18. Ann de Forest, editor, Ways of Walking

I was on a Zoom call a couple of weeks ago, learning more about a walking workshop I’ll be part of in early May. I recognized the name of one of the other participants: Ann de Forest. Don’t I have a book by her? I asked myself. When the call ended, I went looking. Yes, there it was: Ways of Walking. It’s been a while since I read something about walking. Why not give Ways of Walking a try?

What’s a good metaphor to describe the collection of personal essays? A buffet, a smorgasbord, a feast? (It’s getting close to supper time–can you tell?) The 26 authors included show how moving through the world on foot is connected to so many other aspects of experience, individual and collective and both together: grief, curiosity, memory, connection, anger, caretaking, assault. Ever asked yourself what it might be like to walk through Philadelphia–many but not all of the essays here describe walking in that city, the home of its editor–if you’re African American? Wonder what it’s like to walk in places that have been colonized? Want to know about walking and disability, or walking and illness, or walking and injury? As a woman, if that’s not how you identify? Thinking about walking and pilgrimage? All of that, and more, is included here. The writers aren’t shy about giving credit to their literary forebears, either. Thoreau makes multiple appearances, as does Virginia Woolf; the Little Prince shows up, as does Hart Crane, Yi-Fu Tuan, Gertrude Stein, and Aphra Behn. Ways of Walking is a rich collection of perspectives and references.

Some of the thinking here caught me unawares. For instance, Justin Coffin, in the final essay suggests that there are “two kinds of great journeys: we are either Theseus escaping the labyrinth or Odysseus trying to get home.” I want to steal that idea. David Hallock Saunders remembers walking games his father played with him in Los Angeles when he was a boy, games that recall the playful way that the Situationists and, more recently, psychogeographers like Phil Smith navigate the city. Ann de Forest’s essay about walking in Los Angeles encourages me to rethink what I imagine that city to be like. Ruth Knafo Setton, remembering walking with her late father, suggests that “[w]alking is an act of gratitude for our ability to perceive, to move with our bodies, and to see and absorb with our senses.” Walking gives Lena Popkin “two conflicting, almost clashing, emotions”: as a woman and a survivor of sexual assault (more and more it seems those two groups of people are one and the same, a Venn Diagram that overlaps completely), she feels “both apprehensive and calm, often in the same walk and sometimes at the same time.” Once again, I was reminded of how limited the notion of a text being “relatable” is. We ought to read to understand difference, not similarity–to learn something new, even if that’s difficult.

My favourite essay in this collection, I think, is Sharon White’s “Walking (Variations on Thoreau).” It’s a beautifully written braided essay, and I’m a sucker for beautifully written braided essays. Half of the time I wasn’t sure what was going on in White’s essay, and it didn’t matter:

In the pine forests it’s not a handicap to be alone. A group of fishermen give me a map. A ranger says I should have had an ice ax, but I don’t. I take a day or so to reach the ridge and then it’s splendor wherever I look. The chime of the wind crashing against my ears. In the morning I can’t see, my eyes pinned shut by bees. My first-aid kit is useless. But I can make it down to the series of clear sandy streams emptying into pools where I strip off my clothes and soak my bites in the water.

Had I not been on that Zoom call, had I not recognized de Forest’s name, this book would’ve stayed on its shelf, and I would’ve missed reading that paragraph. You just can’t predict what wonderful surprises are waiting for you.

25. Robert MacFarlane, Is a River Alive?

I’ll admit it: I’m a fan of Robert Macfarlane’s writing. I haven’t read all of his work, but I loved The Old Ways: A Journey on Foot, The Wild Places, and Landmarks. I intend to read Underland this summer. Maybe I should’ve turned to that book before tackling his latest, Is a River Alive?, but all the attention it’s getting—the reviews and interviews—encouraged me to get a copy and start reading. I’m glad I did.

Is a River Alive? reflects on the recent shift in jurisprudence which began in New Zealand in 2017, when the Whanganui River was declared “a spiritual and physical entity” possessing a “lifeforce.” Alive, in other words. That idea had been circulating since Christopher Stone’s 1972 essay “Should Trees Have Standing?” It sounded radical 53 years ago, and to some it still does, but corporations are considered to be legal persons, and most of those who strain to understand the idea of ecosystems as living things have little trouble with that idea. Macfarlane explores the concept through three rivers, or perhaps river systems: Los Cedros in Ecuador, threatened by mining projects that would destroy the cloud forest that is its source; the Kosasthalaiyar, Cooum, and Adyar Rivers in Chennai, India, which are dying because of industrial pollution and the draining of their wetlands; and the Mutehekau Shipu or Magpie River in Quebec, which may be drowned by a hydroelectric project that would see several massive dams constructed. Los Cedros and Mutehekau Shipu have been declared by law to be living creatures; the fact that the three rivers in Chennai are dying suggests that they have the potential to be alive. The book also considers the chalk springs near Macfarlane’s home in Cambridge, England, which nearly died during a drought several years ago.

I like the way that Macfarlane struggles at times to accept ideas that his rational mind is troubled by. Not everyone has so much difficulty. His son, Will, asks him what the title of his book will be. Is a River Alive?, Macfarlane responds. “Well, duh, that’s going to be a short book then, Dad,” the boy says, “because the answer is yes!”

I consider related questions about our kinship with the world around us in my forthcoming book, Walking the Bypass: Notes On Place From the Side of the Road, but I don’t have as much difficulty, partly because the fact that humans share 40 to 60 percent of the proteins in their DNA with bananas tells me that we’re made up of the same stuff as the living creatures around us. As Mike Francis, a PhD student in bioinformatics at the University of Georgia told Alia Hoyt, “This is because all life that exists on earth has evolved from a single cell that originated about 1.6 billion years ago,” he says. “In a sense, we are all relatives!” Perhaps I found it a little easier, too, because trees and birds are obviously alive, whereas it could be argued that rivers are inanimate. Spoiler alert: Macfarlane finds his way to seeing the animacy of rivers. That’s not much of a surprise, though: it’s pretty obvious from the outset that’s where he’ll end up.

Macfarlane’s writing is gorgeous. I was amazed by the book’s introduction, which presents a biography of the chalk spring in Cambridge since its birth after the last ice age. The last chapter, which imitates the turbulent flow of Mutehekau Shipu through long, flowing sentences, is pretty great, too. The book makes its readers think, too, about the destruction our extractive civilization wreaks on the world we live in, the foolishness of considering hydroelectricity a form of “clean” energy, and the grotesque unsustainability of the kind of resource projects our federal government intends to fast track. Maybe that’s all obvious, but it needs to be said, repeatedly.

Macfarlane sometimes gets criticized for the way his work focuses on men. The Old Ways, for instance, almost entirely ignores women who write about walking, as Phil Smith points out. That might be less of an issue here; two of this book’s main characters, mycologist Giuliana Furci and poet Rita Mestokosho, are women. Still, most of the people here are men, and some will see the book as a brofest. I’m not as bothered by that, because we all have blindnesses, but I still see it.

Still, this is a wonderful book. I’m glad I read it, and I’m looking forward to reading Underland.

Helen Billinghurst and Phil Smith (writing as Crab and Bee), The Pattern: A Fictioning

I’ve been meaning to read this book since it appeared two years ago. One sign of that desire is the fact that I’ve ended up with two copies (e-mail me your address if you’d like the spare). Nevertheless, what with school and work I haven’t found the opportunity—until now, when I find myself in a strange lull between drafting and revising, waiting for feedback. So here I go. My reading will focus on the accounts of the walks Billinghurst and Smith made, along with the manifestoes and theoretical ruminations the text contains, and I’m going to skip over the games they propose for humans in the landscape; others might do the reverse, playing those games and ignoring the walks. I’m also going to skim through the poems and definitions of mythological figures, which some readers might wish to make their focus. To each their own. There’s a lot going on in this book, and different readers will want to take different things from it.

The Pattern begins with a page entitled “Ways To Read This Book,” where the text is described as “a handbook for walking, art making and using a map that has been left for us in the landscape” (v). It is, Billinghurst and Smith continue, an “invitation to make a playful pilgrimage that is attentive to both new and ancient special places, webbed together around a tattoo that is in the earth and in the mind” (v). Readers are invited to use the book the way they want to, by solving its mystery, borrowing tactics from it, or drilling it for ideas. See? I can, on this reading, make the walks the centre of my attention if I want to do that. And, while The Pattern “describes a model for art making,” that was not its authors’ intention: “Instead, the model emerged from our ‘hyper-sensitized’ walking in marginal and disregarded spaces and it has become a kind of ‘web walking’” (v). The model it proposes developed through poetry readings and performances, by inviting people to take the authors on walks, in workshops and ann art exhibition. “The Pattern is then the story of the places we found as we spun those threads wider,” they write (v). They also note that the book is “a fictioning” in which they “adopted narratives and characters to find things out” (v). The introduction ends with an invitation for readers to join their threads to the book’s web.

The Pattern is a collection of fragments, written by Billinghurst and Smith under multiple pseudonyms: Smoke and Mirrors, Cloak and Daggers, Crab and Bee. Using pseudonyms is one of the consistent elements of Smith’s mythogeography practice. Part One, “The Edges,” begins with an epigraph: “It is when we do not ‘know our place’ that we best discover who we are not and who we are to become” (1). The text begins with a walk in a labyrinth in the Scilly Isles; the idea of the labyrinth quickly becomes a motif, as the authors consider the “labyrinthine geography” of their city, Plymouth, in the context of Greek myths involving labyrinths (1). “Winding and unwinding became part of our methodology of enchantment,” they write, describing how that process became part of their art practice (1). 

After announcing this theme, the text turns to another walk, made with Tony Whitehead (with whom Smith and John Schott wrote the 2019 book Guidebook for an Armchair Pilgrimage), in Southway, a suburb in northwest Plymouth. “We wanted to test for a labyrinth in the least mythical of circumstances,” Billinghurst and Smith write (2). In the rain, they discover a ruined Tudor farmhouse among trees, a quarry, a wasteland “where acres of woodland had been felled and roots dug up and piled high like bodies on a battlefield” and where “old cars rotted into ferns” (3). On the other side of a stream, the trio goes “on a deeper quest, begun not by imitating ancient or esoteric rituals, but turning off an anonymous residential street to follow a concrete path” (3). That night, Billinghurst wrote a poem about the walk that surprised and frightened her, as if it had written itself. “[T]his was the first time, for us together, that the atmospheres or forces or whatever they are showed us that they had as much agency as we did and that, whatever we thought about the matter, they might have their own ideas about what needed to happen” (4).

The next section of the text thinks about a game the authors play, in which they imagine themselves to be wolves. That game seems to be central to their practice because of its sensuality and “raw commonality” (5). “Hence our willingness to abandon principles, to never say never, in order to undo closures and open up ways of cornering and sidestepping,” they write. “At a cost we blazed trails, tying red threads to the imagined hunting tracks of missing wolves. Whatever the cost, the wolves must return” (5). That description shifts to British political and intellectual history, particularly “the new royal materialism of Isaac Newton and his successors,” which “could not cope with things that can only be known by their consequences” (5). Red, the colour of the monarchy, persists in mail boxes, telephone booths, buses. For Billinghurst and Smith, those objects, especially mail boxes, “are red magical objects; wayside shrines to connectivity” that are not unlike holy wells, since “they are the visible springheads of invisible currents of penned paper, postcards, packages and parcels” (7). Around the fringes of Plymouth, they took over a variety of holes and boxes “as an alternative postal network; as a way of flagging up the magic of the postal system we already have” (7). 

That anecdote leads to a story about a mail coach near Plymouth being attacked by a lion in 1816. Where the lion would have come from is not clear. That story leads to an account of a walk about imagined or remembered predators—wolves again, this time—in which a company named Wolf Minerals is mining wolfram for light bulbs. The walk begins in a junkyard, continues through a wooded valley filled with abandoned houses, where they hang red threads (their motif, the labyrinth) around objects as a performance. Then they arrive at the huge open-pit mine, where they perform rites for the missing (extirpated) wolves. They come to consider those rites a pact with the absent wolves. They make the same walk the next day, this time with a Brazilian theatre performer and PhD student, performing similar rites, mending the woodland, which has been “defiled by yellow and black signs,” with red thread (12).

“The terrible irony of the destruction by tungsten mining of so much terrain at Plymouth’s Drakelands and Merdon by Wolf Minerals,” the authors explain, “is that this wounded land is part of the moor where some of the last wild wolves in England were killed. This irony is revealing; for humans can only subdue the wolf by destroying their shared world” (13). Destroying such essential predators “is catastrophic for the planet” (13). However, by “re-loving the wolves, by respecting and re-sharing our roles as top predator with them, in a landscape managed by predators rather than gamekeepers and the managers of ‘shoots,’ more general reparations and re-wilding can begin” (13).

Another walk on a different moor, this one marked by apparently abandoned clay pits, follows. They discover various colourful objects and a sheep’s skeleton, which they collect, running red and white thread through the vertebrae and swinging the bones beetween them. “We leave the sheep bones and the threads strung on the barbed wire fence; a warning to the mining corporation about the consequences of their depredations,” they write (16). They walk until they can see the tungsten mine in the distance: “The landscape has been royally trashed here” (16). They discover a hole, covered by a board, in which a green frog is sitting. “We have opened the book of the hill,” they write (17). They call their game with the thread and the bones “Crow” and describe it as a “‘horizontal maypole’” (21). During their walks on the Scillies, they looked for the village of Maypole but almost missed it—but for their game with the bones and thread, which (they realized) had taken place on the village green in “a kind of bone-dowsing” (21). That game leads to another: writing poems that curse the powerful.

Next, Billinghurst and Smith describe the book’s cast of characters, its “bestiary,” taken from various sources, which represent earth gods, “Chthonics,” “the gods-we-need, the snakes and worms that are our guides to the forest-beneath-the-forest, the dark place of rhizomes and fungi and white strings where chemical messages are shared from bushes to trees and from trees to bushes; the cat’s cradle of the underground” (25). Another labyrinth, then, defined by gravity, “the attraction of all things for all things” (25). 

The next page presents a description of a barrier that is actually a doorway, installed by locals to protect meadows from being quarried. That gate-like barrier becomes a symbol: “Opening the gate one way, things can come through the other way” (27). Those things are unpredictable, their process open-ended. No one knows in what form they might return. More walks follow: this stime to forts that ring Plymouth, where “‘bomb proof’ earth coverings were now mutating into novel ecologies,” including mature trees and shrubs in which birds nest (30). “Vaulted stone military structures were starting to look like the temples of oracles,” they write, providing a tangible example of unpredictable, open-ended processes (30). During another walk at Efford Fort, a doorway, “a chance arrangement of three slim tree trunks that framed the sun,” led to a strange experience, a shift in vision, for Billinghurst (31). They wondered if it was a sign that something terrible had taken place there, or whether they were imposing that interpretation on the place: “Was there the residue of something bad at Efford, or some residue in us?” (32). During a performance at another fort—this one “a melancholy heritage site” (33)—they meet a local worthy they dub the “Woodland Dame,” who is impervious to the sadness they sense in that place. “Strange things happen, strange feelings take over” (34), they continue, including more poems, illness, surprises happening on walks through Plymouth’s suburbs. They walk through a forest joined by a long thread. They become attuned to the world under the ground—trees, fungi, microbes—“as much as the surfaces of places” (37). 

Next, the book tells the story of Alfred Watkins, who came up with the idea of ley lines, “traces of ancient trackways most of which had now disappeared,” always straight (38). Smith and Billingshurst believe in the truth of this theory, because of the number of “‘privileged points” those lines connect (39). Ley lines are linked to Ufology, the failure of which as an explanatory paradigm, they write, “is a mark of the inadequacy of a wider culture, both in its mainstream and alternative forms, that is still trying to measure its quantum social sstructures and phenomena with a Newtonian clockwork model” (40). I’m not sure about that. Ley lines are similar to the idea of “Thin Places,” where the veil between this world and another frays (40). “In a world of spectacle, in which everything is available through its appearance, the enigma of these ancient sites is a disruption of our smooth consumption of apparent meaning,” the authors contend. “Instead, the abject things of pseudo-research and pseudo-science suggest ways of unpicking the spectacle of self-evident significance” (40). I can’t follow Billinghurst and Smith in this argument, but as their introduction suggests, that doesn’t matter; I’ve been encouraged to take what I like from this book, and that’s what I’ll do. Indeed, the references to “scrying” in this book confused me until I gave in and looked up that word; I’m not likely to engage in oracular predictions using bodies of water any time soon, but if Billinghurst and Smith want to engage in such serious play (or playful seriousness), that’s fine.

One of those games (or performances) involves probe heads, bolts with ribbons tied to them. “By throwing a probe head onto the path ahead of you, you cause yourself to stop and let the ripples wash back, upsetting what you thought was your purpose for going on, your reason for being there in the first place, even what you thought you were doing when you threw the probe head in the first place,” they write (43). “Probe heads hurl sideways the image an artist has of their work and of the plans they have for it; instead, the work itself steps forward, quite different from what the artist thought it was,” they continue (43). The probe head “disrupts assumptions about what we really want, it can reveal desires that have no ‘what,’ it may cut up lines-of-desire and shuffle the expected order of events” (43). The authors contend that when a probe head lands, “time stops moving in just one direction towards one target”; instead, “all parts become probabilities,” and “a field unfolds for re-making wholly new understandings of what place, desire and art can be” (44).

Their walks became silent, so that they could attend to the voices of places that had started to talk back; they stopped in friendly pubs; they thought of themselves as walking fascia; they considered the tangle of birdsong around them. All of this, it seems, is part of their web walking practice: “We stretch a thread between different places and ideas. Soon it is not a single line, but a mesh or tangle of threads that wind themselves around” (46). Those tangled threads vibrate “as unseen things in unseen places give them a tug” (46). I think the webs are both literal (note the games they play with thread) but, more importantly, metaphorical. For instance, they think about hollow places underground: tunnels, chambers, caverns, nests of ants, holes in the limestone beneath their feet—phenomena that are both real and symbolic. “All the time we felt intimations of an underground all around, of the rush of subterranean rivers, of a hiddle fluid-matrix and an airy affordance in solid rock, which left its rhythms in the surfaces on which we trod,” they state (47).

But the authors are also interested in what’s above ground, too. One odd site, a stone proscenium in the garden of a “National Trust stately home,” a place they had never liked, is discovered to be the centre of “the geometry of strangulation” driven by that house, which is “an alibi, a distraction, a decoy, an excuse to destroy everything about it” (49). The lesson: “Trust your feelings about places” (49).

Next comes an account of a walk with two scientists who study microplastics; their presence sensitizes the authors to the amount of plastic litter everywhere, most of which bears the logos of transnational corporations. They walk from one water-treatment plant to another, learning about the way that sewage sludge (including microplastics) is spread on agricultural land as fertilizer. Hulks of ships line the sea front. Billinghurst recites a poem about plastic. “Has our pollution triggered the wild’s own re-wilding of itself?” they ask (52). 

Another walk, another suburb on the edge of Plymouth. A creek, a barbed-wire fence, a power pylon. They lie on the edge of the water, sinking into the “beach” beside it (53). “We are falling through roots, loam, pebbles, cold soils, spores, damp fungal layers, a mesh of plant-pedicles, hidden rivulets, latent vapours, compost, the waste of centuries, worms, rhizomes, tubers, plastic bags, beds of grit and soot,” they write (54). They are, in their imaginations, becoming one with the land, in all of its damaged splendour. 

The pair set out “to find a remote example of an ark on Tamerton Creek,” but discover that it is just another “rusting hulk” (55). “There will be no biblical floating away from climate emergency and species extinction,” they tell us. “The fuels don’t work, the invasion of plastic is at the cellular level. No ark can escape either problem. Instead of floating off, our eco-sensual sinking-in is the better, only, way to go. Not up or away, but down and within” (56). The apocalyptic vision here doesn’t surprise me; in the face of runaway ecological catastrophe, hope becomes irrational. By imagining their bodies “stepping forward to fall apart,” by imaging their own “eco-sensual composting,” they are imagining their deaths (56). And perhaps the deaths of all of us.

The next walk the book relates took place in one of Cardiff’s eastern suburbs, where they tied red thread onto twigs and discovered plastic garbage floating in what a sign described as “a ‘nature pond’” (61). An example of “short-termism”: “Little gestures, concessions to wildlife, abandoned and forgotten as soon as installed” (61). Such “short-termism” includes abandoned public art next to the remains of a fire, and “the rotting wooden posts of an other processional route over a subterranean sewage swamp linking two housing estates” (62). The human inhabitants of these estates are confused and confusing, odd. The following day, on another walk, they realize that Cardiff Bay has become “a captive lake, a fake sea,” and they use clay “to fashion models for new sensory organs that we might use to re-access the treasure and the treasured in this reconstructed space” (63). What is present is interesting to Billinghurst and Smith, but I think their hearts are in these wild, utopian gestures, these artistic investigations of impossibility. The mud of Cardiff Bay becomes “a metaphor for the way of working that we adopted during the Labyrinth project; a spinning out and holding up of actions between artists and artforms” (65).

The authors ask why they would risk “being dismissed out of hand” by “talking about myths and legends all the time” (81). I’m not surprised by that interest; after all, Smith’s version of psychogeography is called “mythogeography.” In any case, they see evidence of mythical stories everywhere: in advertising and corporate logos, for instance. “In other words, myths and their symbols are so much of a part of the hypermodern world that we seem largely desensitized to them,” they suggest (81). Only Greek myths, though; the foundational stories of other cultures get little attention. In any case, “we chose our own myths and characters and symbols,” they continue, “in order to re-sensitize ourselves to what is going on around us” (81). 

Threads, they suggest, are “‘lines of flight’” to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, but they allow for travel in both directions, enabling an increase or decrease in intensity (82). “The thread is the first step to web-walking; walking connected to multitudes of others,” they continue (82). The web is one pattern that emerged in their walking project. Another was “the green ‘poison ponds,’ glowing with algae and pond weed,” the mud of Cardiff Bay and into which the hulks of Plymouth were rotting—the apparently abandoned, polluted water (83). “These are all variations of a green lake of desirousness without the thread of desire,” they write. “An id machine generator of desires without objects, a green, green id machine; pure subject and presocialised” (84). Desire, they continue, “does not always want or need an object,” and the “most viable human id machines are fecund places of desire without obsession or jealousy” (84).

As a performance, they told the story of the mythical Albina, founder of Albion, on Teats Hill to anyone who passed by. Some listened; others told their own mythic tales; children made a sculpture of Albina from rock and seaweed. “A kind of model had been at work in us; to find the myth of a place, and begin from there . . . letting the story do most of the work, make most of the decisions, draw most of the attention,” they write. “So: find your place, uncover its story, gather the materials and invite everyone else to make the body” (88). For them, the Teats Hill project was a success, a way to put a story into a community. They used found materials—rocks, seaweed, rusted rivets and smoothed glass fragments—to tell that story. “All around the site we planted evidence of red lines of desire, of blood flow, red hunting lines and then white lines suggesting other bonier, milkier and more skeletal connections,” they recall (91). “Without forcing anything on anybody, we were able to place a diverse story of the origins of Albion (England) into a community that is always being told that nothing important or good ever happens there, and who often felt as if that were the truth,” they continue (91). The five days on that beach changed the myth and the performers, pushing them to rethink their understanding of shape-shifting, from something liquid to something more geological and “unharmonic” (91).

Next is another walk along “an abject way out of the city, under the Expressway” (91). They saw a broken toby jug, a man who resembled the figure of John Barleycorn, and twenty deer. Then they discover the corpse of a deer somehow fastened to a metal fence surrounding an industrial estate: “A deer/fence hybrid” (92).

The authors find themselves working at night, “almost physically allergic to solar things,” which they interpret through alchemy as part of a processof transformation (93). “In our case it was the precipitation out of our ‘work’ of what was hidden, even to us as we were making it,” they write (94). They are also working together, rather than separately, counter to the contemporary “ideology of separation . . . that renders communities and societies incapable of responding to those things that challenge or invite them collectively” (94). “The practice of webbing subjectivities tells a different story,” they argue. “Working intensely and closely with others, with openness and willingness to explore and talk in detail (often accompanied by coincidences and happy accidents) can work and talk new subjectivities into being” (94-95). The “Plymouth Labyrinth” project is an example of this: even though it was “driven by invitations to be subjective, intuitive, dream-based, eccentric,” “its processes were always convivial, and at times the art making was collective and ensemble” (95). “Such processes do not reduce a subjectivity, but connect its eccentricities to those of others, webbing and weaving feelings and shared associations and ideas that reach a critical mass—ecologies of subjectivity—as a haecceity” (95). I’ve never had that experience, partly because I’ve never encountered a working partner with whom I could undertake such a project, and my most recent work was of necessity solo (the pandemic, the difficulty of the walking). In any case, Billinghurst and Smith contend that working together in this way causes the relationships between people to “slip into the magical mode,” to bring in mythical creatures and the natural world (95). “What a sociologist might see as a problem—the idea that amoral forces can produce haecceities indifferent to social factors—is the idea here,” and the practitioners are freed from the restrictions “of individuality and individualism” (95).

Next is a description of the Plymouth Labyrinth art exhibition: drawings connected with red thread, paintings that “are the closest we come to alchemy” (97). The poems included in the show are like the paintings, containing “gaps across which their sense must leap” (98). That description ends the book’s first part.

Part Two, “The Pilgrimages,” begins with the authors’ attraction “to a certain kind of shaping in the ground,” not unlike amphitheatres, although not connected to human performance (103). Those landforms—I think they are natural, rather than the work of humans—may have functioned as “ritual landscapes,” as places to see the sky (103). They found such a place near the Icknield Way, and they lay down in it. This event, it seems happened on one of their pilgrimages, during which they tried to avoid “heritage paths, with official signs,” and to follow other routes instead (103). Their walk on the Scilly Isles was another such pilgrimage, during which they found another natural amphitheatre, the kind of site that makes “a space for Erewhon”: “A time out of time, a place out of space” (104). While they didn’t make that space, they did activate it by “walking first with a red thread for life and desire,” asking their fellow walkers “to feel the circulation of the blood in their bodies,” and then adding “a white thread for bone and death, asking the walkers to feel their skeletons holding them together” (104). “Opening the gate to the Erewhon on St. Mary’s was the first time we had worked to open these things up for others; first heating things up for them, then cooling them down” (104). On another group walk, they asked their walking companions “to concentrate on their own beating hearts and circulatory systems as they carry a red wollen thread for vitality; and then to focus on their skeletons as they carry a white woolen thread for change” (107). “The participants walk in single file between the two lengths of thread, between the two colours, between the two ideas,” they state (107). 

Next, the authors describe “body dowsing,” trying to find a lost holy well by feeling the pull of the water with their bodies (108). They were, they say, successful. “Imaginations, intimations and intuitions are powerful things,” they writes, “but sometimes the sensory organ of the whole body trumps them all” (109). I’m not sure if that well is/was on the Scilly Isles, but they continue with a story about walking on the beach at the Old Town there and thinking about Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who is buried nearby, and recent British history, which suggests, to them, the looming threat of authoritarianism. 

Next is a text by an alias, Cloak & Daggers, that explains “why web walkers skulk” (115). It is a how-to-skulk manual, a how-to-web-walk treatise: not just how to do it, but also why. It presents a combination of theory and practice. There is a shift here from a concern with the spectacle to one with “the assemblage,” which can (perhaps) be resisted by skulking, by a “dissidence-of-one that can preserve and nourish an inner self; an inner working that the dissident-of-one refrains from sharing either publicly or intimately, avoiding even the most sensitive and sympathetic arms of the assemblage, without apparently doing anything to protect themselves” (116). Such skulking ought to take place “in ‘unimportant’ places,” where it’s typically assumed that nothing important ever happens (116). Skulking isn’t a game, but rather it is “a down-to-earth way to live as human beings, resisting a twisted human society in which some humans exploit other humans and exterminate the unhuman. It is a way to commit tiny treasons while keeping ourselves safe” (116). It is not a withdrawal from the world, but a plunging into its ignored edges, and despite the need for working collectively which they previously argued for, skulking involves a refusal to share, a necessary being apart from others, even if a small group of friends skulks together. 

Billinghurst and Smith advise their readers to put together their own “pantheons, lexicons and bestiaries: stories, experiences, local legends, feelings, intuitions, superstitions, mental maps, insider knowledge,” and cherished nursery rhymes (119). That is world building, practiced by the “pseudo-science and wishful archaeology” of (for instance) the author of the ley lines theory, who was one of the “artists and poets of world-building arts” (119). Anyone motivated by such “non-systems” can “break the bad spell of capitalism” (119). How that happens, though, isn’t quite clear. I suppose the book itself is presenting a belief in “non-systems” as a form of resistance. Art and intuition are linked forms of resistance. “These are sensitive signals passed up and down the threads; it is how the spider, sitting on one thread, knows where you are on the web,” they continue (121).

“Walking for ‘Plymouth Labyrinth,’ it was plain for us to see that despite all the city’s concrete culverts and river-diversions, drained marshes, dried river beds in parks in the centre of the city, water-management and the profusion of manhole covers and balancing ponds on the estates, the streams were still powers in the city,” Billinghurst and Smith write (126). They came to think of the city as an archipelago rather than a continuous landmass, imagining it as a collection of islands, some quite isolated. “When we found sadness in the city, it was often associated with isolation,” they continue (127). Water became, for them, a symbol of connection and communication, often hidden or buried, but which could return. 

Now the setting shifts to Dorset, where the authors are “struggling to find a way in”: “even turning back to re-visit a portal to hell got us nowhere” (129). They get lost in the neglected landscape. Finally they find a stream and a path which appear “prehistoric” (129). The stream drops into a green ravine, while the path continues along the edge and into a village. “For a day and a half we had been walking this part of Dorset,” they write, “and in a moment we had ducked in and were deep in its underland” (130). 

That experience somehow, mysteriously, healed their tired, injured bodies. “One of the more intimate lessons learned from exploring the labyrinth by the deployments of playfulness and myth together, is that privileged points of pleasure can be redistributed across different parts of a hyper-sensitized walker,” they write. “Walking in the city in refrains rather than repetitions is not simply to put your body in the city, but to put the city (and other terrains) in your body, to flatten the points of your obsessions and roll yourself out as a sensitive diagram overlaying you-terrain and terrain-you” (131). The figures in their mythological bestiary played a part in this phenomenon, they argue, by “tripping strong emotional responses that jumble wariness, attraction, awe, longing and so on, into unsettling mixtures that enter the blood stream” (131-32). All of this is contrary to the ideology of husbandry, in which humans attempt to control the movement of nature.

Here Billinghurst and Smith return to Ufology, which “exemplifies the contemporary cultural failure to explain phenomena in their multiplicity” (133). The mistake that ufologists make is their attempt to make things into a system, to follow the example of “enlightenment science” (134). The study of “the sited uncanny” is another example; it fails because its practitioners sought “academic, empirical respectability for their speculative practices” by subjecting their work to the rules of positivism, by trying to become a conventional discipline (134): “However, a reader can web walk these literatures as something quite different: works of poem-analysis, phenomenological archaeology, adept intuition, pattern recognition, thoughtful wishing, and the imaginary narrating of forces that have never yet existed, or been proved to, but surely ought to. . .” (135). I’m not sure what the point of investigating such consciously confabulated forces might be—why bother with what “ought to” exist, when what actually does exist is more interesting, to my mind?

When they are out walking, Billinghurst and Smith witness the evidence of a war on the ecology, an ongoing destruction of flora and fauna. That leads to the idea of “Sexy Theory,” the “opposite of transcendent thought” which sits in the intellect: a way of thinking that is “thinking-through-the-body,” that happens through embodied acts (136). “Sexy Theory is not about valuing one idea over another,” they write. “It is a way of experiencing theories as erotic and interested in our bodies. For, just as the forest benefits from people attending to it, so theories gain by our attracting to them and we by their attraction to us” (136).

Next is a discussion of “useful randomness,” of data that refuses to be “sensibly, empirically or academically organized that gives us access to an earlier plasma, to a something prior to its self-organsation,” which “usefully rearranges . . . our more rational vocabularies and lexicons” (137). They see something similar in the oracles of the ancient world: a randomness that reveals something.

Back in Dorset, after a day of rain and writing, they climb Eggardon Hill. They find a small, grass-covered mound, and Smith lies down there. When he gets up, “the field was coloured like a lunar landscape,” which reminds him of an apocalyptic dream (139). That leads to a discussion of species coming together, of “[o]rgans without a stable organism” (140), which is followed by another manifesto on “Field Thinking”: “We are against the intellectual property borders and the sedentary thinking of the lecture hall” (141). “While our walking is geographical, we walk through physical space, there is a psychic aspect, a sub-set of the physical: we have all our diagrams of this aspect, but we suspect that they are all parts of a single seething diagram,” they write (141). Field thinking, they continue, is partly about “scaling up and down. Shifting ideas across different fields, volumes, genres and phases” (141). to Plymouth, and then take the train to Bristol, where Smith grew up. They follow the path of a buried river, which is marked by the “charred remains of fires” (145). They get lost again, disoriented, unsure if they will find their overnight accommodations. They notice almost no insects in some fields, “as if the chemical damage has been so severe, and perhaps ongoing, that the recovery of species, despite the return of habitat, has not been possible” (148). Finally they see moths and butterflies in abundance. They climb to the highest point in the Mendip Hills and eat bilberries. “We are moved by what is below and what is all around,” they write (150). “[W]e have a first inkling of how our web walking is changing from the hypersensitisation to detail and textures and fragments of narrative and lore, deepening and burrowing down in awareness of the vivacity of a dar forest below and the welling up from ‘privileged points,’” they write. “We had felt all along the threads of connectivities and lines of flight and desire, and then were buoyed up when those threads knotted and tangled and formed cat’s cradles and spider’s webs; and this is the same, but different” (151).

In Cheddar, they visit a museum dedicated to “Cheddar George,” a 9,000-year-old man, the oldest complete human skeleton ever found in Britain, and he becomes the patron saint of their pilgrimages. They also visit a healing pool at White Spring, a place without liturgy or dogma in which “the least ‘fixed’ thing of all” is the water (156). Later they drink from the Red Spring across the road, where “[t]he water tastes of iron and blood” (156). The twin springs are “a geological wonder,” so different and so close together (157). 

Next, they describe a pilgrimage to Cambridge. Their first stop is a nearby village, where Billinghurst grew up, near a place where nineteenth-century archaeologists discovered the bodies of nine giant men in a quarry. They walk a path Robert Macfarlane took on a journey he relates at the beginning of his book The Old Ways: A Journey on Foot. Beneath a field where people are playing rounders, they think, lie multiple chalk figures—based on the work of “archaeologist and psychic researcher T.C. Lethbridge,” one of the purveyors of disreputable knowledge they had discussed earlier (163). They walk back to Cambridge and drive on to Ashwell Springhead, another location “where holy space is public space, where holy space is common ground” (166). Weeks later, they discover that the spring was once a site of pilgrimage for the Romans, “who came to take the waters, to petition and make offerings to the water goddess Senuna” (170). 

They continue on to Arbury Banks, to the earthworks there, which they describe as “another unconvincing ‘hill fort’” (171). The site is behind a fence and there is no information about it. They stay in Dunstable, a depressed place, where they walk into town to find dinner. They recall searching for an artist’s grave in a cemetery in Cambridge, where they experience something they describe as time looping, a kind of glitch or slip that subverts time itself. That leads to a discussion of tantra, a “plateauing of that dying” in which life and death are in tension (177). They wonder if the lines they’ve been thinking about are actually the product of the stones, circles, and tombs. In Cambridge, they walk with no purpose to a forest called Nine Wells. “Our tattooed land, marked by architecture, accidental landscape and woozy stories is like a wonky gameboard,” they write. “Its grids yanked out of ‘true’ by the gravitational pulls of attractive characters and the tugs of amoral forces on its line and rungs” (179). They propose “a pilgrimage of the Pattern which eschews the trappings of aspirant-religions or ambitious systems of any kind, and assumes a more nomadic approach, going place by place, feeling by feeling, making things up as you go along,” letting the spaces guide the pilgrims “rather than what we believe of them” (179). In a motel filled with truckers, they spend the evening writing and drawing.

“Removing humans from the green environment creates a flood, accelerates an uninhibited rush to destruction”—destruction caused by corporations and other abstract entities, I’m assuming. “Human boulders in the flow create the possibilities for rapids, for the soaking up and variegation of the rush, turning energy into meanings and meaningful variations of velocity and volume,” they continue (183). They recall a climb in Ebbor Gorge, in Somerset, where they wondered if they would have the same fate as the schoolgirls in the film Picnic at Hanging Rock.

Now, they discuss the tentacular as a force that cannot be managed, “Tentacularity is never wholly explicit; there are always blind streams which emerge without expressing by quite what hollows they have arrived,” they write. Then they return to their pilgrimage with a visit to a cave near Royston, where they bought a guide to “the alchemical agencies at work in the Red and White Springs at Glastonbury (187). They consider the importance of those colours in their work. During their walks, “our red and white threads became like two serpentine routes, weaving around each other, each a slippery scaffolding for the other, while together raising the ghost of a third and invisible thread” (188). 

Another pilgrimage, this one to the Wandlebury Ring, the site of Lethbridge’s excavation and “his problematic proposal for a jumble of supposedly ancient chalk images” (189). They acknowledge that it’s easy to laugh at Lethbridge’s method, but they “prefer to think of him as an intuitive myth-scientist, an artist, a skillful seer able to crochet-hook a vanished past into modernity, rendering it visible—and useful—for others” (189-90). They visit (on foot or by car? I can’t tell) the White Horse of Uffington, and have a picnic while watching volunteers refurbishing the chalk drawing. On their descent down the hill, they “slip through time,” seeing a white horse, a “bright flash, glint of metal,” and “red blood” soaking into the white chalk: “A strange, beautiful spectacle” (192). A “Red Kite” hovering overhead becomes a military helicopter (192). The following day, they visit Avebury Circle (they are clearly travelling by car now), where charms and trinkets hang from the branches of beech trees.

“There is, it seems, a web of surface patterns,” they write, which bring together “ancient chalk figures and esoteric grafitti with chance hill contours, motorway networks, zodiacal chartings and the Jungian imaginings of the likes of T. C. Lethbridge” (193). That web “tattoos the entire country” in a tangible pattern (193). “These are the veins and arteries to which our wanders on the outskirts of Plymouth have brought us, driven by the things we found there, the agents of connection,” they continue. “We did not set out to trace a pattern; instead it has come to us by our following an unfolding; first with threads, then knots and tangles and webs, and then the under-forest of rhizomes and mycelium, and myths and privileged points, and, fainally, brought us to The Pattern” (193). The tattoo on the surface is dense and meaningful, and “The Pattern is a hybrid; partly of affordant shapings in the landscape—mounds, inclines and bowls—and partly of subjective marings and tellings; a legend of the hill, a tower built on its summit” (193). They see parallels between The Pattern and Billinghurst’s drawings, and the line of their walks “is the line of implicit and explicit memory, mirrored in the survivals and disappearances of the palimpsests of old ritual layouts heaped one on top of another, a tattooing not only extensive, but in places deep and thick” (196). Other writers and artists have discovered “the same nodes and threads” (196). They constitute “the great land art,” which is “always walkable, processional, democratic; complementary to a train of thought that connects immediate personal associations to complex, buried, promiscuous shared memories and boxes of bones” (196-97).

Now they turn to their final walk for the book, on the edge of Plymouth. They climb to the top of a medieval motte and a hill near a quarry where the body of a sheep rots. “There is something very wrong here,” they write. “The privileged point is poisoned” (198). After a stop in a nearby pub, they carry on towards home. “We are travelling in different dimensions,” they continue. “part of us is following the ghost of the old creek, slipping spectrally by as the heart of the town becomes a port again; as unplanned cargoes arrive; as a ghostly schooner kisses the quayside, unmanned. Another part is still in those crimson armchairs, upholstered mechanisms for travelling in time and space” (199). “We started these journeys with an idea about space and set out to find a labyrinth; and now we are beginning something new with an idea about time and its loops, threading us back and forward, from future inundation to former idealism and back to the present where the past is curled snug in front of the glowing grate in the London Inn, resolutely provincial and promiscuously connected,” they conclude (199). But it’s not a conclusion, as the last words unequivocally state: “There is no conclusion . . .” (199).

So, what do I make of this book? I’m not sure. The walking practice it describes is very different from my own, but I already knew that would be the case, before I opened it. I find myself unable to fictionalize or mythologize, especially here, where the indigenous myths—the myths of Indigenous peoples—are not stories I feel qualified to tell, or borrow from, or play with. There is little playful here, in Saskatchewan—indeed, from the account Billinghurst and Smith provide here, there is little playful in England, too. The tattoo on the surface of this land is made of grid roads and road allowances, which overlay older trails, rivers, creeks, anything that meanders or deviates from the strict north-south or east-west lines on the map. I think that the practice outlined in The Pattern might fit the United Kingdom, but I’m not sure it would work here, in this very different place. In any case, Smith’s writing and his walking practices are always interesting, always worth thinking about and trying to learn from.

Works Cited

Billinghurst, Helen, and Phil Smith. The Pattern: A Fictioning, Triarchy Press, 2020.

Macfarlane, Robert. The Old Ways: A Journey on Foot, Penguin, 2012.

Schott, John, Phil Smith, and Tony Whitehead. Guidebook for an Armchair Pilgrimage, Triarchy Press, 2019.

C. Michael Hall, Yael Ram, and Noam Shoval, eds. The Routledge International Handbook of Walking

I didn’t know what to expect from The Routledge International Handbook of Walking, and indeed much of the book—including almost the entire final section—is rather peripheral to my research interests. However, even chapters that seem to be unrelated to my project ended up yielding surprises, and the book as a whole suggests something about the richness of walking as a topic of research in a number of disciplines I hadn’t considered.

In the book’s preface, the editors describe walking as “an essentially human activity,” suggesting that whether it’s for transportation or leisure, or as a religious act, “walking has served as a significant philosophical, literary and historical subject” (xix). This book, they continue, takes a broad approach to the subject: “The purpose of this book is . . . to bring together a number of the main themes on the study of walking from different disciplines and literatures” (xix). Indeed, in the introduction, the editors contend that walking is inherently interdisciplinary—it crosses academic borders (1)—and that it is inherently a good thing: “Walking encourages good public and private health, interaction between neighbours, contributes to feeling of community and positive sense of place, and, importantly in a time of concerns over climate and environmental change, contributes to reductions in traffic congestion, air pollution and emissions, and resource use” (1). At the same time, though walking “is also constrained by social practices shaped by gender, culture, religion and economics,” and in many parts of the world, walking is in decline, because of other forms of mobility and changes in the planning and design of the built environment “that have often led to a decline in public space” (1). In addition, “walking has developed more as a commodity with associated development of commercial products such as specialist clothing, walking and fitness aids, as well as walking holidays and walking trails”—so that what was a private activity is now becoming marketed as a consumer good (2). Indeed, they continue, “indeed, the clash between notions of public and private is an important theme in much of the walking literature” (2). Walking can challenge forms of domestication or domination and enable us to ask questions about the authoritarian features of contemporary urban design, private property, and public space (2).

Almost everyone walks, but data on walking “is highly variable,” and many able-bodied people never walk anywhere (2). The editors indicate that a range of qualities of the built urban environment are relevant to walking; they include imageability (the quality of a place that makes it distinct and memorable), legibility (the ease of navigating and understanding the space), enclosure (the degree to which public spaces are visually defined by trees, buildings, and other elements), human scale (whether the “texture and articulation of physical elements” match the size and proportions of humans and the speed at which they walk), transparency (the degree to which people can perceive human activity beyond the edge of a street or other public space), linkage (physical and visual connections between elements in public spaces), complexity (the visual richness of a place), and coherence (the sense of visual order a place provides” (6). These features, which end up being considered under the term “walkability,” are particularly interesting for me. Current walking art practices focus on collective, convivial, and participatory walks, in which the role of the artist is to curate an experience for participants, and the kind of walking I’ve been doing—solitary and somewhat durational—is considered out-of-date or even politically regressive. Sometimes I wonder whether those who advocate convivial walking, most of whom are in the United Kingdom, are missing the context in which those convivial walks take place. Perhaps parts of the UK are more walkable, or perhaps a general level of walkability in that country has led to the development of a walking culture which convivial, artistic walking is part of or related to. I’m not sure. All I can say for certain is that outside of a very limited selection of paths—around Wascana Lake and, to a lesser extent, along Wascana Creek—very few people walk in the city where I live, and issues of walkability might be a factor. Perhaps engaging people in participatory or convivial art walking would be much more difficult in this city, given the different degree of walkability here and the lack of a walking culture. Context is important, and different places will present different contexts in which walking of all kinds takes place.

There are strong associations between the physical environment and leisure walking (7). Studies have found that “land-use mix, connectivity and population density, and overall neighbourhood design were important determinants of physical activity,” including walking (7). Safety is another issue related to walking: it can refer “to safety from traffic, safety from other people (i.e. from crime), and physical safety (i.e. from falls or animal attacks),” and the nature of the built environment “can have a significant impact” on perceived safety (7). Walking in this city is often unsafe, because of a lack of sidewalks and other pedestrian infrastructure. In addition, men and women tend to perceive walking in public spaces differently, partly because of perceptions of safety (10). The editors note that “only 60% of women in the UK feel safe walking at night, compared to 82% of men” (10). However, the data from the UK suggest that men and women walk the same amount, so women may walk while feeling unsafe (10). In addition,“location as well as culture are very important factors in influencing whether or not places are regarded as safe for women, as well as whether they are perceived differentially between men and women” (10-11). 

Technology is changing the experience of walking, particularly mobile phones and “wearable ICT and augmented reality” (11). For instance, many people use technology that allows them to track how many steps they’ve taken; the notion that we should take 10,000 steps every day dates back to the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympic Games and an effort at supporting the physical activity of the Japanese population (11). By 2016, an estimated 20 million people worldwide were using Fitbit devices to track their steps; one in five Americans measures steps with some form of technology (11)—even though there’s no evidence that these devices increase their wearers’ fitness levels (11). Pokémon Go is—or was: are people still playing that game?—an augmented reality app that contributed “an additional dimension to the link between physical activity and technology” (11). The editors suggest that the impact of “carryable and wearable augmented technologies on walking is likely to be profound” (11); it’s possible that “the intersection of walkability and mobility with the ‘Internet of Things,’ ‘smart cities,’ social networks, transport networks, Google, and augmented and virtual realities” could mean that “perhaps in only ten years’ time, the social practices of walking for many will be profoundly different” (12). Such technologies could “create new opportunities for marketization, the furthering of capital and the closing of the informational commons,” yet they also “hold considerable promise for better design of built environments and the enhancement of walkability” (19). “Nevertheless, the extent to which such methods and the people who adopt them contribute to the public rather than the private good will depend as much on political and ethical decisions as it will the availability of technologies” (19).

