finger and was transformed into sudden green and metallic brilliance. (125-26)

Years later, finding her way home on New Year’s Eve by following the North Star, Hogan thinks “that learning the sky might be a practical thing” (126). “But it was the image of earth from out in space that gave me upward-gazing eyes,” she continues. “To dream of the universe is to know that we are small and brief as insects, born in a flash of rain and gone a moment later. We are delicate and our world is fragile” (126). 

Hogan recalls the 1977 launch of the Voyager probes and the greetings to aliens they contained in different languages. “There is so much hope in those greetings, such sweetness,” she writes. “If found, these messages will play our world to a world that’s far away. They will sing out the strangely beautiful sounds of Earth, sounds that in all likelihood exist on no other planet in the universe” (127-28). When, if, those recordings are found, it’s probable that “the trumpeting bellows of elephants, the peaceful chirping of frogs and crickets, the wild dogs baying out from the golden needle and record, will be nothing more than a gone history of what once lived on this tiny planet in the curving tail of a spiral galaxy” (128). She thinks about the recorded sounds and images included with those spacecraft: “To think that the precious images of what lives on earth beside us, the lives we share with earth, some endangered, are now tumbling through time and space, more permanent than we are, and speaking the sacred language of life that we ourselves have only just begun to remember” (129). 

“There is so much hope there that it takes us away form the dark times of horror we live in,” she writes, considering the genocides we have perpetrated (130). “At second glance, this vision for a new civilization, by its very presence, shows us what is wrong with our world,” she continues. “The underside of our lives grows in proportion to what is denied. The darkness is made darker by the record of light” (130). For Hogan, “[t]he broken link between us and the rest of our world grows too large, and the material of nightmares grows deeper while the promises for peace and equality are empty, are merely dreams without reality” (130). 

Hogan considers a time when Catholic missions “were being erected in Indian country,” when a white woman showed paintings of Jesus and Mary to an Indigenous woman. When the white woman showed a picture of the crucifixion, however, “the Indian woman hurried away to warn others that these were dangerous people, people to fear, who did horrible things to each other” (131). Hogan notes that no images of the crucifixion are included with Voyager, “for fear we earth people would ‘look’ cruel” (131). “There are no political messages, no photographs of Hiroshima,” she writes. “This is to say that we know our own wrongdoings” (131).

She notes that pictures of a naked man and a naked pregnant woman were not included on Voyager because it was “‘smut,’” “as if our own origins, the divine flux of creation that passes between a man and a woman, are unacceptable, something to hide” (131). “[T]his embarrassment about our own carriage of life and act of creative generation nevertheless reveals our feelings of physical vulnerability and discomfort about our own life force,” she contends (132). “From an American Indian perspective, there are other problems here,” she continues: the selection process itself “bespeaks many of the failings of an entire system of thought and education. From this record, we learn about our relationships, not only with people, but with everything on earth” (132). “We inhabit only a small space in the house of life,” she writes (133). 

Will the “time capsule” aboard Voyager be found (133)? “We barely even know our human histories, so much having unraveled before our time, and while we know that our history creates us, we hope there is another place, another world we can fly to when ours is running out,” she writes. “We have come so far away from wisdom, a wisdom that is the heritage of all people, an old kind of knowing that respects a community of land, animals, plants, and other people as equal to ourselves. Where we know the meaning of relationship” (133). And yet, “[t]he people of earth are reaching out. We are having a collective vision. Like young women and men on a vision quest, we seek a way to live out the peace of the vision we have sent to the world of stars” (134). Hogan returns to the memory with which she began the essay: “That night we were small, my mother and I, and we were innocent. We were children of the universe. In the gas and dust of life, we are voyagers” (134).

The fourteenth essay is called “The Snake People.” “One green and humid summer, my father and I were driving through the hot Oklahoma countryside,” Hogan writes, when “something that looked like a long golden strand of light leapt up, twisted in the wavering air, and flew lightning fast across the road” (135). It was a golden racer snake. “That flying snake, that thin flash of light, brought back a store of memories,” she continues. “Our lives have been peopled with snakes and stories of snakes: there was my Chickasaw grandfather who, riding his stocky, thick-muscled horse, could smell the reptile odor from a distance,” and her Aunt Louise, who “had a reputation for swimming among water moccasins so smoothly that they did not take note of her” (135-36). Hogan and her father, while fishing for worms in an abandoned well, discovered a blue racer: “Quickly, my father caught it. He held it just behind the head for a while, then put it into my hands” (136). There are other stories, too, about rattlesnakes, and in most of those stories, the snakes ended up being killed, “with shovels, hoes, sticks, and sometimes with guns” (137). She thinks that the blue racer her father caught must have ended up being killed as well. “But its graceful life, not its death, is what has remained in my memory,” she writes. “And down through the years, I have come to love the snakes and their long, many-ribbed bodies” (137).

That love was strengthened by a dream “of a woman who placed a fantastic snake over her face” (137-38). The woman and the snake became one: “Her breath became the snake’s slow breathing, and they lived through one another, inhabiting a tropical world of wet leaves, vines, and heavy, perfumed flowers” (138). The woman began to dance and “other people emerged from the forest wearing feathers, deep blue and emerald green, like human birds” (138). Then the music and the people disappeared. “The woman removed the snake and placed it on a wall where it hung alive and beautiful, waiting for another ceremonial dance,” Hogan continues, and in the dream, the woman told Hogan that everyone has pieces of that snake’s skin, and if everyone saves those pieces, “it will remain alive” (138). At first, she thought the dream was about tradition and history, but since then she has expanded her vision: “Now, it seems that what needs to be saved, even in its broken pieces, is earth itself, the tradition of life, the beautiful blue-green world that lives in the coiling snake of the Milky Way” (138-39).

Hogan recalls walking along a road in spring and seeing a snake. “It moves off the road so carefully and mysteriously, an inch at a time, as though it is sliding off ice,” she remembers (139). A friend tells her that he once saw a black racer carried into the sky by a red-tailed hawk. The snake was still alive. Another hawk appeared and the two birds fought over the snake. During the fight, the snake was dropped. Hogan wonders if the snake survived its fall. Hogan herself once say an eagle carrying a snake through the sky to its nest. Another time, she saw a snake swallowing a bird.

When floods happen, snakes seek refuge from the water by moving uphill, wrapping themselves around branches to wait for the waters to recede. “Gold-eyed, they stretch across limbs, some looping down, some curled tight and nestlike between branch and trunk, their double tongues darting out like weather vanes,” Hogan writes. “They remind me of women who know they are beautiful” (140).

Human cultures once considered snakes to be symbols “of healing and wholeness,” but more recently, “the snake has symbolized our wrongs, our eating from the tree of knowledge, our search and desire for the dangerous revelations of life’s mystery” (140-41). We have been damned by “[k]nowledge without wisdom, compassion, or understanding” (141). Hogan writes of the Hope snake dance, which celebrates “the old ones, immortals who shed a milky skin to reveal the new and shining” (141). “[T]he image of snakes twined about a tree or one another looks surprisingly like the double, twisted helix of DNA,” she suggests (142). 

“I call them people. That’s what they are. They have been here inhabiting the same dens for tens of thousands of generations,” Hogan writes. “They love their freedom, their dwelling places, and often die of sadness when kept in captivity” (142).

Hogan recalls walking on a road and seeing a snake that has been hit by a car. It is dying. The snake’s belly has been cut open, and from the wound a baby snake that has been swallowed but is still alive escapes. “It leaves a winding, thin path in the road dust,” she concludes. “Maybe it is writing a story of survival there on the road, of what is left of wilderness, or of what has become of earth’s lesser gods as one by one they disappear” (143).

In the next essay, “Porcupine,” Hogan considers “the dark old porcupine” she sees walking on the edge of the road (144). “This one is torn and lame and her undignified quills are broken on one side, as if she has slept them tangled,” she writes. “She hobbles and limps away from her many batterings. She wears her history, dark and spiney, and there is a light in her, a fire around the dreary sharp halo of quills” (145). One evening Hogan finds the porcupine dead beside the road: “Her face is sweet and dark, her inner light replaced by the light of sky. The drifting clouds are in her eyes” (145). She offers sage to “this animal old woman who lived on earth, who breathed the same air that for years I have been breathing, and that breath prays for all creatures on earth” (145). The next morning, she notices that the porcupine’s body is being eaten by maggots which are turning into beetles and flies. “In that crossing over, that swallowing, the battle of life with life, the porcupine lives on,” she concludes. “In its transformation, life continues. My life too, which stopped only for a small moment in history, in that great turning over of the world” (146).

The fifteenth essay is “Waking Up the Rake.” Hogan remembers her grandmother’s hair. When she was a child, Hogan would sometimes brush her grandmother’s hair. “We were the old and the new, bound together in front of the snapping fire, woven like a lifetime’s tangled growth of hair,” she writes. “I saw my future in her body and face, and her past was alive in me” (147-48). Years later, when Hogan was sick, she went to a traditional healer. They prayed together at dawn for several days. A year later, she returned, and the healer told her, “‘Our work is our altar,’” words that have remained with her (148).

“Now I am a disciple of birds,” she writes, the birds whose cages she cleans at the Birds of Prey Rehabilitation Foundation (148). She considers the carcasses and skins she sees as she cleans those cages. “Over time, the narrow human perspective from which we view things expands,” she suggests. “A deer carcass begins to look beautiful and rich in its torn redness” (149). So too do the bone fragments in the cases she cleans. “This work is an apprenticeship, and the birds are the teachers,” she writes (150). “There is a silence needed here before a person enters the bordered world the birds in habit, so we stop and compose ourselves before entering their doors,” she continues. “The most difficult task the birds demand is that we learn to be equal to them, to feel our way into an intelligence that is different from our own” (150). The birds know “that as humans we have somehow fallen from our animal grace, and because of that we maintain a distance from them, though it is not always a distance of the heart” (150). Nearly all of the birds have been “injured in a clash with the human world”: shot, hit by cars, caught in traps, poisoned, ensnared by fences (150-51). “To ensure their survival, they must remember us as the enemies that we are,” she writes. “We are the embodiment of a paradox: we are the wounders and we are the healers” (151).

In cleaning the cages, Hogan begins “to see the larger order of things. In this place, there is a constant coming to terms with both the sacred place life occupies, and with death” (151). In death, life returns in the form of ants and maggots, which “are time’s best and closest companions” (151). “To sit with the eagles and their flutelike songs, listening to the longer flute of wind sweep through the lush grasslands, is to begin to know the natural laws that exist apart from our written ones,” she writes” (151). Intuition is one of those laws, she contends: “It’s a blood-written code that directs us through life” (151). 