“Walking is a democratic act,” the editors conclude, a claim that underlies much of contemporary artistic walking. “All can potentially share in it”—at least, all of those who are physically able to walk, I think; the volume pays little attention to the needs of people in wheelchairs or those for whom walking is difficult. “However, as this and the other chapters in this book demonstrate, there are a wide range of constraints that limit where, when and even how people can walk,” the editors acknowledge. “Nevertheless, the slowness of walking enables linkages and connectivity to people and place that other forms of transport do not provide” (19-20).

In the book’s second chapter, “Walking in the Capitalist City: On the Socio-Economic Origins of Walkable Urbanism” (27-36), Anja Hälg Bieri, argues that walking is not only “a human form of locomotion or a transportation mode” but “a social phenomenon” (27). The chapter theorizes walking anthropologically, as a social practice “that takes on different forms in different historical and spatial contexts,” and draws “a genealogy of the walking trend and theorizing its underlying logic with the help of critical theory” (27). “A dialectic of aestheticization and commodification runs through modernity that generates aestheticized forms of walking today,” Bieri contends:

While the desire to walk is initially a form of aesthetic struggle against the rational principles of modernity and the forces of capitalism, this struggle is co-opted by the logic of capital in a continuous interlacing of the processes of aestheticization and commodification. The social and spatial consequences of capitalism together with the process of aestheticization of society produce new spatial forms of capitalism, new commodified forms of social interaction, and new forms of walking. What became of the yearning for agency through walking? With walkable urbanism, capital returns to the city centre and creates new markets for a budding walkable lifestyle which is fed through conspicuous consumption. (27)

This argument would be a lot easier to follow if Bieri defined “aestheticization” or explained what the term means, or even if she cited a source for the word.

Anthropologically, walking is “a universal phenomenon, but it takes on different forms in different cultures, times and places,” forms which “are subject to change” (27). “Moreover, walking is a performative act, in the sense that it co-creates social distinction and social identity,” Bieri argues. “Walking and the social possibilities of walking represent the spatial organization of a given society and its subjects. It is both a physical and a social practice” (27). She is interested in “walking in the context of walkable urbanism,” “a trend in urban design and planning” which “promotes urban space that is more walkable than the traditional car-centred spaces” (27). According to Bieri, we need to understand this notion “both in its urban design dimension and in its social dimension”: walkable urbanism creates new forms of built environment, but it also “creates a social environment, an ecology, and even a lifestyle” (27). “Urban design and architecture styles are not isolated, but they need to be conceived in their social, historical and spatial context” (27), she argues, and so “contemporary forms of walking” are products “of the aestheticization of society and capitalism’s continuous quest for new markets” (27). 

Here Bieri arrives at what seems to be her theoretical touchstone, a book I have yet to read: “the social imaginaries and the material manifestations of walkable urbanism are places of spectacle,” she writes, following Guy Debord’s book, The Society of the Spectacle, which suggests that “the spectacle is a social relation between people mediated by images” (27-28). “The misleading impression is that the human-scale, somewhat analogue character of making America more walkable seems to go against the grain of a spectacular society of simulacra and pastiche” (28), she writes, but it is “yet another stage of commodification, using the growing aestheticization of society to appropriate the yearning for more creativity and agency” (28).“Walkable urbanism and the trend for creativity find their aesthetic and commodified realization in creative cities and their creative economy,” she continues, so that “the tender aesthetic rebellion against the car-centred, isolating landscape and culture of post-war America through initiatives to further walking has been co-opted by capital’s interest in finding new markets, aided by the aestheticization of society, thereby deceptively combining the economic and political needs of capital” (28). 

At this point, Bieri turns to walking as an art practice as a form of spectacle:

Walking as art, walking as research method, and walkable urbanism can all be understood as an attempt to reclaim an everyday practice—walking. It is striking, however, that the predominant forms that emerge from this endeavour are not everyday forms of walking but performative forms of walking—art walking, research walking, and walking in walkable spaces that are spaces of spectacle. The alienation from walking, from a direct use of the body for locomotion, is so advanced that all the postmodern reclamations of walking result in these performative forms of walking. An everyday activity is elevated to something extraordinary. It is aestheticized. Thereby, walking (or the relationship to walking and the use of the body) goes through another stage of alienation through creating even more spectacle. It reproduces late capitalism’s logic and cannot unwind the postmodern spiral. It cannot fulfil the yearning still attached to the modern promises of happiness, it only aggrandizes the yearning by creating images of idealized walking and the silent realization of failure to live up to this image without understanding the reasons for this failure. (29)

As a result, “the political force is taken out of the movement towards more walking, more physical capacity, imaginary freedom and ultimately happiness” (29). I wonder if that’s true of all art walking practices—both solo and participatory—or if any practices live up to their claim to be both creative and critical for Bieri. It seems, from her argument, that she believes none do.

The built environment actively produces the society it reflects (30). Because the built environment and society are in a dialectical relation to each other, urban design is “highly political,” and she reads both walkable urbanism and walking in this way (30). “Designing walkable urbanism like a theme park with a set of supposedly evidence-based arguments, ranging from health benefits to tourism attractions to economic uplift, creates places of spectacle that only further our state of alienation,” she writes (30). “Imaginaries of class differences are reproduced in walkable urbanism, as consumption is a means for social distinction,” she continues. “Genders are performed in relation to other established categories of difference, such as class, ethnicity and sexual orientation” (31). Therefore, walkable urbanism, as a response to the limits of suburban life, may appear to be liberating, but it is yet another “aestheticized and commodified lifestyle” (32). Walkable urbanism is a trend, part of real-estate and tourism marketing: “The desire to make American towns and cities, even suburbs, more walkable and to sell walkability to real-estate clients and tourists has led to the quest for a repeatable scenario, a tendency already present in the beginnings of this urban design trend and which established itself over time. A recipe for mass-produced walkability emerged” (34). Like any other rebellion or innovation, walkable urbanism presents the danger of recuperation by “the dominating forces”—and “[t]he fact that walkability is becoming a sale pitch for real-estate premiums, that a whole spectrum of gear, clothes and even cars go with a walkable lifestyle, that walkable neighbourhoods are becoming an exclusive place of social distinction through consumption rather than through civic activity, all point to the necessity to try and understand this phenomenon in its economic and social context” (34). I always find the argument that walking requires specific gear and clothing to be a little difficult to swallow, since aside from a comfortable pair of shoes, little is required to walk relatively short distances. I’m not sure what cars go with a walking lifestyle, either. In other words, parts of Bieri’s argument would be more convincing if it presented clear evidence in support of its claims. 

The book’s third chapter, Phil Smith’s essay “Radical Twenty-First-Century Walkers and the Romantic Qualities of Leisure Walking (37-45), is the reason I decided to read this book in the first place. Smith begins with Jiro Taniguchi’s 1992 manga, The Walking Man, in which “the everyday walks of a conservative white-collar worker are diverted by chance and curiosity into an ambiguous zone between leisurely strolls and hyper-sensitised exploration, trespass, stalking and pilgrimage” (37). That manga “maps the territory for this chapter, which examines examples of UK-based walking arts practitioners who work around the boundaries of everyday or leisure walking, part of an identifiable ‘meshwork’ with unevenly shared principles, aesthetics and narratives” (37). Smith describes a number of walking art practices, all by women artists: Jess Allen’s “tractivism,” walking footpaths and engaging the people she meets in dialogues about ecology and climate change (37), and Elspeth Owen’s durational walks, such as Grandmother’s Footsteps (2009), in which she carried messages between other first-time grandparents (37). “While Allen and Owen generally walk alone, their practices are sociable and relational (unlike the epic solo journeys of earlier male walking artists, such as Richard Long); not only challenged by terrain and duration, but ecologically woven into that environment . . . and reflexively confronting the social in their own bodies,” Smith writes (38). He also describes convivial walking art practices, such as Emma Bush’s Village Walk (2008), which “was led at different times by different residents; they narrated the history of individual houses, discussed residents’ paintings, told autobiographical and fantastic stories” (38). “There were collective actions of planting, singing and witnessing a newly engaged couple dancing,” Smith writes. “Somewhere between a community and an aesthetic event, the walk wove together public spaces with private gardens and rooms, entangling local historiography with subjective fantasies, challenging the valorisation of authenticity and dismantling each narrative as it established itself” (38). 

Some walking art practices are documented in text, such as Lucy Furlong’s Amniotic City (2011), which “maps a space as defined as any village, close to the City of London” through poetry. Furlong’s poems “are recognisably sited; potential liturgies for re-enactment”; they are “proposals, less bent on cutting passages than on following clues to alignments of desire in patterns immersed in the terrain,” they interweave “intimacy and otherness” (38). Amniotic City included “a beautifully produced fold-out psychogeographical poetry map that depicts London’s hidden feminine archetypes,” according to The Guardian’s Dan Holloway; I looked for a copy online but apparently the book or chapbook (it’s hard to tell which best describes Amniotic City) is out of print. Smith also discusses the zines collected by Laura Oldfield Ford in her book Savage Messiah (2011), which are “fuelled by emotions, rushes, love, desiring, dreaming and an erotic urge to fight back. Inspired by her ‘drifts’ through the brutalist architecture of the emptying housing estates she has lived in, they speak of the spontaneity of parties, squatting and protests, of self-questioning and heightened states” (38).

“These are just five of the hundreds of self-designating ‘walking artists’ or artists and activists using walking in the UK,” Smith tells us (38). “While they are distinctive practitioners, there is much common ground in immersive and reflexive subjectivities, the deferral of synthesis and the sustenance of multiplicities, placing oneself at the mercy of the world, shifts between solitude and sociability, use of everyday materials, distance from a recognised art market and playing around common forms of walking such as strolling, tourist visiting, rural rambling and guided walks,” he continues (38). Those “common forms of walking” are not that common where I live—certainly rural rambling and guided walks are quite rare—and that difference makes me wonder whether the walking context in this city would support convivial or participatory art practices, and whether there is a significant difference between walking in the UK and walking here. In my limited experience of walking in the UK, there are differences. There are few footpaths in Saskatchewan, and access for walkers to private land is very rare. In the UK, in contrast, I was able to walk from Marlborough House into Oxford almost entirely on marked footpaths listed in an A-Z guide of the area—with the exception of a half mile on a terrifying B road, with cars passing at high speed just inches away from me while I cowered against a hedge. There is nothing like the UK’s network of national trails in Canada, either; true, the TransCanada Trail exists, but I’m not sure one could actually cross the country—or even a province—walking on it. I could be wrong, of course, but I’m beginning to wonder whether the demand that all walking be participatory might not be coming out of a very different pedestrian context than the one I experience here.

Smith notes that genealogies of walking art typically begin with Romanticism, implying a continuity between “twentieth-century radical walkers and movements” and Romanticism despite “their explicitly breaks from it” (38). More than half of the walking artists Smith surveyed rejected any influence from the Romantic tradition and/or saw their work as a break with Romanticism (39). Those walkers, practitioners of a “new movement” of walking or a “new psychogeography,” “are taking advantage of earlier movements’ breaks from functional and ideal walking to make their work increasingly in the ruptures and margins of everyday and recreational walking” (39). 

Romanticism is the shadow against which many walking practices define themselves. Discussions of recreational walking “usually begin by citing aesthetic, philosophical or spiritual motivation” (39)—typically influenced by Romanticism. According to that motivation, hikers walk themselves “into anonymous symbiosis with the landscape,” which significantly under-represents “the impact of the walker on their environment,” and “a directly localised and site-specific spirituality” is advanced, one “served by parallel and contradictory narratives in which rural pedestrianism” is either disappearing, a form of religious practice, or a resistance to the dominance of automobiles (40). Indeed, Smith notes that it’s rare to find an acknowledgement that walking isn’t a pleasure (as Morris Marples does) (40). Its enthusiasts load walking “with universal meanings and virtues” that excesses of various kinds are generated, such as Colin Speakman’s claim that “To walk is to be a human” (qtd. 40). 

“Yet competition, property accumulation, normativity and colonialism are among the roots of recreational walking,” Smith contends (40). He suggests that rural rambling is a separation from the real world, defined by moralism and aversion to risk and restriction; it is “cluttered with obstructive and constructed representations,” including exclusions of various kinds (40), or else it is “a righteous but functionalist exertion,” “a corporeal re-statement of common rights over property, and an inward-looking ambulation relegating the landscape to a visual background for contemplation” (40). “Entanglements of such conservative and radical, appropriative and ecological, romantic and materialist views are complexly manifest within individual walking groups, and within and between memberships and leaderships of walking organisations,” Smith notes (40).

The anthropologist Tim Ingold tries to “distil, personify and resolve” some of these contradictions in his introduction to the book Imagining Landscapes (40). Ingold prefers an “interwoven, active sensing,” derived from the work of cognitive scientist James J. Gibson, and he performs “a very peculiar, but revealing, act of wishful thinking” by turning to the photographs of walking artist Richard Long and suggesting that we “re-imagine these commodified images, encouraging passive consumption” (40-41) and instead understand the landscapes they depict as a “contrapuntal interweaving of material flows and sensory awareness” (qtd. 41). This argument redeploy’s Long’s art, “the products and sensibilities” of his practice, and and instead sees Long’s form of walking “in an alternating movement of casting forward and drawing up” (qtd. 41). Long’s solo, durational, representational (sometimes) art practice is very much out of fashion, and Ingold’s use of Long as an example seems to surprise Smith. 

For Smith, a receptive field to Ingold’s strategy “awaits somewhere between the contradictions of recreational walking and the reparative practices of the new generation of walking artists and psychogeographers” (41). Recreational urban walking is not the usual form that recreational walking usually takes; most recreational walking is rural (41). In contrast, psychogeographers make “regular expeditions” “across derelict wastelands,” “into retail sites,” “along routes of culverted rivers, through sewerage and other concealed systems” and “around abject traffic structures” (41). Indeed, Smith notes that walking artists tend to see rural and urban spaces as entangled, rather than as binary opposites (41). He suggests that “if any one group of walkers has truly explored an ‘abyss of fusion’ it is the oft-maligned, urban, occult, late-twentieth-century literary psychogeographers who have sought out and described cryptic patterns in the urban fabric and invoked an intensity of presence equivalent to anything in the literature of rural walking” (42). These practices of urban, suburban, and edgeland walking are “peculiar in embracing difference and ambiguity,” in stepping back from the heroic, in “clinging to the rim of the abyss not as an extreme moment on a mount pass but as the modus vivendi of late capitalist psychic precarity” (42).

The “new psychogeography,” for Smith, is different from the older neo-psychogeography, which was “pulled between Marxian materialism, tedious algorithmic drifting and ‘mystical fusion’ with occult patterns”; instead, the “new psychogeography” is reflexive and reparative and heterogenous (43). “As well as providing the entanglement . . . required by Tim Ingold’s proposal for re-making walking,” Tina Richardson’s “new psychogeography” “reveals the gap that separates these kinds of walking from both Romantic and occult psychogeographical walking; their reflexive sensitivity to the performed nature of everyday life, their deconstruction of their own materials and forms of representation . . . their postmodern sensibility to the mediation of aesthetics and iconoclasm,” take precedence over “the distillation of Essence or Presence” typical of Romanticism (43). The product of these new forms of walking “is praxis, democratic but also provocative,” and participatory (43).

Smith suggests that Richard Long and Hamish Fulton might be easily mistaken for hikers: “Immersed in the hiker’s terrain of choice (moors, long trails, mountain regions),” their walking evokes “the apotheosis of the walker’s presence and fusion with spectacular place to which recreational walking, at various stages of dilution, aspires” (43). However, the “intense solitude” and “‘heroic’ pace” of their “epic journeys,” and Long’s “physical interventions in and extractions from the landscape put a considerable distance between them and anything like leisure” (43). Moreover, their works—with the exception of Fulton’s shift to participatory walks—“do not ‘bait,’ but successfully circulate within, the conventional art market and generate a passive, mentally appropriative consumption rather than provoke trespass” (43). Smith prefers walking practices that “provoke trespass” and that exist outside of “the conventional art market.” Literary psychogeography also encourages “passive consumption,” although Smith suggests that Iain Sinclair’s “walk-based books” may be at odd with that passivity because of “their inspiring effect” (43). I was shocked when I read those words, since Sinclair’s books, which I quite like, are rarely spoken of in positive terms by contemporary walking artists. 

“The latest generation of performative, postmodern walkers (artists, activists, and psycho-geographers) has more in common with the iconoclastic break of the International Lettristes/situationists; but without their retreat from engagement,” Smith concludes. “Where there is product, other than walking itself, it often takes the form of documentation, handbooks and exemplary objects designed to encourage others to further exploratory walking rather than of commodities for new markets” (43). “This ‘new movement’ of walkers places itself in ambiguous and critical, but not dismissive, proximity to the gaze and ethos of the leisurely stroll, at times borrowing from the practices of recreational walking,” he continues. “Rather than confrontation, this ablative, ‘just to the side’ of the ramble, is not ‘absorbed within a wider perspective’ of nature, implacable time, massive space, emptiness and near silence, but proposes a sociability, ordinariness and intense relation to the terrain (built and natural, rural and urban) that is both an abolition and an extension . . . of Romantic ‘fusion’” (43-44). Thus new walking art practices are about multiple layering or archaeological engagement with space, and there is a “potential ground” for them within hiking and rambling (44)—a claim that is another surprise, since both hiking and rambling tend to be durational and therefore less participatory and demographic than short urban walks. “Given their strategic positioning, valorising the everyday and the ‘to the side’ of the aesthetic, the ‘new movement’ and ‘new psychogeographers’ are well placed to gain leverage within the multiple contradictions of recreational walking; to embrace and redeploy immersive, sensual, ritualistic, contemplative and interpretative elements of Romantic, recreational walking,” he continues:

To expose, accentuate and challenge the contradictions of the appropriative, neo-colonialist products of Romanticist walking arts and “new nature writers” and persuade leisure walkers to take a small step to the side of the conventions of their strolling/hiking/rambling to an agentive, non-appropriative walking; to walk in the gaps (both in the sense of ideological contradictions and affordances for trespass) rather than “in fusion.” To invoke recreational walking’s origins in rebellion. (44). 

That kind of walking practice is good; other forms of walking, which tend to lead to soft fascination (more on that shortly), are not good. However, I wonder if there’s a connection between walking “in the gaps” and soft fascination. I will have to learn more.

I skipped a chapter that did not seem relevant to my research and landed on Karein K. Goertz’s essay, “Walking as Pedagogy” (55-64). “For a variety of economic, ideological and quality-of-life reasons, so-called millennials (born between the early 1980s and 2000) are rejecting cars and choosing to live in walkable urban communities,” Goertz writes (55). “As intentionally built environments, college campuses are well positioned to make walking an integral part of their ethos and identity” (55). That might be true at some universities, but certainly not at the one where I work!. “If walking is to become a public health priority in the fight against chronic disease, institutions of learning must lead the way,” Goertz continues, and universities can do that by training students across disciplines to recognize their role in promoting walking and walkable communities (55). “For many American students, the transition into a daily routine without a car and with a lot more walking marks a radical departure from their past experience,” (56) but the “formative, typically car-free college years can and should play a significant role in initiating and shaping them as walkers” (56). For that reason, this chapter “examines data from science and the humanities on the mental, emotional and physical impact of walking and proposes pedagogical applications to enhance student learning and wellness” (56).

For many first-year students, “becoming a student coincides with becoming a daily walker out of necessity” (56). “Perhaps more interestingly, walking can be seen as a metaphor for change and dynamism: just as the walker is on the move, not stuck to one place or perspective, so too, the student is in a particularly fluid time of life when, ideally, old patterns are broken, ideas are approached anew and self-identity undergoes transformation,” Goertz suggests (56). In addition, walking gets us away from our desks, which is important for health and for the opportunity to experience “changing scenery, unplanned encounters and surprising thoughts that engage the mind” (56). “Physical movement and mental activity are complimentary, and walking, in particular, fosters the very kind of original, inquisitive and creative thinking that is the hallmark of a college education,” she contends (56).

A student’s first experience of campus often a walking tour—a way to orient oneself spatially (57). Goertz suggests that first-year students might be asked “to design a thematically oriented walking tour” as part of their classes (57). I wonder what discipline would support such an assignment. Walking also encourages sociability, even though students are typically wearing earbuds or looking at their phones (57)—a fact that undercuts Goertz’s claim. Walking could also help students deal with the record numbers of mental health problems that are being reported, including depression, anxiety, eating and sleep disorders (57). “Many people with mental illness have found that walking helps them manage their inner anguish,” she writes (57). “Recent empirical findings in (neuro)physiology validate the curative properties of walking with variables relative to duration, intensity and frequency: it clears the body of stress hormones, boosts endorphins, strengthens the immune system, increases energy, elevates mood and promotes restful sleep” (58), and the “flow of oxygen to the brain heightens mental alertness, concentration and memory” and “enhances connectivity of brain circuits and boosts performance on cognitive tasks” (58). For these reasons, “colleges should explicitly encourage and support” walking “as basic preventative care for mental and physical health” (58).

Along with its health benefits, “[t]he cognitive benefits of walking support the college mandate of teaching students how to think critically, analytically and creatively” (58). Goertz notes that “walking has been shown to considerably promote creative thinking and the generation of new ideas”; it “is an excellent facilitator of original, innovative thinking because the physical act of left-right steps simulates the integration of the two halves of the brain, the logical and the intuitive. The rhythmic alternation of steps can put the walker into a relaxes, but fully aware alpha state that is conducive to creative thinking” (60). Walking meetings are part of corporate culture, so why couldn’t advising appointments be conducted peripatetically? she asks (61). 

While walking is “not always practical when students need access to computers, white-boards, desks, etc.,” nonetheless “there are a number of curricular applications that would enhance the learning experience” (61). For instance, “[s]mall walking groups could help brainstorm ideas, break up habituated seating arrangements, change the scenery and energy level, and shift attention away from the instructor” (61). “In light of the many benefits of walking for mental and physical health, academic skills and creativity, it makes sense that colleges actively promote walking,” she concludes (61). Walking “serves as a compelling model and vehicle for students to assert their own position as active, aware and engaged participants in this world and to step towards it” (63). What about students who cannot walk, though, or who prefer not to? What about issues of climate and weather? What about commuter campuses where the car is king? 

In chapter 6,“Walking in Germany: Between Recreation and Ideology” (65-73), Dirk Reiser and Vanessa Jansen-Meinen suggest that the expansion of interest in walking after the turn of the 21st century in Germany was encouraged by the publication of books about walking—both fiction and nonfiction (65). Because walking replies to the increasing speed of contemporary life, they claim, it encourages walkers to become immersed in flow states (65). As a “gentle form of mobility,” walking 

fits in with a growth in health-conscious behaviour and a movement towards sustainability. This positive image change during the last decade is due to the possibility of an outdoor experience with low entry barriers that is consistent with a sustainable, environment-conscious and nature-responsive lifestyle—although walking has a long history as a vital part of tourism and recreational activities in Germany. (65-66)

In German, there is a clear distinction between walking and strolling: strolling is “regarded as being more spontaneous, without special equipment or preparation, in contrast to what is required for walking (e.g. planning of route and equipment, shoes, checking of weather and maps)” (66). In addition, while walking suggests relatively short walks, trekking is used for walks that take several days; there are additional forms of walking in German, including “hillwalking, mountaineering, long-distance hiking, height hikes, scouting, hut hikes” (66). The differences between these forms have to do with “the place of accommodation, seasonal nature of walking, and the use of fixed rope routes” (66).

The authors note that 16 percent of Germans go on walking holidays, and the rest include some walking in their vacations (66). While most Germans “walk for the pure pleasure of being in nature and outside,” motivations related to health and fitness are secondary; other motivations include getting away from technology, achievability, and “a concentration on oneself,” meaning relaxation and stress-release (66). Another motivation is the shared experience of walking with others, although “walking in large groups is not favoured” and “many walkers have become individualists” (66).

Then the authors present a short history of walking in Germany: from travelling journeymen learning their craft, pilgrims, bourgeois walkers in the late 18th century, to Romantic walkers “looking at the landscape as a mirror of the inner self” and, by the nineteenth century, people travelling by train to rural locations for leisure walking (67-68). Walking becomes institutionalized along with industrialization and urbanization, especially technologies that allow people to travel comfortably to areas where walking is considered particularly attractive: mountains and the ocean; walking and mountaineering clubs begin to appear in the middle of the 19th century (68). Other institutions that supported walking as a leisure activity—hostels, for instance—also come into being at the turn of the 20th century (69).

However, when the Nazis came to power, walking changed: “one of the first steps after taking power was the synchronisation of all professional and social organisations, such as the walking and mountaineering clubs” (69); in other words, they were integrated into party organizations (70). Walks were organized by the Strength through Joy programme, a Nazi organization (69). “The main aim was to establish control over leisure time and to indoctrinate Germans with Nazi ideology,” they note (70). 

It wasn’t until the early 1950s that vacations became important again, but walking lost its importance because of increased vehicle ownership and the development of tourist infrastructure (70). In East Germany, though, while walking clubs were not allowed, walking became an important leisure activity (70). However, it wasn’t until the end of the 1990s that walking became a popular activity again in the west (70). Today, half of Germans enjoy nature walking. “It is often perceived as a counterbalance to urban life, the urge to move outside asphalt and concrete,” and it is 

linked to a sustainable lifestyle because it is environmentally sustainable (it is a soft nature sport, strengthens the relationship with nature, needs only minimal technical infrastructure, is possible in many places, creates an awareness of the speed of nature), is economically sustainable (it facilitates regional development, secures a sustainable livelihood, offers a high value ration, creates synergistic effects, and is healthy), and socially sustainable (it is an ideal sport for small groups, is relatively cheap, is possible outside holiday times, connects people and allows a view into different life circumstances). (71)

This chapter presents another national context in which walking takes place—two national contexts, given the postwar differences between West and East Germany—and so it encourages me to think more about the contexts in which walking takes place here in Saskatchewan.

I skipped another irrelevant (to me) chapter and found myself reading Yoshitaka Iwasaki’s “Dog Walking as a Leisure Activity” (83-91). Dog walking is one of the world’s most popular leisure activities; this chapter “examines opportunities and challenges of dog walking as a leisure activity” (83), which focuses on the “intrapersonal, social and environmental factors that contextualize dog walking,” including “sociodemographic factors and urban design,” “a sense of attachment to dogs as companions, and social support of dog walkers” (83). “Attention is given to the dog-owner relationship (e.g. practice of caring), the dog’s positive effects on an owner’s cognitive beliefs about and motivation towards walking,” and “the provision of dog-supportive physical environment for dog walking” (83). “In addition, dog walking as a leisure activity can provide opportunities to promote meaning-making as another benefit of this potentially meaningful leisure engagement,” Iwasaki writes (83).

Not surprisingly, people who own dogs tend to have higher levels of physical activity, and therefore dog walking is “a method of promoting a healthy lifestyle” (83-84). In addition, dog walking helps to shape “ties between people, and between people and places in different ways” and “care is central to decisions surrounding dog walking” (84). Thus dog walking can both increase physical activity and create a heightened sense of community (84). However, some factors can encourage or discourage dog walking; proximity to an off-leash dog park, for instance, increases frequency of dog walking, while a “less-walkable street pattern was negatively associated” with participation in dog walking (84). This brief comment is interesting to me: what constitutes a “less-walkable street pattern”? 

According to Iwasaki, “dog walking is considered as a social activity whereby an individual gets to know other dog owners, performs an outdoor physical activity, and engages in communication and information sharing” (85). In addition, “the perception of dogs as a subjective being and one’s connectedness with them seem to provide opportunities for meaning-making within one’s life through actively engaging with dogs” (86). Dog owners share emotional bonds with their dogs (86), and those emotional bonds become “a way of finding meaning in one’s everyday life” (87).

I’m still curious about what kinds of walking people do, and “Walking in Switzerland: Urban and Not So Leisurely,” by Derek P.T.H. Christie, Emmanuel Ravalet and Vincent Kaufmann (92-99), provides some data about how people walk. It uses the Swiss transport micro-census (MRMT2010), which “contains all transport movements in excess of 25 metres which are not entirely within a single entity, such as a train station, university campus or shopping mall” (92). The MRMT2010 database can “divide trips by their destination and motive, with the trips themselves being divided into stages” (92). According to that database, walking decreases with education and salary and access to a motor vehicle (93). In addition, walking is typically combined with other forms of transportation: the average distance for walking is 900 metres in a day (94-95). However, the median distance is only 430 metres, suggesting that most walking distances are much shorter than 900 metres, but also that a limited number are much greater, going up to a maximum of 60 kilometres (95). However, while the data may be showing less walking than people are actually doing, and most of that walking is connected to other modes of transportation (95), “a substantial proportion of the population walks very little or not at all on any given day” (96). 

According to the authors’ analysis of the data, “people living in city centres or in mountain resorts reported significantly more walking (approximately 2.4 km per day) than those living elsewhere” (97). At the same time, less than 25 percent of walking trips are motivated by leisure (97). Most of the walking was part of commuting to work or a place of study (97): “Mundane descriptions, such as accessing another transport mode (e.g. walking to a bus stop or car park) or returning home after an errand, accounted for over half of the walking trips” (97). In addition, dog walking plays a minor role in walking in Switzerland (97).

Thus, “walking from A to B is far more important than walking for leisure (including dog walking) and therefore public authorities should concentrate on helping people get to and from where they live, where they work and where they use public transport” (98). In addition, walking for leisure needs to be encouraged “by setting aside walking trails within urban and suburban areas” (98).

In chapter 10, “Purposeful Leisure Mobilities: Reframing the Walk to School,” by Debbie Hopkins and Sandra Mandic, (100-08), walking, as a form of “incidental exercise,” is a way to increase physical activity among school students; it “requires fewer competencies in order to participate (e.g. compared to cycle skills or a driver’s license) and is without the requirement for mobility-enabling artefacts (e.g. bikes, helmets)” (100). Distance is a factor in walking to school: the likelihood of a student walking to school “declines substantially” when the distance to school is greater than a mile (100). These days, fewer children walk to school than ever before (100), and yet “walking to school has been identified as a powerful policy objective” because of “rising levels of childhood obesity” and “transport-related carbon emissions” (100). According to the authors, 

this chapter will argue that walking to school is usually framed as a transport mode, putting walking in competition with other motorised and non-motorised forms of transport and measured by traditional transportation metrics, including distance and travel time. We argue that this framing overlooks the additional opportunities and benefits that arise from walking, and that reframing the walk to school may contribute to greater success in ATS interventions. Thus we explore purposeful leisure mobilities; a conceptualisation of the co-benefits of walking, as both an objective (i.e. to travel between home and school) and a leisure space (e.g. for individual reflection and socialising). (100-01)

They propose “that new framings of walking to school are required, that better align with insights from the mobilities literature and the articulation of walking to school found in the current research” (101).

“Research has suggested that perceptions of the physical and social environment may differ between people who walk for leisure and those who walk for transport,” they continue. “For example, the accessibility of public transport, along with trust of many people in the neighbourhood, predicted increases in walking for leisure. Yet physical environment features (such as connectivity, pedestrian crossings and local traffic speed) predicted increases in walking for transport” (101). However, the authors question whether the opposition between leisure and transport is useful, “given the complexity and variability of everyday social activities” (101). Indeed, their research suggests “that, for young adults, walking is not always perceived to be a transport mode, but rather an everyday activity” (101). Framing walking as a mode of transportation “often results in walking being understood through quantifiable, automobility-derived terms of speed, geographic proximity of A to B, and derived demand” (101), but “walking is the antithesis of the dominant, pace-driven mobility system,” because it is slow, “intertwined with concepts of mindfulness,” and “about ‘the political, cultural and aesthetic implications and resonance of these movements,’” their meanings, and the embodied experiences they enable (the authors cite Tim Cresswell and Peter Merriman here) (101). 

Their research proceeds from “a moderate social constructionist position,” which recognizes both social, cultural, and environmental forces and individual agency, the way that meanings “are constructed by human actions and interpretations” (101). Their research findings come from an interdisciplinary, multi-method study on transport to school behaviours at high schools in Dunedin, a city in New Zealand; they are particularly interested in exploring “alternative framings of walking to school as purposeful leisure” (101-02). They conducted focus groups of high-school students, which elicited “in-depth, nuanced social perceptions of walking to school” (102). 

The students did understand walking as a form of transportation and felt it was only viable for students who lived near their school (103). “This traditional, and constraining, lens was articulated by many of the focus group participants and links together notions of proximity and time, which could be interpreted as perceptions of walking as a slow mode of transport,” the authors contend (103). Students were concerned about the amount of time it would take to walk to school and about having to wake up earlier in order to make that journey on foot (104). The hills in Dunedin also featured as barriers to walking (104). According to their conversations with students, walking for transportation was considered to be different from walking for exercise—one student would get up early to walk for exercise with her mother, and then be driven to school—which “can signal the different meanings and expectations associated with types of walking” (104). Other students worried about what they might look like if they walked to school (104)—sweaty and disheveled, perhaps?—and some students thought that only rich people could afford to live close enough to school that the distance would be walkable (104). 

“From the focus groups we found evidence of multiple, often competing ‘walking as leisure’ framings, which, to varying degrees, challenge or complement the traditional transport frame of walking,” the authors continue (104). Research participants identified places where they liked to walk, “pleasant environments to be enjoyed and experienced,” or places that were inaccessible to other modes of transportation (104). Research participants also talked about the experience of walking to school, in particular the way it produces an awareness of the walker’s surroundings, which suggests “that there can be values to walking to school that go beyond health benefits and reduced carbon emissions, whereby walking enables students to learn about and experience the local environment. This type of enjoyment and experiential learning might be overlooked through the traditional transport framing” (104). Some participants talked about the benefits of having time to think, time to prepare for the day, while walking: “These attributes underscore the leisurely values of walking that can be neglected by a speed/pace focus. For these students, the speed of travel is less important than reflective opportunities enabled through time spent walking” (104).

Did the students enjoy walking? Yes, a few did: one “positioned the period of time that he spent walking as a transition between school and home; the demands on his attention and the stress of home life and school life are temporarily suspended” (105). “The independence and freedom of walking for high school students was also articulated in this research,” the authors note (105). In addition, walking was also identified as a social activity, something that groups of friends could do (105). This finding “highlights the way walking interacts with individual or collective processes and norms” (105). Students who walked to school identified “more nuanced meanings of walking, which go beyond the function of travel from A to B,” including pleasure and independence (105). 

This research suggests that the benefits of walking go beyond traditional transportation discourses “and present a conceptualisation of walking to school that relates more closely to leisure mobilities” (106). “The purposeful nature of these mobilities lies in the directed travel between places (i.e. from home to school). We therefore propose that ‘purposeful leisure’ could present a new framing that cold be beneficial for the promotion of walking as part of an active transport promotion intervention,” the authors contend (106). This framing is a departure from the “traditional focus of transport researchers on specific categories of travel (e.g. commuting, leisure, business) or spheres (e.g. walking, driving, or travelling virtually)” which “treats these movement as separate and self-contained”; in contrast, their research “illuminates the range of ways that walking is experienced by high school students and suggests that reframing the walk as purposeful leisure rather than transport, could expose more nuanced ways that mobility is performed” (106). Indeed, “for some high school students, negotiating the urban space, using short cuts and accessing new parts of the city, contributes to the attractiveness of walking and experiences of the city” (106). Their research participants articulated experiences of the city they gained by walking to school: “routes of particular meaning, taking short cuts, and enjoying nature, that would be missed if other modes were used” (106). “This research exposes both experiences of walking as a space for quiet, reflection and preparation, but it also highlights the sustained physical and emotional sensations, feelings of happiness and positivity, after walking,” the authors contend (106), noting that specific geographical and socio-cultural and socio-economic contexts will generate “nuanced, place-based and localised perceptions” of walking (107). In any case, “a ‘walking as purposeful leisure’ framing may help to overcome any stigma attached to these perception[s], and could contribute to interventions to increase walking to school among high school students” (107). Their research findings “present a new lens through which to view the benefits of walking to school; benefits that could transform future interventions” (107). While traditional transportation-focused comparisons may end up defining walking as “conceptually demoted” as a slow or inconvenient mode of transportation, “framing walking for transport as ‘purposeful leisure’ may overcome some barriers” (107).

In chapter 9,“Spiking: The Quest for Challenge and Meaning Among Hikers” (109-18), Ron McCarville and Chantel Pilon note that walking is good for you and that recent research has discovered that walkers felt detached from their problems and released from responsibilities (109). That detachment “may be enhanced when the walking takes place in natural settings”: “It seems that interaction with . . . nature can be profoundly positive for the walker” (109). “The popularity of walking may also be enhanced by its inherent flexibility”—in other words, there are fewer restraints involved in walking compared to other leisure activities (109). This flexibility: is important: “Walkers may choose from an array of distances, terrains and conditions. They may explore their own back yard or may travel the globe to experience hikes organised and coordinated by others. Their journeys may take place over several months on iconic routes like the Appalachian Trail, El Camino or the Milford Track, or may be completed before lunch” (109). Because of this flexibility, “we know that walkers and hikers will self-select settings that best meet their own particular requirements,” and that “this flexibility helps paraticipants explore, express and develop sense of self,” because they can “choose from activities, challenges and locations that meet their own interests and capabilities. . . . As their preferences are expressed, notions of self are challenged or affirmed” (109).

However, what if the goal of the hike is to induce rather than reduce stress? what if the hike isn’t about tranquility and reflection? (109). This is the goal of “spiking”: “the phenomenon in which traditionally noncompetitive activities (like hiking) are approached with a competitive spirit” (110). “Spiking,” short for “sport hiking” (110), has three characteristics: “1) the primary motive is overcoming a challenge; 2) the degree of difficulty is enhanced by self-imposed conditions; and 3) specific goals are set such that these conditions render goal attainment uncertain” (110). According to the authors, “the goal of spiking is to enhance and even celebrate” the challenge associated with hiking (110). For example, spikers undertake the “rim to rim” challenge at the Grand Canyon, a hike of 24 miles with a vertical drop/climb of about 9,000 feet (110) in a short period of time: 

many sources recommend that hikers allocate two to three days to complete this very difficult hike. However, the spiking spirit is both ingenious and diabolical. Enthusiasts continue to add to the challenge. Much of the rim-to-rim coverage is highlighting ever more aggressive time limits for completing this route. Many of those who complete the challenge report doing so in a single day. but the challenge continues to grow. Recently, a small group has begun to toy with the idea of hiking rim to rim to rim. (110)

Choosing to increase the difficulty of such a hike is an exercise in spiking (110). Unlike typical tourists, “spiking excursions may seek anything but the ideal”: “The goal is to seek out challenge; and (perhaps) to rejoice in the discomfort that the challenge might bring” (111). Hardship may be associated with challenge, but “overcoming a challenge seems the more central interest” (111).

Challenge needs to be balanced with skill, though, so that the participant can enter into a flow experience: “The more difficult it is to negotiate the balance, the more profound and meaningful the experience” (112). Because “spiking permits hikers to choose challenges/parameters that best meet their personal skills and goals. . . . hikers can best express their own values, abilities and skill sets” through the challenges they pursue (112). “Challenge and the potential to overcome that challenge stir the heart of the spiking community,” the authors contend. “This represents considerable opportunity for tourism providers. Locations and venues that can promise challenge will gain the attention of the spiking community” (112). 

Spikers often share their adventures, using blogs to do so (113). Those blogs “may promote, guide and direct the spiking efforts of others,” who desire to emulate the challenges they read about (113). Spiking has a shadow, however: the risk of personal injury, which can be life-threatening (114-15). Any usually non-competitive activity, like birding, has “spiking potential” (116); in fact, the idea of spiking “can be applied to almost any setting” (116). The solo, durational walks of artists like Richard Long or Hamish Fulton might be considered forms of spiking, but I’m not sure that their primary goal is challenging themselves physically or mentally. Spiking also suggests that the range of activities in which people are willing to engage can extend far beyond relatively short, convivial walks. I find myself wondering what kinds of walking are actually anti-democratic, given the way that people engage in spiking out of desire and interest.

In chapter 12, “On the Beaten Track: How Do Narratives from Organised Hiking Differ from ‘Real’ Hiking Narratives?” (119-26), Outi Rantala and Seija Tuulentie write that “there is an emerging market for soft adventure holidays offering convenient, risk-assessed and quality-assured hiking experiences for people with little wilderness experience”—in contrast to the ideal Finnish hiker, “a Jack-London type lonely wolf surviving easily in wilderness” (119). These “commercial hiking holidays are described in terms of easiness of accessing beautiful scenery, convenience, and no-need-for-previous-experience” (119). They are not like traditional hikes in Finland:

Traditional, independently arranged hiking in Finnish Lapland means walking fairly long distances, carrying quite heavy backpacks with equipment for camping out, and having some orienteering and fire-making skills. On the other hand, infrastructure such as open huts and fireplaces are available easily for everyone. Everyman’s rights permit walking almost everywhere, and nature can be regarded as safe. Despite the relative easiness of hiking terrain, good infrastructure and well-marked trails, demand exists for organised hiking trips. (119)

The authors want to know how the experiences of hiking differ between independent hikers and those participating in an organized hike (119). That’s the language they’re using: 

The concept of hiking refers here to trips that include long-distance walks across mountain areas or woods, and at least one overnight stay. By organised hikes, we refer to trips that have been arranged by tourism companies or outdoor and other associations, and which have a participation fee. Organised hikes also differ from independent hikes in that the group members do not know each other beforehand, and the group has a guide or a leader. In addition, luggage transportation may be arranged and accommodation provided by local enterprises. These arrangements make the organised hikes naturally more costly, but also more safe and easy, than the independent hiking trips. (119)

However, the authors note that “both types of hiking include a lot of walking along paths or terrain, which requires good physical condition and appropriate clothing and shoes” (119).

Their data consist of narratives about both kinds of hiking, posted on blogs or published in book form (120). They write that “there is a difference between online diaries produced by ‘real’ hikers and those produced by persons participating in organised hiking trips. Organised hiking trip narratives were more often published on the organisers’ websites instead of independent blogs or diaries” (120). The authors focus on practices “that seem to differentiate the ‘real’ hikers from commercial ones in Finnish Lapland: finding the way, setting up the camping area, and adventuring” (121), but they also “focus on issues that are common to the walking experiences of both types of hikers’ narratives” (121). 

“Orienteering, or simply finding one’s way in the wilderness dominates the narratives of independent hikers”: getting lost, finding the path, are essential parts of narratives of independent hikers (121). “The practice of finding one’s way . . . brings together the previous embodied experience of hiking in the wilderness and the hours spent preparing for the trip by reading maps, counting kilometres, evaluating the fitness of each hiking companion, learning about the spots to find fresh water, and checking the weather forecast,” they write (122). In addition, “the descriptions of way-finding often refer to the process of learning—learning the best route, learning how to walk on rocky ground, or learning not to trust other people’s advice” (122). Hikers also need to be ready to change plans quickly (122). In contrast, while way-finding is also present in narratives of participants from organized hiking trips, they usually take a visual form: “paths show the way, but they also give perspective to the pictures of open landscape” (122). In other words, while “independent hikers use way-finding as a plot in their narrative or fill the narration of way-finding with thick description,” participants in “organised hiking use pictures related to way-finding more as proof of being in a certain spot and as marking where the path next takes them. Thus, the expectations are not forwarded towards the embodied knowledge of not getting lost” (122). 

“Similar to way-finding, the parts of narratives that describe setting up the camp for a night and sleeping in the wilderness are thick with expectations and modalities,” they continue (122). For independent hikers, 

the practice of setting up the camp is very much intertwined with the practice of walking—both because the longer it takes to find a good spot to set up the camp, the longer one needs to walk and carry their heavy backpack with all the gear related to sleeping, and because the rhythms of walking and sleeping impact each other. Sleeping out in the wilderness does not form a break from the day’s activities for independent hikers, but is rather an integral part of the experience where the walking body is in a lying position on the same ground that is trodden by feet during the hike. (122)

Narratives about setting up camp are bound up with narratives about weather; storms and hard rain bring out “strong emotions such as fear,” partly because they are not typical in Finland (122). Other weather challenges reported include wind and hot temperatures (122). In the narratives of independent hikers, “the freedom of setting up camp anywhere in the wilderness and freedom to change plans is apparent throughout the stories. . . . It is the freedom of choosing the place to set up camp, but also the embodied skill needed to be able to do so, that differentiates the narratives between the two groups of hikers” (123).

Photographs taken by independent hikers and participants in organized hikes resemble each other—because the landscape is the same, and because the images suggest the way adventure is constructed “through hiking in a special and prestigious destination” (123). “However, the independent hikers add another layer of adventure to the narration by describing when something unexpected happens in this landscape—when the vastness of the wilderness or the hardness of the rocky ground causes changes to the planned hike,” the authors suggest. “The unexpectedness refers to risks that are apparent in hiking in the (relatively safe) wilderness and mastery of the risky conditions. Outdoor adventure tourism is, however, as much about mastering the risks as about communion with nature and therefore various methods can be used to construct expectations related to adventure in the narratives of hikers” (123). 

“The communion with nature is referred to when the rhythm of walking and sleeping is changed to match better the rhythm of nature” in the thick description of the hikers’ engagements with the natural world (123). However, “sociability is also a significant focus of the narratives,” both in those created by independent hikers and to the participants in organized trips: “Independent hikers often report being with friends and meeting other hikers, while the participants of the arranged trips have to adjust their walking to that of the group of previously unknown participants and the guide” (123). Sociability is related to safety, since hiking alone is dangerous, and in the arranged trips, that relationship is intensified, because the members of the group don’t know each other before beginning the hike (124). Participants in organized hikes often write about finding solitude and avoiding social action as a moral imperative: “Because of these expectations related to the wilderness experience, it is not surprising that some of the participants of the organised hikes want to emphasise that it is possible to be alone in a group; to walk alone and only have pauses and nights together, or the notion of the group being so small that it is possible to feel the wilderness” (124). However, social relationships end up strained when something goes wrong (124).

“Another important part of the narratives, which is common to both independent and organised hikers, is the expression of surviving and exceeding oneself,” the authors report (124). Achievement means different things to different people, but it is central, and difficulties make the achievement more memorable (124). Indeed, without difficulties, there is often no story to tell: “the Finnish narratives convey an intensity of experience, when something ‘really happened’ during the journey. When the route is lost, the weather gets worse or some small injury happens, the narrative gets more layered” (125). Thick description also emerges “when decisions about the change of route or place to set up camp have to be made, or when there is hesitation if the hikers have lost their way” (125). Hiking in a group is a sociable experience, both in independent and arranged hikes, but “the possibility of solitude is strong” (125). 