There are rewards to her work: seeing snakes, turtles, reminders “of all the lives beyond these that occupy us” (152). “One green morning, an orphaned owl perches nervously above me while I clean,” she writes (152-53). It accidentally lands on the end of her rake before flying off to a safer perch. “The word rake means to gather or heap up, to smooth the broken ground,” Hogan continues. “That’s what this work is, all of it, the smoothing over of broken ground, the healing of the severed trust we humans hold with earth. We gather it back together again with great care, take the broken pieces and fragments and return them to the sky. It is work at the borderland between species, at the boundary between injury and healing” (153). Her work, her raking, “becomes a road to what is essential,” she writes. “Work is the country of hands, and they want to live there in the dailiness of it, the repitition [sic] that is time’s language of prayer, a common tongue. Everything is there, in that language, in the humblest of labor” (154). In that work, “all earth’s gods are reborn, and they dance and sing in the dusty air around us” (154).

The book’s last essay is entitled “Walking.” It begins with a plant growing on a hillside. “I saw it first in early summer,” Hogan writes. “It was a green and sleeping bud, raising itself toward the sun. Ants worked around the unopened bloom, gathering aphids and sap. A few days later, it was a tender young flower, soft and new, with a pale green center and a troop of silver-grey insects climbing up and down the stalk” (155-56). The sunflower “grew into a plant of incredible beauty” (156). As summer progressed, new insects visited that sunflower every day. Eventually “birds arrived to carry the new seeds to another future” (156). “In this one plant, in one summer season, a drama of need and survival took place,” Hogan continues. “Hungers were filled. Insects coupled. There was escape, exhaustion, and death. Lives touched down a moment and were gone” (156-57). Hogan acknowledges that she was an outsider, that she “never learned the sunflower’s golden language or the tongues of its citizens” (157). She understood little of the flower, the insects, and the birds, “[b]ut they knew what to do, how to live” (157).

Hogan notes that “[t]here are other summons and calls, some even more mysterious than those commandments to birds or those survival journeys of insects” (157). Once every hundred years, a certain species of bamboo flowers, no matter where it is, in Malaysia or in a Minnesota greenhouse. “Some current of an inner language passes among them, through space and separation, in ways we cannot explain in our language,” she writes. “They are all, somehow, one plant, each with a share of communal knowledge” (157). Sometimes Hogan hears that language: “The light of the sunflower was one language, but there are others more audible” (158). She recalls “a beat, something like a drum or heart coming from the ground and trees and wind” in a redwood forest, and the “booming voice of an ocean storm thundering from far out at sea” (158). 

“Tonight I walk,” Hogan writes. “I am watching the sky. I think of the people who came before me and how they knew the placement of stars in the sky, watched the moving sun long and hard enough to witness how a certain angle of light touched a stone only once a year. Without written records, they knew the gods of every night, the small, fine details of the world around them and of immensity above them” (158). She can almost hear “the redwoods beating. And the oceans are above me here, rolling clouds, heavy and dark, considering snow” (158). She passes the place where that sunflower grew and wonders if it will return the next summer. It’s winter. “It is a world of elemental attention, of all things working together, listening to what speaks in the blood,” she continues. “Walking, I am listening to a deeper way. Suddenly all my ancestors are behind me. Be still, they say. Watch and listen. You are the result of the love of thousands” (158-59).

I began this summary wondering how Hogan’s version of the world might compare to Latour’s object-oriented ontology. I would have to reread both texts much more carefully, teasing out similarities and differences, but after quickly reading both texts, I think that their emphasis on the aliveness, or at least agency, of everything around us is a similarity between them. The difference, though, is in Hogan’s emphasis, her insistence, on the idea of relationships—both between humans and the world, and between everything in that world. Even to say “between humans and the world” is a mistake, the product of an epistemology and ontology that imagine, incorrectly, a separation between us and our surroundings. That’s what Hogan would say, I think, and I believe Latour would agree, perhaps. There is much to think about in these essays, and Hogan’s beautiful prose is certainly worth rereading. I hope I get a chance to return to this book.

Works Cited

Hogan, Linda. Dwellings: A Spiritual History of the Living World, 1995, Norton, 2007.

Latour, Bruno. Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime, translated by Catherine Porter, Polity, 2018.

121. Bruno Latour, Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime

bruno latour down to earth

I first heard about philosopher of science Bruno Latour at the Walking’s New Movements conference in Plymouth, England, where I gave a paper at the beginning of November. I thought I might read his book Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime eventually, but a friend raves about this book and tells me that it is directly connected to my project. So here I go.

Down to Earth is a book-length essay. It begins by explicitly addressing Trump’s election in order to bring together three phenomena whose connections have been missed. The first is the claim, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, that history had ended. The second is the history that was happening, despite denials: a history defined by “an increasingly vertiginous explosion of inequalities” (1). Those two phenomena “coincided with a third that is less often stressed: the beginning of a systematic effort to deny the existence of climate change” (1). “This essay proposes to take these three phenomena as symptoms of a single historical situation: it is as though a significant segment of the ruling classes (known today rather too loosely as ‘the elites’) had concluded that the earth no longer had enough room for them and for everyone else,” Latour writes. “Consequently, they decided that it was pointless to act as though history were going to continue to move toward a common horizon, toward a world in which all humans could prosper equally. From the 1980s on, the ruling classes stopped purporting to lead and began instead to shelter themselves from the world” (1-2). “The absence of a common world we can share is driving us crazy,” Latour continues (2).

Latour’s hypothesis is simple: 

we can understand nothing about the politics of the last 50 years if we do not put the question of climate change and its denial front and centre. Without the idea that we have entered into a New Climatic Regime, we cannot understand the explosion of inequalities, the scope of deregulation, the critique of globalization, or, most importantly, the panicky desire to return to the old protections of the nation-state—a desire that is identified, quite inaccurately, with the “rise of populism.” (2)

“To resist this loss of a common orientation,” Latour continues, “we shall have to land somewhere. So, we shall have to learn how to get our bearings, how to orient ourselves. And to do this we need something like a map of the positions imposed by the new landscape within which not only the affects of public life but also its stakes are being redefined” (2). The word “affects” is interesting, and Latour repeats it in the following paragraph when he suggests that his reflections “explore the possibility that certain political affects might be channeled toward new objectives” (2). Is Latour influenced by affect theory, another thing I learned about at Walking’s New Movements?

For Latour, the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Accord makes a statement that the U.S. no longer belongs to the same planet as everyone else. In other words, “no longer is there an ideal of a world common to what used to be called ‘the West’” (3). Brexit was the first historic event leading in this direction: it is a decision “to stop playing the game of globalization” (3)—or at least to play that game in a different way, one that does not require the free movement of immigrants from Europe. Trump’s election is a second historic event: 

The country that had violently imposed its own quite particular form of globalization on the world, the country that had defined itself by immigration while eliminating its first inhabitants, that very country has entrusted its fate to someone who promises to isolate it inside a fortress, to stop letting in refugees, to stop going to the aid of any cause that is not on its own soil, even as it continues to intervene everywhere in the world with its customary careless blundering. (4)

Both of these events confirm “the end of one concept of globalization” (3). Latour suggests that the third historic event is “the resumption, extension, and amplification of migrations,” caused by war, the failure of economic development, and climate change” (4). These three phenomena “are simply different aspects of one and the same metamorphosis: the very notion of soil is changing. The soil of globalization’s dreams is beginning to slip away” (4). And, he continues, “each of us is beginning to feel the ground slip away beneath our feet. We are discovering, more or less obscurely, that we are all in migration toward territories yet to be rediscovered and reoccupied” (5). This discovery is related to Latour’s fourth historic event: the Paris Climate Accord. This agreement is important because “all the signatory countries, even as they were applauding the success of improbable agreement, realized with alarm that, if they all went ahead according to the terms of their respective modernization plans, there would be no planet compatible with their hopes for development. They would need several planets; they have only one” (5). If the planet is destroyed, then “there is no longer an assured ‘homeland,’ as it were, for anyone” (5).

For that reason, each of us “faces the following question: Do we continue to nourish dreams of escaping, or do we start seeking a territory that we and our children can inhabit?” (5). That is our choice: “Either we deny the existence of the problem, or else we look for a place to land. From now on, this is what divides us all, much more than our positions on the right or the left side of the political spectrum” (5). “In other words,” Latour continues, “the migratory crisis has been generalized” (6). In addition to migrants leaving their countries to find new places to live, “we must from now on add the migrants from inside who, while remaining in place, are experiencing the drama of seeing themselves left behind by their own countries” (6). Both groups share a common ordeal: “finding oneself deprived of land” (6). “This ordeal accounts for the relative indifference to the urgency of the situation, and it explains why we are all climate quietists when we hope, while doing nothing about it, that ‘everything will be all right in the end,’” Latour writes. “It is hard not to wonder what effect the news we hear every day about the state of the planet has on our mental state. How can we not feel inwardly undone by the anxiety of not knowing how to respond?” (6). That’s a good question: the news over Christmas—especially of the fires in Australia—has reduced me to tears.

For Latour, “this unease, at once personal and collective,” gives Trump’s election “its full importance” (6). The United States had two options: to acknowledge the reality of climate change and the extent of its responsibility in causing it, thereby becoming “realistic” and leading “the ‘free world’ away from the abyss, or it could plunge further in denial” (6-7). “Those who conceal themselves behind Trump have decided to keep America floating in dreamland a few years longer, so as to postpone coming down to earth, while leading the rest of the world into the abyss—perhaps for good,” he states (7).

“The question of landing somewhere did not occur earlier to the peoples who had decided to ‘modernize’ the planet” (7)—the European colonizers of every other continent. “It arose—ever so painfully—only for those who for four centuries had been subjected to the impact of the ‘great discoveries,’ of empires, modernization, development, and finally globalization,” Latour writes. “They knew perfectly well what it meant to find oneself deprived of land. . . . They had no choice but to become experts on the question of how to survive conquest, extermination, land grabs” (7). The novelty of the current situation, for “the modernizing peoples,” “is that this territorial question is now addressed to them as well as to the others” (7). This new situation “adds an unexpected meaning to the term ‘postcolonial,’ as though there were a family resemblance between two feelings of loss” (7). “In other words, the sense of vertigo, almost of panic, that traverses all contemporary politics arises owing to the fact that the ground is giving way beneath everyone’s feet at once, as if we all felt attacked everywhere, in our habits and in our possessions,” Latour continues (8).