In their conclusion, the authors note that the main difference between the two kinds of hiking “relates to making decisions related to way-finding and setting up the camp. The narratives of either deciding to continue the trip as planned or to take a step away from the planned route and rhythm were full of expectations. The continuous decision making, based on embodied knowledge and sensory perception of weather, is an important part of independent hikers’ experiences, but is not apparent in participating in an organised hike” (125). All of this strikes me as relevant to discussions of solo, durational walking practices as compared to some, but certainly not all, participatory or convivial art walking projects. I know that when I have participated in walks curated by my friend Hugh Henry, I haven’t worried about way-finding or where to camp, because those decisions have been made in advance. In contrast, when I’ve walked alone, I’ve gotten lost and often been puzzled about where to camp. I wonder if the same is true of some convivial walking projects. If the route is determined in advance, there will be less flexibility and also perhaps less anxiety for participants—but more for the organizers of the walk, I would think, who are responsible for the safety, well-being, and quality of experience of participants. 

Chapter 13, “Comparisons Between Hikers and Non-Hikers in Iceland: Attitudes, Behaviours and Perceptions,” by Anna Dóra Sæþósdóttir, C. Michael Hall and Þorkell Stefánsson (127-36), looks at hiking and walking is an important part of the tourist experience in Iceland (128). The authors surveyed hikers and non-hikers—both Icelanders and foreign tourists—and discovered that hikers were more likely not to like roads, bridges, hotels, restaurants, gas stations, visitors centres, and power plants; however hikers were more in favour of mountain huts and campsites (131). On the other hand, non-hikers thought designated footpaths, walkways, picnic places and markings on places of interest were important (131). “However, enjoying peace and unspoilt nature, walking without seeing structures, having few other tourists around, seeing no trace of off-road driving, and no trace of others having been there, of marked walking routes and campsites with facilities, and to be able to camp wherever they want and where they do not hear or see others, are all more important to hikers than non-hikers,” they suggest (131-34). In addition, hikers were more negative about power lines than non-hikers (134). Hikers also tend to perceive Highland areas as “safer, more natural and more accessible than non-hikers” (134). In their conclusions, the authors note that 80 percent of international tourists visit Iceland because of its natural environment, “which makes it a resource for the tourism industry, as well as for energy generation and low-cost, energy-dependent businesses such as smelters. Nevertheless, the capacity to reconcile infrastructure development with tourism is substantially limited from a visitor perspective” (134-35). Therefore, if the country develops power plants, energy-dependent industries, and power lines in Highland areas, tourists may not return—although only 10 percent of visitors surveyed engaged in hiking, although that activity was more prevalent in the Highlands (135). The authors conclude that “hikers perceive and understand the landscape in a different way from non-hikers. Their willingness to tolerate certain infrastructure or evidence of environmental disturbance is more limited than non-hikers” (135). Perhaps the hikers expect an unspoiled or even curated landscape, whereas other tourists have lower expectations?

I skipped half a dozen chapters that were not relevant to my work and landed on chapter 22: Hannelene Schilar’s essay “The Solo-Hike: A Journey of Distance and Closeness” (223-31). Schilar walked 800 km on hiking rails in Sweden, Norway, and Finland over three months in the summer of 2014—alone: she was “curious about what thought and solitude would do to me” (223). As a researcher, she was skeptical about those motivations, however, and observant of the experience and interested in what others are looking for “out there” (223). Her hikes were her fieldwork; she met 16 other solo-hikers during her journey “and sought to grasp their aspirations as well as experiences” through unstructured interviews, with leading questions as prompts (223). Those leading questions included “What do they seek out there? What is solo-hiking about? What does it feel like?” (223). Those questions “emphasize the phenomenological stance of the project” (223). “Striving to translate the phenomenological approach into practice, my work has been characterized by moving forward, not only on the paths, but interview by interview—building, rebuilding and discarding hypotheses, seeking a deeper understanding of the solo-hiking experience,” Schilar writes (224). She met her interview subjects as another solo-hiker, an equal “sharing their experiential world and building a trust-based relationship” (224), and her hiking became the basis of her PhD dissertation (224).

“Initially, the solo-hike disguises itself as a celebration of solitude and independence,” Schilar writes. “Solitude is never seen as boring, but in its calm and beautiful moments, it gets lonely at times” (224). So while solitude “allows a deeper engagement with and profounder experiences of the natural surroundings” and an experience of independence—“a somewhat Romantic vision of the solitary walker”—“there is more than the mere being alone, isolation, intensity or independence to the solo experience” (224). Some solo hikers do not choose to walk alone, but do that by default (224). Paradoxically, being alone means meeting more people: “actual solitude is a much-negotiated attribute of the trip; and what appears a search for solitude can in reality be a search for company” (225). For Schilar, “the solo-hiker is not a simplistic archetype—a loner or a hard-core adventurer. Rather the solo-hiker is a momentary role people are curious about or long for. This experience is often depicted in contrast to their social/family lives and symbolizes a response to it” (225).

Hiking “is very bodily and physical. Simply a forward movement. Moving forward is satisfying and natural. There is the body and its only task is the path” (225). “You just go ahead,” she writes. “A hundred, two hundred, three hundred kilometres. Sometimes you stumble. Sometimes it rains. It is exhausting” (225). In their descriptions of the physical experience, “people speak of challenge, struggle, pain and an encounter with their limits. It should be emphasized that the attraction lies again in the difference to the challenges of everyday life” (225). She writes that “some people might come in the first place because of an encounter with their psychic boundaries (work, family, etc.). So, out there they play with their physicality and test their bodies instead, which seems to establish a different way of proving oneself. Thus, walking is seen as bringing physique and psyche in balance” (226). 

Schilar’s particular interest is in “the construction of adventure and awayness through the forward movement” of solo-hiking (226). She suggests that “the physical nature of walking and experiences of liminality become exploited in people’s storytelling to construct some form of adventurer-identity: moving forwards, the solo-hiker becomes an adventurer” (226). People use humour to turn risky experiences into adventure stories where they are heroically pitted against the natural world (226). In this way, solo-hiking is a form of performance: “I remember when I walked without seeing anybody for hours or sometimes days. You walk completely alone, unobserved. When you then spot a person on the horizon something strange happens: you become aware of your body through the eyes of the other, how you walk, what you look like; you immediately censor your behaviour” (226-27). Some solo hikers take selfies—another kind of performance (227). Solo-hikers “seek an adventure aesthetic and the forward movement is a becoming: first, through their physical embodiment, and second, through their narratives” (227). 

“Further, the forward movement brings the solo-hiker away,” Schilar writes. “Away from real life, the city, work, technology and society. It is about being somehow close to nature and far away from ‘all this’” (227). Hikers thus make a distinction between urban life and nature which implies frustration with and critique of urban life—its speed, the way it destroys the natural world through resource extraction and consumerism, its anonymity and coldness (227). In contrast, nature is seen as “less harsh, but offering calm, relaxation and peace” (227). “In this respect,” Schilar writes, 

nature is a place that is away and distant, not necessarily in terms of geographical distance, but distant and different in terms of experience. Moving forward, the solo-hiker enters and explores another experiential world, another lifeworld. Time and space are perceived differently: they evaporate or dissolve. People speak of following the flow of the day and inner rhythm instead of a schedule or a clock. They also describe a different way of place-making that is free and unconstrained. They have the feeling of being able to go anywhere, to make places their own by simply putting up the tent and give them meaning. They tell about a deep engagement with place and particularly the path. (227)

The natural world “and its construction stand very much in relation to real life. The solo-hikers strive to travel and live outdoors, collect new experiences and return. Again the appeal lies in the temporariness of the experience” (228). The hike is thus not “an escape, but rather an establishment of balance” (228). That balance embraces not only “the here and there, but also the inner/outer, mental/physical” (228).

According to Schilar, the solo-hike can be “understood as an inwards turn, exploration of the self and its place within the life path,” and it gives “a frame for thought,” which is seen as desirable (228). It is an experience of flow (228) and a meditation or inner exploration (228). However, solo-hikers aren’t clear about how those inner processes are connected to their journey: “Occasionally, it is expressed that the simplicity of tasks (walking, eating, camping) liberates the mind. Yet, I remember these also occupy the mind greatly: How far have I walked? What will I cook? Where will I put my tend?” (228). Her interviewees tended “to feel more calm and orderly in their minds, without knowing how” (228). She argues “that the walking path and the individual life path are closely intertwined. So, some people seek to overcome specific life events (death, separation, loss of job[)]” while for others “the path symbolizes a rite of passage between childhood and maturity” (228). “Popular culture is full of tales of salvation through solo-hiking,” and these narrative raise “critical questions: Is that a promise? Does the solo-hike always function the way people hope for or expect? Is there always a rewarding inner experience?” (228). For that reason, there’s a need for longitudinal approaches, “to explore the wide range of experiences that individuals gain when turning inwards and when placing the solo-hike within their life paths” (229). Schilar concludes, “While it could at first seem that the solo-hike stands isolated in time and space, seemingly remote and alone, the material emphasized instead the embeddedness of the solo-hiking experience within a specific social, societal context and point in life” (229). 

I skipped most of the book’s third section, on the establishment and management of hiking trails, and found myself at chapter 25, “Rambling On: Exploring the Complexity of Walking as a Meaningful Activity,” by Kirsty Finnie, Tania Wiseman and Neil Ravenscroft (253-63). “Walking is the most popular leisure activity in the UK,” they begin, although people walk less now than they used to, “many healthy walking initiatives have failed,” and “more than half of the adults in England are not meeting the minimum recommendations for physical activity,” especially men (253). There is a gender divide in walking: “men do not benefit from simple physical activities such as walking to the extent that women do, which can impact negatively on men’s health and well-being, especially in later life” (254). 

To find out why men walk, “[a] qualitative study using a phenomenological approach to analyse semi-structured interviews was designed. This design allowed the exploration of the participants’ experiences of walking as a meaningful activity” (254). Participants were eight men interviewed about walking by a BBC radio podcast about rambling in the UK, interviews that took place in rural settings chosen by the participants—the authors were looking for “a rich description of the meaning of walking outdoors to men” (254-55). 

The findings of the analysis of those interviews suggested that “[o]ne of the main motivations found was to take the time to notice the setting. Participants made a point of commenting on their surroundings over the course of the walk, which was often linked and intertwined with the past, the place and nature” (256). Participants commented on how the space where they were walking had changed over time or how it had been used in the past (256); they also talked about how “the place can evoke strong emotions and provide motivation to walk” and about the personal significance of the location (257) and discussed their connection to nature, the earth, and life itself (257). Participants also “expressed their sense of self in terms of their present selves, how the walk inspires reminiscence of past self and in terms of the overall well-being experienced while walking” (257). “Participants demonstrated that walking provides opportunities to view the world differently, gaining inspiration from the surroundings and from the rhythm of walking, as well as discovering and exploring new things,” the writers suggest (259).

“This study illustrates the multifaceted and complex nature of walking as leisure, demonstrated by the three main themes and nine subthemes emerging from the data” (260). For the authors, “the benefits of walking go well beyond achieving the recommended weekly activity intake”: 

Indeed, the physical benefits of the activity were routinely lost within a deeper connection with the landscape, nature and a keen sense of the past. This study thus illustrates that there are a number of different meanings for men of walking for leisure, challenging ideas of walking as simply physical exercise and men’s leisure as essentially instrumental. Walking, for these participants, provided a platform to connect with themselves and the natural environment, both in the present and the past, and to reap the benefits of these connections. (260)

These findings “offer new insights into the potential value of walking for men”: 

Chief among these insights is that—unlike many of their other activities—walking can introduce sociability into men’s lives, as well as giving them an apparently safe space in which to experience themselves. Contrary to current literature, which places significance on walking in a group and values social connectedness, this study demonstrates the importance of surroundings. This was important to the participants’ experiences of meaningfulness. . . . The surroundings offered participants a sense of homecoming, belonging and familiarity, and were related to the physical environment in terms of history, landscape and nature. (260)

The research participants “described a connection to specific places, which suggests that the landscape provides cultural importance to the individual. This supports the unique value of personal experience and the finding that people access different landscapes for different reasons to meet specific needs” (260). They “reflected on aspects of themselves as part of their walking experience and these emerged in three subthemes of present, past and well-being” (260). 

“Contrary to common discourse about walking, social aspects did not appear to be a key element for participants in this study,” the authors state:

Masculinity also did not emerge as a main finding within awareness of self, which may be incongruent within the social construction of men portrayed in leisure studies. This may be due to the type of walking or rambling that the men were discussing, as it could be argued that this level of activity lacks many of the more “masculine” characteristics, such as competition or stamina. (260)

The brief discussion of masculinity suggests something about walking and the performance of gender for me. Perhaps because walking is not strenuous, the “physical aspects of well-being were not commonly highlighted as a main part of engaging in walking outdoors”; nor were issues of vulnerability (260). The authors suggest that “participants may not have considered walking primarily as a form of exercise” but rather “a platform to engage in other activities” (260). “Participants were able to view the world differently, gain inspiration to feed their creativity and explore and discover new things,” they conclude. “This theme is congruent with doing, which values exploring new opportunities as a way of experiencing meaningful occupations” (260-61). While walking “offered an opportunity to be inspired,” it also “elicited a sense of adventure, which appeared to motivate many of the participants to engage in it, because they valued the unpredictability of the exercise” (261).

I skipped over a chapter that concluded that long-distance walking can be tranformative—I already knew that from experience—and read chapter 27, “Walking to Promote Increased Physical Activity” (274-87), by Ian Patterson, Shane Pegg, and Wan Rabiah Wan Omar. They suggest that “there are two categories of non-participation” in walking: “those who do not desire to participate, and those for whom constraints or barriers exist” (276-77). The authors distinguish between “internal constraints, which are seen as within the individual’s control, and external constraints, that refer to those beyond an individual’s control” (277). They suggest that “the challenge for policy makers in to identify walking intervention strategies that reduce these constraints, as well as to increase people’s motivations to walk regularly” (277).

Ethnicity, age, gender, car ownership, education, and work status are socio-demographic characteristics “pertinent to walking activity” (277). Under the heading of ethnicity, language barriers and peer non-acceptance due to cultural beliefs are barriers to physical activity, particularly for women from “diverse racial or ethnic backgrounds” (277). People tend to become less physically active as they get older (277). Women less likely to walk than men—partly because of chores in the home—but women are more likely to walk if they have friends to walk with, if they have family support, could walk with a baby in a stroller, and “had a variety of places to walk” (277); in contrast, walking for men was more associated with their level of education (277)—although how education affects men and walking isn’t clear from the chapter. Car owners walk less than people without cars (278). High levels of education and income are correlated with high levels of physical activity, although one study found no connection between people who reported being regular trail users and socio-demographic characteristics when income, race, and gender were taken into consideration (278). Being in or out of work seems to have little effect on whether people walk (278). Intrapersonal influences, including knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, personality traits influence walking behaviour (278). However, intrapersonal influences are hard to change, so the authors suggest focusing on environmental factors instead (279). 

Social support is “one of the important influential determinants on walking activity,” and both formal and informal social support networks are important (279). Focusing on changing social factors regarding walking is important, but that needs to be supported with other physical interventions, such as “providing suitable facilities in order to make walking convenient” (279). For this reason, walking trails are important (280), although people need to feel they will be safe from crime on walking trails, and safe from traffic as well (280). Different trail surface materials suit different types of trail activity, but a “fine-grained surface creates an efficient environment for pedestrian travel and, more importantly, it enables wheelchair users, as well as families with babies in strollers, to use walking trails” (281). Trail width is also a consideration, as are the gradients of slopes: “The absence of hilly terrains has been found to be associated with higher levels of trail use” (281). Walking trails need to be close to communities (281)—not only close to home, but also to schools, shops, transit, open spaces (281). Trails need to have scenic views and trailside facilities, including toilets, benches, drinking fountains, garbage bins, signage, picnic tables, parking, bike racks; and, for people with disabilities, handrails, accessible toilets, seats for resting (282). Well-maintained trails attract more walkers (282). For the authors, “the most effective trails are usually generated from community input that emphasises community interest,” so “it is important to consider a range of people’s perspectives in the design of trails, in order to encourage greater interest in walking” (282). They conclude that “a multi-level intervention is the most desirable option to achieve increased walking activity” (282). I found the brief discussion of gender and walking in this chapter interesting, but I would’ve liked to know more about why and how men and women walk differently.

I skipped a chapter on leisure walking and began reading Giovanna Bertella’s “Dog Walking in Urban Greenspaces” (300-08). Although this chapter seemed far from my research, it yielded the term “‘soft fascination’”: “a combination of light physical activity, effortless concentration and aesthetic pleasure” (300). “Soft fascination is often described by the pleasure deriving from various sources, such as, for example, the observation of vegetation and animals, at a distance removed from urban landscapes, typically studded with offices and shops,” Bertella writes (300). I would like to know more about “soft fascination” and its connection to different kinds of walking.

“The companionship of a dog usually motivates people to use urban greenspaces for daily walks,” Bertella states, although some studies indicate “that simple ownership of a dog does not necessarily lead to performance of daily walks” (300). “Nonetheless, it can be said that urban greenspaces provide a leisure-oriented landscape to which many dog guardians daily bring their canine companions to play, exercise and socialise with other dogs and humans” (300). This study focuses “on those aspects related to the dog guardian’s mental well-being, understood as an experience of pleasure, happiness, sense of meaning and self-realisation” (300). Dog walking is one way the relationship between dogs and their owners manifests itself; it “can be described as a daily ritual shaped by a combination of the guardians’ conceptualisation of their dogs and other more practical considerations, such as, for example, the time available for the activity, and the physical conditions and characteristics of the dog” (300-01). Because dog walking is “motivated by a strong sense of responsibility as a result of interspecies love and respect” and is “designed to satisfy the dogs’ physical and mental needs to be active,” it “can be described as a leisure-friendly obligation”:

Dog walking is about commitment and responsibility, as well as enjoyment and relaxation. Thus, the dog walking experience can be situated between the obligation the person feels towards the animal and the pleasant aspects of the activity that, from the perspective of the human, is centred on a strong emotional attachment to the dog as well as personal positive output in the form of soft fascination. (301)

There’s that term “soft fascination” again: I’m going to have to learn more about that. 

Bertella’s study used an autoethnographic, narrative methodology: she reported her experiences of dog walking in Florence, Italy, and Tromso, Norway, in both summer and winter, in a diary (301). Those diary entries were then categorized thematically (301-02). Her findings suggest that the dog-walking experience is “an interspecies ritual,” and its repetitive aspects generate a sense of security for participants (303). The experience is shared with other dog-human couples (303), and dog walkers tended to see themselves as a group of like-minded people (303). In this way, “dog walking in urban greenspaces promotes the emergence of spontaneous interspecies communitas. These are social entities which include people and dogs—the latter viewed as significant others—that emerge as temporary states of affectual bonding created through direct mutual interaction and the recognition of similar lifestyles” (304).

“Several aspects of the dog walking experience . . . can be related to the concept of soft fascination”: ideas of relaxation and reflection, of getting away from obligations to people (family members or colleagues), and of spending time alone (304). According to Bertella, “[t]he dog in particular seemed to be perceived as a special significant other with whom the person could be entirely her- or himself” (304). “The data suggest also that dog walking was perceived as experiencing a sort of domesticated nature, characterised by vegetation and animals, as well as by human built objects, such as benches and—in the case of Florence—monuments,” she writes. “In this sense, it was an experience somewhere in between being in nature and being in a human-built environment” (304). In addition, “dog walking was sometimes described as an alternative way to see and live in the town” (305).

Dog walkers tended to respond to the urban environment through their interpretations of the animals’ perception of the environment (305); “[t]hus, dog walking can be described as a sort of in-between experience—an experience between an obligation and a leisure, an experience of being together and being alone, being in nature and being in town, being a human and being an animal” (305). It is a liminoid experience, both “a means of escaping from the realities [of] everyday responsibilities, but also as opportunities for individual movement and expression” (305). Dog walking is also an ethical experience: it depends “on the conceptualisation that the guardian has of his or her dog and, presumably, of dogs in general” (306). Dog walkers sometimes reflected “on both their attitudes towards, and beliefs about, different animal species, and also about the value of each animal, viewed as a unique individual and not just as a member of a specific species” (306). In this way, urban dog walking is complex: it can be understood through concepts like communitas and liminoid experience, and it “can be important in terms of soft fascination, and can also be a meaningful experience in terms of security and freedom” (306). It also offers people “the possibility of finding harmony in the contrasting aspects of everyday urban life” (306). Finally, it “can encourage reflection on the way we experience the physical environment and animal ethical issues, and, consequently, it can be relevant in terms of self-realization, contributing to personal growth” (306).

I still want to learn more about the differences between places that are walkable and places that aren’t, so I read chapter 30,“Walkable Places for Visitors: Assessing and Designing for Walkability” (311-29), by Yael Ram and C. Michael Hall. They note that cities, 

as walking spaces, were developed for their citizens around two forms of walking facilities—streets and what Solnit described as, ‘anti-streets,’ which refers to public spaces such as parks, gardens and promenades. While the ‘streets’ reflect everyday life and, before the eighteenth century were seldom used for pleasure, the ‘anti-streets’ were often built solely for the pleasure of citizens, and especially the emerging middle classes of the industrial revolution, and were initially designated to convey or resemble high-class aesthetics. (311)

More recently, streets and parks “have become foci of research, reflecting the understanding that walking facilitates the pedestrian’s mental and physical health, and can provide environmental benefits as a mode of green mobility, as well as encourage the development and maintenance of social capital through engagement and familiarity with the neighborhood and local people” (311). Walkability is “achieved when the streets and other walking spaces provide pedestrians a secure network of connections to varied destinations, within a reasonable amount of time and effort, and offering a pleasant and interesting context” (311).

The concept of walkability is broad “and encompasses different approaches and definitions, which may lead to different design outcomes” (311). Its features include “areas being traversable, compact, physically enticing and safe, while others deal with the outcomes potentially fostered by such environments, such as making places lively, enhancing sustainable transportation options and inducing exercise” (311). Other features of walkability in the literature of the subject include the notion that it can be equated to “encouraging physical activity; close, barrier-free; safe; full of pedestrian infrastructure and destinations; and upscale, leafy, or cosmopolitan” (311). There are two key factors of walkable built environments: proximity and access (312). “Walkable trips are usually considered by urban planners as trips that take no longer than five minutes (equivalent to 400 meters) for each direction,” Ram and Hall note, suggesting that for longer trips, people prefer to drive (312). “Other factors that are often mentioned as central to walkability,” they continues, “are connectivity and continuation of the sidewalks and absence of barriers for walking; linkage to other transport modes; safety from traffic, crime and falls; the physical conditions and the quality of the path and contextual values, such as aesthetic and historic interest” (312).

However, walking also takes place within a behavioural environment “within which walking and personal decisions about walking occur” (312). “The characteristics of the built environment and the physical geography of a location, e.g. weather, steepness, together with the people who use and inhabit a location create the design and place qualities that walkers experience,” Ram and Hall contend. “These are also affected at the micro-level by decisions with respect to routes, distance, purpose of trip, as well as the time at which walking occurs; and at the macro level by the governance of walking in a particular location,” which includes factors such as “street cleanliness and garbage collection, but over longer time scales it includes path maintenance and design, public space provision, public transport availability, and the planning laws that affect urban design, density, roading and pedestrian friendliness” (312). The combination of these objective and subjective factors “provide the environment that determines perceived accessibility, as well as the behavior of walkers” (312-13).

Visitors and tourists tend to be ignored by the literature on walkability in favour of “local pedestrians” (315). However, the authors contend that “research and understanding of tourists’ walkability can be perceived as an additional important aspect of walkable places, as well as urban walkability” (315). I’m not interested in tourism, so I skipped ahead to the authors’ conclusions, where they suggest that “the popular assumption that walkability is always good for places is simplistic and neglects issues of design and assessment. For the urban destination as a whole, walkability is probably an advantage, but there is a lack of reliable and valid measurement tools to confirm it” (324). The chapter’s bibliography of studies on walkability gives me a place to begin trying to understand that concept better. I want to know whether my city is walkable, compared to other cities where convivial or participatory walking takes place, and whether walkability is a feature in the development of a walking culture that would support participatory walking events and projects. 

I skipped over the rest of the book, which focused on tourism and the design of walking trails—I’m not interested in either topic. The concluding chapter was repetitive and not of much interest. Nevertheless, The Routledge International Handbook of Walking was useful as an introduction to the way social scientists think about walking, and ideas like walkability and soft fascination will be worth following up on. To what extent are psychogeographic or mythogeographic walks, for instance, ways of experiencing a form of soft fascination, perhaps in environments that might not tend to generate that response, even though, on the surface, soft fascination appears to be the antithesis of what that kind of walking seeks? Is walkability an unspoken requirement for participatory or convivial walking events? I’ve ended up with a long list of articles to read after finishing this book, and no doubt that’s a good thing. I’m broadening my ideas about walking. That’s the point of this exercise, so I’m heading in the right direction.

Works Cited

Hall, C. Michael, Yael Ram, and Noam Shoval, eds. The Routledge International Handbook of Walking, Routledge, 2018.

Holloway, Dan. Six Self-Publishing Surprises.” The Guardian, 30 July 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/jul/30/six-self-publishing-surprises.

Helen Billinghurst, Claire Hind, and Phil Smith, editors, Walking Bodies: Papers, Provocations, Actions from Walking’s New Movements, the Conference

This book arrived some time last year, but I didn’t read it right away. Why not? I don’t know. Perhaps because I attended the conference at the University of Plymouth in November 2019 that it documents, or because I’m the author of one of the chapters. But since I’m reading books about walking as an art practice, it was time to take it off the shelf and start reading.

Walking Bodies is a heterogenous text, bringing together accounts of walking projects, theoretical essays, manifestoes, scripts and walking prompts and various forms of photographic and textual documentation of walks of many different kinds. That mixture suggests something about the richness of contemporary art walking practices—at least as represented at that conference—and of their political ambitions. I’m not going to discuss every chapter in this summary, but they’re all worth reading or, in the case of the photographic chapters, viewing. Instead, I’m going to focus on the chapters that have some bearing on my current research project.

All three editors, who organized the conference as well, provide introductions to the book. Phil Smith is first. He notes that at the beginning of the conference, the organizers “acknowledged a lack of any clear pattern to the subject matter of the various provocations, performances and papers,” and that they wondered whether “something more coherent might arise as a result of the events, question and answer sessions, social encounters and general interactions to come” (v). Afterwards, when they sat down to think about this book, they felt the same way: “for all our excitement at the multiplicity of experiences and information-exchanges that we had shared in, we retained only the vaguest sense that anything as coherent as a theme had emerged from the conference” (v). It was only after chapter submissions had been received did “something like the appearance of a ‘movement,’ however partial,” begin to form: “Not in the sense of a social movement, but rather a coalescing of quite separate ideas that seemed drawn to each other, perhaps superseding the agency of their human proposers” (v). For Smith, the book suggests “something of a change of direction in walking arts,” even though it includes only “a fraction of a fraction of a fraction” of the work of the conference’s participants (v). The pattern Smith sees 

seems to be partly constituted of a shift towards embodiment; to a walking body at the mercy of the terrain rather than one bathing in the sublime or masterfully sponging up ambiences. The relative and material nature of that “at the mercy” is made clear in some of the chapters below: it is not something that many walkers now seek to transcend, but rather to negotiate. The dynamic pattern at play here is partly fuelled by a fracturing in psychogeography; with the unhuman geography becoming more highly prized than the human “psycho” part. (vi)

“Within this shift, the integrity and identity of walkers’ bodies is far from sure; indeed, they are by no means necessarily human or free from hybridity,” he continues. “Instead, the walk is more likely shared than individual; even when walking alone, the walker is not ‘lone’ in the way that it was sometimes assumed they were in the recent history of walking arts” (vi). 

For that reason, some of the book’s chapters “attend to the unhuman others that walk with the human,” and sometimes “this extended webbing of various walkings is expressed in ecological terms,” while in others, “as a kind of animism,” and in still others, as both (vi). This webbing isn’t the interest in the occult that is characteristic of some forms of psychogeography: “Instead, this is more of a somatic and immersed pushing back against scientism and positivism in the face of climate catastrophe,” which “seems to favour intuition and tacit knowledge; the value of body to body learning and transmission by repertoire as much or more than by archive; and the value of being bodily immersed and entangled with alien consciousnesses as a means to arts, research and activist practices” (vi). New influences on these walking practices have appeared—Donna Haraway, Karen Barad, Simon O’Sullivan—while others have faded in importance, Smith notes (vi), and while it’s too early to say what these changes will mean for walking practices—particularly in the context of the climate disaster that is unfolding—Smith wonders if the Red Brigade, first seen at Extinction Rebellion actions, and the essays in this book might not be “responses to the same extreme circumstances by equally unusual and uneven means”; if that’s the case, “then the future of the ‘walking movements’ looks far less predictable, far less reasonable and far less moderate now than it did before November 2019” (vii).

Next is Claire Hinds. She reflects on the impact of the fleeting moment of the conference, and the way that walking arts “feel like a political necessity, not just for one’s own practice, but for the future of community, embodied practice and transformation” (vii). She suggests that the 10-minute provocations, shared outside of the normal panel-style conference presentations, which “were an exciting range of mini-manifestos and artworks for new ways of walking,” may have been the most important aspect of the conference, and that’s the reason some of them have been documented in this book (vii-viii). The inclusion of those provocations meant that the event felt more like a festival than a conference (viii).

Hinds contends that artists don’t have answers; rather, “they are provocateurs and their works set acts in motion” (viii). The art works that are included in the book “are not simply documentations of walking arts experiences”; instead, “they are prompts asking us to consider changing the way we engage with place and indeed space. They are instructions inviting us to respond, to act now and challenge the way we are living our lives” (ix). She hopes that “this book will be more than a document of a conference. It tells a story of walking’s relationship to creative forms of writing and mark making, where texts, scripts, scores, poetry and the visual arts illuminate the diverse tapestry that is walking arts practice” (ix).

Finally, Helen Billinghurst begins by noting the organizers’ attempt at keeping the cost of the event low, because of the “austerity and precarity” that “currently loom large for many artists and academics” (ix). They also hoped to highlight and flatten “hierarchies of privilege and exclusivity” by pointing towards “convivial and inclusive alternatives for walking, knowledge-sharing, making and doing” drawn from ideas like Nicolas Bourriaud’s “relational aesthetics” or Donna Haraway’s “string figuration” as “a way to relay patterns and make connections in ongoing processes of sympoiesis” (ix). Billinghurst suggests that the resulting conference “evolved into a complex and perplexing body/mind assemblage: jostling, probing, playful, sensual, somatic, occasionally adversarial, sometimes subversive. A human and unhuman hybrid that walked backwards and forwards, looked to the future and leaned into the past” (x). Simply by “levelling the playing field in economic terms,” she writes, “a platform was created that afforded a wider range of bodies and voices to participate and connect with each other” (x). Some of “the rich variety and generosity” of the conference “is now reflected in the chapters and pages of this book” (x).

The book’s first chapter is Sarah Scaife’s “Magical Aesthetics: walking with eight legs” (1-10). Scaife tells us that her visual art practice “tunes in to the vibrations between being-in-the-body, listening and mutual space” (1). “I set out to both emit and receive vibrations; the work emerges through this echo-location,” she writes. “Behind conversations with other people leis another, more private series of dialogues with the more-than-human” which take place through walking “from a place of intention and request, walking in soft absorbency, alert to the polyphony of the cosmos. On these walks I listen and the world speaks to me” (1). This chapter is a reflection on her own presentation but also on “some strands” she perceived during the conference” (1). 

Scaife’s breast cancer diagnosis in 2017 meant that walking took on a new significance; research shows that regular walking boosts the immune system and helps people recover form cancer, and she was able to walk every day during her treatment (1). She is interested in “how a magical, art-walking practice” enables “acceptance of the unknown and inevitable changes which will come; authenticity in expressing thoughts, feelings and emotions; and agency, a sense of autonomy in making choices where this is possible and taking an active part in the journey as it unfolds” (2). Scaife locates her art, theoretically, in “the domain of ‘Magical Aesthetics,’” which she describes as “an aesthetic of hybridity, participation, dialogue and the making of meaning” (2), and she invites her readers to join her in reimagining a walk she made a couple of weeks before the conference, one in which the self and the world present themselves “as tangled multitude” (3).

Scaife cites Emma Bush’s paper at the conference, in which Bush noted that spiders “make sense of the world through eight legs,” through the vibrations they feel in their web; walking also takes place in a web of connection (4-5), as a correspondence to her own practice. She describes her walks as “sign walks,” often walks within walks, made alone or “with one or more human others,” in which they find “an existing beginning and end in the landscape which offers a rite of entry”—a gate, a wall, a place where a path runs between two closely spaced trees or over a stream—and there they “pause and quietly set intention” (5). “From that moment we enter into heightened noticing, a changed perception,” she states (5). After 20 minutes, they step out of the sign walk again, “with appreciation for all we have met, returning to our ordinary sounds” (5). It’s an experience of flow, the state described by the psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi as an state where one experiences few distinctions between oneself and one’s environment, or between stimulus and response, similar to the way non-human animals move through the world (5). “The world that we live in, as experienced through the human sensory body, seems different to the world as known through the body of a spider, or a whale, and yet it is the same world,” Scaife writes. “How are we to make sense of this?” (5-6).

“Magical aesthetic practices offered me the possibility of ‘phoenix growth’: the new growth that rises after a tree has been severely damaged and perhaps fallen, confirming my sense of a deeper dimension of what it is to be alive in the more-than-human world” (6). Her walks, “understood as a magical performance process, have an aftermath,” she continues:

I may archive the walk in the sense that I document signs in a journal, perhaps research the implications of particular signs which I encountered and consider how they relate to the season or the phase of the moon. An object found on the walk—a stone, a berry, a found human-made object—might be added to my private collection temporarily, or for years, and perhaps be used in a different context. There is a time of reflection, of making meaning through the signs. (7)

When she walks with intention, she recognizes these signs: “somehow the creaturely, the elemental and even the discarded shows itself and I just know!” (8). Such “walking in dialogue has an effect on my well being. . . . It is a considered and developed practice. It is walking as a form of listening” (8). She suggests that walking enables her to participate in the generation of different worlds, different communities (9). Her conclusion takes the form of a brief poem: “Through walking we accept the life, death, life cycle. / Through walking we express trust, participation, and gratitude. / Through walking, we perform hope” (9).

In their chapter, “Walking in Tree Time or a walk with the woods” (11-20), Duncan Hay, Leah Lovett, Martin de Jode, Andrew Hudson-Smith ask “what it might mean for walking arts practices and research to recognise trees as walking subjects” (11). That question leads to others:

How can the movements of trees over years and centuries be understood in terms of walking? What does ‘walking in tree time’ reveal to us about our own, human pace, perspective and interactions with the world as walking subjects? Is it possible to conceive of ways for trees and people to walk together and, if so, what techniques are available to artists for bridging the gap—practically, imaginatively—between human and arboreal walking practices and temporalities? (11)

These are the questions raised by their interdisciplinary research project “The Internet of Trees,” which investigated the potential for using “Internet of Things (IoT)” in public spaces (11). The “Internet of Things,” they write, is defined as “a tendency whereby the increasing cheapness of networking, sensing, and artificial intelligence technologies allows more and more objects and devices to become connected to the internet” (12). This process allows “objects not conventionally associated with connectivity”—street furniture, buildings, trees—“to interact with each other and with people” (12). “The corollary of this is that we are not surrounded by objects which are communicating and acting in ways which may be invisible, out of our direct control, and beyond the perceptual limits of human experience,” they write (12).

Their project’s primary outcome was The Listening Wood, a poetic walk on Hampstead heath created by Lovett and a team from the Bartlett Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis at University College London. The project “invited visitors to slow down and attend to the ancient and veteran trees of Golders Hill Park and the wider Heath, employing IoT technologies and SMS text message to disseminate fragments of digital poetry relating to each of the project trees and the landscape they occupy” (12). The Listening Wood required Lovett to spend time observing, drawing, photographing, and walking under the trees, and with their custodians, the park’s arborists (12). “Stories about the veteran pear tree, the weathered sweet chestnut and the steadfast, ancient oak, told to the researchers by the Head of Trees, David Humphries, and his team profoundly challenged our preconceptions about arboreal lives, shifting the direction of the project and shaping the poetic dimension of the installation,” they write (12). The Listening Wood is not as a completed project but rather “an opening and a provocation to the reader to think about trees—and walking—differently” (12). In the project, they set out “to discover the potential for walking with trees and de-centre human practices of walking and open up to indeterminate and nonhuman ways of being and relating to the world” (12). In particular, they are interested in “how radical walking practices might be informed by and contribute to debates in the environmental posthumanities which seek to re-negotiate the concepts of nature and the human” (12-13).

A central concept to their research is “phoenix growth,” which “can occur when a tree falls or when a storm-damaged tree loses a branch. At the cellular level, the grounded branches send out roots and re-orient themselves as trunks, becoming new trees” (13). The authors consider this growth a form of walking, a redefinition that “calls into question tacit assumptions about what it means to walk, what sort of entities might be able to walk, and what it might mean to take a walk in the woods” (13). They note that forests expand and spread (13). However, “to describe phoenix growth—the movement of an individual tree—as walking implies, if not necessarily purposive motion, then at least something willed. To walk is to be active, to move through the world either under one’s own volition or another’s compulsion. Walking implies, in short, a form of subjectivity” (13).

Different temporalities exist for trees and humans, they continue: we may not register the movement of trees as movement, while our own steps, for trees, “if they register at all, must appear as momentary flickers in arboreal lifetimes” (13). “These differing temporalities make the relationships between trees and humans oblique, the forms of subjectivity that they each might hold for themselves and for each other difficult to imagine,” they write (13). “With human walking and tree walking appearing as incommensurate practices, how might we begin to think of walking with trees?” they ask (13).

They suggest their practice is influenced by “serious engagement with Indigenous North American ontologies and methodologies,” and they cite Stephanie Springgay and Sarah E. Truman’s notion of “walking-with” as “a form of solidarity, unlearning, and critical engagement with situated knowledges” that “demands that we forgo universal claims about how humans and nonhumans experience walking, and consider more-than-human ethics and politics of the material intra-actions of walking research’” (qtd. 13-14). “Walking-with, then, engages with marginalised and erased knowledges to bring about new forms of sociability with the other than human, the nonhuman and the inhuman. It seeks to acknowledge the alterity of human experience and nonexperienced time, to recognise the multiplicity of being and time,” they suggest (14). Walking-with “allows for the recognition of nonhuman entities, including trees, as actors with their own distinct peripatetic practices and experiences of walking” (14). 

They also cite Donna Haraway’s notion of “companion species,” species “which are bonded in ‘significant otherness,’” such as human and dogs, comparing this idea to walking-with, since each “relies on acts of empathy and imagination,” on coming into kinship with nonhuman entities (14). “Making kin is . . . a choice and an act: kin does not only describe a genetic, familial relationship; kin also includes those with whom we choose to make common cause, whose lives are bound up with our own, and to whom we are responsible,” they suggest (14). A number of artists—including Jeremy Hastings, Cathy Turner, and Miranda Whall—“have walked with (and in some cases, walked as) donkeys, elephants, and sheep, respectively to de-centre the human in peripatetic artistic practices. These are modes of walking with (or walking-with) which seek to imagine the significant otherness of humans and animals” (14). It may be challenging to make this imaginative leap for domesticated creatures, like dogs or sheep, and it is much more difficult “to imagine the significant otherness of trees and humans,” but the arborists on Hampstead Heath “are in a process of making kin” with the trees they care for: “In their work the arborists are accountable to human needs: the requirement that the Heath be a place of leisure with enough of a modicum of ‘wildness’ to satisfy the bunkered urbanite; to be safe, to be clean, to be beautiful. But they are also accountable to the trees and the meshwork of biological systems they support and are supported by” (14-15). Balancing those needs is delicate and messy, but those are characteristics of “the substance of making kin, of navigating the threads of accountability entailed in sharing a world with other beings” (15). It is also “a form of work” which “de-sacralises the natural. Rather than a sanctified or transcendent space outside of the human (to which we look for salvation), nature is the ground of human and non-human ‘becoming-with’” (15). “The insights of the arboreal team—of tree subjectivity and tree walking—are gleaned through their unusually intimate knowledge of those trees, developed over many years,” they write (15).

“Tree time stretches out beyond the lifespan of any single human being,” the authors continue. “Human lives and human actions can have drastic effects on the lives of trees, but an individual human (if perceptible at all) barely registers in sylvan sense apparatuses” (15). Although they appear stationary, trees have agency: “As much as we act upon them, they act upon us” (15). They wonder if trees use humans as a way to propagate themselves: “There is an eeriness to this thought: that the agency we think we have over the natural might in fact be a part of patterns larger than we (as individuals, at least) can discern” (16). “If tree time and human time are to become commensurate, it must be as inference patterns, the points of convergence, where the rhythms of tree lives and human lives intersect,” they contend (16). Shakespeare’s Macbeth shows how “[t]races of an enchanted world-view cling to Renaissance culture,” with trees walking, and the Witches acting “as mediators between supernatural entities and the world of people. This is a populated universe in which humans are not the only actors” (18). However, this perspective changed with the Enlightenment, when “the humanist subject was placed at the centre of a modern world emptied of other and multiple selves” (18). 

“The Internet of Things, in making objects speak, re-enchants the world; but technology is often thought of as a distraction and as unwanted in spaces that we choose to delimit as ‘natural,’” the authors state, moving to a description of their specific project (18). “Not only does the digital interpenetrate human relationships to politically exploit and monetise them, there is also a sense in which these technologies are hungry for both attention and time,” they continue. “The all-absorbing pull of the screen is felt to prevent meaningful interaction with the world” (18). This technology is also unsettling, both fleshy (the product of rare-earth minerals, assembled in factories by workers) and ethereal, since radio waves are “undetectable to the human sensorium” (18). It also privileges “the instantaneous over the slow” (19). However, The Listening Wood “used technology to encourage people to walk the Heath and unlock poems with keywords inserted into the landscape. The team tried to repurpose the technology in this way to encourage a reflective, slow engagement with arborial lives” (19). The poetry “became the mediating element between the different material and temporal realities of humans, trees, and technology” (19). According to the authors, 

the poems received by visitors to the Heath were less messages from a particular tree, and more a frequency or channel that could only be tuned to in their presence, through being with each tree, in the same place. The appeal to poetics and chance figured as attempts to resist the conversational tropes typical of “chatbots,” to work with the limitations of the software and lay bare the instrumental nature of the message exchange. (19)

The text messages became metaphors “for much greater and more meaningful forms of human, nonhuman and inhuman interaction. It is in the space given over to the imaginaries of the audiences that the trees and technology were able to enchant one another” (19-20). In the project, “IoT and mobile technologies gesture towards new opportunities for walking and walking-with as means of transcending the limitations of species-being, leading to unexpected encounters and ways of imagining relationships between the human and more-than-human” (20). Vicky Hunter’s “Dancing-Walking with Trees” (21-33) reflects on a tree-sound-walk workshop Hunter led with walking artist Rosie Montford and dancer and dance scholar Leslie Satin in September 2019 (21). The workshop was part of the Museum of Walking’s “Sound-Walk Sunday” programme, organized by Andrew Stuck (21). (The Museum of Walking is an online organization that organizes walking-art events [21].) The workshop “extended the sound walk format to incorporate movement, drawing and dance activities alongside listening as modes of doing and thinking that might bring individuals closer to an awareness of environmental issues” (21). It took place in Chichester, along that city’s “tree trail” route, beginning at the city’s university; participants engaged in “drawing, moving, pausing, and reflecting on experiences, sights and sounds gathered along the way” (21).

“Informed by new materialist theory, I will describe what took place, how we worked and reflect a little on the human-nonhuman intra-actions encountered en route and the potential for this type of walking/dancing/moving practice to invoke human-environment relations in particular ways,” Hunter states (21). She includes the work of Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, Stacy Alaimo, Iris Van der Tuin in the term “new materialism” (29), and notes that the term “intra-action” comes from Barad’s work on new materialism and is “a neologism that signifies ‘the mutual constitution of entangled agencies’” (qtd. 21). Intra-action “moves beyond a customary conception of interaction which ‘assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action’” (qtd. 21-22). 

Hunter wants to think about what this approach might bring to walking arts practices and scholarship (22). “My approach to the walking event and to the research that informed it stems from a form of movement practice that I am calling ‘site-based body practice’ in which different actors, material and entities come together and contribute to an entangled process of ‘becoming-with’ one another in a co-constitutive manner in which,” she states, quoting Donna Haraway, “‘all the players evoke, trigger, and call forth what-and-who-exists’” (qtd. 22). “Exploring how bodies, sites and materials might ‘dialogue’ with one another through the medium of sited dance and movement practice I am concerned with pragmatic questions,” she writes, noting that those questions include “how is the body’s design and function reflected in the environments in which it engages? What synergies of form and function exist?” (22). What would happen “if we prioritise bodily knowing over interpretation and analysis and what might site-based body practice reveal regarding human-environment engagement?” she asks (22).

Hunter has engaged “with a range of sites from urban arterial routes to wide open spaces and watery sites and beaches” through “movement improvisation, broadly defined as spontaneous embodied and kinetic responses to bodily engagement with a range of site-based phenomena and materials” (22). Her practice “explores how material and functional analogies between bodies, structures and materials can be initially explored and subsequently developed beyond the analogous into an embodied realm” and aims “to expose the body’s in-built structures and processes as devices through which intrinsic synergies between bodies, and sides might be illuminated and explored” (22). While she’s not interested in anthropomorphizing nonhuman elements, she is concerned with the parallels that can be drawn and the way “that such alignments and synergies might be worthy of closer inspection” (22). Specifically, she works with movement scores that are “designed to lead participants and myself towards specific intra-actions between bodies and sites”: 

Participants are presented with a score in a specific location that draws their corporeal attention towards particular site elements such as textures, forms, materials, tempos and rhythms. Once a process of tuning-in to the site has commenced, spontaneous movement responses are encouraged to emerge, these might include expressive gestures, pedestrian actions, running, dumping and dancing or stillness. (22-23)

“Walking acts as a partner or collaborator for this type of somatically informed movement practice,” she continues; its familiarity “renders the less commonplace practice of dancing (or moving in an expressive manner) more accessible and potentially less threatening” (23). 

During the Chichester event, walking helped get participants “out and about and away from passive environments and mediatised modes of engaging with the world towards hands on, corporeal engagements with sites and their material components” (23). “Such modes of doing and thinking inevitably involve unscripted and spontaneous encounters with real world phenomena, materials, people and things” and require “improvised responses and openness to being in the moment, whatever that might encompass, from which new discoveries might emerge” (23). Walking doesn’t serve the dancing and movement practice; instead, it’s part of a hybrid (23). The workshop “constantly negotiated the various elements of walking, drawing, moving, talking, listening, and dancing in an entangled state of flow” (23). Participants came from local arts and environmental groups; most were regular walkers but were new to movement practices and the hybrid workshop format (23-24). On the walk, “[t]ransitions between selected trees were conducted in silence to enable the movement, listening and drawing tasks to percolate and resonate with each individual on their own terms” (25). The movement tasks were intended to help participants attend to “the trees’ shape, placement, textures and features,” as well as “to bring about awareness of an embodied sense of self in relation to and emerging from each tree-body encounter from which a sense of co-existence might be proposed” (25). 

Participants responded to the trees they encountered in different ways, drawing a score that recorded those responses, but they also responded to stones and bricks; at the end, they reflected on their experiences, “writing key words, thoughts and reflections on a series fo cards that were collected and subsequently placed within our drawing score employed in the second part of the workshop on campus” (28). “The design of tasks and activities employed in the tree walk drew on new materialist perspectives that challenge us to look closely into entangled human-world relations and consider what the immediately perceived life-world compromises,” Hunter writes (28). This site-based body practice “requires concentration and focus on the intra-action at hand as opposed to the telegraphing of gratuitous expressive gestures or unrelated codified movement vocabulary that bears little relation to the nuances or subtleties of the body-site exchange,” she continues. “Tuning in to the affective vibrancy of the body-site exchange and the emerging moving with its complexity requires careful attunement and attention” (29).

The theories Hunter calls new materialism question “the nature of matter itself, what we perceive and consider as human and non-human matter, what counts and what matters and, through doing so enables the fostering of new ontological dispositions towards the world and worlds at large,” she contends:

From these perspectives, the world, the body and their material actants are equally conceived as materially amorphous, unfinished and always on the move. Trees move, dance and communicate with each other and with the human actors who pass by, pause, linger and engage with tree time and space. This mobile perspective informs my reflection on the body-world intra-actions encountered through site-based body practice and facilitates the articulation of nuanced understandings emerging through the movement explorations born from kinaesthetic and corporeal mattering. (29)

When the workshop participants returned to the university campus, where they moved into a dance studio and tried to reflect on the walk by moving their bodies through a series of exercises: “This part of the event was designed to sediment the walk experience in some way, to imprint the experiential encounters within our embodied memory” (29). The bodies of participants became the event’s archive (29). They used the score they had drawn during the walk “as a device to instigate movement exploration” (30). For Hunter, the transition “from the real-world exploration outside the University campus and into the enclosed environment of the dance studio provided a physical and temporal space in which to process the affects and resonances of the walking practice” (30).

Hunter wonders why such events need to be documented, “why the ephemeral and phenomenological could not be left to lie, to sediment, to permeate and percolate within the body-self of the experiencer who had to physically be there, to attend and tend to the event, to acknowledge the walk itself, and its activities” (31). “The residual nature of this type of experience can only be known from the inside, from the doing and being and that, for me is more than enough,” she suggests (31). However, participants asked to be sent photographs of the event, and she wonders “whether they were prioritising the visual record over the embodied and actually not trusting the corporeal over the ocular” (31-32). That’s a problem, since the workshop and other forms of site-based body practice are “concerned with what dance and movement can do here, how it might bring us closer to environmental phenomena as a form of intervention or extra-daily practice” (32). “How might it encourage us to notice the world around us and gently foster a sense of environmental awareness and ethical responsibility?” Hunter asks (32). She hopes this work “can encourage a form of messy exchange wiht the natural world and embolden us to reach beyond hermetically sealed sensibilities that discourage modes of touching unsanitised textures, surfaces and materials prevalent in both nature spaces and urban environments” (32). By “dueting with trees, plants, textures and materials,” participants engage in “playful, sensuous and haptic exchanges within body-site intra-actions from which temporary worldings are formed,” she concludes. “Through these ephemeral moments of exchange we emerge with new-found knowledge and perhaps appreciation of often overlooked or ignored environmental features. We come to knowledge of other bodies, human and more-than human through their vibrant materiality that moves us, moves with us and shapes our perception of the world” (32).

Cathy Turner’s “Walking with Elephants” (34-44) is, as the title suggests, about walking with elephants. That’s pretty distant from my concerns, but Turner begins with a useful discussion of psychogeography. “Walking art, with its roots in dérive and flâneurie, conceptual art and nature writing, is necessarily self-conscious about the simple activity of walking,” she writes. “It is perhaps indicative of the sedentary and alienated nature of European culture that this everyday action is experienced as redemptive or resistance, as the newly-liberated psychogeographer unpicks the urban fabric [and] reenchants fictionalised spaces” (34). She cites Phil Smith’s 2016 essay “Walking and Subjectivity,” in which he describes walking as an escape “from the spectacular media of late capitalism” but warns of the individualist alure of “disrupted walking” (qtd. 34). In his 2015 essay “Psychogeography Adrift,” though, Christopher Collier wonders about the political efficacy of walking, even group or collective walking practices; the problem, he suggests, “is the tension between the desire to provide ‘structural antagonism’ to Capitalism, while also being situated outside a leftist programme as a negative withdrawal, even a hidden and internalised alternative space” (34-35). “The negative and resistant quality of the dérive is in tension with any form of programmatic political organisation,” Turner continues. Moreover, while the subjective significance of the performative experience is undeniable,” she argues that “the dérive’s self-identification with subjectivity cut loose from societal structures is dependent on illusion, and often on privilege” (35). Class and gender privilege is often implicit in walking practices, as is a geographical bias: “Walking art emphasises the anarchic and disruptive, and has been historically disinclined to make wider reference to labour, care, procession or pilgrimage,” forms of walking that “are present in parts of the world where urban dwellers are so predominantly pedestrians that this status is not significant in itself” (35), such as India, where her research for this chapter took her.

Nor has walking art considered “other creatures who walk with us” (35). This leads to Turner’s main question: “what can be learned from the culturally sanctioned walking that occurs in contexts where mythic and artistic spaces are entwined with others which are more problematic and even oppressive”? (35). Her focus is on elephants, “specifically the walking that occurs in relation to the Vrischikolsavam, and eight-day Hindu festival at the Sree Poornathrayeesa Temple in Tripunithura, Kerala” every November (35). With her research network (researchers from the University of Exeter, UK, and the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Bengaluru, India) she studied the elephants and their keepers involved in the festival (35). The festival involves a procession, twice each day, lasting more than three hours, in which elephants walk, “accompanied by the jubilant music” of more than 200 performers (36). “It would be neo-colonial appropriation to consider this as ‘walking art,’ but there is art in it, and there is walking in it,” she writes (36). 

“This essay proposes that such a festival, drawing on traditions of Asian elephant domestication from 4,500 BCE, and perhaps 600 years of elephants in this temple, demonstrates the way that creative, communal and coercive spaces may be simultaneously produced through walking,” Turner contends:

When spaces of spiritual/artistic practice, spaces of spectacle and everyday spaces overlap to this extent, it is hard to see any aspect of this walking as resistant or radical. On the other hand, we should also note the creative, spiritual and communal expression apparent within such institutional, but extra-daily contexts, and that while their more coercive and exploitative aspects might need to be dismantled, their is much to be learned about spatial transformation, the integration of community and the bond with the non-human, in positive as well as negative senses. (36-37)

She cites Donna Haraway’s discussion of “companion animals” and the relationships between them and humans (37). However, the relationship between humans and elephants is neither stable nor straightforward in the context of this festival: sometimes elephants are considered to be lesser beings, sometimes as equals, and other times as gods that need to be venerated (37). For instance, during the festival, one elephant carries the effigy of the Vishnu in circles around the temple (38). “What does it mean, to circumambulate?” Turner asks. “This is not the A to B walking of purpose, nor the deliberate evasion of purpose that is the dérive, nor the sustained walking of pilgrimage, though closes to that” (38). Instead, it is a revolving of the world around the god (38).

“The festival itself is this practice writ large—more elephants, more music, a slower pace, a more relentless and ecstatic obligation,” she continues. “Slowly the elephants move in the temple precincts. Slowly the crowd backs with them. And slowly, such slow walking and its unaccommodating music produces the temple as world” (38). While the meaning of the event is likely lost on the elephants, the practice is shared, “a practice in which the command to process is unavoidable, for both human and companion animal, albeit differently obligated” (38). What the elephants make of the event is not known; whether they enjoy the music or not; there have been instances of elephants running amok, although some elephants seem to enjoy being looked at fed sugar cane (38-39). “Despite this, there was consensus in our interviews that ‘the elephant would not choose the festival.’” she notes. “That there is restraint and tolerance is, perhaps, all one can really ask of a god” (39). 

Restraint is different, however, from being restrained, and often elephants are treated cruelly and exploited; measures to reduce the cruel treatment of these animals have had unwanted results—for instance, transporting the animals by truck is stressful for them (39)“Given such scenarios, one could view the Keralan festival parade as a simulation, merely a procession of captives where wounds are disguised and backstage areas hidden,” she states. “This could be described as a commercialised space of spectacular show, where a festival equals profit to the detriment of elephants and mahouts alike” (40). On the other hand, improvements to the treatment of elephants have been made, even if they are insufficient (40). In addition, the “mahout-elephant relationship, when sustained and developed over years, is remarkable as a familial bond, often as great or greater than that of the same-species family, and taking more of the mahout’s time” (41). Before elephants travelled by truck, for instance, mahouts and elephants walked together, and trust between them developed (41).

“The spaces that seem to be emerging through this festival-related walking include: a practiced space of restrained otherness in the walk around a sanctum; a spectacular, staged, commercialised parade space of hidden pain and occasional cruelty; a social street spaace where co-personhood and trust can exist,” Turner writes (42). These spaces are simultaneous, not separate, but co-existent, “partially entangled and convergent with one another”: “The artistic (musical) component blurs, on the one hand, int ritual, and on the other, into the everyday, while also contributing to the spectacle (in all senses). To adapt any one of these spaces, or these modes of walking, or the artistry of each, is to adapt them all, and that must be done with the care of a surgeon, whose cut endangers the whole body” (42). This entanglement makes attempts to reduce cruelty difficult: “The challenge is to unpick and subvert objectifying and commodifying practices, while understanding the knock-on impact on delicate naturecultures, and not to presuppose an ideal state of unsullied wildness, or that innocent humanity can be obtained by restoring all elephants to wild forests, and retraining the mahouts” (42). That restoration is not feasible, and it would lead to losses of “creativity, knowledge, community and even the inter-relationship between species. It would be contemptuous not to listen to all those involved, including paying close attention to the elephants” (43). Turner cites Arjun Appadurai in her conclusion: “To return to walking art, this example demonstrates what Appadurai describes as ‘the production of locality,’ entailing the ‘imaginary work’ of ‘ordinary persons’” (qtd. 43). “If we are serious about re-imagining our world through walking art and psychogeography, we must take account of the ways in which it is already walked, creatively, recognising the performative significance of walking even in conservative settings,” she writes. “Spectacular spaces are entangled with communal ones. We are entangled with others, human or otherwise. These entanglements are the products of inescapable histories and political realities.” These entanglements mean that there “is no independent, quasi-heroic walking. Therein lies both our tragedy and our opportunity for acknowledging the multiplicity and paradoxes of walking, by seeking mutual understanding and collectively-realised alternatives” (43).

I remember Iain Biggs’s paper at the conference, and his chapter, “Walking away? From Deep mapping to mutual accompaniment” (63-74), suggests the idea of deep mapping as a model for the walks I have been making (or at least that I made last summer). Biggs is interested in listening to “those whispered and marginalised voices that only join us in conversations that would otherwise be made impossible, or else drowned out, by the strident demands of categorical analysis” (63). Such listening, in non-Western cultures, “constitutes a psychosocial or spiritual practice,” understood as “a walking with the ancestors” or “with the dead” (63). “This ‘somewhere-else’ is significant here as the ground onto which those of us who are drawn to multi-directional and other open walking practices are likely to stray; through psycho-geography, mytho-archaeology, deep mapping, or any related performative practice,” he suggests (63-64).

Biggs notes that his presentation started with Hugo Ball’s decision to walk away from Dada over the ambitions of Tristan Tzara and Francis Picabia to turn it into an art movement (64). He describes their position as “radical nihilism, pandering simultaneously to the most toxic and most trivialising aspects of the culture of possessive nihilism,” which Ball rejected because he “believed in the ultimate unity of all beings and the totality of all things,” along with “the need to live with the dissonances and contradictions that follow from that belief” (64). Biggs argues that his involvement “in a walking-based, open, deep-mapping relates to Ball’s concerns in two ways”: “Firstly, open deep mapping requires adopting ways of working that lead one towards that sense of unity and totality by, ironically, working with the particular dissonances and contradictions inherent in a particular place or region. Secondly, as indicated, it requires putting distance between yourself and the assumptions that underpin the whole complex machinery of the art world” (64-65). 

In 1999, Biggs began a 14-year-long “open deep mapping project” about Belfast, one “that follows one of the tributaries of trauma that fed into that city’s fear and anger” by engaging with “the long-standing Anglo-Scottish Border culture of endemic violence later exported to Ireland” (65). That project took him to Scot’s Dyke along the English-Scottish border (65), a site of terrible violence in the 16th century (65-66). “By excavating and contrasting narratives focused here and elsewhere along the Borders, I cold uncover a deeply engrained legacy of anger, trauma and fear,” he writes (66). He wants to think about “the consequences of the large-scale denial of the undertow of violence and trauma that haunts so much of a land viewed through rose-tinted or heroic lenses,” a denial with “very real sociopolitical consequences, not least by sustaining the status-quo in terms of the ownership and usage of land” (66). The work of Robert Macfarlane, and of nature writing in general, participate in that nostalgia and sense of heroic individualism, he contends (66), and he insists on “the need to keep in view the violence and trauma that haunt the land” (67). 

“The most critical point here, however, is open deep mapping’s distancing itself from the culture of possessive individualism,” Biggs continues. “Something achieved by setting aside the assumptions that flow from the monolithic, heroic ego, redressing the Cartesian splitting of self from other, mind from body, the perceptual from the imaginal, the material from the spiritual” (67). “Open deep mapping enacts, that is, a desire to embrace and celebrate an ensemble self. A self that is aware of its own multiplicity and that of the multiverse to which it finds its various selves or persona related at every level” (67). In addition,

Open deep mapping is fundamentally peripatetic, grounded by a walking, listening body getting to know a place in as many dimensions as possible. It’s also, of necessity, intellectually peripatetic, wandering freely across disciplinary and conceptual borders in order to ask unexpected and unorthodox questions in spaces-in-between. Its practitioners also tend to be psychically peripatetic—to resist any long-term identification with any single genre or praxis by accepting the necessity to regularly “move house.” (67)

Biggs sees deep mapping “as a walking-with a multitude of voices of both the living and dead; a walking-with that animates differently a particular place or, increasingly, set of relationships between places. A walking-with that’s alert to voices that dominant narratives have forgotten, marginalized or repressed. Alert to them so as to re-articulate their pressing and unanswered questions in the here-and-now” (67). 

Biggs cites the work of Mike Pearson, especially his collaboration with Michael Shanks, Theatre/Archaeology (2001) as a powerful influence on his deep-mapping practice (68), which brings together photographs, text, and maps (69). The maps he creates are attempts “to address and visualise, by analogy, the cognitive dissonance I experienced as an academic/artist/researcher with a walking-based practice and as a carer for someone too ill to walk more than a few paces” (68)—his daughter (70). That work emphasizes “the need, in open deep mapping, for lateral thinking, for looking for connections where they’re not expected—some would say don’t exist” (70); it comes from “listening to a range of narratives—of power, fear, loss, and anger—and to their counter-narratives” (70). “Those engaged in critically alert, psychosocially engaged, ensemble practices like open deep mapping must act nimbly while moving in many dimensions if they’re to avoid being co-opted by the disciplinary status quo for its own instrumental ends. Ends that always threaten to water down or undermine its primary concerns,” he argues (70). In addition, he suggests that deep mapping educates us “in what Bruno Latour calls Terrestrial politics,” that it teaches us “that a place, region or country is not exclusive, nor is it differentiated by closing itself off”; instead, deep mapping enacts “Edward S. Carey’s claim that places, despite their frequently settled appearance, are in effect essays in experimental living that are undertaken within the context of a constantly changing culture” (71). Deep mapping demonstrates “why Terrestrial co-habitation requires us to think the global through our embodied engagement with specific places. Places experienced as inclusive—as opening themselves up to multiple, diverse, sometimes contradictory, relationships, attachments and connections” (71).

Open deep mapping is “a multidirectional activity involving observing, listening, walking, conversing, writing, exchanging, selecting, reflecting, naming, generating, digitizing, interweaving, offering and inviting” (71). However, he fears deep mapping is becoming a discipline, the opposite of what he wants it to be, and so he wonders if he ought to walk away from deep mapping if it becomes “reduced to supporting mechanisms for a conceptually driven worldview caught up in serving the culture of possessive individualism” (73). Nevertheless, if deep mapping instead contributes “to ensemble practices predicated on mutual accompaniment,” then it is worth preserving (73). “Open deep mapping has led e to see the desire to ‘mutually accompany’ others as helping to make that commitment possible”—a commitment to Hugo Ball’s belief in “the unity and totality of all things,” which would call on us to “find new ways to live with the sometimes-overwhelming dissonances and difficulties that flow from any such commitment” (73).

In “Web Walking (75-82), Helen Billinghurst and Phil Smith propose a new strategy, Web Walking (75)—it’s a manifesto, I think, describing and calling forth a new practice. They begin by reflecting a long walk they took, from Plymouth to Dunstable, a town west of Luton, along the Icknield Way (75)—one of the walks discussed in their subsequent book, The Pattern. “We are on an adventure we have spun out from a labyrinth in Plymouth to a web that stretches as far as Cardiff and, the other way, to Cambridge,” they write (75). Is this a form of mythogeography? An extension of mythogeography? It’s clearly related to mythogeography, because they have been noticing details along the way, particularly details with mythological or occult associations (75) and developing “a way, a collective and convivial way, without dogma, to access certain things, often old things—patterns, values, objects, connections, desires—and throw them forward into the future” (75).

Web walking incorporates performance and collective engagement, it seems: “Through a practice we’ve come to call ‘Web Walking’ we want to map such affordances in privileged points such as Ashwell and a Glastonbury spring we bathed in or at the Uffington white horse where we imagined a ceremony of red on white, while volunteers crushed chalk and a red kite hovered over our heads,” they recall. “We want to avoid separating off the explicit nodes that still connect us to a certain ‘magical mode’ and reconnect them to a wider pattern that includes the places where capitalism is bottoming out” (75). One such place is Dunstable, and they describe the lack of vitality in that town in vivid terms (75-76). “From Plymouth to Cambridge we have seen and felt the same sadness, isolation and division,” they write. “We have picked our way through smack dens to heritage sites and along needle strewn paths in woodland. We have watched the harried looks on people’s faces, trespassed into the pits ripped out by mining companies and ceremonialised in the killing fields where the last wild wolves were slaughtered” (76). In the face of longstanding and accelerating epistemic, economic, and ecological crises—“of populism and authoritarianism, failing globalism, misinformation and digital invasion, misogyny, fundamentalist reaction and species extinction”—they “want to propose a new emphasis for walking” (76).

“Changing the default mode of our ‘drifts’ from solo walks or group wanders focused on affect and ambience, to make walks of conviviality and togetherness for a collective world building,” they continue: 

Dérives based on experiencing are vulnerable to apocalyptic thrills and the consumerist charms of the eerie; to go beyond the affect, we want to repurpose psychogeographical walking as a means of connectivity, not just with each other and the past, but with the future and with the unhuman. We call this “Web Walking.” Putting hyper-sensitised walking at the heart of a multi-modal practice that fires out threads and routes and lines of communication to form webs, which in turn, attach themselves to a wider Pattern. (76)

“Web Walking starts with a familiar site-specificity, with attention to materials, to scuzz and grime and soil, to the plastic in our gut,” they continue. “We need to love that fucked-upness, if we’re going to do anything about it. Like good Butoh dancers, get our noses in the mud; moving from the grot to re-enchantment without dogma; unearthing the signal within the signal in the abject landscape” (77). “These hidden signals, curled up in tiny dimensions within consensus reality, are messages through time from when life was in a so-called ‘magical mode,’” they write. “We want to understand them, then throw them forward as a challenge to futuristic techno-exterminism’s claim to be the only possible and inevitable future” (77).

Billinghurst and Smith desire to “make art that unveils patterns that shift through different planes. To be sparing in our use of representations, but rigorous in our specificity to the qualities of found materials, and enthusiastic for diagrams that show relations” (77). Their tangible art work—representations of the webs they discover?—takes shape across disciplines: “actions, drawing, painting, written and spoken word and installations, drawing threads together into a web, which we then throw out to others—to other people, to other things, to other webs” (77). For instance, their “Plymouth Labyrinth” project used the story of Ariadne and her red thread “to investigate the way a city weaves together” (77). They wrote poems and made paintings; dancers created site-specific performances (77-78). Elsewhere, later on, they added white thread “and entangled these two colour codes, asking walkers to walk between the blood red hunting lines of desire and the bony deathliness of the white,” because between these extremes “there is a connectivity in the moment of crisis” (78). “By letting things have their own life, and their own death, we saw them combine and fix themselves in different webs, flows and diagrams”—and this was the beginning of Web Walking (78). 

During their walks, they found “wolf packs, hidden forests, arks, giants, and the Syrian founder of Albion” at old mines and new suburbs (78)—a description that sounds not unlike mythogeography. They connect to mythos and stories of place “by skulking around in places where few people care to go, or care about. And listening to what we are told there. And we talk endlessly—about the walk, the places, we share memories, theories, and fictions . . . and we are silent . . .” (78). “We inhabit stories as we walk, we put ourselves into fantastic or futuristic narratives that challenge the fixity of where and when and what we are” (79), and so Web Walking mixes together fiction and nonfiction, imagination and the reality of what is there, without drawing those boundaries (79). “We walk, we connect, we spin yarns,” they state. “With feet on the ground and eyes open, through observations and encounters with people, animals and unhuman things, we construct complex models of how things connect ecologically, socially and economically” (79).

Donna Haraway’s work is an inspiration for Web Walking, which is an embodied form of thinking (79). Billinghurst and Smith worked on a long-term walking project throughout 2019 (79). “In this spirit of connectivity, we invited all the people we walked and workshopped with to send us a postcard with a drawing or a poem or whatever, and then in the exhibition we used the corridor of the gallery to link its different rooms with long threads to which we attached the over one hundred postcards we received,” they write, describing the Plymouth Labyrinth exhibition (I think) (80). “We drew from the myths and images that had stepped forward during our walking to create a red room with a scrying mirror, like the body of a spider, from which legs of silken thread worked around the room and escaped through the window to join another web on a roof top. Ariadne had been joined by Arachne” (80). The stories, images, ideas, and theories constituted a web: “Threads from which we then span out across more of the country—walking to Cambridge, Dunstable, Glastonbury, Cardiff, Ashwell, Bristol, Exeter, Wells, Scilly Isles, Avebury, Cheddar, Draycott, and so on, extending the lines of our wandering, each time connecting to more and more threads, and drawing them together to make new webs” (81).

All of this a preview of their new book, The Pattern, which they hope people will use “to connect their own threads to the threads of others, to make their own pantheons and fire out their own lines of desire and flight, to connect one web to another” (81). That new book “is very much a practical handbook,” but it also describes “moving warily towards something we have chosen to call ‘the pattern,’ a tattooing of the land that we have found to be far more intense, connected and intricate than is generally acknowledged” (81). The magical mode of Web Walking “is the life of connectivity—of human and unhuman—pre-dating any division between subject and object in culture, pre-dating human exceptionalism. A mode in which an increase in being free is done, paradoxically, by entanglement with other forces so that agency is magnified by connection” (81). 

Smith and Billinghurst believe “network of ‘privileged points’—places where there was an especially intense exchange and entanglement of ancient humans with their cosmos, where this entanglement was compacted and landmarked for repeated use,” exists, and that neolithic sites, holy wells, and contemporary places of ritual or connection are examples of such sites (81-82). They state, “we are threading together old and contemporary ‘privileged points’ as lines in a larger pattern, a map of a future that is alternative to the mode of the present one” (82). “This pattern is experienced most intensely at sites that were once foundational to the magical mode; but we can add to them, because the old places were never just human constructions, but also natural and random affordances,” they write (82). The network that connects these sites “is like a spider’s legs without a single organising body, like an orrery without a sun in the centre; it constitutes a way of reverencing things without the need for dogma. A way to live and walk in hyper-connectivity as well as hyper-sensitivity; a way to learn how to live with the plastic in our guts alongside excited invasive species” (82). They are searching for “a connective and immersive ‘mode,’ slipping the binaries of human and unhuman, self and cosmos, me and you” (82). They don’t expect Web Walking to solve the problems of cruelty, desire, or community, but like the myths and fairy tales that describe those problems, they “seek a mode that rubs thin the subjective-objective and self-world distinctions. Which makes the route the agent of the walk; makes a stranger just as responsible for a place as the residents, makes the crow our partner and our witness, makes the squid an ideal and an ecstasy, makes the world a web in which we are always in loco parentis and always children” (82). 

In “How do our bodies act as instruments of sensory navigation? A study through ‘shared acts of sensing’” (99-112), Emma Bush states that she is interested “in using performance walking to invite the senses to become more alert to ‘thing power,’ the unceasing motion and responsiveness inherent in objects including those usually considered inert or dead” (99). Her recent works “place ‘shared acts of sensing’ in a central role with a shift towards a more participatory embodied way-finding” (99). She began a research group, “warm-up,” in 2017, to explore “embodied approaches to place, and extended modes of sensing by using a variety of methods”; up to a dozen people from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds gather together for day-long events (100). That led to Night Walk, “an ongoing project which offers an opportunity to experience ‘shared acts of sensing’ on a coastal walk to Elberry Cove, Brixham. Through a gentle play of communal experience, we arrive together in this place at night-time, using our bodies as sensory instruments to navigate the darkness and to notice what is already there” (100).

Bush cites Linda Hurcombe’s contention that the traditionally defined five senses miss the fact that the sensory system is holistic, “‘where sensations perceived by one mechanism act as cues for the receipt of other sensations and where inter-sensoriality is recognised” (qtd. 101). “Shared acts of sensing” is her term describing “collective acts of looking, listening and more broadly the orientation and perception of the senses. Focusing on particular ways of framing communal observation these are performance acts aimed towards a radical permeability, offering insight into embodied encounters between ‘self’ and ‘other’” (101). “I am interested in making time for ‘arts of noticing’ through direct material sensory experience and framing this participation as central to the life of an artwork,” she writes (101). The “embodied trans-sensual fluidity proposed here in attending to matter, the body and sensation” will encourage the senses to combine into a web (101). The purpose of this paper is to define the term “shared acts of sensing” (101).

“I work with an approach that creates pockets of time, or spaciousness, and potentially frees us from our habitual patterns of observation—using tools from performance, including non-linear story-telling, gesture, and repetition to guide attention and to make an invitation,” she contends (102). Stasis, rather than movement, is part of this practice: “To stand still and simply look at the sky, a snowdrop, or a stone wall for five, ten or fifty minutes is an unusual act. To do this looking, really looking—especially in a group, is something we don’t often do, perhaps because we do not have time or capacity, perhaps because we are so often lost in thought and a large part of our lives is now constantly screened or mediated by technologies” (102). In this way, her practice “is concerned with making spaces for intimate encounters with materiality, meeting points between self and other, in a way that relies on sensual lived experience and remembering how to refine our receptivity” (102).

Bush explains “shared acts of sensing” in a series of points (103). First, she emphasizes “sensory contact with materials and thus a direct ‘lived experience’ of materiality” (103). The collective observation and attention “will be guided by a clearly marked temporal and spatial frame” (103). The observation will be performed by a group of people in the same place, at the same time, doing the same task (103). Most of the experiences of observation will take place outdoors (103). “Language will operate through instruction or score as a mode of storytelling, priming or guiding aimed at inviting participants to particular spaces of collective encounter,” she continues. “The language used will be a blend of fact and fiction and will suggest, emphasise, and frame notions on which the continuity of the walk lies” (103). The “shared acts of sensing” will reacquaint participants “with familiar territory by re-examining our experience of place and our relationship with our surroundings” (103). They will also “alter our experience of time” through practices such as slow walking “and thus could be viewed as techniques for time travel” (103). The practice leaves space “for the un-known or in-expressible element” of the experience (103). Part of the encounter she seeks to facilitate  “cannot be pinned down or tamed into a definition” (104).

Bush acknowledges that it’s good to be skeptical “about just how much of these activities is shared and who with,” and that converting such experiences into language “is obviously flawed,” although still valuable (104). The sharing of experience “does not imply an equivalence of experience—what we notice and how we notice it will vary and those differences in what draws or attracts our attention are revealing” (104). “A shared sense of time opening up or slowing down can create space in which sensory attention is given room to notice small details or events; the constant flux of change about and within us is given the opportunity to arise,” she states. “Shared acts of sensing can give rise to a space in which our perception is invited to slow down, to look anew without preconceptions and indeed to attempt to see ‘as if for the first time’” (104). 

Bush cites Henri Bergson’s notion of pure perception—an impossible attempt to get close to a spontaneity of vision or sensory perception; it is impossible “because we come with our histories, memories, our ‘life-worlds,’ placing a filter, between us and all that we meet, or come into contact with” (104-05). Her suggestions for looking at a flower, for instance, suggest not naming or categorizing the plant (as a nettle, in her example) but merely taking time to look closely at the plant, to “[h]old it, smell it, touch it, listen to it,” to “let the object and the information it contains present itself to you. Notice varied colours, shades, lines, textures, markings” (105). “We look and we look again, we draw the details, try to describe in words, we listen with our touch and our eyes, then we use a hand lens to magnify the details 10 times more. We let the information come to us, present itself and wash over us,” she states. “Going out like hunters, we try to become more porous and open to our more-than human selves” (106). Her performance training plays a role in sensitizing her to sensory data (106): “This mode of observation offers insights from the viewpoint of a world in which agency is more evenly distributed allowing for an approach which acknowledges networked processes of perception which can reside in, deflect from and be triggered by ‘object’ and further encourages a decentralising of the object/subject dualism” (106). She also wonders whether “sensory observations might guide us to consider our individual selves as multiple, our bodies as collectives” (108).

The “serious play” she engages in has rules: 

A group of human bodies will be organised and placed into a considered formation—with a chosen distance setting them apart, in a chosen position e.g. standing, sitting or lying down. The intended formation provides a tension or a resistance for the activity, a set and setting outside our habitual experience, functioning a design which holds and gathers the experience. This modelling provides a formality or a disciplined structure and for some participants is part of a strengthening framework which may bring a more relaxed merging into the activity and/or a frustration or resistance. The tension perhaps exists in the pull between the orderliness and constraint of formality alongside the (sometimes) welcome relief offered in moments through a movement towards stillness and a listening to all that is sounding in silence. (108-09)

Shared acts of sensing enable the creation of a temporary community through shared intention (109). Shifting from the language of sensation to verbal language through “the overarching framework of the walks”: using storytelling, instruction, rhythm, and atmosphere to guide “each participant deliberately back towards somatic experience through cues which foreground sensation, touch and materiality” (109-10). Framing and experiencing these events as live performances “offers heightened focus internally and this operates in connection with the affect or ‘idea’ of being witnessed,” which acts as a “crystallising of presence, giving heightened intensity to the shared activity” (110). “We may consider shared acts of sensing as artworks in their own right, although small scale interventions they are also offered as acts for the ‘environment’ (field, city, garden, town square) in which we are co-present fully aware of the possibility of the reciprocal gaze. In this regard ‘performing’ plays provocatively with the notion of reciprocity or exchange across human or non-human actors,” Bush concludes. “Shared acts of sensing can give a sense of temporary community, solidarity, or shared common ground which heightens focus and gives rise to an expansive sense of belonging with the matter of the world” (111).

In “The Sight of the Walker” (137-49), William Sharpe also examines the senses—in particular, senses other than vision:

When art is made from the action of walking, the sight of the walking, in a double sense, is often a focal point. What does the sighted walker see—conceptually, visually, in terms of both insight and/or eyesight—and what does an audience see—again conceptually, visually—when it looks at a walker walking? And is this visual information overvalued? Or could the sight of a walker change a life? (137)

While visual representations of walking “can be compellingly beautiful,” they are incomplete: “Because the ever-altering engagement of body, mind, and environment necessitates a hopelessly complex imagining of interior and external stimuli just to evoke the sensation of taking a few steps, images cannot convey the totality of the walk” or of the walker (138). “The spectator must fill in what’s absent, an act that creates the pleasure and frustration of viewing walking images” (138). No doubt that is true of images of any human activity, for that matter. A representation never includes everything; it always leaves things out.

Sharpe argues that, “[f]or millennia, images of walkers have played a central role in representational art,” but that in “contemporary walking art, art that regards the act of walking as artistic in itself,” the concern has been with the “immateriality” of walking: “Each step vanishes as the next one comes into being. One cannot grasp the totality of a walk from a single point of view or a single point in time and, as Hamish Fulton asserts, one cannot erase the line made by a walk” (138). Are “visual artifacts generated by the walk . . . incidental or integral to the art-walk ‘itself’”? he asks (138). “Does the ‘art’ reside in the walk, the walker, or the documentation?” (138). 

Sharpe is also concerned “about ocular-centrism, about the inadequacy and selectiveness of visual images, have led many walk-makers to focus on senses other than sight”: sound walks, tactile walks, unsighted walks, smell walks, memory walks (138). He contends that “the sight of the walker, what the walker sees, has been an incessant subject of writing about walking since ancient times” (139). “If there is a new movement in visualising walking, it must find its way amid the push-and-pull of current theories and practices, where sight and the other senses jostle for attention,” he argues. “Critiqued or admired or puzzled over, visual images and encounters continue to play a vital role in walking art. . . . This is particularly true in the case of artists who want to make more visible two interconnected groups of ‘watched walkers,’ the disabled and the surveilled” (139).

Next, Sharpe establishes a genealogy of walking art: it begins with the Surrealists and Situationists, but emerges as a form in the 1960s along with conceptual art, performance art, land art, and “new definitions of sculpture that not only required involvement from the spectator but also interacted with natural and human-made environments in site-specific ways” (139). “In a world cluttered with lasting masterpieces, the process-oriented art of happenings and performances sought to create something spatially ephemeral and ecologically advanced, works that might take up just a moment in time and only the space needed to hold an idea,” he suggests (139). “Walking art offers its proponents a choice: do I make my body visible in this work, as a painter might, so that my audience may have a sight of the walker, or shall I shape my work in such a way that the audience, perhaps as participant, sees something else?” (139). These questions not unlike those Blake Morris asks in his definition of walking as an artistic medium (Morris).

Sharpe notes that walking is an everyday activity, and so walking art “defamiliarises the world we know. The artist imposes an unusual, thought-provoking itinerary or bodily constraint or underlying conception that signals difference, that marks the walk as art, not life” (140). The act of documenting a walk “forms part of the estrangement” (140). Documentation is also part of walking art’s genealogy: 

Immaterial though it may be, walking art emerged in part from the actions of artists tied by training to a visual arts tradition, one that produces objects to look at, from gallery-ready textworks or photos and films, to retrieved objects, casual drawings, and illustrated books, that artists employ to record the passage of their bodies through time and space. Whether art walks are done privately or presented as public performances, material traces and pictorial images of them convey part of the artistic experience, but never its entirety. In an art of process, an art involving mind, body, and landscape, the image will never be enough. It will always be suggestive rather than complete. (140)

Images or other forms of documentary representation tend to act as placeholders or “evocations of actions now completed or that may never have had an audience” (140). “In contrast to the unseen ‘heroic’ efforts” of Richard Long and Hamish Fulton, who made “arresting images from unwitnessed walks,” other artists “with a performance orientation enacted striking works that produced indelible images,” showing “that it’s not the length of the walk but the strength of the idea animating it that counts in making provocative, illuminating art. A strong alliance between concept and image has been essential to their success” (140). He offers Marina Abramović and Ulay’s The Lovers (Great Wall Walk) (1988), Francis Alÿs’s Sometimes Making Something Leads to Nothing (1997), and Mona Hatoum’s Performance Still—Roadworks (1985-1995) as examples (140-41), along with Hamish Fulton’s slowalks (141). “Given the staying power of certain images, these documented sightings of creative walkers may, for all their shortcomings, actually have more political, social, and/or aesthetic impact than the ‘real’ walks they have emerged from,” he writes (141).

However, in the last two decades “a growing number of practitioners have argued that walking art needs to challenge ocular-centrism, to pay less attention to objects that can be visually consumed without engaging other senses” (141). Those artists “seek to explore a body intermeshed with the landscape and with other people,” and the resulting “emphasis on walking as a collective, activist form of art,” along with “less certainty about the value of tying the meaning of the art walk to representative images,” has led to “a de-centring of the image, through a greater emphasis on haptics, sound, memory, and orality” (141). This “corrective, anti-ocular position” is necessary, but it “does not sufficiently recognise the somatics of looking,” the way that the seeing eye “activates the rest of the body’s senses,” such as “kinaesthetic empathy, an effect that can produce physical sensations of fear, desire, revulsion, anger, sorrow, and so on” (141-42). 

“Today more than ever, the sight of the walker is related to the words that surround or appear in the image, since walking images rarely circulate without language to sustain them,” Sharpe continues. “Psychogeography, which could be said to bridge the perceived gap between sight and sense, is a heavily textual mode of walking art, since its rambles seem most amenable to documenting in semi-novelistic form, most saliently in the work of Iain Sinclair” (142). Of course, so many proponents of psychogeography reject the literary form of that practice that Sinclair’s work represents. In any case, psychogeography, while it claims to be about feeling, “is often directed by sight since that sense operates over longer distances and pulls the walker toward far-off enticements” (142). Reinventions of the dérive, such as Phil Smith’s mythogeography, “delight in visual discoveries, ripples in the space-time of history, community, and physical situatedness” (142). “Smith’s walks present themselves to the audience as a series of unanticipated discoveries of texture, feeling, thought, and organic matter that are notated visually with a quirky eye for detail but that, in their post-walk presentation, are most eloquently elaborated in texts whose sinuousity mirrors the twists and turns of mind and body through a space densely packed with material encounters,” he notes (142). Smith writes that the various kinds of documentation of walks is designed to encourage others to engage in exploratory walking as well, rather than to be marketable commodities (143); and yet, Sharpe suggests, “even a shared walk needs company; it does not communicate its artistry by itself” (143). In other words, a walk requires other media to communicate its structuring design (143).

“The walking medium is not monolithic: it can touch, smell, taste, and hear, engaging time and space and its own thoughts,” Sharpe continues. “Visuality forms an inevitable part of this communication, as walkers see, while others see them, and the camera eye, human-pointed or fixed in a surveillance stare, sees both. Whether it is ‘captured’ ‘only’ in memory, or whether is is represented in various media, the walk is ‘seen’ on many levels” (144). “Two kinds of walking art—disability art and surveillance art—are concerned with new movements in a literal way as they question the meaning of public space”—they are concerned with a desire “to make their subject matter visible, and visibly felt” (144). As examples of disability art, he includes Carmen Papalia’s Blind Field Shuttle (2010-), Noëmi Lakmaier’s short film One Morning in May (2012). In addition, he considers William Pope.L’s performance The Great White Way, 22 Miles, 9 years, 1 Street (2001-2009), which “makes visual in an indelible way the ‘out-of-placeness’ and paradoxical invisibility of black people in America,” to be a metaphorical example of disability art (144-45). “The flip side of being overlooked and yet pushed from public life by being stared at when entering it, is being constantly monitored and silently recorded,” he continues (145), citing as examples of one form of surveillance art projects that use GPS tracking systems, such as Jeremy Hunt’s My Ghost (Sixteen Years of Mapping My Life in London With GPS) (2016) and Jen Southern and Jen Hamilton’s Running Stitch (2006) (145). “But these are technologies that walkers use,” he notes.” What of technologies that use walkers, often without their permission, either to entertain them or to point out their vulnerability to darker devices?” (145). “Like disability art, surveillance art seeks to turn the tables, to make visible the repressive gazes that threaten watched people, bringing those gazes into fuller human contact with the spectator” (145): his list of surveillance art includes Christian Moeller’s Nosy (2006), Camille Utterback’s Abundance (2007), Marie Sester’s Access (2003), Dries Depoorter’s Jaywalking (2016) (146). In addition, Jill Magid’s Trust (2004) connected disability and surveillance: she walked through Liverpool with her eyes closed, guided by a surveillance camera operator (146). 

Cameras and watchers “subvert one of walking’s most heralded attributes”: the notion of solitary walking as self-discovery, as a space of freedom from imposed social roles, as in the writing of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (147): “Today’s Rousseau must assemble instead an array of defamiliarising techniques, an artistic wardrobe of masks and disguises, to get free of a gaze that presumes to know all the walker’s secrets” (147). “Where walking’s new movement will lead, as we step into a future invisible to us, is anyone’s guess. It may be that an ever-more feeling form of walking perception will thrive in the coming years,” Sharpe concludes “But touchingly or remotely, the art of walking will have to deal with the fraught and ever-shifting sight of the walker” (148).

Hamish Fulton’s “Words From Walks” ([167]-[82]) is a description of his walking practice, in the form of a lengthy work of text art, a leaflet ([167]). It offers “a few points regarding my general outlook” ([167]). “Walking art is the bringing together / of two entirely separate activities,” he writes ([169]). “I transform ideas / into physical experiences. My self-imposed rule is: / If I do not walk I cannot make any art” ([169]). Thus, he continues, “I am an artist who walks, not a walker who makes art. / Not every artist enjoys walking / and not every walker is tolerant of contemporary art” ([169]). Fulton distinguishes between walking and art: “An ‘artwork’ may be purchased, / but my walks / cannot be sold or stolen” ([169]). He recognizes that not everyone is physically able to walk ([169]). Fulton also notes that he makes a variety of walks—that they are diverse in length, terrain, duration ([170]), and that he also engages in solo and shared walks, which build experiences rather than objects ([170]).

Some of Fulton’s text reminds me of the distinction Morris draws between walking as an artistic medium and walking as a prelude to work in other media: “I walk on the land, not in the ‘landscape.’ / I do not take walks, I make walks. / ‘Walk texts’ are about past events. / Walking ‘in the moment,’ / is walking now. // AN OBJECT CANNOT COMPETE WITH AN EXPERIENCE. / A completed walk is like an invisible object” ([170]). “Walking Is The Constant The Art Medium Is The Variable,” Fulton continues ([170]). His text works are made “exclusively / from walks that I have personally experienced” ([171]). He sees his text works as narratives: “Make a walk, write a text, read it to an audience. / By word of mouth. The spoken word. Oral history. / Memory is selective. / The retelling of stories. / A good story well told. / Verbal interpretations for the meaning of visual symbols. / Picture writing. Sign language” ([171]). In any case, as far as his practice is concerned, “A walk may exist purely as a walk, / but my ‘artwork’ / cannot be created without the walk” ([172]). “An Artwork Cannot Re-present The Experience Of A Walk,” he notes, acknowledging Sharpe’s critique as a reality ([172]). He also seems to anticipate Morris’s argument: “Walking Art. / Neither of these two words / specify an art medium, / thereby suggesting openness and potential / for anyone. // The separation of experience and object.” ([172]).

Fulton advocates walking without a smartphone ([173]): “Walking / is the interconnected experience / for a wide spectrum of possibilities, disciplines and research” ([173]). All of his walks are woven together through his invisible footsteps ([174]). In 1973, he “made the single most important decision” of his creative life: “To Make Art Resulting Only / From The Experience Of Individual Walks” ([175]). He rejects the label “Land Artist” ([178]): “LAND ART CONTRADICTS WALKING ART” ([178]). I’m not surprised by that rejection; Richard Long also eschews the label “land art.” 

Towards the end of his leaflet Fulton returns to the division between experience and representation: “An Object Cannot Compete With An Experience” ([178]). “When I say that ‘the walk is the art,’ / I simply mean / that ‘the walk’ / is my contribution to contemporary art,” he concludes ([181]). Indeed, he is a pioneer, and his work is important, even though many contemporary practitioners reject the notion of solo or durational walks altogether.

In “Walking-with whiteness: story carriers, affect aliens and reluctant heritage” (204-13), Richard S. White/Walknow begins by acknowledging his embodied privilege: “Engaging critically with walking practices as an able-bodied white English man, I recognise that for me race, gender and ability are as embodied and normalised as walking” (204). Throughout the chapter, he cites Garnette Cadogan’s essay “Walking While Black” as “a reality check on the unspoken privilege bound up in my experience of walking as a white man” (206). White’s practice is both political and corporeal: “Questioning the normalisation of injustice through the immanence and instability of walking is the wobbly corporeal foundation of my creative practice” (204). This paper describes “an iteration of a walking-with approach [to walking] through a short case study of a project I hosted in Bath, ‘Sweet Waters,’ ‘sense-ing’ legacies of slave-ownership. I consider how a walking arts engagement with heritage might attend to whiteness and the normalisation of privilege” (204).

Sweet Waters was a series of participatory performance walks in Bath and along the River Avon. The focus of those walks was the ongoing effect of slavery on Bath: 

The cycle of walks involved durational and location-specific interventions generating affective responses, curated to disrupt and question official heritage accounts. Whereas in Bristol the slave trade and the ownership of captured and enslaved Africans has become part of a contested sense of place, in Bath, although manifested in the Georgian architecture, these past injustices are seen as unconnected and happening elsewhere. (205)

That history “forms part of what I describe as a ‘reluctant’ heritage, a heritage that is painful or shameful, in which something of the past has become obscured or hidden in the present” (205). He is exploring “a walking, questioning, doing, process attending to that reluctance and in this context specifically addressing issues of racialisation and whiteness” (205-06). White wants to move “beyond passive embodiment towards considering gaze and power, and the agency of matter” (206-07).

During Sweet Water, walkers “were invited to become agents in a slow reveal of the seductive normalisation of white supremacy as a legacy of slavery and slave-ownership” (207). For instance, they walked to a tower above Bath, funded and used by slave-owner William Beckford; the source of Beckford’s fortune has been glossed over—but it came from sugar plantations in Jamaica (207). The walks “passed the former residencies of slave-owners and the remains of mills where goods were made for the ‘Africa Trade,’ we walked along the river to Bristol where those goods were loaded on the slave trading ships” (207). Along the way, “curated provocations”—“readings from archives and contemporary statements from slave-owners”—were presented; participants were invited to share their thoughts in writing and on social media; each walk began with introductions and “an attunement exercise alerting the senses, engaging attention and focusing thoughts” and ended with “a group sharing” (207). 