Here Latour arrives at a question that is central to his argument. “Have you noticed that the emotions involved are not the same when you’re asked to defend nature—you yawn, you’re bored—as when you’re asked to defend your territory—now you’re wide awake, suddenly mobilized?” he asks (8). What accounts for that difference? “If nature has become territory,” he writes,

it makes little sense to talk about an “ecological crisis,” “environmental problems,” or a “biosphere” to be rediscovered, spared, or protected. The challenge is much more vital, more existential than that—and also much more comprehensible, because it is much more direct. When the rug is pulled out from under your feet, you understand at once that you are going to have to be concerned with the floor. (8)

The uneasiness this situation causes for everyone, both colonizers and colonized alike, “gnaws at everyone equally” (8). “What is certain is that all find themselves facing a universal lack of shareable space and inhabitable land,” Latour contends (9). And this feeling of panic comes from “the same deep feeling of justice felt by those who found themselves deprived of their land at the time of the conquests, then during colonization, and finally during the era of ‘development’: a power from elsewhere comes to deprive you of your land and you have no purchase on that power” (9). “If this is globalization, then we understand retrospectively why the colonized have always been right to defend themselves,” he continues (9). This feeling, this realization, is the new human universality, “the only one available to us,” and it “consists in feeling that the ground is in the process of giving away” (9). This new universality “is our only way out: discovering in common what land is inhabitable and with whom to share it” (9). “The alternative is to act as though nothing were happening and to protect ourselves behind a wall while we prolong the waking dream of the ‘American way of life,’” Latour writes (9). 

“Migrations, explosions of inequality, and New Climatic Regime: these are one and the same threat,” Latour argues. “Most of our fellow citizens underestimate or deny what is happening to the earth, but they understand perfectly well that the question of migrants puts their dreams of a secure identity in danger” (9-10). The populist desire to put up borders against immigration cannot address the climate emergency, however, which “has been sweeping across all our borders for a long time, exposing us to all the winds, and no walls we can build will keep these invaders out” (10). To defend ourselves, we need to identify these formless migrations—“climate, erosion, pollution, resource depletion, habitat destruction” (10)—for what they are. “The most basic right of all is to feel safe and protected, especially at a moment when the old protections are disappearing,” Latour suggests. “This is the meaning of the history that remains to be discovered: how can we reweave edges, envelopes, protections; how can we find new footing while simultaneously taking into account the end of globalization, the scope of migration, and also the limits placed on the sovereignty of nation-states that are henceforth confronted by climate change?” (11). And, above all, “how can we reassure those who see salvation only in the recollection of a national or ethnic identity, always freshly invented? And, in addition, how can we organize a collective life around the extraordinary challenge of accompanying millions of foreigners in their search for lasting ground?” (11). The “political question” is how to reassure and shelter everyone who is “obliged to take to the road, even while turning them away from the false protection of identities and rigid borders,” but to reassure them, “we would have to be able to succeed in carrying out two complementary movements that the ordeal of modernization has made contradictory: attaching oneself to a particular patch of soil on the one hand, having access to the global world on the other” (11-12). “Up to now, it is true, such an operation has been considered impossible,” Latour acknowledges: “between the two, it is said, one has to choose. It is this apparent contradiction that current history may be bringing to an end” (12).

Next, Latour asks what it means to talk about “the ravages of globalization” (12). Globalization, he argues, consists “in two opposing phenomena that have been systematically confused” (12). “Shifting from a local to a global viewpoint ought to mean multiplying viewpoints, registering a greater number of varieties, taking into account a larger number of beings, cultures, phenomena, organisms, and people,” he writes:

Yet it seems as though what is meant by globalization today is the exact opposite of such an increase. The term is used to mean that a single vision, entirely provincial, proposed by a few individuals, representing a very small number of interests, limited to a few measuring instruments, to a few standards and protocols, has been imposed on everyone and spread everywhere. (13)

For that reason, it’s not a surprise “that we don’t know whether to embrace globalization or, on the contrary, struggle against it” (13). The battle to multiply viewpoints in order “to complicate all ‘provincial’ or ‘closed’ views with new variants,” Latour argues, “is a fight that deserves to be fought” (13). But if it means the opposite, “a matter of decreasing the number of alternatives regarding the existence and the course of the world,” it needs to be resisted “with all our might” (13). Latour suggests that it’s necessary to “distinguish between globalization-plus and globalization-minus” (13).

Complicating “any project of landing someplace is that this definition of the inevitable globalization will lead, in a backlash, to the invention of the ‘reactionary’” (13). “The advocates of globalization-minus” have accused those “who resist its deployment” of being archaic and backward and defensive (13). “It is to stir up this backward-looking people that globalizers have subjected them to the great lever of modernization,” Latour writes. “For two centuries, the arrow of time has made it possible to locate on one side those who are moving forward—the modernizers, the progressives—and on the other those who remain behind” (14). Any resistance to globalization was thereby deemed illegitimate and irrational (14). “Advocacy of this type of modernization defines, by contrast, the taste for the local, the attachment to the land, the maintenance of traditions, the attention to the earth” as archaic and “‘obscurantist’” (14). “The call to globalization is so ambiguous that its pliancy contaminates what can be expected from the local,” Latour continues. “This is why, since the beginning of modernization, any attachment to any soil at all has been read as a sign of backwardness” (14). 

However, just as there are two ways to look at globalization, there are “at least two ways, equally contrasting, to define the attachment to the local” (14). The elites who have profited from globalization “have so much trouble understanding what upsets those who want to be held, protected, assured, reassured by their province, their tradition, their soil, or their identity,” and tend to label such resistance as “populist” (15). But “[t]o reject modernization is also to resist courageously by refusing to trade one’s own province for another . . . that is even narrower and above all infinitely remote, thus much more indifferent to local interests” (15). Such resistance is normal and just, Latour suggests, because it is a way to continue to register “more differences more viewpoints, and above all not to begin by reducing their number” (15). So, in the same way that there is a globalization-plus and a globalization-minus, Latour suggests that it’s necessary to distinguish “the local-minus from the local-plus” (15). “In the end, what counts is not knowing whether you are for or against globalization, for or against the local; all that counts is understanding whether you are managing to register, to maintain, to cherish a maximum number of alternative ways of belonging to the world,” he writes (15-16).

The point is that the modernization project has become impossible, “because there is no Earth capable of containing its ideal of progress, emancipation, and development. As a result, all forms of belonging are undergoing metamorphosis—belonging to the globe, to the world, to the provinces, to particular plots of ground, to the world market, to lands or to traditions” (16). “We must face up to what is literally a problem of dimension, scale, and lodging: the planet is much too narrow and limited for the globe of globalization,” Latour writes, while at the same time “it is too big, infinitely too large, too active, too complex, to remain within the narrow and limited borders of any locality whatsoever. We are all overwhelmed twice over: by what is too big, and by what is too small” (16). “And thus no one has the answer to the question ‘how can one find inhabitable land?’” Latour states. “We don’t know where to go, or how to live, or with whom to cohabit. What must we do to find a place? How are we to orient ourselves?” (16).

“Something must happened, some truly extraordinary event, for the ideal of globalization to have changed valence so quickly,” Latour writes (17). How did this happen? Latour suggests that an “avant-garde” of “activists, scientists, artists, economists, intellectuals, political parties” has “grasped the increasingly endangered status of the formerly more or less stable relations that the Earth maintained with humans,” beginning in the 1980s (17). The question of the limits to development was obvious, but the modernizers ignored it. Nevertheless, that question continued to resonate, and “we find that under the ground of private property, of land grabs, of the exploitation of territories, another ground, another earth, another soil has begun to stir, to quake, to be moved” (17). At this point, “the hypothesis of political fiction comes in,” Latour suggests:

Suppose that other elites, perhaps less enlightened, but with significant means and important interests, and above all with extreme attentiveness to the security of their immense fortunes and to the durability of their well-being, each and every one of them, heard this thread, this warning.

We have to assume that these elites understood perfectly well that the warning was accurate, but did not conclude from the evidence, which had become more and more indisputable over the years, that they were going to have to pay, and pay dearly, for the Earth’s turning back on itself. They would have been enlightened enough to register the warning, but not enlightened enough to share the results with the public. (17-18)

Rather than taking on their burden, however, those elites decided that others would have to pay, and that they would deny the existence of what Latour calls “the New Climatic Regime” (18). “These two decisions would make it possible to connect three phenomena,” Latour continues: deregulation and the dismantling of the welfare state since the 1980s; climate change denial; and the “dizzying extension of inequalities” over the last 40 years (18). “If the hypothesis is correct, all this is part of a single phenomenon”: 

the elites have been so thoroughly convinced that there would be no future life for everyone that they have decided to get rid of all the burdens of solidarity as fast as possible—hence deregulation; they have decided that a sort of gilded fortress would have to be built for those (a small percentage) who would be able to make it through—hence the explosion of inequalities; and they have decided that, to conceal the crass selfishness of such a flight out of the shared world, they would have to reject absolutely the threat at the origin of this headlong flight—hence the denial of climate change. (18-19)

This description, or explanation, seems to fit the evidence: the extreme nihilism of the wealthy elites who support liars and climate-change deniers in return for tax cuts. For Latour, the wealthy have decided to reserve the Titanic’s lifeboats for themselves, and to let the rest of us drown.

Latour calls the wealthy “the obscurantist elites” and suggests that they “understood that, if they wanted to survive in comfort, they had to stop pretending, even in their dreams, to share the earth with the rest of the world” (19). This hypothesis explains, for Latour, “how globalization-plus has become globalization-minus” (19). Until the 1990s, he contends, it was possible to “associate the horizon of modernization with the notions of progress, emancipation, wealth, comfort, even luxury, and above all rationality” (19)—a claim that runs aground on the exploitation of people outside of the West, but never mind—but after that point, “the rage to deregulate, the explosion of inequalities, the abandonment of solidarities have gradually associated that horizon with the notion of an arbitrary decision out of nowhere in favor of the sole profit of the few. The best of worlds has become the worst” (19-20). The reaction to this betrayal by the elites is rage. “[O]ne can imagine that those left behind also understood very quickly that if globalization were tossed aside, then they too would need gated communities,” Latour writes. “The reactions on one side led to reactions on the other—both sides reacting to another much more radical reaction, that of the Earth, which had stopped absorbing blows and was striking back with increasing violence” (20). The origin of these overlapping reactions “must be sought in the Earth’s reaction to our enterprises,” he continues. “We are the ones who started it—we of the old West, and more specifically Europe. There are no two ways about it: we have to learn to live with the consequences of what we have unleashed” (20). The growth of inequalities, the “wave of populism,” and the “migration crisis,” he states, cannot be understood unless we grasp “that these are three different responses, basically comprehensible if not effective, to the powerful reaction of the earth to what globalization has done to it” (20-21). We have all, in different ways, decided to flee from this problem: into “the gilded exile of the 1%,” into the fantasy of “secure borders,” or, for “the most wretched of all,” exile (21). No wonder globalization—as globalization-minus, that is—has lost its “power of attraction” (21).

Latour admits that his hypothesis about the obscurantist elites “appears implausible”: “too much like a psychoanalytic interpretation, too much like a conspiracy theory” (21). “It is not impossible to document it, however, if we make the reasonable assumption that people are fairly quick to suspect what some are seeking to hide from them, and are prepared to act accordingly,” he writes (21-22). The effects his hypothesis explains are obvious, particularly “the epistemological delirium” that has taken hold since Trump’s election. Denial means lying, and lying means remembering one’s previous lies, and this is “draining,” Latour argues (22). Lying eventually drives liars crazy: they, and those who believe their lies, “become attached to ‘alternative facts’ to the point of forgetting all forms of rationality” (22). But it’s important to remember that the people who seem to have abandoned rationality (not the elites, but the people themselves) have been betrayed “by those who have given up the idea of actually pursuing the modernization of the planet with everyone, because they knew, before everyone else, that such modernization was impossible—precisely for want of a planet vast enough for their dreams of growth for all,” Latour writes (22-23). “Before accusing ‘the people’ of no longer believing in anything, one ought to measure the effect of that overwhelming betrayal on people’s level of trust,” he continues. “Trust has been abandoned along the wayside” (23). “Facts remain robust only when they are supported by a common culture, by institutions that can be trusted, by a more or less decent public life, by more or less reliable media,” Latour contends. The effect of the betrayal by the obscurantist elites has been the erosion of all of those things.

“But the epistemological disaster is just as great among those who are in charge of carrying out this extraordinary betrayal,” Latour states, suggesting that the chaos of the Trump White House as evidence. “How can one respect the best-established facts, when one has to deny the enormity of the threat and wage, without acknowledging it, a full-scale war against all the others?” he asks (23). Lying, “denegation,” “poisons those who practice it as well as those who are presumed to be duped by it,” he suggests (23). The difference is that the obscurantist elites have committed an unforgivable crime: “their obsessional denial of climate change” (24). “Because of this denial, ordinary people have had to cope within a fog of disinformation, without anyone ever telling them that the project of modernizing the planet was over and done with, and that a regime change was inevitable,” he writes (24). “[I]f there were to be any hope of dealing with this fact in time, ordinary people would have had to push politicians to act before it was too late,” he continues. “At a point when the public could have found an emergency exit, the climate skeptics stood in their way and denied them access” (24).

The denial of climate change “organizes all politics at the present time,” Latour argues (24). People know their leaders are lying, and as a result “they are suspicious of everything and don’t want to listen any more” (24-25). Meanwhile, the “rational thinkers” continue to believe that “facts stand up all by themselves, without a shared world, without institutions, without a public life”; they are “just as caught up as the others in the tangles of disinformation,” because they themselves “live in an alternative world, a world in which climate mutation occurs, while it does not in the world of their opponents” (25). “It is not a matter of learning how to repair cognitive deficiencies, but rather of how to live in the same world, share the same culture, face up to the same stakes, perceive a landscape that can be explored in concert,” Latour continues. “Here we find the habitual vice of epistemology, which consists in attributing to intellectual deficits something that is quite simply a deficit in shared practice” (25).

“[T]he key to the current situation,” Latour writes, “has to be sought in the form of the world” (25). That’s the problem: “there are now several worlds, several territories, and they are mutually incompatible” (26). The movement into modernization was a movement away from the local and towards the Global; in fact, the Local was abandoned. “Once these two poles have been identified, we can trace a pioneering frontier of modernization,” he continues. “This is the line drawn by the injunction to modernize, an injunction that prepared us for every sacrifice: for leaving our native province, abandoning our traditions, breaking with our habits, if we wanted to ‘get ahead,’ to participate in the general movement of development, and, finally, to profit from the world” (27). People were torn between two opposing injunctions: to move “forward toward the ideal of progress,” or “backward toward the old certainties,” but “this hesitation, this tug-of-war, ultimately suited them pretty well” (27). They could determine where they were on the vector that runs between the Global and the Local. “There were of course protestors, but they were located on the other side of the modernization front,” Latour continues. “They were the (neo-)natives, the antiquated, the vanquished, the colonized, the subaltern, the excluded. . . . one could treat them unassailably as reactionaries, or at least as anti-moderns, as dregs, rejects” (27). “It was brutal, perhaps, but at last the world had a direction. The arrow of time was going somewhere,” Latour states (27). 

The vector from Local to Global was also where the Left/Right distinction was projected (27). On economic matters, the Right usually wanted to go further toward the Global, whereas on moral or sexual issues, the Left usually wanted to go in that direction. “[P]eople ended up finding common ground in spite of everything, for the good reason that all these positions continued to be situated along the same vector,” Latour writes. “Which made it possible to identify them the way one reads the temperature of a patient by following the gradations of a thermometer” (28). “Depending on the topics under dispute, the import of the positions could vary, but there was always a single direction that derived from the tension between the two poles of attraction, the Global and the Local” (28-29). However, “[w]hat happens to this system of coordinates if globalization-plus becomes globalization-minus?” Latour asks. “If what has been the pole of attraction drawing us with the force of self-evidence, pulling the whole world in its direction, becomes a counterforce that pushes us away, leaving us with the confused feeling that only a few will profit from it? Inevitably, the Local, too, in a counterreaction, will become attractive again” (30). But it is no longer the same Local; it is now the Local-minus (30). Neither is plausible; neither is livable (30). “Nevertheless, this second pole attracts as powerfully as the first, especially when things are going badly and the ideal of the Globe seems to be more and more remote,” Latour writes (31). In fact, “[t]he two poles of attraction have finally pulled so far apart that we no longer have the luxury of hesitating, as before, between the two. This is what the commentators call the brutalization of political discourse” (31). “Instead of tension, there is henceforth a yawning gap” (32). 

It is as if, “everywhere at once, a third pole of attraction has come in to turn aside, pump out, absorb all the objects of conflict, making any orientation along the old flight line impossible, Latour suggests (32). And this is where we are now: “Too disoriented to array the positions along the axis that went from the old to the new, from the Local to the Global, but still incapable of naming this third attractor, fixing its position, or even simply describing it” (32-33). “Everything has to be mapped out anew, at new costs,” he continues. “What is more, this is an urgent task that must be carried out before the sleepwalkers, in their blind headlong rush forward, have crushed what we care about” (33). 

It’s possible that the American decision to pull out of the Paris Climate Accord was caused by this “third attractor” (33). But for Latour, “[i]t is as though Trump had managed to identify a fourth attractor,” which Latour names “the Out-of-This-World,” “the horizon of people who no longer belong to the realities of an earth that would react to their actions. For the first time, climate change denial defines the orientation of the public life of a nation” (34-35). “It is unfair to the Fascists to compare the phenomenon of which Trump is the symptom to the movements of the 1930s,” he continues, since the Fascists existed along the old Local/Global vector, whereas “in the current innovation,” “the State is in disgrace, the individual is king, and the urgent governmental priority is to gain time by loosening all constraints, before the population at large notices that there is no world corresponding to the America depicted” (35). Latour contends that “Trump’s originality is to link, in a single gesture, first the headlong rush toward maximum profit while abandoning the rest of the world to its fate” to “the headlong rush backward of an entire people toward the return of national and ethnic categories” (35). Trump’s supporters behave as though these two movements—towards the Global, on the one hand, and towards the Local, on the other—“could be conflated. Such a fusion is obviously possible only if the very existence of the conflict between modernization, on the one hand, and the condition of being terrestrial, on the other, is denied” (35-36).

This denial demonstrates for Latour “the constitutive role of skepticism about climate science, which is otherwise incomprehensible” (36). “We can well understand why denial prevails: the total lack of realism of the combination—Wall Street pulling millions of members of the so-called middle classes toward a return to protection of the past!—is unmistakable,” Latour writes. “For the time being, the project depends entirely on the requirement of maintaining utter indifference to the New Climatic Regime while dissolving all forms of solidarity, both external (among nations) and internal (among classes)” (36). “For the first time, a large-scale movement no longer claims to address geopolitical realities seriously, but purports to put itself explicitly outside of all worldly constraints,” he continues. “What counts above all for the elites behind this movement is no longer having to share with the others a world that they know will never again be a common world” (36). Why wouldn’t this denial of reality coalesce around a failed businessman “who became famous by way of reality television, another form of unreality and escapism” (36)? “This movement defines the first government totally oriented toward the ecological question—but backwards, negatively, through rejection!” (37). The elites who support Trump have, for the past 40 years, understood that climate change would leave “no room for them and for the nine billion left behind”; they intend to make their money and say they will be dead before the disaster arrives (37). Trump is therefore playing the role of Bernie Madoff for the entire country (37).

What needs to be understood, Latour continues, is that the United States “had the most to lose from a return to reality. Its material infrastructures are the most difficult to reorient quickly, its responsibilities in the current climatic situation are the most crushing,” even though “it possesses all the scientific, technological, and organizational capabilities that could have led the ‘free world’ to take the turn toward the third attractor” (38). Trumpian politics is “a politics with no object, since it rejects the world that it claims to inhabit” (38). Faced with the obstacle of climate change, the United States has “simply refused to proceed—at least for the time being” (38). Given this situation, we can either wake up or “the whole business will end in a fiery deluge” (38). “Contrary to Marx’s dictum,” he writes, “history does not go simply from tragedy to farce, it can repeat itself one more time in a tragic farce” (38).

“It seems ridiculous to advance the claim that we have no more precise indications about the third attractor than the one offered by those in flight from it,” Latour writes (38-39). Yet that is the situation we face: “The terrifying impression that politics has been emptied of its substance, that it is not engaged with anything at all, that it no longer has any meaning for direction, that it has become literally powerless as well as senseless, has no cause other than this gradual revelation: neither the Global nor the Local has any lasting material existence” (39). The Global/Local vector now “resembles a freeway without any beginning or end,” and “we now find ourselves, in a 90º shift, suspended between the old vector and a new one, pushed ahead by two temporal arrows that are no longer going in the same direction” (39). For Latour, “[t]he main concern is to establish what makes up that third term. In what way can it become more attractive than the other two—and why does it appear so repellent to so many?” (39). What is that attractor called? Latour decides to name this “new political actor” “the Terrestrial” (40). “The massive event that we need to sum up and absorb in fact concerns the power to act of this Terrestrial, which is no longer the milieu or the background of human action,” he continues. “People generally talk about geopolitics as if the prefix ‘geo’ merely designated the framework in which political action occurs. Yet what is changing is that, henceforth, ‘geo’ designates an agent that participates fully in public life” (40-41). “The current disorientation derives entirely from the emergence of an actor that reacts and will continue to react to human actions and that bars the modernizers from knowing where they are, in what epoch, and especially what role they need to play from now,” he states (41).