“In this walking and questioning approach, the developing somatic sensibility and its ethical context, an iteration of walking-with emerges,” White suggests (207). He describes Springgay and Truman’s notion of “walking-with”: “Walking-with is an ethical practice of building solidarity, respecting dignity, valuing the contributions of all, in this way of knowing walking becomes an immanent practice, a speculative act of somatic questioning, attending critically to shared and embodied experience” (208). He describes what walking-with was like during the Sweet Water walks (208-09). The walks “involved walking Bath’s iconic crescents and promenades, stopping and delivering a gentleman’s visiting card at residencies of former slave-owners” and “short performances listing the plantations, numbers of enslaved people owned and compensation paid out” (209). “Fellow walkers on the ‘Sweet Waters’ walks were engaged through walking networks, artists networking and a local natural history festival, most were white, many were local; although not all were middle aged the demographic was perhaps typical for a walking festival,” he recalls. “This was my intended audience as it is this demographic who in some way have internalised the values of, and often embody, white privilege” (210).

Those walks are emblematic of his artistic practice: “At the core of my practice is an interest in registers of walking and an exploration of tactics that provoke involuntary thought. I curate experiences of temporal and spatial dissonance into a walk seeking to generate empathetic responses. I use somatic attunements and such factors as duration, distance and pace to generate alertness and sensitivity” (210). He cites Sara Ahmed’s contention that “historical injustice does not fade over time”—that “the injustice of slave-ownership,” for instance, “manifests today as normalised white privilege. Injustice lives on if we don’t address it, in order to begin the repair work and bring about change we must make the return” (211). The “dissonant juxtaposition” of “an enforced migration with a walk for pleasure in a city and countryside inscribed with the wealth of slave-ownership was an act of making the return” (210-11). For Ahmed, forgetting “is an act of complicity to the persistence of injustice” (211). White is interested in “the possibility of walkers becoming heritage affect aliens empowered to ask difficult questions of a reluctant heritage, to interrogate the silence” (211).

The Sweet Water walks also stirred white discomfort and fragility (211): “At times it felt like we had hit on the raw nerve of reluctance, especially with regard to slavery and the issue of white superiority” (211). “Walking-with in this context developed an embodied experience of confidence and solidarity towards countering white fragility, eroding reluctance to engage critically with this particular heritage narrative,” he suggests (211). Participants became storytellers, 

breaking the ‘dead silence’ of Bath. A supportive space for questioning heritage and responding to the instances of white fragility . . . was established. In this way, through new insights and ways of seeing, walkers took ownership of the story, generating affective attachments to a new co-created heritage narrative. The silence was broken, however temporarily, and the story of the walk and the spirit of questioning is shared, networked again and again. (211-12)

In this way, White concludes, Sweet Waters “was an opening towards a somatic creative activism manifesting new ways of attending to whiteness and revealing privilege” (212). He suggests that “walking-with may offer a non-confrontational embodied approach to addressing other ‘wicked’ problems and complex social justice issues” (212). “At a time of deep dislocation and as an ugly romance with empire and white supremacy emerges,” he states, “I believe that collective and somatic acts of making the return to past injustice are vital precursors to the social repair needed for a just and sustainable future” (212).

Sarah Harper, in “The Meaning and Importance of Refusals: is walking as accessible as we think?” (214-24), reflects on La Grande Traversée, a participatory walking art project in northern France. While she considers a success, she wants to think about “the limitations of the practice, looking at where it failed to engage, why that matters, and what could be learned from it. I will ask whether walking as a participatory art practice can be racially exclusive, and what value we could give to its refusal” (214). She notes that contemporary French culture “puts a high value on participation, and as artists, we can tend to be complicit with that demand, without necessarily addressing whose interests that participation might serve” (214). Nevertheless, refusal to participate is both inevitable and useful—for those who refuse, that is (214-15):

I’d like to focus on the value on non-participation, looking at some of those who did not walk and why, and in doing so re-assess the comparative cultural value of everyday activities, by which I mean what people are already doing before an artist turns up to invite them to go for a long walk, collectively, in the name of social cohesion. Exploring this act of walking together, walking through, and walking past, through the lens of refusal, I will focus on those for whom walking was problematic: physically, psychologically, culturally or for religions reasons, as well as those too angry with the economic desert they were born into to participate in celebrating a major aspect of their heritage with any kind of collective action. (215)

Those who refused to participate in the project are, in this account, more important than those who did, and they suggest the limits of participatory walking as a practice. Harper notes that she takes walking for granted; she starts all participatory projects with walking, “in a slow immersion process,” walking to meet people and explore place (215). “But when does walking, walking past or walking through, become an exclusive rather than an inclusive activity, reinforcing a community of sameness, of like-ness, reserved for those who are financially able, or who have the cultural or social capital which puts pleasure, sport, well-being, or risk-taking easily within reach?” she asks (215). 

The purpose of La Grande Traversée was “to be a cultural strategy to re-activate links between populations who, due to poverty and unemployment, are highly sedentary, many rarely venturing out of their neighbourhoods, let alone their towns. It was to reframe participants’ lived experience with the territory, and re-infuse contested or disaffected sites with expressions of story, history or ownership” (215). However, celebrating the mining heritage of an area which has suffered devastating unemployment difficult, as was “proposing a walking project within a culture of limited mobility” (216). The area is dotted with “ex-mining estates,” built for miners, and since the mines closed in the 1990s, the remnants of the mines—buildings, slag heaps, lift shafts, pitheads—were left to rot or demolished, until ecotourism initiatives turned the railway tracks to the mine sites into cycle paths, “the slag heaps into havens for biodiversity and walking or mountain bike trails, and caved in the underground pit tunnels to create lakes for watersports” (216). As a result, the area is “a walker’s paradise, but social relics of 19th-century patriarchy mean that, after generations of being provided for (and controlled), initiative is lacking on mining estates and people find it hard to do things outside their comfort zones. Many families are third-generation unemployed and have never known a working family member” (216). That unemployment has caused a sharp rise in passive activities—watching television—along with alcoholism and suicide (216). 

The project Harper curated involved walking for pleasure, which “might be an exclusive activity”: problems of length (twelve kilometres at first, but as she searched for an appealing route, it became longer) (217). Also, because “the project’s numerous institutional partners proved only half committed to the idea of an artist exploring ‘the poetics of the everyday,’” they  “wanted to bring this Great Crossing past their expensive new arts centre, or renovated town hall” (217). This meant that the “poetics of the everyday”—“the subtle, poetic rediscovery of sidestreets, corner cafés or unsung front-gardens”—was “sacrificed to tourism and municipal pride, as the route lengthened again . . . to nineteen kilometres” (217). That was too long for an area with the highest obesity rates in France, so to make it easier for people to participate, she included travelling from site to site by tram “into the walk’s protocol,” but the fares were too expensive for “the large, low-income families we particularly sought to engage” and the tram company refused to provide free tickets (217). I would also suggest that a lack of appropriate walking shoes or boots would have been a barrier.

“For each community group I worked with, the decision to walk or not was usually based on the group’s physical capacity to walk far,” Harper recalls. “Groups who opted out on these grounds were invited to be ‘hosts’ along the route, harnessing their existing cultural activities to punctuate the walk with performance” (218). “For the walkers, these theatrical interventions served to revive flagging energies,” she states. “The guide-maps in their hands became visible signs of belonging to this ephemeral community of adventurers, an invitation echoed in the local myths or stories that hosting residents confided to them, or in the soundscapes whispered from trees or letterboxes along the way” (218).

Nevertheless, some groups were excluded: people who spoke little or no French, who spoke Arabic or Kabyle instead—women from Algeria in particular, whose “daily routines were largely restricted to their flats” and a community centre, a group for whom going to another town or taking a tram was unimaginable (218-19). “The project’s focus was too wide to be meaningful for them, their isolation too great, and yet their industry was a key part of the region’s history that would remain unembodied and silent,” she acknowledges (219). “Another group excluded themselves in reaction to their experience of exclusion from society’s workforce”: young, unemployed, third-generation North African immigrants (219). “Faced with their rage, a celebratory walk seemed an inappropriate suggestion”—after all, their grandfathers were miners (219). Instead of walking, those youth made a film, with a rap they created as its soundtrack (219). A third group “that found themselves excluded” was a collective of North African women, who wanted to participate but found it difficult because the walk took place during Ramadan, a time when the daily fast would make walking 20 kilometres difficult (220). The organizers would not move the date of the walk to a day after Ramadan. 

“Care and reparation are central to the relational aesthetic,” and in an aesthetic of care, as James Thompson suggests, decisions about accessibility are “crucial ethical propositions” (qtd. 220-21). However, in Harper’s compliance with the funding and hosting agencies, 

little space was made for those for whom walking out of their neighbourhood was physically or mentally impossible, nor for those whose experience of the territory was one of anger, or rejection, nor for those who would be celebrating Ramadan at the time. With an assumption that “walking together” would be an accessible and cohesive act, the project ultimately appealed to white working families, with social and physical mobility, for whom the weekend could be devoted to leisure, or those whose memories or family ties still rendered the, now historical, mining heritage meaningful. (221)

Those who refused to walk were made invisible (221). What was the value of their refusal? Harper wonders (221). The groups that did not participate had good reasons for not engaging in the project (221). 

“In conclusion, it seems important to ask whether the act of walking is itself racially exclusionary?” she asks (221): “I cannot avoid the reflection that the three groups, whose refusals I have examined, were made up almost entirely of people of North African descent. And looking back over the hundreds of photos that were taken that day, of the walk and its participants, I can see two faces of colour; the vast majority of the 450 walkers were white” (221-22). Therefore, “this act of walking was racially divisional, through racism deeply embedded into the region’s history” (222). In other words, the walk produced exclusion (222). For all three of the excluded groups, “the unfamiliar act of walking a long way, in a group for pleasure, surrounded by others they did not know, with whom there was to be some undefined inter-action, would have needed mediating, accompanying or adapting” (222). 

Harper examines other walking events that were either seen as for whites alone, or where participation by people of colour seemed strange and unusual (222): “The history of the black body so painfully linked to walking under duress, and the contemporary black body still economically bound to walking by necessity continues in non-urban contexts to make it unusual or difficult to imagine black families walking out of choice” (223). She also notes that the participants in the Plymouth conference were mostly white and middle class and older: “The thing about walking is that it is, in theory, so accessible. Anyone can do it. But if its afficionados are so distinctly lacking in diversity, it begs the question, has walking become, or remained, a white practice, something elitist, potentially exclusionary, belonging to the last century?” (223). I’m not at all surprised by this recognition, but at the same time, I don’t think walking is a practice that’s open to everyone, even though, in theory, most people are capable of doing it. In the city where I live, for instance, very few people walk; everyone drives. To suggest walking for pleasure—outside of one route around or near the lake in the large park at the centre of the city—would be considered strange. Is the problem that some people are not engaged by participatory walking-art events, or is the problem the belief that everyone is or should be called to walk? Or does the problem Harper identifies consist of both of those questions?

“It used to feel, a few decades ago, radical, or counter-cultural to reclaim the streets with our feet,” Harper concludes. “To stay relevant, we have to hope that as a movement it embraces, and is embraced by, diverse artists for a diverse public” (223). In the end, she argues against her own practice, “recognising non-participation in order to highlight inbuilt conscious or unconscious bias, and systemic contradictions of intent” (223). People who refuse to walk “are doing something else that has value” and “walking may not be as accessible as we think” (223). So, when people refuse to participate we need to consider “an ecology of mutual doings and beings” (quoting Anna Harpin and Helen Nicholson) by “acknowledging the implications of how participation is recognised and by whom” (223). 

In “Access Denied? Walking Art and Disabled People” (225-34), Morag Rose picks up on the question of accessibility. She begins by celebrating the conference as “a gathering of kin”: people who believe “that the ordinary can be transformed and our footsteps can be creative” (225). “However, too often I find myself asking awkward questions about whether I am going to be excluded in subtle (and not so subtle) ways because of how my body works,” she writes. “As a disabled person will I have to ask about access?” (225). Would she be the “conference crank,” a figure not unlike Sara Ahmed’s “feminist killjoy,” “the participant whose awkward questions create the space to discuss who, and what, is being overlooked or marginalised” (225). After the conference, she was left with “a lingering unease” (225). She wants walking artists “to make a few small changes to ensure their work is welcoming to all” (225-26).

Rose discusses the Loiterers Resistance Movement, which she co-founded in 2006: a psychogeographical collective whose manifesto states, “Our city is wonderful and made for more than shopping. The streets belong to everyone and we want to reclaim them for play and revolutionary fun” (qtd. 226). However, her walking, because of her disability, “has always been problematic and contradictory,” and while there “is still pain, and tiredness, and falls,” she also experiences “stubbornness, joy and a deep sense of gratitude” (227). “I haven’t really spoken or written much about being an artist whose chosen medium is my nemesis because I didn’t want to, and I was too busy with other things,” she confesses: 

Trying to reconcile this paradox, without making myself a spectacle, a superhero or an object of pity, has often felt hard and not something I wanted to give time to. My broken feet are not the most interesting thing about me, and having always lived with pain I don’t really want to give it more energy. A truth: chronic illness is boring, really boring. Also exhausting, expensive and dull. Pain is painful. (227)

“I want to encourage walking artists to think about how we can recognise the needs and experience of disabled people and find ways to open up our work,” she states (228). She notes that the archetype of the walker is male, but also “able bodied, wealthy, heteronormative, urbane and white,” all things that need to be addressed collectively (228). “Improving access and valuing different bodies takes effort and means encountering uncomfortable truths,” she states (228). For instance, she realized, at the conference, that she rarely engages with the work of other artists, because she is afraid she will ruin it—because of the way she walks, because of her disability, which is not included in the walks’ designs. 

Rose includes a note she posted on the Walking Artists Network after the conference, asking walking artists to think about how to include disabled people in their work. But her post did more than that: “Please can we all try and be explicit, and honest, about who is welcome and able to participate in our work. It can be really difficult to find out access information for many venues and events, and this labour should not have to fall on our audience” (229). Her description of her experience is, frankly, a shock: “on several occasions I have found myself literally left behind during performance walks because the pace was too fast and nobody noticed or the terrain became very hard to navigate and this was not made clear from the off. I’m sure this is oversight rather than design, but it is, to put it mildly, unfair and unpleasant” (229). In fact, she writes, “I have become reluctant to attend events unless it is clear disabled people are welcome—because I assume otherwise there will be an uncomfortable struggle and my body will be constructed as a problem for others. I will not apologise for my pace or my body. This is, amongst many other things, exhausting and unfair” (229).

“I am not saying all our walks must be for everybody, this is clearly inappropriate and I have no desire to censor fast or long or physically arduous walks,” she continues. “I also recognise the environment we live in is disabling in many ways and we may not always have the power to choose or change a venue” (229-30). Nevertheless, accessibility information needs to be added to publicity, and walk organizers need “to think about whether there are changes we can make that would enable more people to join in or access our work in other ways if they cannot physically be there” (230). Also, walking artists must “be respectful of our audiences and reflexive to their needs. I don’t ever want anyone else to be left behind, abandoned or excluded by creative walking due to someone else’s thoughtlessness and/or bad planning” (230). Rose wants the term “walking art” to be expanded, in order to be as exclusive as possible: “My belief is that if we are making something enchanted out of the everyday it should be for everyone and ‘walking’ can, should, must include sticks, wheels, orthotics and other enabling technologies” (230). 

The response to the post was “overwhelmingly positive” but she was also “shocked . . . to realise the social model of disability is not integral to many peoples’ understanding of prejudice and exclusion” (230). She posted a follow-up, describing her original message as “a call for kindness, thoughtfulness and respect for the needs of different bodies” (231). “The most important thing is to be honest, open, and to listen. Ask people what their access needs are because they know much better than you do,” she wrote (231). She called for the development of a compilation of resources on access “and amplifying/celebrating the work of disabled walking artists” (232); that is under development, and she welcomes contributions from people with a variety of disabilities (232). “I will continue to work with others to make Walking Art as accessible, diverse, challenging and creative as possible,” she writes. “The social model of disability teaches us that the environment is disabling and we face massive structural issues. This does not give us an excuse to not be caring, kind and self-reflexive” (232-33).

Rose ends with three walking projects she finds inspiring: first, Sue Porter and Dee Heddon’s work in the “Walking Interconnections: performing conversations on sustainability” project (2017), which “challenged the lack of disabled peoples’ voices in debates around environmental sustainability”; Carmen Papalia’s Mobility Device, where he replaces his white cane with a marching band; and Alec Findlay’s Day of Access (2019) which called on landed estates to open their lands to walkers (233). “We are all walking in a world that can be hostile to many and where disabled people are too often marginalised, ignored or discriminated against. I urge everyone reading this to pause and think about how we can challenge ourselves to make things better,” she states (233). Walking with others is “a way to take and hold space, building connections and creating communities as we do so. The question I am asking is who are you willing to make space for? Please do not leave any walker behind” (233).

In “The Documentary Drift: Lutyens, Cockington and Poetry” (242-54), Sam Kemp describes his intention to write a collection of poetry, influenced by Phil Smith’s book about a mythogeographical journey across South Devon, exploring “the pastoral contradictions of Cockington, a heritage village in the south west of England,” but when he encountered a collection of letters by the architect Sir Edwin Lutyens (1869-1944), “the village soon became a fantastical theatre where his questions of language, craft and beauty could unravel” (242). “In this essay I’ll highlight the role that walking played in a bleeding together of a documentary and geographical landscape,” he writes (242).

At the beginning of the project, Kemp walked around the village at different times of day, different routes, different conditions, taking notes (242). “I was interested in multiplicities, how the village cold be both a pastoral retreat and a complicated mash up of commodified rural tropes,” he recalls (243). He has a personal connection to the village: his family runs the gift shop (243). “Simply walking the village as a visitor was a new experience. Up until then, it had always been a place of tension,” he states (243). These complications suggest that it is a “mythogeographical hub,” and he drew inspiration from Smith’s writing on Cockington (244):“Cockington is a complicated place, seemingly still stumbling for a precise role”: a tourism destination that presents a façade of the local and traditional (244). However, he found lots of evidence that “punctures Cockington’s commodified pastoral”: rough sleepers, struggling businesses, death, a “stifled utopia under the car park,” “bizarre finds that don’t fit anywhere” (245). It seemed like he was engaged in a mythogeography of place.

“Yet the more I delved into Smith’s practice and writings, the more I realised I was refusing to allow myself to drift. It was all going too well,” Kemp writes (245). Mythogeography “poses more questions than answers, and I had only been searching for answers. After a year or so of walking the village I had amassed piles of poems, most of them reports on my walks that I had attempted to tie together into a narrative. But the poems were predictable, more critiques than personal accounts” (245). There wasn’t enough theatre in what he was doing: “I wasn’t fully drifting around the village, and so I couldn’t fully drift on the page” (245). “I have struggled with the relationship between walking and writing,” he admits. “The poetry needed to be something more than just a narrative report of my drifts, yet I wanted the loose ethos of the drift to influence the page. My attempts at writing up my walking felt too calculated, almost too easy” (245). When I read those words, I thought of my own manuscript, and wondered whether it came too easily as well, whether it is superficial or rigid. 

Walking with strangers to the village helped: it “began to open up rather than be closed down with critique” (245). “I stopped searching and theorising and began to see the beauty in the place, even the beauty in its contradictions,” he states (245-46). The village became “a haunted yet progressive landscape, a place of genuine beauty disguised by a façade of itself. In short, it unravelled into a place I no longer recognised or understood” (246). Then Lutyens, “my deceased co-conspirator,” arrived: “Lutyens’ constant striving towards a perfect sense of beauty became a catalyst for questions of craft and led to my experiments with visual and sonic page-based drift that were influenced by, but free from, the wonders and limitations of Cockington Village” (246-47). Kemp began writing about a village that was “a palimpsest of past and future Cockingtons,” which exists only in language (247). “In the poems Lut is a complex construction, both hopeful and defeated, reborn and weighted, witty and inarticulate, contradictions spurned from glimpses of his historical character,” he states (248). Kemp’s drifts “took on a documentary landscape,” but Lutyens’s papers are “riddled with complications and confusions” (249). 

The fragmentation of Lutyens’s life, as discovered in the archival material, was not unlike his walks through Cockington: “The disparate nature of the archives forces you to drift across time, leaping through papers that may bear little relation to one another. There is no singular narrative, just as Cockington was a weave of competing places layering and re-laying a sense of place, the archives were the scattered odds and ends of stories” (250). The archival material “became a lens by which to re-construct Cockington Valley, its topography and cultural histories, but also its future”:

Each poem is a gathering of splinters, curated for form a landscape around Lut, a figurehead for the hopes, dreams and disappointments invested in the land. I wanted a sense of a drift through place and space, the latter being that of the documentary fragments of the archives. Walking and stumbling across multiplicities began the project and eventually extended to the page, with the process of researching and writing the village being a narrative that runs alongside the more tangible written and experienced histories. It was important to engage with that multiplicity, to sneak in, but, at the same time, confuse my presence as author. The poems would not just be showing up different sides of this village, but they would form a village of themselves, a new Cockington made up of fragments of sources. (253)

“It was only by letting go of the village in the first place and allowing myself to be led, both by the living and the dead, that I was able to experience its multiplicities,” Kemp concludes. “The act of walking, moving forward with no definite destination, both through a geography and an archive, reminded me that the fragments of time and place are in constant motion. The past is unsettled by our traipsing through it, splintering off into that all-important future” (253).

Hilary Ramsden and Clare Qualmann, in “Chip Walks” (266-74), present an account of an ongoing artwork, Chip Walk, which began as a project by walkwalkwalk and developed into a mapping of every chip shop in a specific area of east London (266-67). “As we walked and ate and mapped the chip shops—talking to the owners and the people who worked in them along the way—we began to consider the shifting food map of the area as an indicator of the gentrification that was then in its early stages,” they write (267). That project developed into a convivial walk, a tour of the area’s chip shops that “involved participants in discussions about food, what we want to eat, where and when” (268), which led to a chapter in Qualmann’s 2015 book, co-edited with Claire Hind, Ways to Wander (268). 

This is where Ramsden comes in: her walking, and her theatrical practice of clowning, “both involve interruptions—of assumptions and expectations, of logic and habit, of seriousness and play and everyday movement and all these elements are linked” (268). For Ramsden, 

the Chip Walk is a further interruption in an intentional everyday kind of walk and one that brings together people around a common purpose, buying and eating food; and noticing and perhaps discussing in some depth the surrounding environment might happen almost as an aside, in a deceptively easy and simply way. In this way the chips might be considered almost a playful misdirection, in magician’s terms, where other issues emerge almost by change, through incidental conversations, imaginings, local knowledge, the re-surfacing of memories and the periodic attention to surroundings at the Chip Walk moves on. (268)

In 2018, Ramsden walked with Blake Morris in his rewalking of Chip Walk, part of a project in which he walked every walk in Ways to Wander (268-69). That walk took place on her birthday, but it felt irresponsible, given that she knew refugees in Greece were walking long distances for food (269). So Ramsden decided to walk a different kind of Chip Walk: she organized one on the island of Lesvos, which would start at a refugee camp and end with a free meal (270). The event met with enthusiasm from NGO workers and refugees from all over the world (271): 

The walk gave each of us a chance to walk and talk with different people, at different paces and at different levels of engagement. Some people were already friends, some worked together, had become friends in the camp or had crossed the sea together. All wanted to engage in conversations and discussions—many about family, about their situation in the camp, about their desires and dreams for the future—where they wanted to be and what they wanted to be doing; not living in the camp and not being sent back to where they had fled from. (271)

It was a creation of what Grant Kester calls dialogic art, in which “socio-political relationships” are the raw materials (271). “We continue to conduct further iterations of this convivial and participatory art work.” they write (271). Some of those walks have raised money to support a nonprofit that feeds refugees on Lesvos (272).

“What further Chip Walks on Lesvos point to is the creation of a longer, continued story—not only of personal stories from the people in the camps but the creation of dialogue with others—in other places on Lesvos, beyond, to mainland Greece, to other countries and peoples in Europe where there is the potential to raise awareness and money, as well as to fight for justice through the legal systems for people seeking asylum and fleeing oppression,” they continue (272). People who“are lucky enough to be able to walk to the local chip shop to get food with money that we are privileged to earn easily must be able and willing to contribute time, money and energy to fight bureaucracy, to resist complacency and to go beyond our fear of the other in order to assist in making it easier for people to flee oppression and injustice and to live with respect and hope” (273). “The Chip Walk enables us to interrogate the commonalities of circumstances (people gathering together for simple, everyday activities of walking, eating and talking) and of disparities that exist in these worlds apart—between incomes, accessibility to work and housing, in addition to issues of gentrification, sustainable building and urban planning,” they conclude. “The two main contexts that we have practised this work in[,] Lesvos and Hackney, are worlds apart, yet the action of walking and eating and talking, following a score for an artwork, creates in each location a temporary community” (274). The repetition of these walks “enables us as walk artivists to consider the similarities and differences between walks” (274). That repetition is “a way of making sense of patterns of culture” and it “enables us to look askance at our processes and methods, refining, re-interrogating our practices, in exchange with others” (274).

The last chapter I’m going to discuss in this summary is Anna Sanders-Falcini, “Chasing Mists: walking to scent and sense the atmosphere of the Hoo Peninsula” (290-301). “Do places have atmospheres and if so, how do they manifest themselves?” she asks (290). She has been “chasing the atmosphere of the Hoo Peninsula”—a place on the edge of the Thames and Medway rivers in North Kent—“for many years” (290). This place “offers a particularly dense, rich and variable source fo information from which to explore the question of whether and how a distinct atmosphere exists and can be defined in a specific location,” she writes. “The variability of the landscape, of large open agricultural spaces, ruins, industry, redundant nuclear bunkers and its shoreline amongst other features, presents a range of atmospheric conditions. In any one of these places, the phenomenon is present fluctuating between degrees of a subtle or more overt nature” (290). When experienced cumulatively, the “separate incidents of atmosphere” become “an overall, singular phenomenon that is powerful and potent. This nebulous force of atmosphere is complex in its geographical context alone, and the problem of making manifest any research findings led me to the act of walking through a psychogeographic methodology” (290).

“In order to experience the atmosphere and to be receptive to it, I have immersed myself in the landscape,” Sanders-Falcini continues. “Walking therefore, has been at the core of this investigation, and as a female psychogeographic explorer, walking has articulated (as my body speaking to me) of how the atmosphere can be evidenced: through its geography, archaeological matter, botany and, more abstractly, through its mapping, as well as elusive and ephemeral materials such as mists and memories” (290-91). She’s particularly interested in smells and scents (291). She has put together a collection of found objects—“forgotten and disregarded matter”—from the Hoo Peninsula as well (291). She calls this collection “The Archive of the Atmosphere” (291-92). Those objects “have become the focus of a series of performances, where, as Louisa Cornford”—a character she has created, an amateur Edwardian archaeologist—I have performed the archive” (292). One of those performances took place at the conference, although I missed it (292).

Some of Sanders-Falcini’s comments are oddly related to walking in Saskatchewan:

Walking entails staying at ground level and because of the flatness of the land in the peninsula, this results in a constant perspective with few degrees of variants. In one sense this encumbers the walker and the flatness literally flattens the experience. This is not to imply that the experience is unrewarding but that the figure is perpendicular to the ground and in being so, she feels the atmosphere at this axis. (293)

“At this level, I am in close contact with elements that might trigger any of my receptors: smell, hearing, taste, sight and touch,” she writes (293). As an example of taste, she harvested rosehips and made syrup from them, taking a teaspoon every day (294). 

Her practice also addresses gender issues. When she first began drifting in the Hoo Peninsula, she “settled into a rhythm of wanderings that continued over a period of years. Entangled were the shadows of an embodied position, vulnerability and female mobility. It was imperative that I walk alone, for to walk with others, though useful, was an unnecessary distraction” (296). She was aware that women walking alone in an isolated place is considered dangerous: “the narrative to this fear is the real suppression of women walking alone and particularly at night that had been historically been enforced by the policing of spaces in the Victorian period and earlier” (296-97). “What I began to understand and experience was that the atmosphere in the Hoo Peninsula was activated by my encounters with it through my solitary position as a female in the landscape,” she tells us (297). Being a woman walking is a form of “covert infiltration of the landscape” (298).

Sanders-Falcini identifies atmosphere through intangible feelings, as well as tangible maps and diagrams (297-98). Walking in the Hoo Peninsula led to research of “its dark histories (prison hulks and disease, for example)” which she could feel through walking before she carried out that research (298). Her research led her “towards the more inhospitable areas of the peninsula” (299), such as the Isle of Grain, an area scarred by industrial activity with a dense atmosphere, where buildings leaked “the ghosts of past histories and lives” (299).

“This article is a glimpse of a larger body of research where I have sought to identify the phenomenon of atmosphere present in the Hoo Peninsula. In this research, I have investigated atmosphere as a phenomenon of ‘feelings in the air,’ that one senses in connection to a specific place, in this case, the North Kent marshes in the peninsula,” she concludes (299-300). “The atmosphere I argue, is present and like a figure lingering in the background appearing to haunt the place. It is palpable. The atmosphere appears both as an all-enveloping phenomenon and as a more intimate, series of phenomena that are localised” (300). This research “has led to the finding that the Hoo Peninsula’s atmosphere is uniquely characteristic, attributable to its location and is experienced only in this location” (300). “Walking led to a cognitive mapping of the atmosphere and through a wayfaring rhizomatic movement I wandered over the marshland through a series of routes that revealed the portals of atmosphere” (300): she uncovered “qualities of atmosphere” through “the objective nature of the landscape” but also places where her body, in a phenomenological way, “sensed the acute atmosphere” (300):

In order to be receptive to it, the feelings of displacement and immobilisation were triggered when I first encountered the Hoo Peninsula as a young woman and these continued to be provoked on subsequent visits to the landscape. The body had to be in a position to absorb thee sources of atmosphere and it was only when I repeatedly absorb these sources of atmosphere and it was only when I repeatedly entered this situation that it began to operate in this intermediary space, becoming inextricably intertwined. (300)

Finally, she reminds us that atmosphere is felt through the senses: taste, smell, and sound; through “the weather, the tides, the ground” (300).

Walking Bodies: Papers, Provocations, Actions from Walking’s New Movements, the Conference tells me two contradictory things. The first is that there are many walking artists, mostly in the UK, whose work is not dissimilar to mine. But the other is that my practice, which has been based (partly out of pandemic necessity and partly by choice) in solo walks, is probably considered outmoded or retrograde by many of my peers. I would argue that those walking artists who reject solo or durational walking probably don’t understand the very different context of walking in Saskatchewan, or the difficulty and danger walking here can present—or the difficulty in establishing a participatory, convivial walking practice in a place where very few people consider walking as part of their lives. Perhaps that’s just defensive on my part, or perhaps the prescriptive undertone I sense in some writing about walking art rubs me the wrong way. I’m not sure. The book also reaffirms the goal I came back from the conference with: to read about the new materialism or assemblage theory or whatever it’s called (the same authors and texts seem to be described in different ways), so that I can communicate with my peers. In any case, I’m happy I finally got around to reading this book. I’m going to carry on reading about walking art. I’m not sure what my next book will be, but it won’t be hard to find one to read, since I have bookshelves filled with them now. 

Work Cited

Billinghurst, Helen, Claire Hind, and Phil Smith, editors. Walking Bodies: Papers, Provocations, Actions from Walking’s New Movements, the Conference, Triarchy Press, 2020.

Morris, Blake. Walking Networks: The Development of an Artistic Medium, Rowman and Littlefield, 2020.

Some Things to Read While Self-Isolating

A lot of us are stuck at home right now–or at least don’t feel comfortable going out, particularly those of us living in cities with icy sidewalks, as I do. What are walkers supposed to do?

Well, we can at least read about walking. Here is a lovely short essay on walking as an art practice by Julie Poitras Santos on walking as an art practice. If you are at home self-isolating but hankering to get outside, you might enjoy it.

And here is a whole lot of writing about walking by Phil Smith. This would be an excellent time to read his book on “armchair pilgrimage”–and you can request a .pdf on that site.

Stay well!

124. Fiona Wilkie, “‘Three Miles an Hour’: Pedestrian Travel”

wilkie

I read Fiona Wilkie’s book, Performance, Transport, and Mobility: Making Passage, during my MFA, but I don’t remember it. That’s what happens when you read a bunch of books quickly, without taking good notes—at least, that’s what happens to me. I remember reading the book. It came by interlibrary loan; I remember the yellow paper band around the cover and having to rush to finish it by the due date. And I remember finding it useful. I wish I could remember the argument, though. A couple of months ago, I found a cheap(ish) copy online, and it arrived, finally, just before Christmas. On this snowy day, I decided to give it a (second) look.

“‘Three Miles an Hour’: Pedestrian Travel” is the first chapter in the book—the others discuss mobile performance by train, automobile, boat, and airplane, none of which interest me—and I thought I would return to it today. I’ll read her introduction as well. The introduction begins by positing a homology between performance and movement: performance “moves its audience to a range of feelings” and “tours from one place to another” (1). “Performance has always been a slippery business,” Wilkie writes: “on the move, ephemeral and difficult to contain” (1). Wilkie has “two opening premises”:

The first is simple: that transport systems are important to our experience and understanding of mobility. The second is that, perhaps less obviously, a rich dialogue exists between transport and performance, and that this is worth investigating in order to consider how concepts of mobility are explored and debated. An underlying assumption of this book is that how we travel is intimately connected with the ways in which we both understand that travelling and conceive of ourselves—and others—as travellers. And part of this understanding comes through performance. A wealth of performances and related cultural practices have been, and continue to be, actively engaged in imagining, exploring, revealing and challenging experiences of being in transit. (1)

For Wilkie, “transport systems are a means of enabling collective imagining,” as theatre and performance is, and so thinking about these two different practices together “raises questions of the kinds of imagining that have been, and might be, done through them, and of those who are included in, and excluded from, such imaginings” (2). Her case studies, she hopes, will show that “performance not only responds to but can also produce new mobilities, reshaping existing models and engendering new, alternative possibilities for movement” (2).

Wilkie acknowledges that she has been influenced by work on “the ‘mobility turn’” in the social sciences—work by geographers and sociologists on travel—and her intention is to bring “scholarship in geography and sociology . . . into dialogue with that in theatre and performance studies” (2). “My hope . . . is that this book begins to signal some of the ways in which, when we consider performance, ‘mobilities make it different,’” she writes, citing John Urry. “By bringing ideas from within the mobility turn to bear on theatre and performance analysis, I suggest, we open up a rich field of inquiry,” she continues. “Conversely, I believe that performance has much to bring to the conversation and so, by discussing a wide range of performances and artworks that offer nuanced explorations of what it is to be mobile, I argue that the perspectives of performance extend existing discourses of mobility” (2).

Next, Wilkie summarizes the idea of the “mobility turn” (3). One of the clearest arguments about the significance of this shift is made by John Urry, who “conceives of a ‘mobilities paradigm’ . . . which provides a theoretical framework for analysing social groupings and practices in terms of movement instead of spatial rootedness” (3). She cites Urry’s 2007 book Mobilities, which I should probably read. Mobility theorists presuppose “that social life consists of movements and stillnesses at different levels that sustain one another” (3). “Broadly, the concept of mobility enables an enquiry into how the movement and transmission of ideas, arts practices, theory, capital and information relate to the physical movement (voluntary or otherwise) of people,” Wilkie writes (3-4). However, mobility isn’t just about physical movement. Wilkie quotes geographer Tim Cresswell: mobility “is about the contested worlds of meaning and power. It is about mobilities rubbing up against each other and causing friction. It is about a new hierarchy based on the ways we move and the meanings these movements have been given” (qtd. 4).

Wilkie discusses Cresswell’s distinction between a “sedentarist metaphysics,” in which “place is unmoving and mobility is perceived as a threat to fundamental human values,” and a “nomadic metaphysics,” in which “mobility is coded as freedom, figuring centrally in postmodern culture and positively linked to subaltern power,” as in the work of Michel de Certeau on walking (5). For Cresswell, neither the sedentarist nor the nomadic metaphysics is aware of the ideological meanings they ascribe to mobility (5). Janet Wolff’s feminist analysis is suspicious o the postmodern sense of travel as freedom, suggesting that this assumes “a patriarchal model of movement as the norm and thus excluding the experiences of women and other less dominant groups” (5). “Much of the current scholarship on mobilities takes care to avoid universalizing assumptions,” Wilkie writes. “For example, Cresswell’s proposed way out of the nomadic/sedentarist/dichotomy is an approach that is alert to the ‘historical conditions that produce specific forms of movement, which are radically different’” (qtd. 5-6). Doreen Massey’s work also argues for a consideration of place “as fundamentally mobile” (6). “One consequence of these debates,” Wilkie continues, “is a focus on mobilities as fundamentally relational” (6). In other words, “the various scales on which mobility operates, and the vastly different levels of privilege and empowerment in experiences of being mobile, exist not in spite but in direct relation to one another” (6). Writing on mobility tends therefore “to be invested in a notion of connection. It frequently reveals the ways in which movements on a small or local scale have generated important ideas about mobility, in turn informing a much wider set of movements across different scales” (6). We might, Wilkie suggests, 

consider the range of mobilities involved in theatre and performance as not merely arbitrarily linked by meaningfully connected in terms of ideas about mobility. In this way, the audience’s applause, stage entrances and exists, the dramaturgical structures of movement, thematic explorations of travel within theatre works, the actors’ journeys home, and the global tour of a mega-musical might all be understood to contribute to a sense of the theatre’s mobility. But the seductive power of such connections should not mask an awareness that these various movements at different scales are not connected equally. An emphasis on the relationship of mobilities requires also an acknowledgement that difference rather than similarity is often the result of relations between mobile experiences. (7-8)

Many of Wilkie’s case studies “work to tease out the disparity and power imbalance of vastly different mobilities” (8).

Wilkie is interested in the ways that “performance always already attends to, and is expert in, a number of different levels of movement” (8). Movement is part of the content of theatre and performance works. Historically performers moved from place to place, seeking audiences. “These various movements—of the performers and the characters—then circulate in a variety of ways: as theatre tours, as documents (for example, playscript, photograph, video, and web presence), in the memories of spectators, and in critical responses,” she writes. “Underpinning all of this is the travelling that enables performance events to happen at all: the temporary relocation of actors required in rehearsal periods, national and international touring schedules, and the travel of audiences. The circulation and production of contemporary arts practices have an intrinsic mobility that is worth conceiving as such” (9). She cites Miwon Kwon’s comments on the way that travel has become a marker of artworld success (9). It’s part of academic success as well. And many artists address travel in their work.

The purpose of this book is to demonstrate that “a range of performances and artworks that might otherwise not be considered together” do actually “have something to say as part of a larger conversation about movement and travel” (11). The book focuses on modes of travel other than walking as a way to extend discourses about walking and performance, “to signal a rich set of performance dialogues taking place in and through other means of travel” (11). Moreover, “transport has not often been a focus for scholars of theatre and performance,” even though “transport frames ideas of social experience in ways that are worth investigating” (12). One of the ways she tried to understand performance’s relationship to mobility at the beginning of this book project was “through a concept of ‘registering passage’” she takes from the work of David Pascoe on the architecture of airports: we move through airports “‘without registering passage’” (qtd. 16). This idea echoes Marc Augé’s discussion of such spaces as “non-places” (16-17). “Performance as a set of mostly live practices has a vested interest in meaningful encounters, and it is therefore not surprising that there are many examples of performance that seek to mark the significance of transit spaces,” Wilkie writes. “Such performances work against the logic of uninterrupted flow as sites of transport, encouraging spectators to register their passage as a complex activity, simultaneously public and private, and culturally, socially and even morally loaded” (17). Now, however, she wants to claim “something more for the practices discussed in this book” (17). She cites sociologist Peter Frank Peters, who discusses the relationship of time and passages, and the Australian artist Mick Douglas, who describes his participatory art projects “as a kind of ‘making passage’ and therefore a creative ‘method of mobility’” (17). “Following Peters and Douglas, then, I suggest that the cumulative effect of the case studies gathered in this book is one of making passage, developing not merely a commentary on travel but a valuable means of shaping experiences of transit and thereby creating new momentum,” she concludes (17).

Wilkie’s introduction outlines her general approach; the first chapter, on walking, presents specific instances of the ideas she discusses in that introduction. (So do her other chapters, which I’m not going to reread this time.) Walking, “the form of mobility that occupies the most central place in twentieth and twenty-first century performance practices,” provides her with a context in which other forms of mobility can be discussed (18). Wilkie’s argument is that “the well-established tradition of thinking, writing and performing the pedestrian yields a rich critical legacy that informs both theoretical and artistic explorations of other kinds of mobility” (18). Walking, she continues, “establishes a set of values and ideals against which the choice of mechanized transport is measured (and frequently found wanting)” (18). 

While walking is often seen in opposition to other forms of movement, it also complements other kinds of travel. “The fact that an overwhelming majority of the walking attended to in the critical discourse is undertaken as a choice also has implications that we should note,” Wilkie continues:

For the most part, Romantic poets, landscape artists, Situationists, ramblers, cultural geographers and flâneurs walk because they want to, not because they have to. The stories of those who walk because they are too poor to do otherwise are far less visible in the vast literature on walking. . . . There is therefore a context of privilege in which most documented walking occurs, and a corresponding context of walking in poverty that needs to be acknowledged. In some places this is more apparent than others. (19)

At the same time, many artists “position their work as a political response to the situation found in LA and elsewhere,” the notion that walking is pathological, and “walking is thus perceived as a radical choice in the face of cultural pressure to relinquish any prolonged contact between pavement and footwear” (19).

In the work of Guy Debord, Michel de Certeau, and Walter Benjamin, the radical potential of walking is a key theme, and these writers “have created a pervasive critical apparatus, setting out the figures of the dérivist, the pedestrian and the flâneur as standard positions from which to theorize one’s walking” (19). This critical apparatus “has become academically favoured—the accepted means of accounting for the role of the walker—and at least one of these three writers is likely to be employed in any discussion of walking in the arts, humanities and social sciences” (19-20). One consequence of this dominance is “the shift of focus to urban settings” (20). After all, all three of those “standard positions” are urban walkers. “The critical discourse of walking also tends to be organized, albeit often implicitly, around two pairs of opposing terms: urban/rural and solitary/collective,” Wilkie continues. “That is to say, the claims made for pedestrian mobility frequently rest on its status as either urban or rural; similarly, different claims are made for walking depending on whether it is undertaken alone or as part of a group. The urban/rural pairing emerges from quite distinct genealogies” (20-21). Rural walking begins with Romanticism, and “[s]till today, discourses of rural walking emphasize introspection, beauty, imagination and inner discovery,” while discourses of urban walking, which begins with avant-garde walkers, focus on “modernity, subversion and political comment” (21). (My walking practice, I think, tries to apply subversion and political comment to rural spaces, which is part of what makes it strange.) So-called “natural” country walking is both historically unusual and demographically limited: that’s the point made by “[t]he black British artist Ingrid Pollard’s Wordsworth Heritage” billboards (1992): “Pollard’s photographic project draws attention to the dearth of black pedestrians in narratives of rural walking, and cautions us to consider the ownership of various types and sites of mobility” (21-22). Walking practices also tend to be organized around “[t]he solitary/collective pairing”: Romantic rural walkers are supposed to walk alone, as are Benjamin’s flâneur and de Certeau’s pedestrian (22). Rousseau makes it clear that he walks alone “not through choice but through circumstance,” but nonetheless “the prevailing image of the Romantic walker is a solitary figure,” and that figure can be seen in the art of Richard Long, who walks alone: “the point of encounter with others is in the documentation rather than the journey” (22). Alternative versions of walking prize the collective: the dérive is a collective form, as is Misha Myers’s “conversive wayfinding” and Deirdre Heddon’s “Turning 40” project (22-23). Collective walking is said to be sociable, as well as “an enduring form of protest, found in both rural and urban situations” (23). 

The term “walker” is very broad, and it “encompasses a wide variety of approaches to, and reasons for, travelling on foot”:

The walker, as we have seen, is frequently theorized as flâneur, dérivist, or pedestrian. Elsewhere, the walker is figured as pilgrim, hiker, wanderer, activist, stroller, climber, migrant, nomad and tourist, among others. Further, walking art constructs a number of different modes of encounter: the artist walks and reports back; the spectator walks, guided by the artist in the form of recorded voice, written instructions or “smart” technology; spectators walk with performers, experiencing sections of performance en route. (23)

“Across all of these discourses, figures and structures,” Wilkie writes, “the themes of belief, retracing, resistance and pace recur, emerging as guiding ideas that inflect every other experience of travel” (23). These are the themes Wilkie goes on to discuss in this chapter. 

Wilkie begins the section on belief by quoting Phil Smith: “When the writer and performance-maker Phil Smith writes ‘I am a great believer in walking as far more than physical exercise,’ he is expressing something akin to a spiritual belief, and it is a belief that has many historical precedents” (23). Many grand claims are made about walking; it is “conceived by some as a life choice rather than, or as well as, a means of getting from A to B. And it is as a life choice that walking becomes associated with values of truth and authenticity” (23-24). Walking is both physical and spiritual, “prized for its directness,” because “it seems to offer an unmediated encounter between environment and traveller,” and because “[i]t enables a contact with the elements—with open/fresh air and changes in weather—that many other modes of transport prevent with barriers of glass and metal” (24). Rebecca Solnit suggests that walking “engenders a feeling of embodiment,” in contrast to the disembodiment produced by automobile travel. An important aspect of this belief, Wilkie suggests, is “the connection made between physical contact and self-knowledge” (24). Walking pilgrimage is the clearest expression of this “strand of belief in discourses of walking,” which “emerges as a fertile model for walking artists,” such as Hamish Fulton and Richard Long, who “both adopt tropes of pilgrimage in their work,” as does the poet Tom Chivers (24). “The structure of pilgrimage—or at least walking as a ritual act of belief—is also there in Carl Lavery’s Mourning Walk (2006), a performance documenting a walk made to mark the death of Lavery’s father,” Wilkie suggests (25). “Another engagement with the pilgrimage model—this time collective and somewhat extended, as befits a pilgrimage—is offered in the Louise Ann Wilson Company’s Fissure (2011),” she continues. “Wilson’s project takes the form of a large-scale secular ritual: a three-day journey through the Yorkshire Dales, in the company of scientists, dancers and musicians, for around 100 participants/audience members” (25). The “fissure” referred to in the work’s title “connects the workings of the brain to the shape of the Yorkshire landscape: the performance was created in direct response to the death of Wilson’s sister from a brain tumour, and was staged in the environment of the sisters’ childhood” (25). What Wilkie finds interesting in both Lavery’s and Wilson’s projects “is that it is specifically a walk, rather than any other mode of engagement, that is chosen as having the required weight and depth to address the subject of grief” (27). For Lavery, that engagement is solitary, while for Wilson it is collective, “[b]ut both artists, through these works, profess a belief in the power of walking: to remember, to mark and, perhaps, to heal” (27).