It’s no longer possible to distinguish between physical and human geography, Latour suggests:

As long as the earth seemed stable, we could speak of space and locate ourselves within that space and on a portion of territory that we claimed to occupy. But how are we to act if the territory itself begins to participate in history, to fight back, in short, to concern itself with us—how do we occupy a land if it is this land itself that is occupying us? The expression “I belong to a territory” has changed meaning: it now designates the agency that possesses the possessor! (40-41)

“If the Terrestrial is no longer the framework for human action, it is because it participates in that action,” Latour continues. “Space has become an agitated history in which we are participants among others, reacting to other reactions. It seems that we are landing in the thick of geohistory” (42). The new attractor, the Terrestrial, “is at once known to everyone and completely foreign”; it is not “a res nullius, ready to be appropriated” (42). “On the contrary,” Latour writes,

the Moderns find themselves migrating toward an earth, a land, a country, a turf, whatever one wants to call it, that is already occupied, that has been populated from time immemorial and that has more recently undergone repopulation by the multitude of those who have felt, well ahead of the others, the extent to which it was necessary to flee posthaste from the injunction to modernize. In this world, all modern minds encounter a kind of exile. They are going to have to learn to cohabit with those whom they used to deem archaic, traditionalists, reactionaries, or simply “locals.” (42-43)

This space is new for everyone, Latour states, “since, according to the reports of climate specialists, there is quite simply no precedent for the current situation. Here it is, that ‘wicked universality,’ that universal lack of earth” (43).

Our civilization was founded on the relatively stable climate of the Holocene, but in the Anthropocene, “we are no longer dealing with small fluctuations in the climate, but rather with an upheaval that is mobilizing the earth system itself” (43). Humans are no longer the central figures in their drama: “Today, the decor, the wings, the background, the whole building have come on stage and are competing with the actors for the principal role. This changes all the scripts, suggests other endings” (43). The only certainty “is that we can no longer tell ourselves the same old stories. Suspense prevails on all fronts” (44). “We understand nothing about the vacuity of contemporary politics if we do not appreciate the stunning extent to which the situation is unprecedented,” Latour writes. “At least it is easy to understand the reaction of those who have decided to flee. How can anyone agree to turn voluntarily toward the third attractor when one was headed tranquilly toward the horizon of universal modernization?” (44). 

“If there is any subject that deserves lucid attention, it is that of the condition of ecology in the modern world,” Latour continues. “This territory, so ancient and so tragically new, this Terrestrial on which one would need to land, has already been crisscrossed in all directions and in all senses by what can be called the ‘ecological movements’” (45). For the Moderns, “time’s arrow pulled everything toward globalization,” but for political ecology—Green parties in Europe and elsewhere—the Local was the destination (45). “Ecology has . . . succeeded in running politics through its mill by introducing objects that had not previously belonged to the usual preoccupations of public life,” Latour writes:

It has successfully rescued politics from an overly restrictive definition of the social world. In this sense, political ecology has fully succeeded in changing what is at stake in the public sphere.

To modernize or to ecologize: this has become the crucial choice. Everyone agrees about this. And yet, ecology has failed. Everyone agrees about this too. (46)

Part of the problem is that ecologists have tried to avoid taking a position on the Right/Left political spectrum, although they have not been able “to get out of the trap set by the Moderns’ temporal arrow” (46). The only ways out of the Right/Left division are to “take a position in the middle between the two extremes by settling in along the traditional vector,” or to “redefine the vector by attaching oneself to the third attractor, which makes it necessary to redistribute the range of Left/Right positions according to another viewpoint” (47). Getting beyond the Left/Right division “is a matter of tilting the front line while modifying the content of the disputed objects that are at the origin of the Right/Left distinction—or rather of the various Rights and Lefts, so numerous today and so intermingled that not much remains, when these labels are used, of the ordering power allowed by this classic system of coordinates” (48). What is needed, it seems, is another vector.

Latour calls the Right/Left division a “mental hemicycle that sets up like a row of toy soldiers first the far left, then the left, the center, the right, and finally the far right” (48-49). “[H]owever rudimentary and contingent it may be, this gradation organizes every poll, every political proclamation, and every categorization; it is operative in every election as well as in every historical narrative, and it governs even our most visceral reactions,” Latour writes. “It is hard to see, at least for the moment, how to get along without such affect-laden terms. Public action must be oriented toward a recognizable goal” (49). Latour’s hypothesis—“that the needle has turned 90º and is now oriented toward the powerful attractor whose originality strikes us today,” an attractor that “has none of the same properties as the two others between which politics has been situated since the dawn of the so-called modern era”—suggests that:

[t]he rift introduced by the Terrestrial attractor makes it necessary to open the packaging and re-examine, piece by piece, what was expected of each component—which we are gradually going to learn to call “movement,” “advance,” or even “progression”—and what goes clearly in the other direction—which we shall have the right henceforth to call in fact “regression,” “abandonment,” “betrayal,” or “reaction.” (50)

“This move will perhaps complicate the political game,” Latour continues, “but it will also open up unforeseen margins for maneuvering” (50).

Two angles will “allow us to identify the delicate negotiations that will have to be undertaken in order to redirect the interests of those who continue to flee toward the Global and those who continue to take refuge in the Local, in order to interest them in feeling the weight of this new attractor,” the Terrestrial (51). This negotiation will lead to a definition of the new politics. “Allies have to be sought among people who, according to the old gradation, were clearly ‘reactionaries,’” Latour writes. “And, of course, alliances will have to be forged with people who, again according to the old reference points, were clearly ‘progressives’ and perhaps ‘liberals’ or even ‘neoliberals’” (51). How could such a miracle take place? “For a simple reason that is bound up with the very notion of orientation,” Latour answers. “Despite the appearances, what counts in politics are not attitudes, but the form and weight of the world to which these attitudes have the function of reacting” (52):

Politics has always been oriented toward objects, stakes, situations, material entities, bodies, landscapes, places. What are called the values to be defended are always responses to the challenges of a territory that it must be possible to describe. This is in effect the decisive discovery of political ecology: it is an object-oriented politics. Change the territories and you will also change the attitudes. (52)

For Latour, “[t]he only reassuring element in the current situation is that another vector is gradually gaining in realism,” which he identifies as “[t]he Modern/Terrestrial vector,” which “could become a credible, perceptible, palpable alternative to the Left/Right dichotomy that remains so acute” (52).

The antagonists in this political realignment would be those who continue to direct their attention towards the Local, the Global, and the Out-of-This World. “But these adversaries are also the only potential allies,” Latour contends. “Thus, they are the ones that will have to be persuaded and converted” (52-53). That would mean figuring out” how to address those who rightly feel abandoned by the historical betrayal fo the ruling classes and are clamoring for the security of a protected space” (53). Their energies would have to be shifted from the Local to the Terrestrial (53). Belonging to a particular place has only become “‘reactionary’ . . . by contrast with the headlong flight imposed by modernization. If we stop fleeing, what does the desire for attachment look like?” (53). But that recognition would have to take place without confusing belonging to the land with “what the Local has added to it: ethnic homogeneity, a focus on patrimony, historicism, nostalgia, inauthentic authenticity” (53). “On the contrary,” Latour continues, “there is nothing more innovative, nothing more present, subtle, technical, and artificial (in the positive sense fo the word), nothing less rustic and rural, nothing more creative, nothing more contemporary than to negotiate landing on some ground” (53). The distinction to be made between the Local and the Terrestrial is that “the Local is designed to differentiate itself  by closing itself off,” while “the Terrestrial is designed to differentiate itself by opening itself up” (54). 

It is here that “the other branch of negotiation comes in, the one addressed to those who are rushing full speed toward the Global” (54). Those who are “rushing toward globalization-minus will have to be shown how much that globalization differs from access to the Globe and the world,” Latour continues. “For the Terrestrial is bound to the earth and to land, but it is also a way of worlding, in that it aligns with no borders, transcends all identities” (54). According to Latour,

This is the sense in which it solves the problem of place we noted earlier: there is no Earth corresponding to the infinite horizon of the Global, but at the same time the Local is much too narrow, too shrunken, to accommodate the multiplicity of beings belonging to the terrestrial world. This is why the zoom lens that purported to align the Local and the Global as successive sightings along a single trajectory has never made any sense. (54)

In any case, the necessary alliances will never be achieved “as long as we continue to speak of political attitudes, affects, passions, and positions while the real world toward which those attitudes, affects, passions, and positions are directed has completely changed,” Latour continues. “In other words, we have fallen behind on revamping our political affects. This is why we need to restart the process and put the new magnetic mass in front of the traditional compass: to discover the direction it will indicate and see how our attitudes, affects, passions, and positions will turn out to be redistributed” (54-55). This process will be difficult. “The time lost in continuing to pace up and down along the old Right/Left vector has delayed the necessary mobilizations and negotiations,” Latour admits (55). “What is important is to be able to get out of the impasse by imagining a set of new alliances,” he continues—to shift the terms from Left or Right to Terrestrial or Modern (55-56). This shift has to happen “before the militants of the extreme Modern have totally devastated the stage” (56).

Political ecology has never been able “to mobilize on a scale adequate to the stakes,” Latour argues (56). “Having failed to figure out how to join forces effectively, socialism and ecology, each of which sought to alter the course of history, have only managed to slow it down,” he continues (56-57). The problem, according to Latour, is that they were defining their choices too narrowly, “when what was really at stake was a different and much more decisive choice having to do with two directions of politics: one that defines social questions in a restrictive manner, and another that defines the stakes of survival without introducing a priori differences between humans and non-humans” (57). “The choice to be made is between a narrow definition of the social ties making up a society”—by that I think Latour means the Local-minus—“and a wider definition of associations that make up what have been called collectives”—which I think refers to the Local-plus (57). “The question then becomes the following: why did the social movements not grasp the ecological stakes at the outset as if they were their own, which would have allowed them to avoid obsolescence and to lend their strength to a still-weak ecology? Or to turn the question around, why did political ecology fail to take up the baton from the social question and forge ahead?” Latour asks (57).

The revolts of socialism, ecology, and even feminism have not merged; instead, they have submitted, “in almost total impotence,” to what has been called the “Great Acceleration” of the past 70 years, which has led to “the triumph os globalization-minus, the sterilization of socialism,” and then the election of Donald Trump (58). “During all these events, we have been stuck with a scarcely attenuated opposition between ‘social’ conflicts and ‘ecological’ conflicts—as if we were dealing with two distinct entities between which, like Buridan’s legendary ass, we have to continue to hesitate while dying of hunger and thirst,” Latour states. “But nature is no more a sack of grain than society is a bucket of water. If there is no choice to be made, it is for the excellent reason that there are not naked humans on one side and nonhuman objects on the other” (58). Ecology, Latour states, is really “a call for a change of direction: ‘Toward the Terrestrial!’” (58).