“Perhaps the belief that I am tracing through these examples is, for some at least, a consequence of a sense of awe,” a feeling that might not be true for urban walkers, “who may feel spurred on to a feeling of mastery by a Certeaudian confidence that their walking ‘transgresses . . . the trajectories it “speaks”’” (de Certeau, qtd. 27). That sense of awe, as Wilkie points out, is primarily associated with the Romantic tradition. “The theme of belief that runs through discourses of walking is, then, tied up with the dialectic of the rural and the urban,” she continues. “It is based on a combination of seemingly paradoxical feelings of autonomy on the one hand and connectedness within a larger ecology on the other, a combination that is arguably unique to walking among modes of transport” (27). In this context, it might be appropriate to note the Romantic connotations of what, for Wilkie, is intended to be a neutral term, “transport”: the O.E.D. suggests that one of that word’s meanings is “The state of being ‘carried out of oneself’, i.e. out of one’s normal mental condition; vehement emotion (now usually of a pleasurable kind); mental exaltation, rapture, ecstasy,” all feelings associated with the Romantic experience of the sublime, as I recall from the course I took on the Sublime so many years ago, taught by Dr. Ian Balfour.

Retracing is next. Wilkie suggests that “[o]ne aspect of the enduring spiritual belief in walking is a sense that walking might enable a kind of communion with those who have gone before” (27-28). She sees this idea in Robert Macfarlane’s book The Old Ways, and suggests that “[t]here is a significant strand of performance practice that responds to such ‘voices heard along the way’ by figuring the walk as reenactment. Retracing another’s steps offers a rich structural and thematic framework for performance walks. It is a framework that immediately imagines a historical relationship, establishing a dialogue between a past and a present” (28). That relationship reveals both similarities and differences between past and present, although Wilkie suggests also that “[t]he historical walk—the one that has gone before—also becomes a means of validating the present one, justifying the choice of pedestrian movement over other modes of travel” (28). 

Wilkie gives Smith’s 2008 performance In Search of Pontiflunk as an example of “this doubling effect” (28). In Search of Pontiflunk is a theatre project based on two walks: Charles Hurst’s acorn-planting walk in the early twentieth century in the English midlands, and Smith’s 16-day reprise of that walk in 2007, “with a variety of accidental and invited companions at various stages along the way” (28). Smith’s account of the journey became a solo play and was toured by Nottingham’s New Perspectives Theatre Company in 2008 (28). During the walk, Smith looked for 100-year-old oak trees that might have grown from Hurst’s acorns. “The performed account reveals both the pleasures and the frustrations of walking,” Wilkie states: “alongside memorable meetings . . . and the enjoyment of ‘private journeying,’ Smith records encounters with others unwilling to talk, blisters and a burning pain in his left knee. He confesses to taking a taxi for part of the route. Certainly, Smith’s enduring belief in the power of walking is tested here, but it remains strong” (28-29). Smith’s belief in the power of walking is political, though, rather than spiritual, an important distinction to be made in relation to his work. Smith’s play (as opposed to his walk, or as well as his walk?) “emerges as a study in time,” contemplating temporality through the acorn. As well as looking back in time at Hurst’s journey, Smith looks ahead, to our responsibility for the planet’s future. He also conceives of his walk in opposition to other forms of transportation: the point is to meditate on walking and the way motorized transportation “displaces us” (qtd. 29). In her chapters on other modes of transportation, Wilkie says, she discusses “many examples of artistic practice that parallel this concern with ‘what our mobility makes us’ at the same time as they challenge Smith’s argument by articulating ways in which transport still has the power to move us and to reassert our sense of place” (29). As a walker, I would be interested in reading those chapters—not now, but eventually—partly because I believe it would be difficult to make that kind of argument successfully.

Another example of walking as reenactment is Esther Pilkington’s A Long Walk (2009), in which Pilkington retraces half of one of Richard Long’s walks: a 626-mile walk carrying a stone from the beach at Aldeburgh to the one at Aberystwyth, and then retracing the journey with another stone. “Divided into 20 short sections, the performance text describes weather conditions, clothing, walking companions, stopping points and photographs taken along the way,” Wilkie writes.  “Alongside such details, the artist considers issues of generosity, identity and documentation. Her focus is on the relationship ‘between the walk and its documentation,’ the activity and its description, and it is a relationship that we can only guess in Long’s work,” which is documented with a sparse text work, as is his practice (30). With its emphasis on anxiety, Pilkington’s text “makes an appealing contrast to the prevailing image of the confident walking artist in command of the task to be undertaken and fully equal to the distances involved” (30). Her decision to treat Long’s text work as instructions rather than a record of a past event “complicates the apparent simplicity” of Long’s Crossing Stones (30). Pilkington’s text “could be read as a postscript to Long’s attending to the sometimes messy realities involved in long-distance walking and art-making. She recasts the closed, completed work as an open invitation, and in doing so implicitly reminds us that any experience of walking is circumscribed by gender, age and expertise” (30). In fact, for Wilkie Pilkington’s performance leaves her inspired to think that she could walk across Britain one day. That is “part of the appeal of conceiving the walk as reenactment: the fact that another has gone before not only validates and lends historical weight to a current walk but also acts as reassurance that it can be done” (30-31). It also generates a sense of being in dialogue with previous walkers even as we are issuing an invitation to future walkers who might follow in our own footsteps (31). 

“As A Long Walk makes clear, though, none of these manifestations of one route can every really be understood as the same walk” Wilkie continues. “When a walk enacts a retracing, it also marks out—footstep by footstep—historical changes, personal differences and cultural shifts” (31). Deidre Heddon’s reenactment of Mike Pearson’s autobiographical talking tour Bubbling Tom is one example: when she reperformed Pearson’s work in 2000, “she found that the ‘original’ guided tour was ‘remembered, written over, added to, forgotten, extended, transformed, recontextualized, reinvented, as space and place were shared, contested, and for the ‘outsider,’ borrowed” (Heddon, qtd. 31). “Indeed, Bubbling Tom itself might be understood as an act of retracing, attempting a communion with the cumulative power of many childhood explorations of the same territory more than 40 years earlier,” Wilkie writes. “By similarly unsettling any sense of a stable ‘original’ walk that exists unproblematically to be traced and retraced, we might view each of the reenactments discussed here as creative exploratory acts, positing histories of walking as open-ended conversations stretched across time” (31). 

Audio walks, such as those created by Janet Cardiff, are another kind of retracing: “The artist walks and records that walk along with instructions for repeating it,” Wilkie writes. “In doing so, she makes claims for the significance of the route: it is, implicitly, worth walking again. The effect of the binaural recording technique used by Cardiff is that the walker follows in the artist’s footsteps, retracing the walk that she has done before” (31-32). This retracing is a layering, and the power of these audio walks lies in the slippages between the two layers. “My suggestion here is that a significant proportion of walking art is premised not just on walking but on walking again: reenacting; retracing; reconsidering,” Wilkie continues. “Legacy thus emerges as one of the value-based claims made for walking over other forms of transport: walking practices are supported, or perhaps haunted, by historical precedence” (32).

Resistance is another theme in walking art: “it is one means by which we can conceive of separate instances of apparently private walking as, cumulatively, a public art. Walking more explicitly engages with the public realm—and with pressing questions of what it is to be public—in those instances when it is figured as an act of resistance” (32). Wilkie suggests that there is an etymological link between “mobility” and “mob” and that protestors are usually on foot. “But resistance, of course, does not necessarily mean protest,” she continues. “Rather quieter forms of resistance involve walking as a deliberate choice in the face of its perceived ‘others,’ including commerce, globalization, transport culture and urban planning” (33). Debord and de Certeau provide key theoretical texts about walking as resistance, and many art projects use walking as a form of resistance: Platform’s 2006 And While London Burns; FrenchMottershead’s 2012 Walkways; Bruno de Wachter’s ongoing series Circling Around (Without Taking Off), in which de Wachter and participants walk around the perimeters of international airports (33-35). 

“In all of these examples, the choice to walk is deemed important to the capacity of resistance,” Wilkie writes, partly because walking is literally out-of-step with modern (or postmodern) forms of space, time, and embodiment (35). “The claim for slowness is used to set walking apart as a more virtuous choice than other means of travel, and therefore has clear implications for the practices discussed in the chapters that follow,” she continues (35). Whereas French theorist Paul Virilio has been called “the ‘high priest of speed,’” he is interested in deceleration as well as acceleration. “One of the means by which the world might now be said to be slowing down is the advocacy of slow travel, which, by association with slow food, signals ‘a concern for locality, ecology and quality of life’” (Dickinson and Lumsdon, qtd. 36). The 2010 performance installation Slow Travel Agency (presented by Sustrans in Bristol) is an example of a performance that emphasizes slowness (36). The work of Wrights & Sites is another example of work that uses slowness to resist hierarchies that value speed. “Many of those employing pedestrian travel in practice and theory rely, implicitly or explicitly, on celebrating the pace of the walk over the speed of mechanized transport,” Wilkie writes. “The comparison with other forms of transport is fundamental to this celebration of walking” (36-37). She notes that slowness is not the only important aspect of walking, and suggests that “pedestrian performance is not so much a return to ‘slowness’ . . . as a quest to find a more fluid and mobile mode of interaction with our surroundings, one which is based on a self-generated rhythm” (Lavery, qtd. 37). Nevertheless, Wilkie emphasizes slowness “because it continues to be cited by those performing and documenting pedestrian travel. Lavery’s caveat would be that walking is a reaction against both the speed and the passivity of contemporary life” (37).

Writer Andie Miller highlights these elements in her book on walking. The artist Ohad Fishof’s Slow Walk series announces its emphasis on slowness: rather than travelling at three miles per hour, Fishof walks at one metre per minute (37-38). The Slow Walk project is intended to have an audience; Robert Wilson’s Walking, another “slowed-down walking event, operates rather differently” (39). First created for the Oerol Festival in the Netherlands in 2008, “Wilson’s immersive installation does not really work in conceptual terms” but rather operates “as something to be experienced” (39-40). “The work sends its participant-spectators on a three-mile, three-hour walk,” Wilkie writes. “Participants set off at intervals of about a minute: the piece works . . . by creating a continuous line of walkers” (40). Participants leave “stress-inducing” items (phones, watches, cameras) behind (40). “The central event of the walk insists on silence, and explicitly strips away what might be seen as the trappings of a fast-paced walk,” Wilkie continues (40). The experience is both solitary but also a communal ritual. “Even as I find myself resistant to any straightforward equation of thought, landscape, pedestrian travel and well-being, I cannot deny the physical invigoration I feel at the end of Wilson’s walk,” she recalls (41). That’s because the work operates through a slow pace and “what it means for the artist or participant to switch to a different tempo” (42). While Fishof connects slowness to political resistance, Wilson “constructs an enjoyably escapist experience that sidesteps any sense of its relationality” (42). Running performances, though, address a very different pace: “Part of its potential, perhaps, will be to problematize the historically enduring sense that contact between the foot and the ground is characterized by slowness and leads to [a] profound relationship with both the self and the environment” (43).

In her conclusion, Wilkie notes her attraction to and skepticism about statements that equate walking with thinking. Despite caveats about the connection between those two activities, “walking seems to maintain an air of righteousness, whether it lies in the ‘one-ness with nature of rural walking or the potential for subversion often claimed for urban walking” (43-44). “Walking is valued because it inspires belief,” she continues, “because it has a strong legacy that can be trace and celebrated, because of its power to resist dominant structures, and because it is slow. It is connected rhetorically or symbolically with ideals of autonomy, freedom, insight, truth, political subversion and critical reflection” (44). But we need to be cautious about claims that the values of walking are “universally available and when the differential experiences of walking are overlooked” (44-45).

Wilkie’s discussion of walking is both a brief introduction and an interesting analysis, through her four themes, of the practice. It would be worth assigning as reading in a course on walking. But my sense, from the chapter’s conclusion, is that Wilkie is more interested in the other forms of transportation she explores in the rest of the book. That might explain some of her missteps: I don’t think Phil Smith’s walking practice is about belief, for instance; it would be better to consider his walking as a form of resistance. That’s how he would frame it, anyway. 

Work Cited

Wilkie, Fiona. Performance, Transport and Mobility: Making Passage, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

109. Stephanie Springgay and Sarah E. Truman, Walking Methodologies in a More-than-Human World: WalkingLab

walkinglab cover.jpg

Published as part of a series on research methods in the social sciences, Walking Methodologies in a More-than-Human World: WalkingLab still has something to offer for those of us who walk as an artistic practice. However, it’s not an easy read, particularly if, like me, you’ve never read A Thousand Plateaux, know little about assemblage theory or affect theory or other theories that come out of the work of Deleuze and Guattari. Those ideas were circulating at the recent Walking’s New Movements conference at the University of Plymouth, and I intend to give myself a crash course on them once my comprehensive examinations are over. Still, my sense is that Springgay and Truman expect their readers to have a certain philosophical or theoretical background, and they aren’t interested in slowing down for those of us who haven’t read what they’ve read. My strategy throughout my reading of this text has been to find the articles they refer to, which I’ll read (eventually) as part of an attempt to understand what Springgay and Truman are arguing. But it’s possible that even all of that additional reading won’t be sufficient. I’m just not part of their intended audience. So this has been a frustrating read.

Given the text’s difficulty, I began with the foreword, by Patricia Ticineto Clough, a sociologist, and Bibi Calderaro, an artist, which starts by suggesting that Springgay and Truman “have a curiosity typical of walkers on a walk. But they do not rest where others might. Where others stop, curiosity moves them on; at every turn they refuse taken-for-granted understandings of land, people, movement and memory” (xii). Springgay and Truman also interrogate the “privileges of race, class, gender, sexuality, region and ableism” as they “turn their attention, and ours, to what is often beneath what has become normalized” (xii). “Definitions, frameworks, and the use of categories become objects of critical reflection as their walking becomes a performative writing of fresh conceptualization,” Clough and Calderaro continue (xii). “On their walks, and in their mode of ‘walking-with,’ Springgay and Truman seek the collaboration of Indigenous, queer, trans, women, people of color and differently abled walkers,” they write, and in this book the authors “share these collaborations of walking/writing/conceptualizing and draw on embodiment, place, sensory inquiry, and rhythm, four major concepts that shape what has already been dubbed ‘the new walking studies,’” offering “a timely and important contribution through the expanded concepts of Land and geos, affect, transmateriality, and movement” (xii). Their reflections on method “provide strategies for turning process of collecting data to experimentation that will greatly enrich qualitative research including walking methodologies” (xii).

According to Clough and Calderaro, “Springgay and Truman offer a critical account of the way the new materialisms, posthumanisms and speculative realisms can inform methods of walking,” approaches that have already “instigated a lively debate in the social sciences about knowledge production, about the subject and object of knowledge” (xii). Springgay and Truman “follow the current ontological turn deconstructing human privilege, not only inviting a reconsideration of the relationship of subject and object, but the organic and the nonorganic as well” (xii). In their idea of walking-with, “foot touches matter but matter touches foot as breeze touches skin; the world displays sensibilities other than our own, prior to consciousness, even to bodily-based perception. There is a sense, if not recognition, of the vibrancy of matter, of a worldly sensibility, of the force of the world’s casual efficacy” (xii-xiii). I am hearing in this echoes of Phil Smith’s discussion of object-oriented ontology in his book on site-specific theatre and performance, and these ideas are worth further exploration. In fact, this aspect of “walking-with” is probably more central to the model of walking Springgay and Truman advance in this book.

For Springgay and Truman, the more-than-human “points to the ethical and political relevancy of walking-with to feel/think or surface the intensities of the entanglements of knower and world,” Clough and Calderaro continue. “Becoming accountable to the more-than-human also involves taking account of the erasures of other knowledges and methods, erasures which, in part, have enabled thinking about the more-than-human as only a recent turn in thought” (xiii). “Walking-with becomes a movement of thought not only with others, but a process of engaging with erased or disavowed histories,” they write. “It is also a moving re-engagement with the ways that the earth and the elements have been understood, protected, feared and treasured” (xiii). The notion of walking-with should be understood as way of thinking “about experience differently, to experience differently, and to experience difference in experiencing” (xiii). The ontological shift encouraged by the idea of walking-with “requires a recognition of an alterity  within the self, an indeterminacy prior to consciousness and even bodily based perception—that is, the nonexperienced or inhuman condition of all experience” (xiii). Recognizing the inhuman within the self is “an opening to all that has been defined as other than human, nonhuman, or inhuman. Walking-with invites a sense of multiplicities in a queering of being and time, a nonexperienced time at all scales of being that affords infinite variation and multiplicities of space” (xiii). For Clough and Calderaro, “[t]he falling of the foot, and the catching-up of the body moving along with the world, allows for the rhythmicity of a multitude of indeterminate beings diffracted through different spacetimes. But because every moment conceals the bifurcation by which anything can take a conflictive turn, utmost care must be taken to move in an affirmative register” (xiii). I’m not quite sure what those last sentences mean, except that all of this is making tremendously large claims about walking.

Walking-with, Clough and Calderaro continue, “is an important methodology for thinking ethically and politically,” although it “is best practiced with a method that betrays any strict adherence to method” (xiii). This book, they write asks questions about what knowledge is, how it emerges and how, how it becomes “settled, sedimented into racial, gendered, classed particulars, the stuff regularly called the social, the political, the economic” (xiv). It’s a book about walking and thinking together, and is best approached that way. Unfortunately, I first read it on a plane, crammed into a tiny seat in economy class, but I hope I was able to get something from it nonetheless. Maybe I didn’t. In any case, Clough and Calderaro are making big claims about this book, and part of the goal of this summary is to determine whether those claims hold up under scrutiny. I can say that the notion of walking-with is gaining traction; several of the papers at the recent Walking’s New Movements conference at the University of Plymouth referred to this idea, and I am interested in learning more about it.

In their introduction, Springgay and Truman discuss how the book came out of a “walk-with Micalong Creek” in New South Wales, Australia. Drawing on the work of Isabelle Stengers, during that walk they wondered about what it might mean to think “‘in the presence of others” (1). “For Stengers, to think ‘in the presence of others’ creates a space for hesitation and resistance that produces new modes of relating,” they write (1). It is a form of thinking that is collective, unpredictable, and open to possibility (1). Its “presentness must include a ‘geo-centred dimension,’ which requires we consider different scales than those that are human-centred” (1). It is a kind of slow thinking in which “in the event of relation, ethics and politics become situated, indeterminate, and artful,” as well as (citing Donna Haraway) accountable (1). The research project that came out of this and other “walk-withs” is WalkingLab, and this book reflects on the collaborations that WalkingLab has generated.

The introductory chapter, Springgay and Truman write, “situates the book in two methodological areas in qualitative research: i) walking methodologies in the humanities and social science; ii) qualitative methodologies that are informed by new materialisms and posthumanisms, and which are called by different names including non-representational methodologies and post-qualitative methodologies,” which they call “more-than-human methodologies” (2). In their empirical research, they bring more-than-human methodologies to bear on walking research (2). The first section of the introduction summarizes “the impact of walking methodologies on qualitative research,” focusing on four major concepts: place, sensory inquiry, embodiment, and rhythm (2). “These concepts . . . mark significant contributions to social science and humanities research in that they foreground the importance of the material body in disciplines that have traditionally privileged discursive analysis,” they write. “Building on the important walk that has been done in walking research, we offer our expanded concepts that are accountable to an ethics and politics of the more-than-human: Land and geos, affect, transmaterial, and movement,” concepts they “activate in each of the remaining chapters” (2). (Bold, italicized text is in the original.)

The book, the authors continue, “interrogates the more-than-human turn in qualitative methodologies” by making “new materialist methodologies and walking research accountable to critical race, feminist, Indigenous, trans, queer, critical disability, and environmental humanities scholarship” (3). They note that Indigenous scholars “have interrogated the more-than-human turn, arguing that it continues to erase Indigenous knowledges that have always attended to nonhuman animacy,” and that “[q]ueer, trans, disability, and critical race scholars argue that while a de-centering of the human is necessary, we need to question whose concept of humanity more-than-human theories are trying to move beyond” (3). 

Next, Springgay and Truman briefly summarize the four themes—pace, sensory inquiry, embodiment, and rhythm—they found in walking research. Place, they write, is understood in this research 

as a specific location and as a process or an event. Walking scholars discuss the ways that walking is attuned to place, how place-making is produced by walking, and the ways that walking connects, bodies, environment, and the sensory surrounds of place. Walking becomes a way of inhabiting place through the lived experience of movement. Walking is a way of becoming responsive to place; it activates modes of participation that are situated and relational. (4)

I’ve written about this notion of walking as place-making, and although I may not have read everything Springgay and Truman have on the subject, I think it’s very complicated, and that space and place end up being folded together (in a Deleuzian sense) through walking. Second, walking is an important way of conducting sensory inquiry, they write:

If, as walking researchers contend, walking is a way of being in place, then walking enables researchers and research participants to tune into their sensory experiences. Walking researchers interested in sensory inquiry sometimes isolate a sense on a walk—for example, a soundwalk—or they consider the ways that the walking body is immersed in a sensory experience of place, such as the texture of feet touching the ground, air brushing against the cheeks, or the smells of city streets. (4)

I think this is true, although it’s possible as well that other ways of experiencing an environment might generate similar sensory experiences, including, potentially, just sitting in a place. Third, “[w]alking methodologies privilege an embodied way of knowing where movement connects mind, body, and environment,” they continue:

Walking scholars typically describe embodiment as relational, social, and convivial. Embodiment is conventionally understood through phenomenology, where researchers and participants examine the lived experiences of what it means to move in a particular place. This experiential understanding either focuses on an individual account of a walking, or is conceptualized through community-based or group walking practices that highlight the social aspects of walking. (4-5)

I’m glad that Springgay and Truman note that individual practices are embodied as well, since not all walking is “relational, social, and convivial.” Finally, they note that “[t]he pace and tempo of walking is another theme that emerges in walking research”:

Here, researchers are interested in the flows of everyday life, pedestrian movements in a city, or the topological features of walking in a landscape. Rhythm is described through embodied accounts of moving and sensory expressions of feet, limbs, and breath. In other instances, rhythm pertains to the pulse of the city, such as traffic, crowds, music, and other environmental phenomena that press on a walker. (5)

As I read these summaries, I found myself wishing that Springgay and Truman had referred to specific examples of texts that explore these four research themes. However, that’s what happens in the actual chapters where these themes are discussed.

Next, the authors suggest that this book extends these themes “through more-than-human theories that are accountable to critical race, feminist, Indigenous, trans, queer, and critical disability theories” (5). They propose four additional concepts: Land and geos, affect, transmaterial, and movement (5). “We use these concepts to think frictionally with WalkingLab research-creation events,” they write, noting that friction “is a force that acts in the opposite direction to movement,” slowing it and introducing resistance to it (5). “Friction exists every time bodies come into contact with each other,” they suggest, citing Jasbir Puar’s argument that when two theoretical frameworks (in his case, assemblage theory and intersectionality) converge, that coming together “is neither reconcilable nor oppositional, but frictional” and that the concepts are held together in tension (5).

By Land and geos (the capitalization of Land is not explained, but it might come from the late Greg Young-Ing’s Indigenous style guide, a book that’s gone missing since I had to move out of my office this past summer and which I’m going to have to replace, so I can’t check to make sure), Springgay and Truman suggest that “[m]ore-than-human walking methodologies must take account of the ways that place-based research is entrenched in ongoing settler colonization” (5). For that reason, “place in walking research needs to attend to Indigenous theories that centre Land, and posthuman understands of the geologic that insist on a different ethical relationship to geology, where human and nonhuman are imbricated and entwined” (5). I understand the first suggestion, but not the second; perhaps all will be revealed as I continue reading. Both of these concepts “disrupt humancentrism,” they continue (5).

Second, affect theory, “attends to the intensities and forces of an affecting and affected body,” needs to be considered along with more-than-human methodologies (5). There’s a caveat, however: “because there is a tendency to ascribe affect to pre-personal sensations, some uses and theorizing of affect can consequently erase identity. In contrast, ‘affecting subjectivities’ brings intersectional theories to bear on affect theories, emphasizing the ways that subjectivity is produced as intensive flows and assemblages between bodies” (5-6). Several papers at Walking’s New Movements focused on affect theory, but I have yet to discover (or put together) a coherent list of readings on this subject. Perhaps this book will help with that task.

Third, transmateriality, or “trans theories, which rupture heteronormative teleological understandings of movement and reproduction, disrupt the notion of an embodied, coherent self” (6). I thought that notion had been disrupted many times, going back to the Greeks and their notion of a division between reason and passion, or Freud’s three-part conception of the psyche—even though our lived experience of ourselves tends to suggest we are coherent to some extent (in my experience, anyway). “Trans theories emphasize viral, tentacular, and transversal conceptualizations of different,” Springgay and Truman continue (6). (Why “different” instead of “difference”?) Again, references here would have been useful, although they do emerge later in the book.

Finally, “[m]ovement, as it is conventionally understood in relation to walking, suggests directionality” (6). However, the movement theories used in this book “understand movement as inherent in all matter, endlessly differentiating. Movement as force and vibration resist capture” (6). Such an understanding of movement “is determinate, dynamic, and immanent and intimately entangled with transmaterial theories and practices” (6). Once again, references to these movement theories would have been useful, although they may appear later on. 

“In addition, there are particular inheritances that proliferate in walking research,” such as the notion that walking is “inherently radical, and a tactic to subvert urban space,” an idea which “often ignores race, gender, and disability” (6). “Figures like the flâneur and the practices of the dérive become common tropes, often assuming that all bodies move through space equally,” they continue (6). These ideas will be analyzed in detail later on—but of course, they have been analyzed before, particularly by Phil Smith (who is not included in the book’s list of references) and by Deidre Heddon and Cathy Turner (who are included). As it turns out, the analysis Springgay and Truman present is significantly different from those of Smith or Heddon and Turner, and it may be blind to parts of their own walking practice, as they describe it.

Next, in “Accountability and more-than-human ethics: walking queerly,” Springgay and Truman situate the book “within new materialist and posthumanist methodological approaches to qualitative research” (6). Those theoretical frameworks are used to “enact” their “four concepts of Land and geos, affect, transmaterial, and movement” (6). They begin with the phrase “walking queerly” (6). “A key concept that has gained momentum in qualitative methodologies is Karen Barad’s ‘intra-action,’” they write, an idea that suggests that the world “is composed of intra-acting phenomena which ‘are the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting components,’ meaning that they become determinant, material, and meaningful through relations,” although I’m not clear why the word Barad uses is “intra-action,” which suggests an interior relationship, rather than “interaction,” which suggests external relationships; I suppose I will have to read Barad’s text to understand (6). “Objects do not exist as discrete entities that come together through interactions but are produced through entanglement,” Springgay and Truman suggest (6). However, “such an ontological view privileges relations,” and so “a materialist ontology recognizes the interconnections of all phenomena where matter is indeterminate, constantly forming and reforming” (6-7). They cite a later text by Barad which suggests that “ethics then is not concerned with how we interact with the world as separate entities,” but rather “‘about taking account of the entangled materializations of which we are a part, including new configurations, new subjectivities, new possibilities’” (Barad, qtd. 7). “The consequences of this ethico-onto-epistemology for qualitative methodologies and walking research are significant, as it challenges individualism and humanist notions of intentionality, destabilizes conventional notions of space as a void, and directs our attention to the highly distributed nature of collectivity and relationality,” Springgay and Truman write (7). I’m not sure what “the highly distributed nature of collectivity and relationality” means, though; perhaps I would have to read Barad to get the point? Probably.

“If ontology and ethics, or being and acting, are always relational,” they continue, “then ethics shifts from a responsibility to act on the world in a particular moral way ‘to on-going precariously located practices, in which “we” are never categorically separate entities, but differentially implicated in the matters “we” engage with’” (Katrin Thiele, qtd. 7). Moreover, “if ‘we’ are intra-actively entangled in worlding, then there will never be a final solution or outcome, rather new matterings will emerge for our entangled intra-actions,” and accountability “shifts from being responsible for, to a response-ability-with” (7). Such an ethics consists of entanglements, “‘enfolded traces’ and an indebtedness of an irreducible other,’” they write, quoting Karen Barad again (7). Barad was mentioned in several of the papers presented at Walking’s New Movements, and Phil Smith mentions her in his writing, so her work seems to be part of the current discourse on walking and therefore important to read. At the same time, I saw a joke about the word “entanglement” on Facebook the other day, which might suggest that Barad’s ideas have become dominant in certain sectors of the academy, or even that people are tired of hearing about them.

According to Springgay and Truman, “[p]art of this accountability is in the use of queer theory to rupture the normalizing inheritances of walking research” (7). They suggest that while “self-identification as ‘queer’ has a place in queer theory,” “thinking beyond subject identification and with a queer relationality opens up new possibilities for understanding space and time” (7). Sara Ahmed’s work on queer phenomenology uses “queer” in a similar way, which I’m tempted to think of as a metaphor, although not to rethink space and time, as I recall. Springgay and Truman cite Jack Halberstam’s contention that “queer time” is “time outside normative temporal frames of inheritance and reproduction,” and that “queer space” involves “new understandings of space enabled by the ‘production of queer counter-publics’” (7). But those ideas speak to an notion of queer framed by sexuality, rather than one “beyond subject identification.” Springgay and Truman also refer to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s notion of “queer performativity”; Donna Haraway’s suggestion that “queering” can undo the distinction between human and nonhuman; and the suggestion by Dana Luciano and Mel Chen that the queer or trans body generates other possibilities for living, including “‘multiple, cyborgian, spectral, transcorporeal, transmaterial’” possibilities (7-8). I’m a pretty down-to-earth person, though, and I’m not sure that spectral or transcorporeal or transmaterial possibilities for living actually exist—not without examples or evidence—and I’m uncomfortable, as a straight, cisgendered man, in simply adopting “queer” without actually being queer. Springgay and Truman discuss that second issue: “while many qualitative researchers in the social sciences and humanities often take up the word queer to describe letting go of traditional research boundaries . . . and utilize ‘queer’ as methodology, we need to account for the subjectivities that don’t enjoy the benefit of sliding in and out of being conveniently queer” (8). I’m not sure how to account for those subjectivities in my work or what doing so might look like, and there are no suggestions on offer here. Nor is it clear to me what it would mean, in practice, to “walk queerly,” as the section’s title suggests. Perhaps, again, this will become clear as the book continues.

In the introduction’s next section, “Unsettling the ‘ontological turn,’” Springgay and Truman suggest that the concept of the more-than-human “emerges at time in scholarly debates that seek to challenge and and de-centre human exceptionalism, taxonomies of intelligence and animacy, and the distinctions between humans and nonhumans, nature and culture” (8). They cite a number of authors on the political effects of the distinction between the human and the nonhuman, including Luciano and Chen (oh, how I hate the APA’s predilection for ignoring the given names of authors), who “posit the inhuman as a method of thinking otherwise,” and Jeffrey Cohen’s suggestion that, as a concept, the inhuman “emphasizes both difference and intimacy” (9). Karen Barad contends that “terms like human and nonhuman can’t be established as polar ends and as givens,” but rather the point ought to be “‘to understand the materializing effects of particular ways of drawing boundaries between “humans” and “non humans”’” (qtd. 9). Jin Haritaworn suggests that “the question of the inhuman is risky and requires anti-colonial methodologies that would in turn be aligned with Indigenous sovereignty” (9)—indeed, I’m finding myself wondering why, in these discussions of animacy, the grammar of Algonquian languages like Plains Cree doesn’t get mentioned. Haritaworn’s argument, Springgay and Truman continue, leads to Zoe Todd’s suggestion that the “ontological turn” is a form of colonization. According to Todd, “non-Indigenous scholars’ realization that [nonhuman] entities ‘are sentient and possess agency, that “nature” and “culture,” “human” and “animal” may not be so separate after all—is itself perpetuating the exploitation of Indigenous peoples’” (qtd. 9). I don’t quite understand this idea, and I suppose I would have to read Todd’s article to understand her point. Apparently, though, Todd is arguing that Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies are “‘legal orders through which Indigenous peoples throughout the world are fighting for self-determination, sovereignty’” (qtd. 9), and that, as Springgay and Truman suggest, “ontological discussions of matter must take into consideration not only Indigenous world-views but material legal struggles over matter and sovereignty” (9). 

Springgay and Truman summarize other critiques of notions of “posthuman” theorizing and suggest that 

[a]s more-than-human methodologies gain momentum in re-conceptualizing qualitative methodologies in the social sciences and humanities its fault lies in broad definitions. While consideration is given to all forms of matter and the intra-relatedness of entangled ethics, its politics is often consumed in a rhetoric of undoing dualisms where “everything matters” and thus becomes flattened. (10)

They also suggest that “[q]uestions about the politics of new materialism are typically elided” as well because “there is a tendency to think that arguments about matter as dynamic, self-organizing, and intensive are political in and of themselves,” and thinking that “politics is everywhere” ends up meaning that politics disappears (10). They cite feminist geographer Juanita Sundberg, who argues that “posthumanist scholarship in its attempt to critique dualisms actually works to ‘uphold Eurocentric knowledge’” because those attempts are silent about their own locations (qtd. 11). All of them? Really? Again, I’ll have to read Sundberg to understand.

Interestingly, though, Sundberg apparently “offers walking as a strategy for decolonizing research,” although her examples are Indigenous rather than Settler walking (11). In fact, it’s Sundberg who apparently came up with the term “walking-with,” borrowing it from the Zapatista movement (11). “Walking-with,” Sundberg states, “entails ‘serious engagement with Indigenous epistemologies, ontologies, and methodologies’” (11). Walking-with should not be misunderstood as “conviviality and sociality, or the idea that one needs to walk with a group of people. You could walk-with alone” (11). Springgay and Truman write that their “conceptualization and practice of walking-with” is situated alongside Sundberg and “the walkers she works with,” and also that they are “indebted to the rich feminist work on citational practices” (I’m not sure what “citational practices” means in this context) and Alecia Jackson’s and Lisa Mazzei’s “thinking-with theory” (11). They write:

Walking-with is explicit about political positions and situated knowledges, which reveal our entanglements with settler colonization and neoliberalism. Walking-with is accountable. Walking-with is a form of solidarity, unlearning, and critical engagement with situated knowledges. Walking-with demands that we forgo universal claims about how humans and nonhumans experience walking, and consider more-than-human ethics and politics of the material intra-actions of walking research. (11)

In other words, despite the various caveats and critiques they have offered about their theoretical perspectives, their practice of walking-with is nonetheless rooted in those perspectives, and in order to seriously engage with their notion of “walking-with,” one would have to read that body of theoretical material. The work of reading and learning, it seems, is endless.

The introduction concludes with summaries of the chapters to come, which I’m including here in hopes of understanding what’s coming. “In Chapter 1 we walk-with Indigenous theories of Land and critical place inquire; posthuman theories of the geological that disrupt taxonomies of what is lively and what is inert; and a posthuman critique of landscape urbanism,” they write, noting that their central example is the “WalkingLab research-creation event Stone Walks on the Bruce Trail: Queering the Trail (12). The second chapter “examines a number of WalkingLab walking projects through sensory, haptic, or affect theories,” using Stefano Harney’s and Fred Moten’s “use of hapticality to think about how walking constitutes a politics-in-movement” (12). The second chapter also discusses affect theory in relation to the politics of walking. The third chapter “examine a sonic walk called Walking to the Laundromat by Bek Conroy, in order to develop a theory of transmateriality” (12). That sonic walk “probes bodily, affective, and gendered labour including domestic labour, money laundering, and the proliferation of new age self-help audio books to question how some bodies are perceived as disposable in order for other bodies to thrive” (12). They critique the notion of the flâneur, and “introduce Stacy Alaimo’s important concept ‘transcorporeality,’ which takes into consideration the material and discursive entanglements between human and nonhuman entities,” along with “a number of trans theories,” including work by Karen Barad, which “complicate walking as embodied and emplaced in order to disassemble and disturb taxonomies, and confound the notion of an embodied, coherent self” (12). 

The fourth chapter looks at notions of walking as participatory or inclusionary and therefore convivial by critiquing “how participation has been framed through inclusionary logics and as rehabilitation,” looking at two walking projects to do so: Ring of Fire, a “mass procession for the opening of the Parapan Am games by Trinidadian artist Marlon Griffin and the Art Gallery of York University,” and “The Warren Run, a group orienteering event by Matt Prest commissioned by WalkingLab” (13). “Following these crucial critiques of participation as inclusion, we ask questions about how we might think differently about participation drawing on theories of movement,” particularly those of Erin Manning, “to argue that participation begins before the invitation of inclusion commences” (13). They also look at Carmen Papalia’s project White Cane Amplified in that chapter as well. Chapter 5, they write, 

responds to agitations that are occurring in qualitative research, particularly issues related to: the incompatibility between new empiricist methodologies and phenomenological uses of methods; the preponderance of methodocentrism; the pre-supposition of methods; a reliance of data modeled on knowability and visibility; the ongoing emplacement of settler futurity; and the dilemma of representation. (13)

“These agitations have provoked some scholars to suggest that we can do away with method,” they note, but their position is “that methods need to be generated speculatively and in the middle of research, and further that particular (in)tensions need to be immanent to whatever method is used” (13). They use a variety of WalkingLab projects as examples in that chapter. 

The sixth chapter examines walking and mapping and the fact that “the prevailing history of mapping is entrenched in imperial and colonial powers who use and create maps to exploit natural resources, claim land, and to legitimize borders” (13), reasons I will be avoiding mapping in my current walking project. However, in this chapter Springgay and Truman look at forms of “counter-cartography” in WalkingLab projects in which “re-mapping offers possibilities of conceptualizing space that is regional and relational, as opposed to state sanctioned and static,” and how “walking can re-map archives and disrupt linear conceptualizations of time” by paying attention to how “walking as ‘anarchiving’ attends to the undocumented, affective, and fragmented compositions that tell stories about a past that is not past but is the present and imagined future” (14). “As counter cartographies and anarchiving practices the walking projects disrupt dominant narratives of place and futurity, re-mapping Land ‘returning it to the landless,’” they write (14), although that return is probably metaphorical, I would imagine, rather than literal. I don’t understand the word “futurity,” particularly in this context, unless the reference is to settler futurity, but perhaps that becomes clear in that chapter. 

Chapter 7 moves away from standard conceptions of walking in education to present “two examples of walking-with research in school contexts” (14). Those examples “offer the potential for students to critically interrogate humanist assumptions regarding landscape and literacy” (14). In that chapter, Springgay and Truman “examine the complex ways that students can engage in walking-with as a method of inquiry into their world-making” (14). The eighth chapter “functions as a speculative conclusion or summary” and “is enacted in a series of walking-writing propositions that respond to questions concerning the relationship between walking and writing, and our collaborative process” (14). “Propositions,” they continue, “are different from methods in that they are speculative and event oriented”; they are “not intended as a set of directions, or rules that contain and control movement, but as prompts for further experimentation and thought” (14). The chapter “unfolds through a series of walks that we invite the reader to take: differentiation walks, surface walks, activation devices, ‘with,’ touch, and contours,” and they once again cite Karen Barad’s contention that ethics “is ‘about responsibility for the lively relationalities of becoming of which we are a part” (qtd. 14). “As a research methodology walking has a diverse and extensive history in the social sciences and humanities, underscoring its value for conducting research that is situational, relational, and material,” they conclude:

Yet, as we argue throughout the book, walking is never neutral. In a time of global crisis—emboldened White supremacy—it is crucial that we cease celebrating the White male flâneur, who strolls leisurely through the city, as the quintessence of what it means to walk. Instead, we must queer walking, destabilizing humanism’s structuring of human and nonhuman, nature and culture. (14)

Again, I find myself wondering what such “queer walking” would look like in practice, and whether it would be open to those who do not identify as “queer.” Finally, Springgay and Truman suggest that walking is a slow methodology: “Slowness is a process of unlearning and unsettling what has come before,” they write. “In approaching walking methodologies from the perspective of slow, we intend to critically interrogate the many inheritances of walking, to agitate, and to arouse different ethical and political concerns” (15). I’ve been told that Settlers walking is inevitably colonial because walking is slow, so I’m interested to read about slow methodologies. It’s always frustrating when a summary is longer than the original text, as is the case here, but Springgay and Truman introduce a tremendous amount of theoretical material in their introduction, and I have struggled to follow along; the length of this summary (so far) is a sign of that struggle.

The first chapter begins with a description of the geology and history of the Niagara Escarpment in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, the site of Stone Walks on the Bruce Trail: Queering the Trail, the WalkingLab event through which this chapter “is activated” (16). That event “sought ways to disrupt the typical uses of the trails in order to think about walking-with place through geologic forces and animacies, and in relation to Indigenous Land-centred knowledges,” they write. “As White settlers, we write about place informed by our conversations and readings-with Indigenous scholars and artists” (16). (Springgay and Truman use hyphens to attach the suffix “with” to many different words: “walking-with,” “thinking-with,” and now “readings-with.”) They note how place is central to walking research but point out that Eve Tuck and Marcia McKenzie “argue place-based learning and research is entrenched in settler colonial histories and ongoing practices and have not sufficiently attended to Indigenous understandings of Land” (17). I have Tuck’s and McKenzie’s book and it’s on my reading list; it’s time to turn to it, I think. Stone Walks on the Bruce Trail: Queering the Trail “sought to unsettler settler logics of place by thinking-with i) geo-theories; ii) Indigenous theories of Land; and iii) posthuman critiques of landscape urbanism” (17). These theoretical orientations are not analogous, but rather “we frictionally rub them together to think a different ethics-of-place” (17). Stone Walks on the Bruce Trail: Queering the Trail was nothing if not ambitious, and I’m always suspicious that such ambitions are difficult to realize.

Springgay and Truman reject “[d]ominant sustainability discourses” which “assume that knowledge of, and preservation through, technological fixes will control the ecological crises” (17). Instead, citing Stacy Alaimo, who argues that “‘the epistemological stance of sustainability, as it is linked to systems management and technological fixes, presents rather a comforting, conventional sense that the problem is out there, distinct from oneself’” (qtd. 17), they suggest that those dominant sustainability discourses turn walkers into spectators who “are external to wider transcorporeal relations including an entanglement with the geosocial and Indigenous Land” (17). (I’m not sure what the neologism “geosocial” means.) “Our research-creation event, Stone Walks on the Bruce Trail: Queering the Trail aimed to queer and rupture walking-with place,” they write (17).

Next, Springgay and Truman look at conventional distinctions between space and place, using Tim Ingold (the specific text they refer to is one I haven’t read) and Doreen Massey to critique those distinctions. However, they note that “[p]lace, much like embodiment, figures in almost all walking research regardless of the discipline and is a fundamental part of walking research” (18). Place is understood (not exclusively) through five threads: “the go-along or walking interview,” “pedestrianism,” “walking tours and ethnographic research,” “mapping practices,” and “landscape and nature” (18). Walking interviews, they suggest, citing Evans and Jones (again, I shudder at the way that APA format turns individual writers expressing ideas into oracular authorities), “‘produce more spontaneous data as elements of the surrounding environment prompt discussion of place’” (qtd 19). I’m planning to incorporate walking interviews into my work as a way of moving beyond a solo walking practice, and so I ought to read Evans and Jones along with the other writers Springgay and Truman cite on this subject. (The amount of reading I have yet to do feels overwhelming; sometimes, despite all the work I’ve done preparing for my comprehensive examinations, I feel that I have hardly begun.) 

What Springgay and Truman are actually talking about here, I think, in their discussion of these “threads” are forms of qualitative social science research that involve walking. For instance, pedestrianism includes “walking as a means of questioning and examining everyday practices and places,” they write (20). Walking tours and ethnographies have been used by many researchers (20-21). One form of “walking in relation to pedagogy and place” that has become “ubiquitous” is the dérive or drift through urban space; its “aimlessness disrupts the habitual methods people typically move from one place to another, and instead directs the walkers’ attention to the sights, sounds, smells and other psychogeographic details of a place” (21). I’m surprised to learn that the dérive has been used by social scientists, given contemporary psychogeography’s resistance (through its interest in the occult and other nonrational ways of “knowing”) to being absorbed by the academy. Mapping is also a way of “materializ[ing]” place, typically by using GPS but through analogue technologies (pencil and paper) as well (22). 

Nature and trail walks are ways “of doing nature, as if nature is separate and distinct from humans,” but understood in that way, nature “is exclusionary” because certain bodies—“queer, disabled, racialized”—are “marked out of place in nature,” since “nature reserves and hiking trails are shaped around a compulsory neurotypicality, able-bodiedness, and normativity” (22-23). In Australia, the practice of “bushwalking” “is a place-making practice that is ‘invested in settler futurity’” because it typically ignores the land’s traditional owners (Tuck & Gaztambide-Fernández, qtd. 23). Some scholars, including Sarah Pink, use the term “emplacement” to suggest the interrelationship between body, mind, and environment, but Tuck and McKenzie argue that emplacement “‘is the discursive and literal replacement of the Native by the settler,’” evident in things like property rights and broken treaties (qtd. 23-24). (I’m not sure how emplacement could be considered the sole paradigm that is entangled in settler colonialism; clearly I don’t understand how Tuck and McKenzie are using that word.) “[P]lace-based research needs to be put into conversation with Indigenous knowledges, practices that ‘unsettle’ white settlers, and critical environmental studies to move place from the periphery of social science research,” Springgay and Truman suggest, citing Tuck and McKenzie; Tuck, McKenzie, and McCoy; Delores Calderon; and many others (24). 

With this critical and theoretical framework in mind, Stone Walks on the Bruce Trail: Queering the Trail, Springgay and Truman write, “ruptured and queered the trail, challenging the nature-culture binary, demanding that we think otherwise about human and more-than-human entanglements” (25). They cite Margaret Somerville’s use of the term “queer in relation to place as a strategy or method for research and writing” that “disrupts and decenters the human, and emphasizes a new theory of representation” (25). Thus “Queering the Trail refuses and understanding of geology and Land from a human linear time-scale that can be reduced to heteronormative reproductivity” (25). (I don’t understand the relationship being posited here, through critique, between geology and Land, on the one hand, and “heteronormative reproductivity” on the other. What are they talking about?)

Springgay and Truman now describe Stone Walks on the Bruce Trail: Queering the Trail: the participants (a group of artists and academics) and the event itself, which included performances, “pop-up lectures” (26) on the history of walking, the word “queer,” the area’s geology, and the way that the word for “Haudenosaunee clans, which Euro-Western scholars have assumed is a human designation for groups of people, in fact is a Mohawk word that refers to Land, clay, or earth” (26-28). “Queering the Trail deliberately engaged with a relational politics that does not flatten all entities into equitable vitalism, but accounts for the ways that different phenomena come to matter as matter,” they write (29). The event, they continue, “enacted what Tuck and McKenzie invoke in their understanding of critical place inquiry”: 

They ask social science researchers to do more than simply collect data “on and in place, [but] to examin[e] place itself in its social and material manifestations.” After each pop-up lecture we asked walkers to continue walking the trail and to use that time for questions and discussions with the guest lecturers, artists, and WalkingLab. As we left the Iroquoia Heights side trail after the final walk . . . we invited the group of walkers to walk in silence for an extended period of time. Unlike sound walks that might ask participants to tune into their sensory surround, the silence was intended as a form of Place-Thought, where the confluence of the days’ events could come together. As a walking methodology, Stone Walks enacts a conjunction between thinking-making-doing. Walking-with place insists on a relational, intimate, and tangible entanglement with the lithic eco-materiality of which we are all a part. (33)

I wasn’t present at Stone Walks on the Bruce Trail: Queering the Trail, but it seems to me that while it would have been a provocative experience, it’s hard to imagine that such an event could carry all of the theoretical freight articulated in this account. How is one event’s walking in silence merely sensory, for example, while Stone Walks on the Bruce Trail: Queering the Trail’s silent walking was “a form of Place-Thought,” a term which comes from Anishinaabe academic Vanessa Watts and suggests that the earth has “aliveness and agency” (29)? How can one be certain that the event’s intentions were realized for its participants? How could a period of silent walking undo hundreds of years of settler colonial, religious, and philosophical baggage? Is that remotely possible? Are lectures along a trail really able to enact the radical programme this account claims they enacted? Could any event do all of the things that this event is described as being able to do? It’s hard for me to imagine. I would never make such claims about my walking; in fact, I’m always wondering whether my intentions are realized or whether I’ve failed to do what I set out to do. I don’t see any similar self-reflectivity or self-questioning here. 

The second chapter, “Sensory inquiry and affective intensities in walking research,” begins with this statement:

Walking methodologies invariably invoke sensory and affective investigations. Despite the fact that sensory studies and affect studies emerge from different conceptualizations of sensation, both, we maintain, prioritize corporeal and material practices. Sensory studies and the various approaches to affect share an interest in non-conscious, non-cognitive, transmaterial, and more-than representational processes. (34)

Springgay and Truman cite a long list of sensory studies and note that the senses have been considered to be important for qualitative research, while affect studies focus on “pre-, post-, and trans-individual bodily forces and the capacities of bodies to act or be acted upon by other bodies” (34-35). “This chapter examines a number of WalkingLab projects and categorizes them as either sensory, haptic, or affective,” they continue. “This pedagogical exercise is arguably problematic and arbitrary, as many of the walks intersect sensory inquiry and affective understandings of corporeality,” but by conducting this exercise, they “are able to demonstrate the degree of complexity and the many variations by which sensory knowing and affective tonalities shape walking methodologies” (35). The first section of the chapter focuses on walks “that isolate a particular sense,” followed by a section that looks at walks “that use synaesthesia to defamiliarize the ordinary, paying attention to visceral and immanent encounters of walking in urban space” (35). That synaesthesia must be metaphorical or otherwise constructed, because true synaesthesia is rare and wouldn’t necessarily take forms that would be activated by walking. Then they discuss hapticality—“a sense of touch felt as force, intensity, and vibration”—and the discussion of hapticality in Stefano Harney and Fred Moten’s articulation of “a politics of the feel” (35). That leads to affect theories and intersectionality. Finally, they argue that “‘feelings futurity’ in walking methodologies requires that sensory inquiry, haptic modulations, and affective tonalities ask questions about ‘what matters’” (35). 

To illustrate these ideas, Springgay and Truman discuss “experiments with multi-sensory and multi-species ethnography with early childhood teachers and students” in the WalkingLab project “Thinking-with Bark” (35), a project called StoryWalks (also with young children as participants) (36), several sound walks (36-38), and “a smellscape walk” in Toronto’s Kensington Market (38). “The interest in the proximinal senses in walking research is significant for the ways that it has unsettled occularcentrism,” they write, noting that “sensory inquiry ephasizes the body and corporeal ways of knowing,” although “such sensory turns need to account for the social, cultural, racial, sexual, gendered, and classed constructions of the senses. The senses are not neutral, but already exist as ethical and political demarcations of difference” (39). They cite Sarah Pink’s suggestion that the identification of five senses is a Western cultural construct (39). Next, Springgay and Truman turn to synaesthetic walks. “In walking research, synaesthesia can be deployed intentionally to defamiliarize a sensory experience of place and as a non-representational strategy,” they suggest, citing a project in which participants were encouraged to map smells “using words from another sensory register” (40): not true synaesthesia, then, but a textually constructed or metaphorical synasthesia. 

They then explore haptic walks: “Hapticality relates to the sense of touch,” they write, and “[i]n walking research, hapticality attends to tactile qualities such as pressure, weight, temperature, and texture,” sometimes organized “around kinaesthetic experience such as muscles, joints, and tendons that give a sense of weight, stretching, and angles as one walks” (40). They cite Laura Marks’s work on haptic visuality, which draws on Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of the haptic (40-41), and discuss a variety of walking projects which think about tactile knowledge and corporeality, including Deirdre Heddon’s and Misha Myers’s Walking Library project, John Wylie’s description of “the rhythm of walking as a corporeal event,” and Tim Ingold’s suggestion that “walkers ‘hear through their feet’ emphasizing the proprioception of movement,” although they suggest that Ingold’s “embodied hapticality . . . foregrounds an individual’s experience and understanding of surfaces and textures, privileging the human,” which is a problem they will address later in “discussions of human embodiment through trans theories” (41). “Hapticality emphasizes transcorporeal touching encounters,” Springgay and Truman continue (42). They discuss the use of the term “hapticality as a political mode of touching and being touched” in the work of Stefano Harney and Fred Moten (42). “Hapticality or a politics of the feel,, lies below cognitive perception,” they suggest (42). This exploration ends with Métis artist Dylan Miner’s WalkingLab event To the Landless “as a politics of the feel” which “might also be understood through theories of affect, where affect is force and intensity” (42-43).

“Affect has inflected qualitative research methodologies with an attention to matter as dynamic, energetic, and emergent,” Springgay and Truman write (43). They acknowledge that “affect surfaces in the previous sensory experiments and walks, as affect circulates constantly” (43). However, they continue, “the focus in the previous experiments was on the ways in which walking shaped a sensory understanding of embodiment and place,” and affect, “although not synonymous with sensory experience, extends and complicates the ethical-political work of walking methodologies” (43). For instance, in the WalkingLab project Evaporation Walks, participants “carry broad dinner plates filled with pigmented water” until the water evaporates, “leaving a trace or silt residue on the bottom of the plate” (43). “The project speaks to pain and grief, and the weight of carrying a dying body both literally (in the form of evaporation) and metaphorically (loss of a child),” they contend. “If affect demands that sensation be understood as intensities, vibrations, and forces that are transcorporeal, as opposed to located in a particular body, then pain and grief are palpable in the circulation of affects between bodies. . . . Affect signals a capacity for the body to be open to the next affective event, an opening to an elsewhere” (43). “Affect is about surfaces,” the continue, “[q]uivering, vibrating surfaces that affect bodies, sticking to them” (44). In Evaporation Walks, they write, citing Deleuze’s claim that affects are “created through encounters, which force us to thought,” “there is a difference between the walkers feeling emotions that are already recognizable—for example, grief—and pre-, post- and trans-personal affects that unsettle and force us to resist identification. The affects that circulate might be anguish, but they could also be joyful” (44). What confuses me here, though, is why the evaporation of water necessarily literally or metaphorically speaks of pain or grief at all. What am I missing? I don’t understand how Evaporation Walks has become such a totemic example of walking and affect. It’s as if the theory and practice are not cohering, or at least not cohering in a way that is intelligible for me.

“The political potential of affect lies in intensities—which can be either deliberate or incidental—and in the ways that intensities instantiate feelings,” Springgay and Truman write. “These feelings, while immediate and in the present, arrive with a past that is never in the past , and engender an indeterminate future” (45). They cite Sara Ahmed’s suggestion that distinguishing between affect and emotion comes with particular dangers, along with other critiques that “emerge in affect studies suggesting that there can be a tendency to avoid the messiness of identity politics and a refusal to engage with issues of oppression,” a situation that “neglects the way that affect and feeling participates in the formation of subjects” (45). Nevertheless, “many affect theorists have turned to affect precisely because affect enables a form of thinking about politics as ‘processes of circulation, engagement, and assemblage rather than as originating from the position of a sovereign subject,” citing the work of Lara, Lui, Ashley, Nishida, Liebert, and Billies (45). “Numerous scholars have attended to the entanglements between affect and politics, including the ways that power and control circulates and flows and the formation of animacy hierarchies that condition corporeal threats,” they continue (45-46). “What affect theory helps us do is re-think the assumption that agency and politics begins with the human subject, and that the human is the only animate agent,” they write:

Affecting subjectivity offers possibilities for exploring material and visceral processes of subjectivity, re-thinks categories previously associated with identity, and considers the emergence of subjectivity as an assemblage of conscious and non-conscious matterings. Affectivity becomes a practice and process of defamiliarization, where subjectivities are not flattened or erased but neither are they fixed, known, or assumed. (46)

They then discuss two water walks, one in Toronto and the other in Hamilton, and “the ways that affecting subjectivities contributes to the scholarship on the intersections between affect and politics” (46-48).

In the chapter’s conclusion, Springgay and Truman write, “There is no denying that sensory experiences, haptic feelings, and affective intensities course through walking research. What matters, we contend, is how we tune into sensation, hapticality and affect” (48). They suggest that what is important is “the politics of the feel” (48). “It is our contention however, that feelings futurity in walking methodologies not only lies in these meaningful and vital contributions to qualitative research, but in the politicality of sensation and affect,” they continue. “This means that walking methodologies need to account for the ways that more-than-human sensations and affects circulate, accumulate, and stick to different bodies and spaces in different ways” (48). I find myself confused by the term “feelings futurity,” but Springgay and Truman discuss it further:

Feelings futurity arises as forces that act through and upon us. The future of walking methodologies requires not only innovative techniques to experiment with and account for sensory and haptic understandings, but must also attune to affecting subjectivities and the ways that affect flows and sticks to different bodies and spaces. Feelings futurity insists that we turn our attention to how matter comes to matter. (49)

Unfortunately, that elaboration doesn’t help. Why use the term “futurity” here? What does “futurity” actually mean in contemporary theoretical discourse? It’s as if there’s a code I’m not able to break, and it’s frustrating. Perhaps as I continue reading, this terminology will become clear. I can only hope.

Chapter 3, “Transmaterial walking methodologies: Affective labour and a sonic walk,” begins with embodiment. “As we walk we are ‘in’ the world, integrating body and space co-extensively,” Springgay and Truman write, citing Sarah Pink and Tim Ingold (50). But, they continue, “the linkage between walking and embodiment is contentious because particular ways of walking might not be embodied, such as mindless daily commutes to work” (50). What’s the connection between mindfulness and embodiment? Is there one? My “mindless” commute to work, particularly these days, when the temperature dips to minus 20, are embodied, not least because they can be uncomfortable, and that discomfort brings me back to my body as I walk.  This morning, for instance, although I was thinking about this summary as I walked through the park, I was also aware of the rhythm of my footsteps and of the cold air entering my lungs, and since I was slightly overdressed for the temperature, of the patch of sweat forming on my back. Is that awareness not embodiment? What about flow states? Are they not embodiment? When I used to run, I would occasionally find myself in a flow state in which the running was effortless. Is that not embodiment? How did mindfulness sneak into notions of embodiment? I don’t understand.

“Likewise,” they write, “when walking is described as embodied, it is typically assumed to be productive, lively, convivial, and therefore positive. However, mass refugee flights experienced globally enact vulnerable, exposed, and brutalized embodiment.” Of course, the walking that is called “lively” and “convivial” is made by choice, not out of necessity, and from a place of relative privilege and safety; comparing it to the walking experienced by refugees misses that point. “Normative understandings of embodiment are framed as affirmative, but do not take into consideration antagonism or power,” Springgay and Truman state (50). Plus, I’m not convinced that accounts of embodied walking require conviviality; I think examples of that argument would have to be provided.

Springgay and Truman turn to the work of Stacy Alaimo, who argues that embodiment “does little to account for ‘networks of risk, harm, culpability and responsibility’ within which humans find themselves entangled; to Lindsay Stephens, Susan Ruddick and Patricia McKeever, who reject “a model of embodiment based on individual experience” and “argue that embodiment theories need to account for more politically emplaced and spatially distributed understandings of bodies and space”; and to Eve Tuck and Marcia McKenzie, who also argue that most understandings of embodiment ignore power and perpetuate “ongoing settler colonial practices” (50). Alaimo’s notion of transcorporeality, which describes “more-than-human embodiment that includes ‘material interchanges between human bodies, geographical places, and vast networks of power’” (qtd. 50) is, for Springgay and Truman, a more satisfactory way of understanding embodiment. “Transcorporeality posits humans and nonhumans as enmeshed with each other in a messy, shifting ontology,” they write. “Transcorporeality cleaves the nature-culture divide and asserts that bodies do not pre-exist their comings together but are materialized in and through intra-action” (50). For example, Astrida Neimanis suggests that water is transcorporeal because it exists inside and outside of our bodies in “leaky entanglements” (50). 

In this chapter, Springgay and Truman argue that walking methodologies are “transmaterial,” although it’s not clear to me that transmateriality and transcorporeality are necessarily the same things (51). There’s a slippage from one term to the other. Their primary example is a sonic walk by Rebecca Conroy called Walking to the Laundromat; that is what they “think-with” in this chapter (51). “Commencing with Alaimo’s transcorporeality we draw on different trans theories to disassemble and disturb taxonomies, and confound the notion of an embodied, coherent self,” they write (51). This chapter also critiques the flâneur (everybody does) and introduces “transspecies and viral theories to further complicate humanist conceptualizations of environment,” before discussing how sounds “render some bodies as inhuman” (51). “Transmateriality,” they argue, “enlarges understandings of corporeality and takes into account more-than-human movements and entanglements that are immanent, viral, and intensive” (51).

Walking to the Laundromat is a 106-minute work of sound art “that participants listen to while doing their laundry at a public laundromat, interspersed with walks around the neighbourhood in between cycles” (51). (I’m guessing that the work instructs listeners to go to a laundromat with their laundry; the sound file is online, but I don’t have time to listen, unfortunately.) Springgay and Truman argue that this chapter uses excerpts from the work “to transduce and shape the writing with rather than about the sonic walk” (51). “In thinking trans, we invoke a transversal writing practice that attempts to rupture a reliance on lived description of artistic and bodily work,” they continue. “A challenge of writing and thinking-with more-than-human methodologies, and their experimental, material practices, is how to attend to their fleeting, viral, multiple, and affective intensities without reducing walking and art projects to mere background. There is a tendency to ‘interpret’ contemporary art practices, privileging the researcher’s voice over the artists’” (51-52). So, rather than interpretation, what? The “sonic walk” is “an instantiation of theory,” they write (52). Perhaps, but does that approach not continue to privilege their voices over Conroy’s? What’s the differentiation between interpretation and theorization in relation to a work of art? How can one talk about art without ending up privileging one’s own voice?

“In using the prefix trans, we understand that trans and non-trans people have different stakes in the field of trans studies,” they continue (52). That’s obvious; I have almost personal no stake at all in trans studies, as a cisgendered man. They note objections to the use of the term that erase “the material and social conditions of transgendered people’s lives,” but also cite those who, like Susan Stryker, Paisley Currah, and Lisa Jean Moore invoke the prefix “to consider the interrelatedness of all trans phenomena” (52). They cite Rosi Braidotti, “who describes transpositions as ‘intertextual, cross-boundary or transversal transfer’” which weave “different strands together” (qtd. 52). “Transpositions are non-linear and nomadic, and as such accountable and committed to a particular ethics,” they write (52). What links non-linearity and nomadism to ethics? I don’t understand. Does that mean that linearity and sedentarism are not linked to ethics? “Trans is a prefix that denotes across, through, or beyond,” Springgay and Truman write. “Transversing from embodiment to trans theories of walking requires us to move beyond questions that position particular kinds of human experience at the centre” (52). “[T]rans shifts the focus from a being or a thing to intensities and movement” (53). But linear understandings of trans are incorrect; rather, they suggest, quoting Eva Hayward and Che Gossett, trans “‘repurposes, displaces, renames, replicates, and intensifies terms, adding yet more texture and the possibility of nearby-ness’” (qtd. 53). “Trans refutes the nature-culture divide proliferating in nonhuman forms,” Springgay and Truman write, and it “includes the interventions of critical race studies and postcoloniality in posthuman or more-than-human conceptualizations of difference, where difference is not between entities, but constituted through movement and affect: a trans touching materiality” (53). Trans undoes “animacy categories” and “foregrounds Black and Indigenous Studies” because, as Abraham Weill suggests, it is about “entangled linkages, or transversality. Trans for Weil becomes a process of pollination and murmuration,” what Springgay and Truman will call “viral” (53).

Conroy’s sonic walk addresses labour “through the intersections of reproductive labour, capitalism, and affective labour,” because it’s about doing laundry (53). “One of the ways that labour gets circumnavigated in walking research is the reliance on two specific tropes: the flâneur and the dérive,” they continue, since the flâneur is a man, and a man of leisure (54); “[i]nstead of the flâneur, we need different conceptualizations of walking that deterritorialize what it means to move,” such as critical disability research (55). The dérive, for its part, is part of a “‘fraternity’” of walking because it is detached, although “[t]here are a number of feminist psychogeographers and collectives that use the practices of the dérive to critique and subvert the myth of urban detachment” (55-56). Walking to the Laundromat “resists the tropes of the visually privileged flâneur and queers the dérive, underscoring the labour, violence, and structures that enable some bodies to walk more freely,” Springgay and Truman contend. “The audio track emphasizes the violence of labour and transnational mobility, and the performance, of washing clothes, walking, and returning respectively to the laundromat, further positions the performance itself as a form of labour,” and unlike a dérive, the walking involved is restricted by the need to return to the washing machines periodically (56). Instead of casting off “usual relations,” the work, “through the labour of walking and washing, embodied affective labour” (56).

“We insist that walking researchers need to stop returning to the flâneur to contextualize their work, and instead consider transmaterial walking practices,” Springgay and Truman, well, insist. “Researchers must recognize that walking is not always a leisure activity, and that particular bodies already labour over walking as work” (56). Those who do draw on the dérive must “remain critical and not assume that it is automatically radical. Some bodies literally walk on foot for miles carrying laundry, water, or other commodities” (56). Conroy’s sonic walk “thinks about urban space, access, and labour associated with walking, borders, and mobility,” and it “disrupts the occularcentrism of the flâneur, focussing instead on sounds, bodies, and transmigratory spaces” (57). (Is a laundromat a transmigratory space?) “Walking to the Laundromat interrogates the ways that capitalism and neoliberalism render some lives disposable, and asserts the violence and Whiteness of colonial sovereignty,” they continue, and the laundromat itself becomes “both a space of care and cruelty” (57). “Conroy describes her project through three threads: mindfulness and penetration; invisible leaking bodies; and viral strategies,” and the audio walk also “takes up the issue of necropolitics, where queer, trans, and racialized populations are subject to occupation, conquest, and elimination” (57). How it does all of this is not clear.

Next, Springgay and Truman turn to Julie Livingston and Jasbir Puar and their term “interspecies,” which refers “to ‘relationships between different forms of biosocial life and their political effects’” (qtd. 59). “Interspecies theories and research insists that the human can no longer be the dominant subject of analysis,” and that interspecies “‘offers a broader geopolitical understanding of how the human/animal/plant triad is unstable and varies across time and place,’” (qtd. 59), a provocative statement that requires reading Livingston’s and Puar’s work to understand. “Interspecies also departs from privileged sites in posthuman work—the human and the animal—or what Donna Haraway calls companion species, to include “‘“incompanionate” pests, microscopic viruses, and commodified plants—in other words, forms of life with which interspecies life may not be so obvious or comfortable’” (Livingston and Puar, qtd. 59). Eliza Steinbock, Marianna Szczygielska, and Anthony Wagner write “that trans ‘enmeshes . . . transgender, animal, a[n]imacy, intimacy,’” and that “[t]he frictional intimacies of trans undoes the animacy hierarchies” (59). (I am finding the subject/verb agreement problems in this text very distracting.) This undoing is featured in Walking to the Laundromat as well, Springgay and Truman contend, through the use of “discordant sounds,” whose “viral penetration undoes” the soundtrack’s use of “tidy, human-centric narratives” (59-60). “‘Being open’ becomes transspecially linked to exploitation and environmental degradation,” they suggest (60).

Springgay and Truman then turn to Claire Colebrook’s “trans concept—transitivity—which emphasizes the linkages and intra-actions between entities that are non-linear. For Colebrook ‘transitive indifference’ undoes the notion of difference ‘from.’ When things are set against one another, and are different from each other, one entity remains in the centre, and is the basis for comparison and measurement,” the way the human is the standard of measurement for taxonomies of difference (60). “Indifference for Colebrook stresses the self-differentiating singularities of becoming,” they argue (60). Conroy’s sonic walk,” they claim, creates “various flowing assemblages” that have “vectors, speeds, rests, modes of expression and desiring tonalities” to construct “an instantiation of transitive indifference” (60). Carla Freccero “uses the term transpecies to invoke a form of becoming that breaks down species taxonomies questioning origins and materializations of classification hierarchies,” they continue, suggesting that “[t]rans is less ‘place bound,’ and more like the concept of ecology often invoked in posthuman discourse, and as such interrogates the logic of human exceptionalism and heteronormative reproduction” (60). How it does so, though, and what the link between “human exceptionalism” and “heteronormative reproduction” is, remains unclear; I would find the argument here more satisfying if it proceeded more slowly. Karen Barad “forms another reading of trans as a process of self-touching animacy, regeneration, and recreation” by deconstructing “the reductionist ontology of classical physics” and describing “instead how [indeterminacy] is entangled through all being” (60). For Barad, trans is about a radical undoing of the self (60). “Trans, as we’re building in this chapter emphasizes movement as flows, vectors, and affective tonalities,” Springgay and Truman write. “Trans shifts the focus from a being or a thing, to intensities and movement” (60). In doing so, might it not be radically disembodying the bodies with which this book began? Where do those intensities and flows and movements exist? Where are they located? I’m growing increasingly confused.

Another trans idea is “the viral,” which Puar uses “to untether sexuality from identity and hetero reproduction, in order to think about sexuality ‘as assemblages of sensations, affects and forces’” (qtd. 62). Hayward’s term “tranimal” “similarly reconfigures heteronormative sexuality and reproduction” by perverting “an understanding of embodiment that relies on  bounded and distinct identities,” and by considering “reproduction as ‘excess, profusion, surplus’” (62). For Hayward, trans “is about a kind of viral movement,” not from one point to another, but rather “it replicates as difference. In the viral, difference is affective and affecting modulation. It is speculative, activating potentiality and futurity through mutant replication” (62). Conroy’s various laundromat projects become, Springgay and Truman contend, “a mutant, virally reproducing, affective site that has the potential to re-imagine labour in different terms. While viruses operate parasitically and they penetrate a host, they are not adjacent to or simply touching a host, but alter and stretch the host,” as Conroy’s soundtrack apparently does (62). “In shifting from embodied theories that perpetuate a coherent sense of subjectivity, trans theories insist on an ethical-politics of walking,” Springgay and Truman continue (63). So having “a coherent sense of subjectivity” disallows ethics or politics? How so? “Thinking alongside transspeciation, Myra Hird argues that trans interrogates the idea that there is ever a natural body—the one we are born with—which must also parallel particular normative behaviours and desires,” they write (63). What if one’s desires and behaviours are normative, though? Where does this line of thought lead?

“Trans theories are invested in thinking about assemblages and viral replication rather than heteronormative future-oriented reproduction,” Springgay and Truman write. “Trans insists that the transitive state is not that some bodies matter while others continue to perish. . . . Trans emphasizes movement and vectors” (64). Walking to the Laundromat “as a transmaterial practice emphasizes the underpaid, repetitive, and bodily labour of service work,” they continue. “The project intervenes into the comfortable ways that walking is described as relational and convivial, recognizing that not all bodies move freely and that walking itself is a form of labour” (64). But when I think back to the book’s introduction, the “queer feminist Bush Salon in which texts were read, photographs taken, “perambulatory writing techniques” experimented with, and cherries eaten (1), I wonder where the labour was during that event, and how it might have addressed walking as labour, which the flâneur and the dérive fail to do. Again, I find myself looking for some degree of self-awareness in the argument. Conroy’s art work demonstrates “that embodiment, as a form of mind-body awareness and mediation, has been co-opted by liberalism,” they continue (64), although is that what embodiment is? A definition of embodiment would be useful here. “In bringing trans theories to bear on walking research we open up and re-configure different corporeal imaginaries, both human and nonhuman that are radically immanent and intensive, as an assemblage of forces and flows that open bodies to helices and transconnections,” they conclude:

Trans activates a thinking-in-movement. By conceptualizing walking methodologies as trans, we shift from thinking of movement as transition (from one place to another) or as transgression (that somehow walking is an alternative and thereby empowering methodology), towards trans as transcorporeal, transitive, transspecies, and viral in order to activate the ethical-political indifferentiation of movement. Trans activates new ways to talk about, write about, and do walking methodologies that take account of viral, mutant replication, and recognize the intra-active becomings of which we are a part. (65)

That is a huge task to lay at the feet of walking, and I find myself stumbling over almost every word. What, for instance, is meant by “the ethical-political indifferentiation of movement”? My dictionary tells me that “indifferentiation” refers to a lack of differentiation—but is that what is meant here? I can’t tell. Is it a term taken from Deleuze and Guattari? Or does it come from Brian Massumi? And what is flowing? I remember that, years ago, Deleuzians used the metaphor of “circuits”; not the language is the more organic flows. But what is actually flowing? Perhaps I really shouldn’t be reading this book without the appropriate philosophical background, and in a way I’m reading it in order to find out what I would need to read in order to understand the argument. This is extremely difficult stuff, and the argument structure, which rushes through texts and summarizes by repeating key terms, is more than a little confusing.

Chapter 4, “An immanent account of movement in walking methodologies: Re-thinking participation beyond a logic of inclusion,” suggests that it will engage with “mass forms of walking” to “consider participation from a vital and materialist perspective,” one that does not frame participation “as democratic interaction where individuals come together by choice, and as a convivial mode of collectivity” that is “emancipatory, liberatory, and transformative” (66). “The problem with this understanding of participation is that while it seems to promote diversity and equity, it operates as a symbolic gesture that fails to undo the structural logical of racism, ableism, homophobia, and settler colonialism,” Springgay and Truman write. “Furthermore, participation in contemporary art practices assumes audiences become active in the work versus passive spectators. This produces a false binary between active participation and passive viewing” (66). Nevertheless, they argue that participation “is important in walking research and as such we need different ways to think about participation’s potential” (66). So this chapter asks, “How might vital, material, and immanent theories ask different questions about the how of coming together and taking part?” (66). “The main thesis of this chapter is a critique of participation as inclusion,” they write (66). they use Ring of Fire, “a contemporary art event that resulted in a procession for the opening of the Parapan American Games” in Toronto in 2015, The Warren Run, “a running-orienteering race executed in an urban neighbourhood in Sydney, Australia,” and White Cane Amplified, “a performance in which a cane used by a walker who is visually impaired is replaced by a megaphone,” as ways of thinking about participation beyond inclusion (66)—although these examples seem to be negative ones. “[I]nclusion in events like Ring of Fire and the Parapan Am Games produces and maintains settler colonialism and White ableist homonationalism,” they argue, while The Warren Run “and the ways in which participation framed as inclusion in public art projects diffuses conflict, dissension, and difference through convivial notions of rationality” (67). “Our critiques aim to demonstrate the failure of thinking about participation as inclusion, rather than the limits of these particular projects,” they continue. “Following the crucial critiques of inclusion, we draw on theories of immanent movement, to ask questions about how we might think differently about participation,” “beyond a rhetoric of inclusion” (67). They argue that “participation begins before the invitation of inclusion commences,” and they suggest that they will conclude with “an analysis of participation that is composed from within, is immanent, vital, and of difference” (67).

The first example, Ring of Fire, brought together a wide range of communities in a procession for the Parapan Am Games. Springgay and Truman describe such “mega-events” as “corporate, neoliberal sites of homonationalism, crip nationalism, and settler colonialism” (68), which seems to be a critique of the project’s intention. They use Sykes’s (oh, that APA) distinction between “taking part” and “taking place”: “‘Taking part’ celebrates queer, disabled, and Indigenous participation in mega events”; it is “a form of inclusion” (69), while “‘taking place’ . . . perpetuates the displacement of Indigenous peoples from their traditional territories” (69). “Taking part” is “a practice of managing dissent” (69), while “mega events ‘take place’ from Indigenous peoples” (70). They cite Puar’s contention that “[r]acism, lack of medical care, settler colonialism, occupation, and incarceration are all tactical practices deployed by the State to create and maintain precarious populations through debilitation,” which, they conclude, means that “inclusion functions to produce and sustain debility” (70). “Rather than a ‘taking part,’ which continues to pathologize the differently abled body, critical disability and crip scholars . . . insist that the body-technology-environment be understood not as a supportive device that helps an individual overcome limitations, but as a moving assemblage that has different configurations and rhythms,” they continue, noting that people using a variety of assistive devices were encouraged to participate in Ring of Fire (71). “If participation as inclusion continues to normalize and pathologize different bodies, maintaining White, ableist, heteronormative, settler colonialism then what other ways can we think-with participatory projects like Ring of Fire?” they ask (71). One possibility is the notion of affirmation as a form of participation that, quoting Erin Manning, “‘keeps things unsettled, a push that ungrounds, unmoors, even as it propels’” (qtd. 71). Okay, but what would that look like in practice? Is there an example the authors can point towards? The section ends without any.

The chapter’s next section, “Conviviality and conflict-free participation,” looks at The Warren Run, an orienteering-inspired race through a neighbourhood in Sydney, Australia. “Walking art projects like The Warren Run that include communities and groups of people in the work, are often described using an assortment of terms including socially engaged art, social practice, relational, and participatory,” Springgay and Truman note (73). The same could be said of Ring of Fire. They review various critiques of this art form, including the idea “that there is a unified, pre-existing, and self-determining subject who participates, which obscures the complex ways that humans and nonhumans act” (73). They cite Brian Massumi’s claim “that participation occurs prior to cognition, before the act of thinking about taking part” (74), which might sometimes be true, but also might sometimes not be true. This idea leads into the next section, in which Springgay and Truman “tease out an immanent conceptualization of participation, arguing that such an ontology of participation might propose a more ethical-political understanding of taking part and coming together” (74). That section, “Relative and absolute movement,” begins with a discussion of rhythm, particularly as Deleuze and Guattari use the term (75). That leads to a distinction between absolute and relative movement in the work of Erin Manning. Relative movement is about the body moving while other objects in space remain stationary; absolute movement “is a form of movement that proliferates endlessly” (75). “In absolute movement, motility does not pass between points” (76); like a yoga pose, it involves “a composition of ceaselessly moving micro-movements” (76). Walking involves both absolute and relative movement (76). Manning suggests that movement becomes a vibrational force, and so rhythm “is composed of vibratory micro-movements that are constantly in flux and change. These vibrations of micro-movement are imperceptible and molecular” (76). If they are imperceptible, though, how does one know they are actually happening? “A vibrational account of rhythm provides a means to interrogate how encounters that are imperceptible produce affects across different entities,” they continue. “Thus, vibratory accounts of rhythm enable different kinds of analysis that attend to the immanent and affective dimensions of participation” (76). How so? Springgay and Truman provide no examples to support this idea.

Instead, in the next section, “Volitional and decisional movement,” they discuss Manning’s distinction between volitional, or conscious movement, and decisional, or unconscious movement (76-77). “In decisional movement, a body reacts and moves, in relation to other decisional movements,” the way a trained baseball player can respond to a ball without thinking through that response (77). Manning seems to think that decisional movement is more important, that volitional movement gets in its way, and that decisional movement “leaves room for mutation” (77). I don’t understand the hierarchy that is being asserted here. “The problem with volitional movement is that it conceives of participation through inclusionary rationalities and, as we have demonstrated, these continue to support White, ableist, settler, and heteronormative logics,” Springgay and Truman write. “Volitional movement as ‘taking part,’ while inviting different subjects and different bodies to participate, supports and reinforces norms. Furthermore, this rhetoric of inclusion is in fact exclusionary, where certain bodies are always marked as different and only included by conforming” (77). On the other hand, 

if participation is composed of absolute and decisional movement, where bodies—human and nonhuman—are rhythmically moving in variation and difference—then we can begin to think of participation beyond the rhetoric of inclusion. This is crucial. We need different ways to conceive of and understand participation, and think about participation’s political potential. This is where absolute and decisional movement become important. (78)

“If participation isn’t reduced to the volitional act of an individual, but is rendered in rhythmic terms of assemblage and composition, participation engenders a politics of potentiality,” they continue. “Instead of ‘taking part,’ which privileges inclusion, and evaluates the kind of interaction inclusion creates, we ask: how to tend to the proliferation of difference, the immanence of participation?” (78). 

Their answer lies in the importance of decisional and absolute movements. Because inclusionary participation “implies volitional movement, a form of free will or choice,” it is “linked to individual agency, rationality, and mastery” and “continues to render some bodies outside of an event, or outside of what it means to be human. Inclusionary logics reinforce and inside and an outside” (78). However, decisional movement “engenders variation and difference”; decisional movements “are rhythmic relations that are produced in and of the event. They are immanent to the event itself” (78). As a result, “[p]articipation becomes intensive, it is internal to itself, and constituted through movement and affect. In other words, participation is produced without knowing what the production will look like. It is creative and experimental” (78). How would one be able to tell that this participation was taking place, though, if it was only made up of decisional and absolute movements? What would that kind of participation look like? Is it the only “creative and experimental” form of movement? Is volitional movement really that bad? Am I not choosing to type these notes, for instance (a form of volitional movement) while reading this book (another form of volitional movement) that Springgay and Truman researched and wrote (a third form of volitional movement)? Writing can’t be a decisional form of movement—at least, it isn’t all the time; one makes a conscious choice to write. The same goes for research. Without a tangible example of the kind of participation Springgay and Truman approve of, one based in decisional and absolute movements, I really have no idea what the thing they are advocating might look like.

“‘Taking part’ in an event assumes that any negative limitations have been removed and that by being included the subject is now transformed, empowered, and liberated,” Springgay and Truman write. (They’ve never seen me grudgingly agree to participate in an office softball match; my limitations remain, and I am neither empowered by striking out nor liberated by missing a fly ball.) “However, inclusion continues to render an outside and an inside,” and it “implies a degree of choice” (78). They cite Elizabeth Grosz’s notion of “free acts,” which do not involve “rational choice and individual agency,” but are “indebted to decisional movement, to cleaving, cuts, intra-actions and transcorporeal entanglements between all bodies” (78). Their example is Carmen Papalia’s White Cane Amplified project, which “replaces the white cane with a megaphone,” allowing Papalia, who is a “non-visual learner,” Papalia’s term for blindness, which doesn’t reduce his sightlessness to a disability, “to instruct other pedestrians and vehicles about his presence and to request help from participants in crossing streets and navigating urban spaces” (79). Papalia, “in contrast to heteronormative notions of a self-reliant male strolling through the city, requires participation from others to navigate safely” (79). (Why “heteronormative”? Are there no gay flâneurs?) Papalia does not ask people to participate in guiding him “as an act of community building or empowerment,” Springgay and Truman contend. “Rather, the participants—much like the megaphone, the sidewalk, and other obstacles he encounters—are decisional in that they become inflexions that alter his movements discretely” (79-80). But aren’t those participants making a conscious decision to participate? Aren’t their movements thereby volitional? I honestly don’t understand how the theoretical paradigm they have outlined has any practical significance. I’m missing something important and I don’t know what it might be.

“Walking methodologies are commonly understood as participatory,” Springgay and Truman conclude; it is “social and interactive, whether you walk with others, or commune with your senses on a solo walk” (81). “But the inclusionary logics of participation, as we have outlined, normalize, commodify, and stratify particular bodies,” they write (I don’t recall the words “commodify” or “stratify,” but maybe I missed them), and also “establish an inside and an outside are distinct. To participate means to move from the outside into the inside. In this regard, participation would appear to be a concept that stifles a work” (81). How does it stifle a work? Were Ring of Fire or The Warren Run stifled? How so? “But if participation is immanent to life, to walking, to events, and as such to research, different questions can be asked about what participation does, or how it operates,” they continue. “Participation as immanent proliferates and multiplies endlessly. Participation as relational, always taking part, emphasizes movement and rhythm as difference” (81). But how could one tell if that kind of participation were to be taking place? What, in practical terms, would participation as an immanent proliferation that multiplies endlessly look like? 

The fifth chapter, “On the need for methods beyond proceduralism: Speculative middles, (in)tensions, and response-ability in research), begins with the “agitations that are occurring in qualitative research”: a host of conflicts that suggest that qualitative research is “stuck . . . between new empiricist theories as methodologies and traditional phenomenologically informed methods” (82). I don’t know what those new empiricist theories might be, and I’m not a qualitative social scientist, so I’m not that concerned about my lack of knowledge. This chapter responds to the suggestion that method can be done away with. “First, there is an assumption that methods are particular things, such as interviews, participant observation, or video ethnography,” but methods already “resist representation” (83). “Second, although we agree with a radical empiricist understanding that posits thought as a form of inquiry,” they feel that “methods are significant and very much present in a research event” (83). “Thus, rather than a refusal of methods, the remaining sections of this chapter propose that particular (in)tensions need to be immanent to whatever method is used,” they write. “If they intention of inquiry is to create a different world, to ask what kinds of futures are imaginable, then (in)tensions attend to the immersion, tension, friction, anxiety, strain, and quivering unease of doing research differently” (83). (I’m not convinced that the neologism “(in)tension” is communicating very much—what is the crossover between “tension” and “intention” supposed to produce?) I would like my walking practice to imagine different futures, but I’m not sure that any of this speaks to the kind of work I do and intend to do.

“We approach methods propositionally, speculatively, and experimentally and maintain that it is the logic of procedure and extraction that needs undoing,” they continue (83). Yes, extraction is something I hope my walking practice can avoid: relatively easy in a solo practice, but perhaps harder when one is walking and talking with others. “We attend to the how of research by thinking-with various walking projects from WalkingLab and beyond,” they continue. “We use the idea of the walk score as a catalyst for movement” (83). Such walk scores are propositions, “different from research methods or a research design in that they are speculative and event oriented,” and “not intended as a set of directions or rules that contain and control movement” (83). Rather, walk scores “emphasize chance and improvisation” (83). “We need to shift from thinking about methods as processes of gathering data towards methods as becoming entangled in relations,” a perspective which “requires a commitment to methods in which experience gives way to experimentation” (83-84). Since I’m not engaged in qualitative social science, though, I’m not sure this discussion is relevant to my work—although Springgay and Truman do cite Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre’s argument that one can’t simply employ new empiricist methodologies (informed by Deleuze and Guattari) or the new materialisms along with phenomenological methods, because these methodologies are situated in different “‘ontological arrangements’” (84-85). That’s worth thinking about, and St. Pierre is always worth reading. Springgay and Truman suggest that they agree with St. Pierre’s contention “that reflexiity (humanist) and radical empiricism (more-than-human) are incommensurate,” because reflexivity, “even as an entangled practice, presupposes a subject and is founded on interpretive practices” (86). 

“In instrumentalizing walking as a method there is the presumption that walking is going to do something specific before the event occurs, and that walking is uniquely situated to discover and gather data,” they write. The problem with this notion “is that instead of attending to the ecologies of research, or what we prefer to call the thinking-making-doing of research, researchers fall into the trap of believing that creating new methods will offer different solutions” (86). “We posit that methods are not the issue,” they continue. “Methods must be engaged with in the speculative middle and (in)tensions must be brought to bear on them” (87). That’s because research begins in that speculative middle, the place where Deleuze and Guattari claim “things grow, expand, and pick up speed” (87). “In the middle, immanent modes of thinking-making-doing come from within the processes themselves, rather from outside them,” they write. “In the middle, the speculative ‘what if’ emerges as a catalyst for the event. The middle is a difficult place to be,” a place where it’s hard to see clearly (87). “That is the point. The middle can’t be known in advance of research. You have to be ‘in it,’ situated and responsive. You are not there to report on what you find or what you seek, but to activate thought. To agitate it” (87). Of course, that would be hard to put on a Research Ethics Board application. 

“A speculative middle does not stop a researcher,” they write. “It’s a thrust, a future provocation for thinking-making-doing. . . . Speculative middles, through processes such as walking, reading, and writing, emerge as agitations and as affective force” (89). The “speculative middle” is “an event” in which “(in)tensions, concerns, and gnawings continually emerge. As the agitations take shape, it is the (in)tensions that incite further action,” changing “the how of methods the research event” (89-90). I wish the word “(in)tensions” had been defined here. “Deleuze’s thought compels researchers to experiment with problems rather than seek solutions,” they continue, citing Elizabeth Grosz’s argument that political activism should be about dreams of the future which are unattainable, rather than solutions (91). Springgay and Truman describe their use of pinhole photography as a method that is “entangled with an (in)tension of problematizing what matters” and that “demands we reimagine ‘land care’” (92). “Our methods of walking-with insists that the Land, the sediment of the escarpment that consist of rocks and Indigenous peoples, stays with us in unrestrained fullness” (92-93). (I’m not sure how the sediments of the Niagara Escarpment, which were formed by oceans that predate the existence of our species, consist of Indigenous peoples.) Another technique Truman used in her PhD research was the dérive, which was problematized in the “speculative middle” by a number of techniques, “including mapping using literary devices, writing poems that examined the spatial politics of their walks to and from school, and writing exercises that activated rhythm in conjunction with movement” (94). “What these minor gestures opened up for the dérive was a place for different (in)tensions to matter,” they continue. “But a dérive inflected with minor gestures is infused with intimacy where knowledge of place is not something grasped from a distance but emerges through proximity; where proximity is not a voyage of discovery, but where one bears the consequences for the things that are not even known yet” (94). I’m wondering, once again, if the theoretical conclusions that the authors place on their practical examples aren’t too strong, too certain. I would certainly be more tentative in evaluating the results of my work. Maybe that’s one of my problems.

Chapter 6, “‘To the landless’: Walking as counter-cartographies and anarchiving practices,” begins with a recognition of the way walkers have experimented with a variety of mapping techniques, although it remains “entrenched in imperial and colonial powers who use and create maps to exploit natural resources, claim land, and to legitimize borders” (99). For that reason, many artists and social scientists “deploy counter-cartographical approaches to map against dominant power structures, question the assumptions that conventional maps produce, and recognize different spatial knowledge systems” (99). Three WalkingLab projects, they suggest, “re-map—as a form of counter-cartography—erased and neglected histories” (99). They “consider the ways that re-mapping offers possibilities for conceptualizing space that is regional and relational, as opposed to state-sanctioned and static. As White settler artist-academics, we problematize the ways that new materialisms and posthumanisms have failed to account for a deeper understanding of the Anthropocene as racialized” (99-100). Walking “can re-map archives and disrupt linear conceptualizations of time,” they state. “Walking as ‘anarchiving’ attends to the undocumented, affected, and fragmented compositions that tell stories about ‘a past that is not past but is the present and an imagined future.’ As counter cartographies and anarchiving practices, the walking projects disrupt dominant narratives of place and futurity, re-mapping Land and ‘returning it to the landless’” (100). The three WalkingLab projects they discuss are Dylan Miner’s To the Landless, Walis Johnson’s The Red Line Archive and Labyrinth, and Camille Turner’s Miss Canadiana’s Heritage and Cultural Walking Tour: The Grange. 

Next, Springgay and Truman discuss borders as “social and physical constructions that paradoxically connect and divide” (101). They note that Miner (among others) argues “that settler colonial borders have impacted and limited ancestral Indigenous practices and fail to recognize Indigenous spatial knowledges” (102). They describe in detail his To the Landless project in Toronto, describing it as “a counter cartography” that “re-mapped anarchism onto the Toronto landscape” (104). The Red Line project is another example of counter-cartography that “re-claims the community spaces within the red line” that excluded African-Americans from certain neighbourhoods in New York City (105). “Walking the red line becomes a transcorporeal materialization revealing the connections between race and place on and through the lived body,” they write (106-07). These counter-mapping practices are “‘anarchival’” because they “rely on fragments of memories, oral stories, songs, marginal ephemera, and affects and emotions” (107). They also rely on archival research, I think, despite the critique Springgay and Truman make that archives are “technologies that served the production of imperialism and settler colonialism” (107); indeed, Brian Massumi states that “the archive . . . becomes the departure point for the anarchive” (108). Anarchives, though, “resist mere documentation and interpretation in favour of affective and material processes of production. . . . approaching matter from new perspectives that may be incongruent with conventional archiving practices, in order to activate erased, neglected, and hidden histories” (107). Camille Turner’s walking tours “re-map” the “erased and forgotten history” of racial intolerance in Canada “onto the Canadian landscape” while questioning “the mechanisms that enable this ongoing erasure” (109). Because there is very little documentation of African-Canadian communities in Toronto, Turner uses “alternative methods, including creating composite fictions” (110). Turner also “materialize[s]” Afrofuturism in her anarchive: “the narratives, songs, sounds, and places encountered on the walk. This is a time that is looped and haunting, rupturing teleological and linear understandings of time. Afrofuturism as a walking methodology could be described as both a method of recovering histories and futures and as an anarchiving of aesthetic productions that enact such a method” (112). Afrofuturism, they write, “is not only literary-based but can be a theoretical, material, sonic, performative, mapping, and anarchival practice” (112).