What explains “this interruption in relaying a collective struggle”? Latour asks (58). Since the nineteenth century, politics has been organized around social classes, and “[d]espite all the efforts to attenuate class oppositions and even to claim that they no longer made any sense, politics was nevertheless organized around them” (59). “If these definitions have begun to spin their wheels in a vacuum, it is because the analysis in terms of social classes and the materialism underlying that analysis were clearly defined by the attractor called Global, above, in opposition with the Local,” Latour writes:

The great phenomena of industrialization, urbanization, and occupation of colonized territories defined a horizon—sinister or radiant, it hardly matters—that gave meaning and direction to progress. And for a good reason: that progress was pulling out of poverty, if not out of exploitation, hundreds of millions of human beings whose contrivances were supposed to lead toward an emancipation that seemed inevitable. (59-60)

Of course, at the same time, those phenomena were condemning hundreds of millions of others to poverty and exploitation; a nodding acquaintance with the work of Frantz Fanon, among others, would tell Latour that progress had two sides. Both the Left and the Right, he continues, were focused on modernization, on “which side would reach the Global world first,” and whether reform or revolution was necessary (60). “But they never took the time to explain to peoples undergoing modernization what precisely described world progress would end up putting them in,” he writes (60). Indeed, progress became “a mere horizon, a simple regulating idea, a sort of increasingly vague utopia, as the gradually evolving Earth would fail to give it substance” (60). The conclusion of the Paris Climate Accord “made it official . . . that there was no longer an Earth corresponding to the horizon of the Global” (60). The limitations of the Earth were ignored by twentieth-century political movements, a failing Latour finds hard to understand when those movements considered themselves to be materialist. What was their material? They paid little attention to it (60-61). “The question thus becomes how to define class struggles much more realistically by taking into account this new materiality, the new materialism imposed by the orientation toward the Terrestrial,” he writes (61).

Class struggles, Latour continues, “depend on a geo-logic” (62). The prefix “geo-” “obliges us to reopen the social question while intensifying it through the new geopolitics” (63). “The difficulty is that to find principles that will allow us to define these new classes”—the new classes of “geo-social loci”—“and trace the lines of conflict between their divergent interests, we shall have to learn to distrust definitions of matter, the systems of production and even the reference points in space and time that had served to define ecological struggles as well as social classes,” he writes. “In fact, one of the oddities of the modern period is that we have had a definition of matter that is hardly material, hardly terrestrial at all. The Moderns take pride in a realism that they have never been able to put to work” (63). How can people who are capable of allowing the temperature of the planet to rise by 3.5º, or allow a sixth extinction to take place, be called materialists (63-64)? Obviously, they can’t.

The reason socialism and ecology have not been able to amalgamate has to do with “the role that both groups have attributed to ‘nature,’” Latour writes:

A certain conception of “nature” has allowed the Moderns to occupy the Earth in such a way that it forbids others to occupy their own territories differently. For, in order to mold a politics, you need agents who bring together their interests and their capacities for action. But you cannot make alliances between political actors and objects that are external to society and deprived of the power to act. (64)

Nature, as it is typically understood, is such an object:

If we swallow the usual epistemology whole, we shall find ourselves again prisoners of a conception of “nature” that is impossible to politicize since it has been invented precisely to limit human action thanks to an appeal to the laws of objective nature that cannot be questioned. Freedom on one side, strict necessity on the other: this makes it possible to have it both ways. Every time we want to count on the power to act of other actors, we’re going to encounter the same objections: “Don’t even think about it, these are mere objects, they cannot react,” the way Descartes said of animals that they cannot suffer. (65)

However, he continues,

if we claim to be opposing “scientific rationality” by inventing a more intimate, more subjective, more rooted, more global—more “ecological,” as it were—way of capturing our ties to “nature,” we lose on both fronts: we will be left with the idea of “nature” borrowed from tradition while being deprived of the contribution of positive knowledge. (65)

“We need to be able to count on the full power of the sciences, but without the ideology of “nature” that has been attached to that power,” Latour writes. “We have to be materialist and rational, but we have to shift these qualities onto the right grounds” (65). 

“The difficulty is that the Terrestrial is not at all the Globe,” Latour continues. “One cannot be materialist and rational in the same way in these two sites” (65-66). Indeed, “it is clear that one cannot praise rationality without recognizing to what extent it has been abused by the quest for the Global” (66): he notes the failure of modernization to take into account the reaction of the planet to human activity, the failure of economic theories premised on inexhaustible resources, the failure of our civilization to avoid making “a forecasting error so massive that it prevents parents from leaving an inhabited world to their children” (66). No wonder “rationality” has become a frightening word. “To restore a positive meaning to the words ‘realistic,’ ‘objective,’ ‘efficient,’ or ‘rational,’ we have to turn them away from the Global, where they have so clearly failed, and toward the Terrestrial,” he writes (66). The Globe, he notes, “grasps all things from far away, as if they were external to the social world and completely indifferent to human concerns,” whereas the Terrestrial “grasps the same structures from up close, as internal to the collectivities and sensitive to human actions, to which they react swiftly” (66-67). “The idea—the revolutionary idea—of grasping the earth as one planet among others . . . can be traced to the birth of the modern sciences,” he continues, including cartography and physics (67). Unfortunately, this idea “is also very easy to distort,” and “some thinkers go on to conclude that it is necessary to occupy, virtually, the vantage point of the universe to understand what is happening on this planet” (67). “Such a conclusion is in no way obligatory,” Latour contends. “No matter how far out they send their thoughts, researchers always have their feet firmly anchored in clay” (68). 

Looking at the Earth from the outside “has the disadvantage of limiting to just a few movements . . . the whole gamut of movements grasped by the positive sciences,” Latour writes. “Yet on the Earth seen from the inside, there are many other forms of movements that have become harder and harder to take into account. Little by little, it has become more cumbersome to gain objective knowledge about a whole range of transformations: genesis, birth, growth, life, death, decay, metamorphoses” (68). “The detour by way of the outside introduced into the notion of ‘nature’ a confusion from which we have still not been extricated,” Latour suggests. “[N]ow, the word ‘natural’ is increasingly reserved for what makes it possible to follow a single type of movement viewed from the outside. This is also the meaning that the word has taken on in the expression ‘the natural sciences’” (68-69). Many scientists have decided to distance themselves from a range of phenomena, “to discern in all these easily accessible movements only those that one could have seen from Sirius,” and “[a]ll other movements have become subject to suspicion. Considered from the inside, on the Earth, they could not be scientific; they could not be really naturalized” (69). “If the planet has ended up moving away from the Terrestrial,” Latour continues,

it is because everything has happened as though nature seen from the universe had begun to replace, bit by bit—to cover over, to chase away—nature seen from the Earth, the nature that grasped, that could have grasped, that should have continued to include, all the phenomena of genesis.

The grandiose Galilean invention has come to take up all the space by making people forget that seeing the earth from Sirius is only a tiny part—even if the infinite universe is involved—of what we have the right to know positively. (70)

“The inevitable consequence,” for Latour, is that “we have begun to see less and less of what is happening on Earth” (70).

“Such a bifurcation between the real—external, objective, and knowable—and the inside—unreal, subjective, and unknowable—would have intimidated no one, or would have been taken for a simple exaggeration on the part of savants not very well acquainted with the realities here below,” Latour writes, “had it not been superimposed on the notorious vector of modernization” (70-71). “It is on this point that the two meanings, positive and negative, of the word ‘Global’ turn out to diverse entirely,” he continues:

The subjective side begins to be associated with the archaic and the outdated; the objective side with the modern and the progressive. Seeing things from the inside comes to have no value other than being traditional, intimate, archaic. Seeing things from the outside, on the contrary, becomes the only way to grasp the reality that counts, and, above all, the only way to orient oneself toward the future. (71)

This “brutal division” made “the illusion of the Global as the horizon of modernity” consistent (71). “From this point on it was necessary, even if one stayed in place, to shift one’s position virtually, bag and baggage, away from subjective and sensitive positions toward exclusively objective positions, finally freed of all sensitivity—or rather of sentimentality,” Latour states. “This is where, by contrast with the Global, the necessarily reactive, reflexive, nostalgic figure of the Local comes in” (71). The only way “to gain access to nature as an infinite universe” was to lose “one’s sensitivity to nature as process”: “To progress in modernity was to tear oneself away from the primordial soil and set out for the Great Outside, to become if not natural, at least naturalist” (71).

“Either one speaks of ‘nature,’ but then one is far away; or else one is close by, but one expresses only feelings,” Latour writes:

Such is the result of the confusion between the planetary vision and the Terrestrial. It is about the planetary vision that one can say, considering things “from above,” that it has always varied and that it will outlast humans, making it possible to take the New Climatic Regime as an unimportant oscillation. The Terrestrial, for its part, does not allow this kind of detachment. (72)

The term “nature” also explains the failure of political ecology:

When the so-called “ecological” parties try to interest people in what is happening “to nature,” a nature that they claim to be “protecting,” if by the term “nature” is meant the nature-universe seen from nowhere that is supposed to stretch from the cells of our bodies to the most distant galaxies, the answer will be simply: “That’s too far away; it’s too vague; it doesn’t concern us; we couldn’t care less.” (73)

Those responses make sense, according to Latour:

No progress will be made toward a “politics of nature” as long as the same term is used to designate, for example, research into terrestrial magnetism, the classification of the 3,500 exoplanets that have been spotted to date, the detection of gravitational waves, the role of earthworms in soil aeration, the reaction of shepherds in the Pyrenees to the reintroduction of bears, or the reaction of bacterial in our intestines to our latest gastronomic overindulgence. That nature is a real catch-all. (73)

For Latour, “nature” is the reason “the slow pace of mobilizations in favor of nature-as-universe” (73). It is not a political idea: objects cannot mobilize us in geo-social conflicts. “In order to begin to describe objectively, rationally, effectively, in order to paint the terrestrial situation with some degree of realism, we need all the sciences, but positioned differently,” Latour writes. “In other words, to be knowledgeable in scientific terms. . . . [i]t is essential to acquire as much cold-blooded knowledge as possible about the heated activity of an Earth finally grasped from up close” (73-74).

But everything depends on what one means by “heated activity” (74). It’s easy, from the perspective of “the nature-universe,” to think of “the earth’s agency” as “a subjective illusion, like a simple projection of feelings onto an indifferent ‘nature’” (74). Thus nature became an externality in economics: whereas humans were agents in systems of economic production, anything deemed “natural” could not be an agent or an actor (74). “It was vaguely felt that everything else depended on them and that they were inevitably going to react, but—here’s the hitch—because nature-as-universe had so fully obscured nature-as-process, those who were seizing control of these resources, sometimes fearfully, were left devoid of words, concepts, and directions” (74-75). Any attitude, myth, or ritual that was not touched “by any notion of ‘resource’ or ‘production’” was taken as “mere vestiges of old forms of subjectivity, of archaic cultures irreversibly outstripped by the modernization front” (75). “It is only today that these practices have become precious models for learning how to survive in the future,” he writes (75).

“The relation to the sciences can change,” but only if the natural sciences “that focus on nature-as-process” are “carefully distinguished from those that focus on the universe” (75). “Whereas the latter start with the planet taken as a body among bodies, for the former the Earth appears wholly singular,” Latour writes, suggesting that a world “composed of agents” could be called “Lovelockian,” after James Lovelock, the originator of the Gaia thesis (75). According to Latour, Lovelock’s point is that “it is necessary to consider, on Earth, living beings as agents participating fully in the processes of generating the chemical, and even in part the geological, conditions of the planet” (75). “If the composition of the air we breathe depends on living beings, the atmosphere is no longer the environment in which living beings are located and in which they involve,” Latour continues. Instead, that atmosphere “is, in part, a result of their actions. In other words, there are not organisms on one side and an environment on the other, but a coproduction of both. Agencies are redistributed” (76). Thinking of “the natural sciences as encompassing all the activities necessary to our existence” would make possible “political orientations” (76-77). Latour summarizes the conflict he is trying to describe:

there are those who continue to look at things from the vantage point of Sirius and simply do not see that the earth system reacts to human action, or do not believe it possible; they still hope that the Earth will mysteriously be beamed to Sirius and become one planet among others. Basically, they do not believe that there is life on Earth capable of suffering and reacting. And there are those who seek, while keeping a firm grip on the sciences, to understand what is meant by distributing action, animation, the power to act, all along the causal chains in which they find themselves entangled. (77)

“The former are climate skeptics,” Latour writes; “the latter consent to face up to an enigma concerning the number and nature of the agents at work” (77). Latour might be giving climate skeptics too much credit here: the ones I see on Facebook simply refuse to believe the evidence, preferring to believe fairy tales sponsored by oil companies instead.

We need science—science “extended to encompass all processes of genesis, in order to avoid imposing a priori restrictions on the agency of the beings with which we shall have to work”—“[y]et the empirical sciences must also be subjected to certain limits” (78). “In particular, it is important to try to single out the sciences that bear upon what some researchers call the Critical Zone(s),” Latour writes (78). “Seen from space, everything that has to do with knowledge of the third attractor, the Terrestrial, is in fact limited in a surprising way to a minuscule zone a few kilometers thick between the atmosphere and bedrock,” he continues. “A biofilm, a varnish, a skin, a few infinitely folded layers” (78). Everything that concerns us “resides in the minuscule Critical Zone. This is the point of departure and also the point of return for all the sciences that matter to us” (78). “This is why we need to circumscribe, among the fields of positive knowledge, those that have to do with the Critical Zone, so that we will not have to weigh ourselves down with the entire universe every time we talk about territorial conflicts,” he writes (78). The “sciences of nature-as-process that bear upon the Critical Zone” involve confronting “conflicts for each of the agents that populate the zone and that have neither the privilege nor the possibility of remaining uninterested” (79). Everyone has an interpretation of what happens within the Critical Zone. It is not a classroom: “the relationship between researchers and the public is anything but purely pedagogical” (79). 

“If we still had any doubts on this point, the pseudo-controversy over the climate suffices to dispel them,” Latour continues, noting that no corporation has spent anything to disprove the detection of the Higgs boson, “[b]ut denying the climatic mutation is another matter entirely: financing floods in. Ignorance on the part of the public is such a precious commodity that it justifies immense investments” (79-80). “In other words, the sciences of nature-as-process cannot have the same somewhat lofty and disinterested epistemology as that of the sciences of nature-as-universe,” he writes. “The philosophy that protected the latter will be of no help to the former. With no hope of escaping the controversies, the sciences of nature-as-process would do better to organize themselves in order to resist all those that do take an interest—a great interest—in them” (80). The point—the political point—“is that the Earth’s reaction to human action looks like an aberration in the eyes of those who believe in a terrestrial world made up of Galilean objects, and it appears self-evident to those who see it as a concatenation of Lovelockian agents” (80). Therefore, the Terrestrial has less to do with “nature”—“in the sense of nature-as-universe”—as people used to imagine (80):

It is through the Terrestrial that we must henceforth understand the conjoined action of the agents known through the sciences of the Critical Zone, which are struggling for legitimacy and autonomy against countless other concerned parties that have contradictory interests, and all of which possess other bodies of positive knowledge. The Terrestrial is literally drawing another world, as different from “nature” as from what used to be called the “human world” or “society.” The three are all political entities, but they do not lead to the same occupation of the soil, to the same “land-grabbing.” (80)

Discovering this new world “requires different psychological equipment” as well (81). “Innovating by breaking all limits and all codes is not the same as innovating by profiting from these limits,” Latour notes. “Celebrating the forward march of progress cannot have the same meaning when one is heading toward the Global as it does when one is heading toward ‘decisive advances’ in taking the Earth’s reactions to our actions into account” (81). 

“The period opening up before us is indeed a new epoch of ‘great discoveries,’ but these resemble neither the wholesale conquest of a New World emptied of its inhabitants, as before, nor the headlong flight into a form of hyper-neo-modernity,” Latour writes; “instead, they require digging deep down into the Earth with its thousand folds” (81). That Earth “is insinuating itself as a third party in all our actions,” he continues. “In both cases it is a matter—to hold onto one of the mainsprings of the modern tradition—of moving beyond, but buy violating different taboos, by passing through different Pillars of Hercules” (81-82).

For Latour, “[r]edirecting attention from ‘nature’ toward the Terrestrial might put an end to the disconnect that has frozen political positions since the appearance of the climate threat and has imperiled the linking of the so-called social struggles with those we call ecological” (82). “The new articulation between the two struggles correlates with a shift from an analysis focused on a system of production to an analysis focused on a system of engendering”: the difference between these analyses is in their principles (freedom for the first, and dependency for the second); in the role they give to humanity (central for the first, distributed for the second); and, finally, in the movements for which they take responsibility (mechanism for the first, genesis for the second) (82). The system of production was based on a materialist conception of nature and of the role of the sciences, and “it assigned a different function to politics and was rooted in a division between human actors and their resources” (82). “At bottom, there was the idea that human freedom would be deployed in a natural setting, where it would be possible to indicate the precise limits of each property,” Latour writes (82). In contrast,

[t]he system of engendering brings into confrontation agents, actors, animate beings that all have distinct capacities for reacting. It does not proceed from the same conception of materiality as the system of production, it does not have the same epistemology, and it does not lead to the same form of politics. It is not interested in producing goods, for humans, on the basis of resources, but in engendering terrestrials—not just humans, but all terrestrials. It is based on the idea of cultivating attachments, operations that are all the more difficult because animate beings are not limited by frontiers and are constantly overlapping, embedding themselves within one another. (82-83)

“If these two systems enter into conflict, it is because another authority has appeared, making it necessary to raise all the old questions again, no longer starting from the project of emancipation alone, but starting from the newly discovered value of dependency,” Latour suggests (83). Dependency limits, complicates, and then reconsiders “the project of emancipation, in order finally to amplify it” (83). This “new form of obligation” is emphasized “in the assertion that there is no planet (one should say Critical Zone) that can shelter the utopia of modernization or of globalization-minus” (83). “How can we deny that we find ourselves facing another power that imposes barriers different from the old so-called ‘natural limits’?” Latour asks (83). 

This is the conflict of authority that the obscurantist elites identified “when they decided no longer to share the planet with the rest of the nine billion good folks whose fate—at least so they claimed—had always been their chief concern” (83). The same conflict, or contradiction, broke out at the end of the negotiations for the Paris Climate Accord: “What power then secured the signature of those 175 states, if not a form of sovereignty to which they consented to bow down and that propelled them to reach agreement?” Latour asks. “If it is not a power that dominates the heads of state, and to which they grant a still-vague form of legitimacy, what should it be called?” (84). It is the same contradiction summed up by the term Anthropocene, which “is indeed the symptom of a repoliticization of all the planetary questions” (84). And this conflict was clarified when the U.S. withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord: Trump’s statement “was a declaration of war authorizing the occupation of all the other countries, if not with troops, at least with CO2, which American retains the right to emit” (84). “Acknowledging that contradictions drive political history, we can see that what fuels the contradiction between the system of production and the system of engendering is dependence on this new form of authority, which is at once very old and freshly minted,” Latour writes (85).

“Another difference between the two types of systems is the role attributed to humanity, a direct consequence of this emerging principle of authority,” Latour continues. “People have been fighting for a century to determine whether questions about nature would make it necessary to exit from anthropocentrism or whether, on the contrary, humans should remain at the center—as if one had to choose between a more or less deep ecology and another more or less ‘humanistic’ version” (85). The question, though, according to Latour, “has always been about the form and the composition of this human” (85). “What the New Climatic Regime calls into question is not the central place of the human,” he writes; “it is its composition, its presence, its figuration, in a word, its destiny. Now if you modify these things, you also change the definition of human interests” (85). The Moderns found it impossible “to situate the human in a precise landscape. The term human referred either to a natural being like all the others (in the classical sense of nature-as-universe) or else to the being par excellence capable of extricating itself from nature (again conceived in the old way), thanks to its soul, its culture, or its intelligence” (85-86). No one has “ever managed to stabilize this oscillation by giving humanity a stable shape” (86). If that is changing now, “it is because the climate crisis has driven both sides off the rails: the notion of nature on the one hand, that of the human on the other” (86). The choice for or against anthropocentrism is implausible now because, Latour suggests, of “the assumption that there is a center, or rather two, man and nature, between which one has to choose. And even more bizarre is the idea that this circle has such well-defined boundaries that they would leave everything else outside. As if there were an outside!” (86). But climate change tells us that there is no circle: no inside, no outside. Instead of talking about humans, Latour suggests, we need to talk about terrestrials, the Earthbound, which “does not lead to the same politics as saying ‘We are humans in nature’” (86). We cannot continue to separate ourselves from the rest of the occupants of the Critical Zone.

The third difference between a system of production and a system of engendering “has to do with the possibility of multiplying the actors without at the same time naturalizing behaviors” (86-87). “To become materialists is no longer to reduce the world to objects, but to extend the list of movements that must be taken into account, precisely the movements of genesis that the view from Sirius did not allow us to follow closely,” Latour argues. “Terrestrials in fact have the very delicate problem of discovering how many other beings they need in order to subsist” (87). (It’s a long list and many of the beings on that list are endangered because of our activities.) Making that list would allow us to “sketch out their dwelling places”—Latour prefers that term to “territory” (87). “To track the terrestrials”—and, remember, these aren’t just humans—“is to add conflicts of interpretation regarding what a given actor is, wants, desires, or can do, to conflicts about what other actors are, want, desire, or can do—and this applies to workers as well as to birds in the sky, to Wall Street executives as well as to bacteria in the soil, to forests as well as to animals” (87). It’s not a question of living in harmony with these other creatures, Latour insists; it’s a question of “learning to be dependent on them” (87). “The list of actors simply grows longer,” he states; “the actors’ interests are encroaching on one another; all our powers of investigation are needed if we are to begin to find our place among these other actors” (87).

“In a system of engendering, all the agents, all the animated beings, raise questions about descendants and forebears: in short, the question of how to recognize and insert oneself within lineages that will manage to last,” Latour writes (87-88). This operation is counter-intuitive for the Moderns, who always felt it necessary to choose “between the old and the new,” with the past defined as “what was simply surpassed, outdated” (88). “The perversity of the modernization front was that, by ridiculing the notion of tradition as archaic, it precluded any form of transmission, inheritance, or revival, and thus of transformation—in short, of engendering,” he continues. “And this is true for the education of human offspring as well as for landscapes, animals, governments, or divinities” (88). (Divinities?) In the system of production, humans alone have the ability to revolt; in a system of engendering, “many other protesters can make themselves heard—before the catastrophe” (88). In a system of engendering, “not only points of view but also points of life proliferate” (88). Therefore, “[b]y shifting from a system of production to a system of engendering, we are going to be able to multiply the sources of revolt against injustice and, consequently, to increase considerably the gamut of potential allies in the struggles to come for the Terrestrial” (88). I find myself wondering, though, whether humans would accept those other sources of revolt—or whether they would just ignore them.

But Latour has anticipated my question. If it were only a philosophical decision, he states, the shift from a system of production to a system of engendering would have no strength: “Before the New Climatic Regime, it seemed . . . to be implausible, convoluted, apocalyptic” (88). But now, we will benefit “from help offered by unleashed agents that oblige us to revisit the definition of what it means to be a human, a territory, a politics, a civilization” (88-89). Our current situation is a contradiction between a system of production and a system of engendering: “It is not simply a matter of economics but rather of civilization itself” (89). Still, though, will farmers or politicians or bureaucrats listen to the bees dying because of neonicotinoids? Or will they continue to close their ears and endanger the food plants we rely upon? Neonicotinoids boost, temporarily, the GDP; short-term thinking triumphs over the long view. What Latour is saying makes sense, but how can we get out from under the tyranny of GDP, of economics, of growth?

“What has been the object from the beginning of this essay can now be named: the Terrestrial is not yet an institution, but it is an actor whose role is clearly different from the political role attributed to ‘nature’ by the Moderns,” Latour writes. “The new conflicts do not replace the old ones; they sharpen them, deploy them differently, and above all they finally make them identifiable. Fighting to join one or another utopia, the Global or the Local, does not have the same clarifying effects as fighting to land on Earth!” (89). Latour also suggests that the word “ecology” should be retired in favour of the word “political,” since “[t]here are only questions of dwelling places inhabited with or defended against other terrestrials that share the same stakes” (90). 

We are in a war, but it is “a conflict between modern humans who believe they are alone in the Holocene, in flight toward the Global or in exodus toward the Local, and the terrestrials who know they are in the Anthropocene and who seek to cohabit with other terrestrials under the authority of a power that as yet lacks any political institution” (90). And that way, “at once civic and oral, divides each of us from within” (90). So my questions about GDP and neonicotinoids are determined by the war against Modernists, against those “who believe they are alone in the Holocene.” 

Or is that all my questions amount to? “The Achilles’ heel of any text that purports to channel political affects toward new stakes is that the reader can justifiably ask, at the end: ‘All that is well and good. The hypothesis may be attractive, though it still waits to be proved, but what are we to do with it, practically speaking, and what does it change for me?’” (90). What should we then do? “The goal of this essay is certainly not to disappoint, but one cannot ask it to go faster than the history that is under way: the Terrestrial is known by all . . . and, at the same time, the New Climatic Regime has no institutional embodiment,” Latour writes. “It is in this in-between position, in this phony war, that we find ourselves, at once mobilized toward the front and demobilized toward the rear” (91). The situation is even more uncertain, because “the Terrestrial is at once empty and populated” (91). And “the third attractor doesn’t look very attractive. It requires too much care, too much attention, too much time, too much diplomacy” (91). The Global still seems shinier; it arouses more enthusiasm regarding our emancipation (91). “Only it does not exist,” Latour contends. “It is the Local that reassures, that calms, that offers an identity. But it does not exist either” (91-92). Still, Latour believes that the questions he began the essay with can now be answered: “How can the feeling of being protected be provided without an immediate return to identity and the defense of borders?” (92). The answer is: “By two complementary movements that modernization has made contradictory: attaching oneself to the soil on the one hand, becoming attached to the world on the other” (92). “The attractor designated as Terrestrial . . . brings together the opposing figures of the soil and the world,” he continues. “A soil that has nothing to do with the Local and a world that resembles neither globalization-minus nor a planetary vision” (92).

“From the soil,” Latour continues, the Terrestrial “inherits materiality, heterogeneity, thickness, dust, humus, the succession of layers, strata, the attentive care that it requires. Everything that cannot be seen from Sirius. Just the opposite of a plot of ground that a development or real estate project has just grabbed. The ground, the soil, in this sense, cannot be appropriated” (92). We belong to the Terrestrial; it belongs to no one. The Terrestrial also inherits from globalization-plus “the recording of forms of existence that forbid us to limit ourselves to a single location, preclude keeping ourselves inside whatever boundaries there may be” (92). “The soil allows us to attach ourselves,” he continues; “the world allows detachment. Attachment allows us to get away from the illusion of a Great Outside; detachment allows us to escape the illusion of borders. Such is the balancing act to be refined” (93).

“What brings us closer to the solution, fortunately, is one of the properties of this new agent of history proper to the New Climatic Regime”:

It makes no sense to force the beings animating the struggling territories that constitute the Terrestrial back inside national, regional, ethnic, or identitary boundaries; nor does it make sense to try to withdraw from these territorial struggles so as to “move to the global level” and grasp the Earth “as a whole.” The subversion of scales and of temporal and spatial frontiers defines the Terrestrial. This power acts everywhere at once, but it is not unifying. It is political, yes; but it is not statist. It is, literally, atmospheric. (93)

The Terrestrial reorganizes politics in a practical way: “Each of the beings that participate in the composition of a dwelling place has its own way of identifying what is local and what is global, and of defining its entanglements with others” (93). Different things are spatialized differently: CO2, aquifers, and antibiotics are not spatialized the same way as transit systems, bird flu, or terrorism (93). We need to understand this point.

Still, “[t]he Global and the Local alike afford us an inadequate purchase on the Terrestrial, which explains the current hopelessness: what can be done about problems at once so large and so small?” (94). Well, first, “generate alternative descriptions” by thinking about “the stuff that makes us the Earth for us” (94). “Any politics that failed to propose redescribing the dwelling places that have become invisible would be dishonest,” he states. “We cannot allow ourselves to skip the stage of description. No political lie is more brazen than proposing a program” (94). We must investigate, from the bottom up, our dwelling places, defining dwelling place as “that on which a terrestrial depends for its survival, while asking what other terrestrials also depend on it?” (95).  That territory will not likely “coincide with a classic legal, spatial, administrative, or geographic entity,” Latour suggests. “On the contrary, the configurations will traverse all scales of space and time” (95). This inventorying is difficult, particularly in a system of engendering, “because the agents, the animate beings, the actors that compose it all have their own trajectories and interests” (95). When we ask questions about the beings we depend on, that depend on us, that live with us, “we notice our own ignorance”: “Every time one begins such an investigation, one is surprised by the abstract nature of the responses. And yet questions about engendering turn up everywhere, along with those of gender, race, education, food, jobs, technological innovations, religion, or leisure” (96). In asking those questions, we discover the causes and effects of our own subjections, which have been hidden from us by globalization-minus (96).

“The question is whether the emergence and description of the Terrestrial attractor can give meaning and direction to political action—forestalling the catastrophe of a headlong flight toward the Local along with the undoing of what has been called the world order,” Latour writes. “For there to be a world order, there first needs to be a world made more or less shareable by this attempt to take stock” (98). Still, in 2018, as Latour is writing, “those who are somewhat sensitive to the situation” are asking themselves, “with unconcealed anguish,” whether “it will be possible to avert another August 1914, another suicide—this time worldwide and no longer just European—of nations, under which such a deep depression has been dug that they will all plunge headlong into it—with enthusiasm and delight” (99). And this time, the Americans won’t help (99).

Latour ends by taking stock of himself: who he is, his attachments, particularly his attachment to Europe, a place whose history of imperialism has delivered it from any sense of innocence, “from the idea that one could either make a new and different history by breaking with the past, or escape from history once and for all” (102). (The unspoken comparison is clearly to the United States.) He wonders how Europe can get out of globalization-minus (104), what knits it together (104-05), what it shall do now that the protection of the United States has been withdrawn (105). Latour is offering this exploration as an example of the kind of inventory he is proposing, and when he concludes, he writes: “Now, it’s your turn to present yourself, to tell us a little about where you would like to land and with whom you agree to share a dwelling place” (106). Surprisingly, that’s what my current project seeks to do.

What I take from Latour’s book—after this first, quick reading—is what he appears to be doing with affect theory and object-oriented ontology (two things I need to learn more about). I like the notion of the Terrestrial as a way of tying humans to their surroundings; it’s obvious—to me if not to others—that we depend on those surroundings, and that we (along with most of the creatures with which we share the Critical Zone) will die if we carry on the way we are going. We’re not separate from what we’ve been calling “nature”; we’re entangled in it, and we need it to survive. Still, I’m not sure how the notion of taking an inventory of our dwelling place will do much. Perhaps I’ve missed something important, but I still feel powerless. Perhaps I would feel differently if I tried to take an inventory of my dwelling place? It’s possible. I guess I’ll have to find out. But while I think Latour’s analysis makes a lot of sense, I’m not sure it necessarily opens a pathway to action, as he expects it to do.

Work Cited

Latour, Bruno. Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime, translated by Catherine Porter, Polity, 2018.