“The WalkingLab projects that we have assembled in this chapter take up walking methodologies in relation to space and time, acknowledging the possibilities and tensions that such work might produce,” Springgay and Truman conclude. “Counter-cartographies and anarchiving practices might in face reproduce the very geographies they seek to undo. However, in attending strategically to re-mapping the past that is not past, these projects offer avenues for imagining a different future. Re-mapping space and time are significant components to a counter-cartographical approach to walking methodologies” (112-13). Futurity, they continue, “refers to the ways that the future is projected and re-imagined” (113). (I’m very happy to read that definition!) “It also considers how the future is implicated in the past and the present, through different conceptualizations of time. Here time shifts from heteronormative colonial chronos”—why, again, “heteronormative”?—“to vectors, hauntings, spectres, regions, and relations. It also speaks to the ways that any reference to the future makes some futures possible while disavowing others” (113). As a counter-cartographical and anarchiving practice, walking can “enact these understandings of futurity, where the future is not a romanticized ideal, but in constant re-figurations” (113).

The seventh chapter, “Reflective inversions and narrative cartographies: Disrupting outcomes based models of walking in schools,” examines two research-creation projects that WalkingLab conducted in schools in Toronto and Cardiff. Regarding the project in Toronto, they write: “Working against the history of Canadian landscape, which is temporal, spatial, and racial, the walking-with events contest the imagined images of citizenship and identity. The work contributes to critical discourses and contemporary art practices on race, ethnicity, colonialism and land” (121). The organizers and the students “resisted the racialized dispossessions of belonging, creating new spacetimes and landscapes” (121). Again, the claim that the project created “new spacetimes and landscapes” seems hyperbolic to me. The project in Cardiff, which involved students participating in dérives, produced “narrative cartographies” that “mapped students’ understandings of how language functions to control and dehumanize students. Walking-with became a method for exploring inside and outside of school place collectively, to consider the ways that language is already pre-supposed and pre-determined in advance” (126). The maps created by the students “enabled new connections and different ontologies to become possible” (126). That seems like a lot: new ontologies? “Walking-with can be a significant and important method for working with students in educational contexts, if it does not become instrumentalized as an anti-technology and as an uncritical mode of being in place,” they conclude. “Walking-with is an ethical and political response-ability that intimately understands that any step towards a different world is always imbricated in a particular conceptualization of the human, one that continues to re-inscribe a separation between nature and culture, human and nonhuman, landscape and Other” (128). “[W]alking-with materializes horizontal and sideways ontologies where spacetimes reflect, invert, and bend,” they write, in another example of hyperbole, or perhaps metaphor (128).

Finally, Chapter 8, “A walking-writing practice: Queering the trail” is a set of propositions. “We use the propositional form for this chapter because propositions are not directions or procedures for writing,” Springgay and Truman state. “Propositions act as hybrids between potentiality and actuality: they propose what could be” (130). “In the first walk queering, we introduce walks by women, Indigenous walkers, people of colour walkers, and queer and trans walking artists, whose methods of walking defamiliarize the historical tropes of the lone walker drawing inspiration from the landscape,” they continue. “Some of these artists’ projects link walking and writing, while others illustrate a thinking-in-movement” (131). The following five walks “are walking-writing propositions that shape our collaborative practice. These are: differentiation; surfacing; activation devices; with; and touch. The seventh walk, contours, re-visits key concepts in the book and reflects on the implications of walking methodologies in a more than human world” (131).

“Walking-writing is a practice of invention, where the movement of thought is more-than a moment of walking, thinking, or inscribing,” Springgay and Truman contend (131). I’m not sure quite what that means, but they offer further description:

Walking-writing is a thinking-in-movement. Walking-writing is a practice of concept formation. We do not conceptualize walking in one register and writing in another, any more than we understand our research-creation walking events as pre-writing. Walking activates the creation of concepts. To walk is to move-with thought. In addition, we understand writing as something more-than what exists on a page or in a book. Walking-writing is experimental and speculative. Walking-writing surfaces. It is viscous and intense. Walking-writing is collaborative. (131)

I’m not sure that paragraph clarifies much for me. On one hand, to claim that walking “activates the creation of concepts” suggests an almost Wordsworthian claim that walking encourages creativity or thought, which I’m sure is not what is meant at all here. And the claim that writing is more than what gets recorded “on a page or in a book” baffles me. Is writing a metaphor, then? For what? What does it mean to say that walking-writing “is viscous and intense”? Does it have to be collaborative? What if one is alone? Are one’s collaborators then more-than-human? Would they be more-than-human even if one were with other walkers? 

The first provocation, written in the imperative, states: “Read this section and then go on a walk. Queer the trail. Defamiliarize Euro-Western traditions and other heteronormative, solo peramulations that link walking with unfettered inspiration” (131). Again, heteronormative? What about, to take one example, Virginia Woolf? And I’m not entirely sure what, in this context “queer the trail” necessarily means. In any case, as promised, the section describes the work of a variety of artists and writers: “African American poet Harryette Mullen” and her 2014 book Urban Tumbleweed; Anishinaabe artist Lisa Myers’s Blueprints for a Long Walk project; “[t]rans Black artist and activist Syrus Ware’s practice,” which “takes on many different forms”; Latai Taumoepeau’s performances; and “queer Black writer Rahawa Haile,” who walked the Appalachian Trail (132-33). “In academic scholarship and popular literature, walking is extolled and prized because: it benefits health; inspires creativity; attunes the walker with the landscape; and is a tactic for re-writing the city,” Springgay and Truman state. “While these fraught inheritances nudge at our practice, WalkingLab has intentionally sought out collaborations with women walkers, Indigenous walkers, queer and trans walkers, differently abled walkers, and people of colour to Queer the Trail. This is the ethical-political thrust of our walking-writing practice” (133). That’s commendable, but what if one doesn’t fit those categories? What if one is a straight, White, cisgendered man in his mid-fifties? What then? I suppose that kind of person is excluded. That seems ironic, given the radically inclusive practice being advocated here—and yes, I know that the authors have already argued that inclusivity is the wrong way to frame the issue, but I’m pretty sure that going for a walk is volitional, rather than decisional, so I’m not convinced that the theoretical justification for those terms works in actual practice. And Springgay and Truman can collaborate with whomever they choose; I’m not really complaining. It’s time to let people from a variety of identities into the walking game. However, I’m still not quite sure what the command to “queer the trail” might mean for that hypothetical middle-aged man: to make walking strange and different and new, I suppose, perhaps through one of the prompts that follows.

“Walk two: differentiation” begins with a command to walk to a destination, but to walk “a different path than you might normally walk” and to “[w]alk slowly” (133). The text then describes the collaborative practice Springgay and Truman have developed. which involves periodic walking. “Walk three: surfaces” suggests that a long walk “surfaces” (134), drawing on the work of Kathleen Stewart, who “describes place through terms like atmosphere, surface, and event” (134). “Surfaces are ambient and effective,” they write. “Surfaces do not refer to a specific location or form but the tonality, the expressiveness, and undulation of body-space. Surfaces vibrate, flow, and move. Surfaces are not without duration” (134). A walk that surfaces is “visceral, bodied, and shimmer” (134). “Surfacing is writing,” they continue. “Surfacing writes the body” (134). “Surface walks foreground bodily intensity,” but they also “disorient and defamiliarize” (134-35). “Walk four: activation device” demands that the reader go for a walk with an activation device, which could be anything that enables a documentary or creative response to the walk. However, the prompt demands that the device not be used for documentary purposes, “but to alter the function of the walk” (135). “The activation device experiments with the walk and enables new ways of thinking-making-doing,” they explain. It “pushes walking-writing to an edge. It forces something new to occur. The activation device is not intended to extract or collect information, but to insert itself within the walking-writing practice as a thinking-making-doing” (135). One might carry helium balloons or a bucket of water or fill one’s pockets with rocks; it doesn’t matter, as long as one is able to “modify habits of walking through various modalities” (135). Those modifications, those activation devices, “rupture and queer the walk, they slow us down and change our gat, they problematize what it means to walk, they agitate and provoke,” they write (136). Activation devices “propel us into a speculative middle and churn our thinking. They surface. They function propositionally because we don’t have a clear procedure of how they will activate the walk beforehand. They are prompts for further walking-writing, as opposed to a representation of the walk” (136).

“Walk five: ‘with’” is a group activity (the group can be composed of humans or nonhumans), but the group “composes only one aspect of ‘with.’ ‘With’ is about co-composition rather than inclusive collaboration” (136). The purpose of the activity is to find a place where the group can write together (probably that will be more difficult for the nonhumans). WalkingLab organizes Itinerant Reading Salons, in which participants walk and read out loud (237). “Walk six: touch” calls upon readers to “[f]eel the haptic; the corporeal” while walking, preferably in a graveyard (because they evoke chronological time) (138). “Walking-writing invokes the intimacy and rhythm of touch,” they write. It evokes what Karen Barad calls “a queer self-touching” in which we “encounter an uncanny sense of the stranger or otherness within the self” which “is a queer perversion of being and time” (138). “Touch queers and perverts individual identity,” they continue, generating an ethics “that queers and undoes the limits of what counts as human or otherwise in the first place. Self-touching means thinking about alterity—our touching indifference—within ourselves. It requires an ethics response-able to the inhuman within us” (139). Walking-writing, they suggest, “recognizes the radical alterity and openness, the ongoing inventive intra-actions of difference that make up the world” (139). “Walk seven: contours” demands that the walker follow edges (141). “Walking-writing contours thinking-in-movement,” they write. “As a practice of edging, contours are thresholds—an in-between space. Thresholds are full of potentiality. They seed things” (141). Part of their own contouring “has been to hold in tension the history and inheritances of walking and walking methods. Who walks, how they walk, and where requires constant queering” (141). The book concludes with a sort of manifesto about their work:

Shifting the focus from walking as a method to move from one point to another, towards an emphasis on walking as an entangled, transmaterial, affective practice of experimentation, our research considers the ethical and political dimensions of ambulatory research. Frictionally theorizing walking scholarship with feminist new materialisms, posthumanisms, queer and trans theories, critical race theory, Indigenous scholarship, and critical disability studies offers vital interventions into walking’s potential as a research methodology. Our queer orientation to walking methodologies is significant because it emphasizes the speculative and experimental potential of walking as research, while simultaneously attending to the complexities of subjectivities, mobilities, and situatedness. Queering the Trail, as [a] concept for critical walking methodologies disrupts the all too common tropes of walkers drifting through the city or rambling along a country path, and the normative narratives that inscribe walking as inherently healthy and meditative. (142)

“Walking can be overlooked in qualitative research because of its able[i]st Euro-Western history or because it is assumed to be uncritical,” they continue (142). Other assumptions are that it is too quotidian in nature, or that it is romanticized “as a method to counter technology,” or that it is naively embodied (142). “The theories and experimentations that compose this book attest to walking’s capacity to interrupt these assumptions,” they write. “Walking-with becomes a practice of thinking-making-doing that attends to the transmaterial knottings between all matter” (142).

If I had the appropriate theoretical or philosophical background, or if the book’s form welcomed those without such a background into its argument, then I might be in a position to determine whether that concluding manifesto—or the rest of the book’s argument—holds up to scrutiny. But since I don’t, and it doesn’t, I can’t. However, the good news is that the references and citations, if pursued, ought to provide readers with a crash course in the theoretical background required to assess the book’s merits. After my comprehensive examinations are finished, I’ll start doing the work of acquiring that theoretical background. Springgay and Truman aren’t the only walking researchers or artists who begin with Deleuze and Guattari, assemblage theory, or affect theory. So I will need to catch up to my peers. Then perhaps the points in this text where I was left confused will become clear. Or perhaps they won’t: in either case, I’ll be returning to this frustrating text in the future.

Works Cited

Ahmed, Sara. Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. Duke University Press, 2006.

Deidre Heddon and Cathy Turner. “Walking Women: Shifting the Tales and Scales of Mobility.” Contemporary Theatre Review, vol. 22, no. 2, 2012, pp. 224-36.

Smith, Phil. Making Site-Specific Theatre and Performance: A Handbook, Red Globe Press/Macmillan International, 2019.

Springgay, Stephanie, and Sarah E. Truman. Walking Methodologies in a More-than-Human World: WalkingLab, Routledge, 2018.

Young-Ing, Gregory. Elements of Indigenous Style: A Guide for Writing By and About Indigenous Peoples, Brush, 2018.

108. Phil Smith, Making Site-Specific Theatre and Performance: A Handbook

smith making site-specific theatre and performance

One of the reasons I decided to read this book—aside from the fact that it discusses The Weyburn Project, which I saw almost 20 years ago—is that I thought it might be useful if I ever get to teach a course on site-specific theatre and performance. (Hey, it could happen.) Smith has taught courses (“modules,” in UK academic lingo) in site-specific performance for the past 20 years, at Dartington College of Arts, the University of Exeter, and the University of Plymouth, and my guess is that much of what’s in this book comes out of those  experiences, as well as his decades of involvement in creating and experiencing site-specific performance work. 

Smith begins with a prologue about the role of sites in site-specific performance, which includes a story about an event that took place in an “enormous medieval barn”:

As I tentatively entered the almost pitch darkness of this barn, I could hear something. I thought at first that it was the sound of water dripping; then maybe of a clock softly ticking. I stood stock-still. Perhaps it was breathing, and I was interrupting a theatrical action? In the deep gloom I thought I detected a very gentle, rhythmic movement. I stared hard into the shadows. The giant roof beams and the grey lines of the cavernous space of the barn gradually emerged from the murk. After that, i sensed nothing additional to these initial impressions. The clock continued to drip and the spectral, almost abstract movement in the shades of darkness, possibly an effect inside my eyes rather than anything in the barn, continued to shift. I left after 20 minutes, still unsure whether I had experienced some very subtle theatrical scene or accidentally trespassed alone into an off-limits part of the heritage complex. Whichever it was, I exited the barn with an impression that has never left me: that with or without human performers a site will always have an agency of its own that can hold a spectator rapt by its performance. (xii)

This idea is central to this book: sites can overwhelm the performances that take place in them, or those performances can use the power of the site. Site-specific work, in other words, is not just about taking something outside of a theatre and sticking it somewhere else; the relationship between performance and site has to be carefully considered, because sites are worthy of care and attention. 

The book proper begins with a section entitled “Finding a Site,” but the first chapter in that section asks an important question: “Why Make Site-Specific Performance?” (3). That’s the right place to begin, I would think. “There is good cause to challenge any use of the word ‘site,’” Smith begins:

The word implies far more than, say, “space” or “place.” It suggests that a human choice has already defined its boundaries, meaning and identity. A site is always the site of something; with the implication that it is a kind of container for what is really important, for the valuable property that is in it but is different from the space itself. It says that space accrues its meaning through its use by humans; which, in an overwhelmingly unhuman cosmos, is an odd way of describing things. . . . (3)

Along with questioning the word “site,” Smith questions the need for site-specific theatre, “if only to dispel the idea that sites are neutral, natural places, blank pages upon which you can write with impunity” (3). Site-specific theatre is “a choice with its own traditions and legacies,” and practitioners need to be aware of them (3). 

Smith’s genealogy of site-specific work begins with Dadaism and the “excursions” that Dadaists organized in Paris, “most famously a 1921 foray to the repeatedly adapted and repurposed Church of Saint-Julien-le-Pauvre in Paris where the Dadists yelled gnomic slogan-poems at passers-by” (4). “The ‘moment’ of Dada has become something of an event horizon for radical art, a phenomenon from which little information is allowed to radiate,” Smith continues. “Dada’s principles of rupture, rootlessness, fragmentation, nihilistic repetition, anti-art, irony and parody have often prevailed both in subsequent cultural practice and in critical theory, and they continue to inform an important seam of site-specific performance which is often closer to live art than theatre” (4). But there are other stories to tell about the origins of site-specific performance, including “the fusions of land art as practised by the likes of Kazuo Shiraga and the Gutai group, Robert Smithson or Ana Mendieta,” all of which have informed site-specific performance (5). “These artists, given their prioritising of sensitivity to and enthusiasm for materials . . . and their preference for immersion in and communion with terrains, over rupture and separation from them, showed that site-specific works could be just as critical and political as those based on modernist fragmentation and disruption,” Smith continues (5). Other “strands of influence” come from “building-based theatre,” which involves “varying degrees of adaptation of the play to their new ‘grounds,’ and varying degrees of adaptation of the spaces themselves” (5). Many theatre companies in the UK and elsewhere specialize in making such work, and “[w]hile it is possible to question quite what it is about many of these performances that is ‘specific’ to their sites, a significant proportion of what is described as site-specific theatre . . . looks much like this” (5-6). 

However, Smith continues, “building-based theatre” has had another influence on site-specific performance: Symbolist Theatre “set out to dissolve and transcend the same conventions and frames that the Dada would smash, disrupt and escape (6). Symbolist productions questioned “the physical frame of appearance and representation itself. They point theatre out beyond the container of the theatre building” (6). The work of Robert Wilson is “[a]n example of the continuing resonance of this Symbolist theatre for site-specific theatre,” Smith suggests (6). His 2008 Walking, for instance, “required its audience/participants to walk around for three hours at half pace, one by one, at intervals, along a designated path through dunes and bushes, encountering various portals, installations and soundscapes, both natural and artificial” (6-7). “Wilson and his collaborators were careful to leave literal space and symbolic ambiguity through which their ambulatory audience could explore their own associations with the augmented landscape by way of an altered moving and seeing,” Smith continues. “These theatrical strands of influence share some things in common with older lineages of performance that were, or are, sited outside of designated or conventional performance spaces,” from high modernism to theme parks and religious festivals (7-8).

“Developments in technical, artistic and productive practices and a renewed attention to terrains have all been crucial to repeated ‘turns’ to site-specificity,” Smith writes, “but theoretical ideas have also been influential,” including “the idealisation of fluidity and the privileging of rhizomic dispersal over and against fixed, vertical rooting in the work of critical theorists such as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari”; “the popularization of neo-vitalism”; Lucy Lippard’s ideas of the “lure of the local” and the dematerialization of the art object; “the ideas of the vibrant energy of non-human things in the work of Jane Bennett and the Object-Oriented Ontologists”; “the study of the performance of everyday life developed from the pioneering work of Erving Goffman”; the “spatial turn” in geography; the “mobilities paradigm” advanced by geographer John Urry; “and the increasing seriousness with which disciplines outside the arts, like human geography and anthropology, have come to regard performance as a tool of research” (9-10). 

Smith offers a “cautionary note” regarding the “temptation to assume that a common idealism, generous politics and thoughtful ethics inform all these works” (10). That’s not in fact the case: “some artists have been accused of an indifference to the impact and sustainability of their interventions in the terrain involved in making spectacular land art”; an attention to localism “can turn into petty nationalism and chauvinism”; and “opportunistic commercialism and neo-liberal individualism” have been identified in “some of the more immersive examples of site-specific theatre” (10). “There is nothing easy here,” Smith argues (10). Taking over a site, however temporarily, is a way of taking ownership that is comparable to other forms of private property (11). Such arguments, while perhaps reductive, are correctives to performances where the ecologies of sites are ignored (11). “Instead, site-specific performance making is an eclectic, conflicted and ambivalent business; and requires a matching set of inspirations, motivations and justifications,” he suggests (11).

There is also a paradox at work in site-specific performance that might cause makers to stop and think: “because site-specific performance is now communicated as a ‘thing,’ a discipline . . . a recognisable and significant cultural activity, each specificity that a performance maker now approaches, whether that be a new site or a performance idea, is likely to be interpreted by others . . . through conventions shared with others engaged with making site-specific performances” (17). In other words, site-specific work is always at risk of “succumbing to a site-specific homogenisation” (17). However, “[b]y acknowledging these conventions . . . it may become possible to do more than discuss the problem as a recognisable one, and either skirt the conventions or transform them” (17). Therefore, “in order to realise a genuine and rigorous specificity to your site not only will it be necessary to surrender some of your accustomed power and autonomy . . . it will also help (or be necessary) to know what the tics, habits and etiquettes of similar work might be, in order, if appropriate, to strip them away and get to what is special about your site” (17). On the other hand, using those existing conventions might be necessary “in order to create work that plays between what you bring to the site and what you find there” (17). 

One of those conventions, Smith writes, “probably best avoided,” is the notion “that an essential identity for a site can be discovered in the documentation of its past; that the everyday and living transformations of the contemporary site are but an ephemeral distraction from the essence that can be established by historical (or some other absolute) veracity” (18). This danger applies to any performance that seeks “to find and expressed the fixed essence of a site,” particularly those that approach such sites “in a rigid, doctrinal and monocular account” (18). Instead, there needs to be an interaction between the site and the performance, not unlike the “partnership between performance maker Mike Pearson and archaeologist Michael Shanks,” in which both found “a mutual illumination of their own disciplines in the workings of that of the other” (18). In fact, “they also found traces of each other’s disciplines in their own” (18). The work of Victoria Hunter and of Pearson and Shanks together constitutes 

a general ‘why?’ for site-specificity that is not about its veracity to a fixed idea of the site, either to its past history or to its present-day norms, or even about fixing the meaning of the site in the moment, but—by acknowledging a performance’s implication in the production of the space in materials and meanings; a process that is never completed, even in the fluidity of performance—it takes responsibility for the next iteration of the place, for its part in its production as a new space and the transformation of its contexts from one set of frames to a whole new other. (19)

Site-specific performance practitioners “emphasise the reciprocity that was not always acknowledged: that the ‘why?’ of site-specificity is equally, maybe primarily, about how its attention revives the site” (19). In other words, Smith asks, “Is the primary emerging ‘why?’ of site specificity the making of new sites?” (19).

“If a theatre maker approaches their site with the assumption that they are not entering a fixed state or exploiting a backdrop, but addressing themselves to living systems, then, by understanding what those systems are and how they work, those makers can amplify, prolong and entangle their interventions,” Smith continues. “Spending sustained periods of time in a site can reveal all sorts of unexpected dynamics,” such as the sounds of a space in an office after hours, or bats in a suburban garden (20). “The question, then, for the observant and site-engaged performance maker is how to ‘recruit’ these reliable rhythmic systems; dancing to the creaks of the building may be all it takes,” he writes (20). “The ‘why’ of performance shifts the grounds—and is the bridge—from a moment when you are most interested in how a site affects you, to one where you are more interested in finding out how—by using its own resources—you can affect it,” he concludes. “This is the moment when neither the site’s agency nor yours need be dominant; when site-specificity becomes a kind of reciprocity” (21).

The second chapter, “Drifting and Quest: In Search of Sites,” is about finding and choosing a site, something that “is more than an instrumental matter”—“[p]articularly now, when the performative qualities of ambulatory exploring are emerging as part of the continuum of site-specific performance itself” (25). (I was expecting a chapter on the intersection between site-specifity and mobility, and here it is.) Walking artists “and other nomadic thinkers have been exploding the notional fixedness or any sense of the ‘at rest’ of the site of site-specific art,” Smith continues, noting that “[e]xponentially increasing numbers of artists, performers, dancers, geographers and others are now using performative journeys as part of their production process, or as the product itself” (25). Walking art is no longer “the preserve of a few high-profile individuals” or made up of “one-off, often spectacular actions”; instead, “performative journeys, even when epic, are likely to have a convivial or social quality,” such as The Walking Library by Deidre Heddon and Misha Myers, which “gathers together groups of walkers who carry, and read from, a selected library that evolves along the way” (25). “Among other factors speeding this shift from ‘sites’ to ‘routes,’” Smith writes,

are the superior versatility of many human bodies over exploratory machines. The multi- and anti-located properties of Wi-Fi that allow a walker connections to elsewhere through area networks, the attractiveness of walking’s sustainability, the rising popularity of (often now secularised) pilgrimage and the influence of relational aesthetics have also been factors. Given its minimum cost and lack of the need for mediation, a prepared, disrupted and improvisatory walking is often seen as an egalitarian and nonspecialist performance without an audience. (26)

Yes, “without an audience”—some site-specific walking performances are private and don’t involve an audience, although sometimes they do involve other participants (if the distinction I’m making between audience and participant holds water, that is).

Smith notes the importance of psychogeography as an influence on these mobile walking performance practices: 

the “dérive” is a walk for gathering information—“psychogeography”—to be used in creating “situations.” These “situations” are temporary manifestations, including performances, constructed against a manipulated life that has become mediated by images. Hyper-sensitivity to ambiance on a “dérive” enables a radical walker to intuit and ap anomalous areas that are resistant to the brutal homogenisation of planned cities and the image-soaking of space by the mass media and social media through handheld devices. These are places where it might be possible to live outside the dominant ideology, places where everyday life might be “taken back,” experienced fully and transformed. (27)

Other influences include the 19th-century flâneur and flâneuse, early 20th-century “trampers,” and “literary walkers from Thomas de Quincey to Virginia Woolf” (27). “The tactics and techniques of the dérivistes, flâneuses, occult psychogeographers, space-activists, urban explorers and literary wanders are a resource for a maker of site-specific theatre and performance, particularly at the start of their producing process,” Smith continues; “the emphasis on sensing the atmosphere of a place, and on how a place’s shaping, symbols and texture might invite particular actions, or contain certain histories, are deployable in the search for sites for performance” (27-28).

The third chapter, “Journey Performances,” is about the “entangled performance journey, capable of engaging with and transforming its route” (37). “There are many different modes of journey-based performance,” Smith writes:

Sometimes these modes involve . . . the ‘carrying’ of a performance on a journey, stretching a narrative over terrain. At other times, however, the journey itself can be the performance. The exploratory and improvised “drift” often has performance-like qualities (spontaneous or planned); however, there is a more formal journey performance in which the route (the geographical line of a journey) is set and mapped, the score refined, the action rehearsed and then an audience is invited. At other times only a concept of a journey is set, the destination is uncertain, the route unplanned and the audience consists of strangers encountered at random. (37)

“If the performance is porous enough these accidental encounters may be full of chances for understanding,” Smith continues, although “the mingling of rigorously instructed audiences with passers-by at a disadvantage can lead to an uncomfortable privileging of those ‘in the know’ or an unhelpful misreading by the chance witness” (37). “The multiplicities of the street are such that too strict an address to them, or too simple and formal a dynamic, can generate complex and unintended meaning-making, though the resulting performance may achieve considerable success in terms of popular attendance or media reach and acclaim,” he notes (38). 

Smith gives one example of a walking performance that isn’t entirely foreign to my own walking: just after 9/11, Donna Shilling walked from Devon, UK, where she was a student at Dartington College of Arts, to her home in London, asking people along the way what was important to them. “While a journey like this might serve to gather materials for a presentation, book or blog, it was also already performance enough,” Smith writes; “the questions and answers became sufficient dialogue, the encounters constituted a score that did not require repetition or representation” (38). However, he continues, “such resonant acts are often porous ones, with more resilience than their apparent ephemerality might suggest”: in 2008, when it was announced that Dartington would close, Shilling recreated her walk, but in reverse, accompanied by a fellow alumnus and others as a way of saying goodbye (39). Another example is Bram Thomas Arnold’s 2009 Walking Home (Again), a walking journey from his home in London to the village in Switzerland where he was born. “Rather than an end in itself, Arnold used the findings of his walk as the material for an exhibition, embedded within which was a two-hour performance,” Smith writes (39). These journey performances, Smith suggests, “are characterised by a gentle political engagement; an argument with borders and property that arises from the restrictions of a route, a dialogue with conviviality and strangerhood that emerges from the walk’s encounters, and an enquiry about the nature of identity and transformation that comes with the pilgrimage-like experiences of many ambulatory performers” (39). However, these qualities are chosen rather than inevitable. For instance, in 2006 the Chinese performance artist He Yun Chang carried a rock around the coastline of Britain before returning it to the beach where he found it. That performance, Rock Touring Around Great Britain, “developed very little real dialogue with its route; it was a performance of an ordeal originally scheduled for the island of Manhattan” (39). 

“Despite their linear quality, and perhaps because of their association with such repeatable transits as pilgrimages, journey-performances lend themselves to re-enactment,” Smith notes. For instance, Esther Pilkington walked half of Richard Long’s Crossing Stones walk, “turning Long’s documentation of his walk into an instructive score, and adding an autobiographical warmth . . . to Long’s simple, dour text” (42). Han Bing’s series Walking a Cabbage in Beijing “is a comment on the upturning of traditional values in contemporary Chinese society; cabbage, formerly prized as a sign of affluence and sustenance in winter, is increasingly snubbed, while trophy dogs are paraded by many of the newly wealthy. So Bing walks a cabbage” (42). This performance was repeated in Srinagar by the anonymous “Kashmiri Cabbage Walker” in a more provocative way, addressing issues of militarization and occupation in that region. “In both cases, the walkers are challenging passers-by to question their (often extreme) responses to their performances’ minor absurdities,” Smith notes, “while all around them, unremarked, what passes for normalcy is skewed by consumerism and military oppression” (42-43).

“Ecstatic or numinous, the street and the road need not be blunt instruments,” Smith writes:

The exigencies of journeying offer a range and volatility that push beyond the limits of buskers’ “spots” or showpeoples’ “pitches.” The route may be too extensive and detailed to research for any intense specificity; there has to be a flexibility, some imposition perhaps, and certainly improvisation. . . . The specificity is to the unfolding of the path, route or vector, not the path, route or vector itself. (45)

The “flexibility and autonomy” of journey-performance can bring to it “a range of specialisms and everydayness; it shifts back and forth between acts that emphasise the rough materiality of terrains and those that embrace the airy ambiguity of the spaces of non-representational performance” (45). So the Walking Interconnections project led by Sue Porter and Deidre Heddon “used an expanded and de-normalised walking (including numerous journeys made by wheelchair users) to challenge the absence of disabled people’s voices from debates around sustainability,” and Bill Aitcheson’s The Tour of All Tours “collapses the many tours in a city into one tour,” a variation on the “‘mis-guided’ tours that challenge the dominant discourses of the heritage and tourism industries” (45-46). William Pope.L’s The Great White Way, 22 Miles, 9 Years, 1 Street “is a protest about and through degradation; an agitation around the spaces of race, power, dignity and fantasy” (46). Other journey performances us automobiles, trains, boats, or air travel, as documented by Fiona Wilkie in her 2015 book Performance, Transport and Mobility (47). 

Chapter 4, “What is a Site?,” begins by stating, “[s]pace is not a container; it is not an empty carton just waiting for us to fill it” (53). The idea of space as a container of action is one from which “geographers and philosophers have increasingly moved” (53). This chapter (which Smith invites his readers to skip over) discusses “theories of space, key strategies for activating sites (archaeological, chorastic, mobility and Deluezo-Guattarian) and challenges to the very ideas of site and specificity” (53). “While these subjects may not immediately appear to offer very much for performances makers,” Smith writes, “abstractions and a powerful personal vision may at times be all that stands between you and the demands of commerce, repetition and what Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing calls ‘scalability’: the making of products that are indifferent to the scale or texture of contexts and encounters” (53). 

Smith begins this theoretical discussion with Doreen Massey’s 2005 book For Space, and its “three-fold replacement of ‘empty space’”: “firstly, space is ‘the product of interrelations, it is made by the meetings and assemblages and exchanges of people and things; secondly, space is a combination of unlikes, a multiplicity, and without that unevenness there is ‘no space’; and, thirdly, space is ‘always under construction’ . . . it is never completed and never virgin” (54). “If we take these propositions seriously, then, there is never a neutral zone or blank slate for a perofrmance artist to write magisterially upon,” Smith writes. “There is, instead, a seething and volatile set of changing layers to shift with and respond to in order to write anything legible at all” (54). Space gives us “difficult entanglements across borders,” “spills, evaporations, tides and gusts that defy and defile whatever limits we choose for them” (54). “A maker of site-based performance, then, may need to be a multivalent one, capable of engaging with multiple partners, human and unhuman, including the active presence of space itself,” he suggests (54). “Given this mutability in the quality of space, you might be sympathetic to Claire Doherty’s suggestion to challenge ‘site’ rather than ‘specificity,’ proposing an alternative category of ‘situation-specific,’” Smith continues (55). I’ll have to read Doherty’s text, because I’m not convinced that changing the word one uses would have much of an impact on the complexity and changeability of space.

“Choosing any one place over another to be the site of a performance implies some concession to limits and a narrowing identification,” Smith writes, “even if it does not exclude ‘multiplicity’ and ‘heterogenous relations’” (56). But acknowledging the uniqueness of a site “is not necessarily an elitist or exceptionalist articulation of the place” (56). Places have a “conditional uniqueness,” which can be embraced by “acknowledging that an ethical ‘attending to’ and ‘tending’” (Smith is quoting Melanie Kloetzel and Carolyn Pavlik here) “is at least partly obliged by the violence of site-making itself,” and such an embrace “may help a performance maker avoid undermining their otherwise vivid work, at least for the more attentive among their audience, by a crass spatial illiteracy” (57). For instance, Smith recalls a conference where one presenter noted that their use of the performance space “had sealed off a shortcut used by homeless people,” a statement that “did not seem to arise from a callous disregard for other users of ‘their site,’ but rather by the panicky pragmatism that can kick in if one approaches a place as needing to be controlled rather than cooperatively engaged with” (57). Some site-specific performances fail because the artists make “[a]ssumptions about the passivity and benignity of space, and its subservience before the authority of the performing presence” which “coalesce into the belief that territory will, and should, fit itself to the art. This is an attitude that will, almost always, come back to bite a performance maker” (57).

Smith warns his readers that writing on space “slithers between spatial metaphors that stand in for ideas and ideas that seem to be more about real places than abstract concepts” (59). “Just as the places we encounter are not ‘pre-given’ and are always ‘open to change,’ similarly our ideas about place and space have also been on journeys; they carry some of the dust of those journeys with them, but they are also missing parts of themselves,” Smith suggests (59-60). In fact, “rather than providing clear or neutral analyses of, and strategies for, uncomfortable and contested sites,” theories of place and space “actually themselves constitute other sites of discomfort and contest” (60).

Next, Smith offers some useful (if not necessarily compatible) examples of theory and/or practice “with which to approach sites in general terms” (60). First is archaeology, drawn from Theatre/Archaeology, the 2001 book by Pearson and Shanks, which draws attention “to different ways that site performance and archaeology interleave each other, from the documentation of performance’s remains to the more subtle overlapping of processes” (60). In a later work, Pearson “proposes that the most intense connection of the two might be in relation to what is sometimes called the ‘contemporary past,’ the present that is already passing” (60). In response to this passing, “people are making their everyday spaces archaeological,” curating past and present together (60). By looking obliquely, by paying attention to texture and detail, Pearson suggests “that we can recognise how, even in apparently mundane places, there are traces of the immediate and ordinary that constitute ‘an archaeology of us,’” and from those marks “we have access to an existing score of how place is being, and very recently was being created and performed” (61). A performance that attends to the “apparently mundane and its juxtapositions” can take the form of a curation or assemblage, “made up from the assembling, arranging and rearranging of ordinary spaces and objects,” creating a multitemporal present (61). 

The second example is the idea of chora or “‘chorastic space’”: spaces which “are regularly seized upon by performance makers as having a certain magical affordance for generating experientially intense or immersive performances” (62). Such spaces “might wear the marks of aging or nostalgia, or display traces of history, wear and tear and abandonment,” but at the same time “there is something dynamic and utopian there” (62). The term chora (described by Stephen Wearing, Deborah Stevenson, and Tamara Young) comes from Plato through Elizabeth Grosz; it refers to “a space where multiple possibilities are not yet closed down in resolution or synthesis,” “a space that resists exchange, commerce and the oppressive obligations of gifting and reciprocity” (62). A chora “works by an evasion (rather than a violent dissolution) of identities and hierarchy, suggesting that what is being found by performance makers in these places is a temporary space where things are in suspense and meanings can be performed before they are understood or recognised” (62). But chora isn’t just about space: “[i]t also applies to the participants’ self-conscious reconstitution of their site-making selves” (62). Chora “is an energy that presages things, perhaps because chorastic spaces are often in some form of disruption or dis-assemblage through redundancy or closure or repurposing” (62). That energy, Smith suggests, “develops new kinds of what Raymond Williams called ‘structures of feeling’: common values or experiences that have not yet reached expression in the form of works of art or institutions, but have enough in the way of structure to be experienced and repeated” (62-63). This description is very suggestive, but I would have to turn to Wearing, Stevenson and Young (if not Plato and Grosz) to really get a handle on what it means.

Next, mobility and the “‘mobilities paradigm,’” which “re-addressed site as a bundle of trajectories and changes, not as stasis, fixed things, boundaries or hierarchy” (63). The mobilities paradigm “challenges specificity as a conservative anchoring of meaning to fixed and located things” and unseats “sedentary thinking” (63). “It is an invitation to make work that frees specificity from site, and vice versa; instead, affirming performance as an expression of transition and velocity, of the ideal of nomadism in ‘smooth space’ advocated by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,” Smith writes (63). “Expressed in those terms, the mobilities paradigm sounds a little like the Futurists’ glorification of speed and transport in the 1920s,” he continues, noting that “there are concerns that it advocates a reactionary perspective in progressive terms in a way comparable to the Futurists” (64). Some scholars have pointed to the various restrictions and obligations and responsibilities involved in global travel to challenge the reality of the mobilities paradigm (64). “The paradigm’s subversive, disruptive, liberating and multiplicitous qualities are susceptible to reactionary and frozen ideas that commandeer the same qualities that ‘mobilities’ proposes to set free,” Smith suggests, and the mobilities paradigm is a cautionary case “that suggests that smooth space, acceleration and travel are not always reliable contexts for efficacious disruptions of fixed sites, but practices that may themselves require disruption” (64).

Finally, Smith comes to the notions of smooth, striated, and holey space, derived form Deleuze and Guattari. The terms “smooth” and “striated” were borrowed from the composer Pierre Boulez, Smith points out: “Striated space is marked by stress and pressure”; “it fixes place as an immobile point, and it fixes people to that immobility, enforcing dwelling against wandering” (65). However, life “is a wandering force; smooth space does not so much facilitate that movement as enable life to sustain it in multiple and discrete (even contradictory) motions without collapsing all its differences into anything that would bring it all to a halt or conclusion” (65). For Deleuze and Guattari, a third form of space—holey space—is the counter to striated space; holey space “includes mines, sewers, caves, bunkers—places where those who oppose restrictions have often hidden out and organised” (66). Some have extended this idea to cyberspace (the Dark Web?) and forests (66). “There is a considerable overlap here wiht the kinds of spaces that are attractive to site-specific performers, and to related activists such as urban explorers,” Smith writes. “As well as identifying holey-ness in virtual space, there is also a connection to the use of public space as a kind of hiding in plain sight; mapping the invisible and overground tunnel systems and blind spots that exist in everyday public spaces” (66). 

There are other theories about space and place that might be useful (or not): structuralist synchrony; Kenneth White’s “geopolitics”; Manuel Castells’s “space of flows”; Tim Ingold’s “meshwork”; Michel de Certeau’s tactics, “tiny and everyday acts of resistance at street-level that compromise the blank space of power”; or Smith’s own mythogeography (66-67). “Or you might want to shake any complacent ease you have detected in these pages, any sense that little is at stake except for careers and egos, and make performances in spaces where ‘stability of geography and the continuity of land . . . have disappeared . . . [where] identity is confined to frightened little islands in an inhospitable environment,” Smith writes, quoting Edward Said’s Orientalism (67). Said’s words “could apply to many for whom any performance on any ground might require an act of decolonialisation,” Smith suggests (67).

Next Smith takes on Miwon Kwon’s criticism of the notion of site-specificity as a weak category that shifted from a place to a discursive vector, leading to a nomadism that generated a greater commodification (69). Kwon, Smith argues, “makes a categorical assumption about site that establishes a dichotomy between location and mobility and limits her thesis to a set of art practices that mostly do not include performance” (69). The journey performances Smith has described “are as obdurately unmarketable, uncommodifiable and tied to their particular routes and the ‘physical attributes’ of them as any of the early site-specific artworks that Kwon describes” (69-70). Nevertheless, “Kwon’s criticism of how repeating the same processes for different sites leads to diminishing returns” and rote and generic art “has force and significance; not only for some of the ‘headlining’ companies and individuals in receipt of invitations from large global capitals, but also for artists who operate across limited local or regional terrains” (70). Both the extremes of localism and placelessness “are at odds with Massey’s idea of space as a multiplicity; one a vapid ideal, the other a frozen identity,” Smith writes (70). “Instead Massey argues for the validity of the unique features of particular places,” while resisting any notion of place that is too rooted and “‘too little open to the externally relational,”” he continues, quoting Massey (70). I am going to have to reread Massey’s book; it is clearly a tremendous source of ideas, and my once-over was not sufficient.

These theories generate important questions for performance makers, particularly in relation to what a site actually is:

Are you choosing sites that are conducive to, even protective of, human performance? Is the escape from the theatre building or gallery a step sideways to spaces outdoors that offer something comparable to the facilities of theatre buildings, or an escape to wider horizons that avoid a sedentary audience’s closer attention to script and theme? do these choices, when taken together, imply a proprietorial understanding of the world as benign, inhabitable, consistent and welcoming of the performers’ presence; or of a terrifying world at odds with human presence? Is your site trying to kill you? (72)

Should performance makers “be preparing for a site-practice that addresses what Don[n]a Haraway calls the Chthulucene, in which, partly but not exclusively by our own actions, humans face, and not for the first time, the monstrous on and in and of this planet?” (72).

The book’s second part, “Generating Performance,” begins with a chapter entitled “Visiting Your Site.” The chapter was initially entitled “Exploring Your Site,” but the colonial implications gave Smith pause; the notion of visiting “suggests something closer to the relationship of a guest to a host than that of an invader to an unwary local” (77). “So, what happens if you consider yourself a guest rather than an explorer?” Smith asks:

What if you consider yourself not as a privileged arrival, but as a compromised visitor with something to prove or redeem? Someone with an obligation to respect another’s hospitality? What charge or price might you pay? What gift might you bring? What kinds of exchange should you prepare for? Are there conventions of greeting and welcome that you would extend to a human host to which you can find an equivalent for a geographical host? How will you announce your arrival; it might be a knock on a door or a ring on a bell at the home of a human host, but how might you address your site before you enter? Or will you wait for the site to invite you in? Perhaps, rather than dashing to its centre, you might work your way around its edges, slowly. Or is that too furtive? Maybe you need to allow the site to “see” you, allow it time to move to include you.

Who has the most power in the exchanges between you and the site? (77-78)

But, Smith continues, if the site is not a blank slate, neither is the performance maker: “we all carry our own baggage of associations, accumulated skills and past experiences” (78). Finding the relationships between sites and artists, he suggests, “may be usefully thought of a a search for the best arrangement of voids, in order that things (objects, ideas, information, emotions, connections) flow back and forth between site and artist” (78). He cites Cathy Turner’s term “deep dramaturgy” in this regard: a sense of porosity or permeability between artist and site (79). Because of this porosity, embodied research might be a good way to approach site-specific performance, along with practices associated with ethnography, such as participant observations, field notes, and case studies (79). Such research practices acknowledge that knowledge is incomplete and uncertain, an idea that might help performance makers avoid a futile search for the “truth” of a site (80).

However, considering embodied research to be the only research method “seems unnecessarily puritanical,” Smith suggests. “If we think of sites as meshworks of connections then to understand any particular one it may be necessary to track and trace movements to and from it that cross its horizons and borders” (82). That might mean looking for written documentation about a site. “It is rare that lack of information about a site is a problem; more often, it is a case of how to deal with the incoherent avalanche of disparate forms and contents,” Smith notes, a problem exacerbated by the limited amount of time usually available to prepare for a performance (82). For that reason, one might end up relying on “[r]apid searches, intuitive leaps, shortcuts and sideways connections” (83). One “may trace the same narrative (up and down) through a multitude of layers,” or “find that different kinds of information spiral outwards from a single narrative to gather multiple thematic or associational threads” (83). 

According to Smith, site specificity “is not a reductive process of authentication based on the latest stage of academic learning” (86). Instead, at best, it 

knowingly and openly . . . embraces the inauthentic, fabricated, wilful, nonsensical, paradoxical and criminal where it is particular to a place. In that sense there is nothing that is necessarily, in any other terms, efficacious in a genuine site-specificity except the care and integrity . . . with which it addresses what is present there, in the site, whether convenient or inconvenient, consistent or inconsistent. (86)

“No ‘site’ has an original, permanent base or real identity to authenticate and be authenticated (that is the work of popular historians and nationalist poets),” he continues:

the site-artist has the more complex, if less heinous, task of making a meshwork-sense of the multiple eddies of materialities, sufferings, dreams and memories, documentations, diaries and monuments, fauna and flora past and present, architectural revenants and planning applications, pub chat, local ‘urban legend’ (how local is that, ever?), administrative structures, trash, informal markers, dignities and indignities . . . and so on. (86)

Like science, “a site-specific piece of work moves forward by a fascination with what it does not know or what it can barely even imagine a meaning for, but that begs the investigation: What is this place? What is happening here? What does all this mean? How could this be?” (86-87). Site-specificity’s paradox, Smith argues, “is that, if genuinely pursued, it brings us to an uncontainable and promiscuous multiplicity of possible ‘heres’ . . . and it is the judicious combining of those possibilities that constitutes the litmus test of the art” (87). These are important ideas for me to remember; it would be too easy to identify (or misidentify) a “truth” of rural Saskatchewan and ignore its contradictory layering.

Chapter 6, “Site Aesthetics,” begins with the words, “There is no right or wrong way to make performance in any site. Or to put it another way—there are only relative and contextualised right ways that will not apply to everywhere” (97). The purpose of this chapter is to “address how for a rigorous site-specific approach, the aesthetics of each performance intervention are forged in a tension between the qualities of the site and the predilections of the performance makers,” with the performance makers involved always, to some extent, “threatening to lose touch with their raison d’être and obscure the object of their desire: the site” (98). Smith offers “three overarching aesthetic approaches to site-based performance in the knowledge that they are necessarily generalised, not necessarily discrete and open to whatever adaptation and traducing the specificity of any use will subject them to: transparency, camouflage and symbolist” (99).

The first approach, transparency, is about “light, self-effacing and non-invasive performances through which a site can be performed and witnessed” (99). This approach will suit quieter sites where the performance is less likely to be drowned out by surrounding activity (99). Transparent performances call upon spectators to be “active witnesses . . . to the effecting of things (including people) by other things (including people) (100). The audience of a transparent performance is obliged to be attentive: “in this ‘transparency’ the focus has moved away from the human ‘act-er,’ whether artist or audience, and is displaced to the material consequences of things, and to the ‘other’ human experiences, an ‘other’ that has to be imagined, a challenge that can only be properly met by empathy” (100). 

Camouflage, however, “means creating performance that is as variegated and demonstrative as its site, integrated by its theatricality and noisiness rather than its unveiling and illuminating by restraint. By excess and showiness a camouflaged performance flattens itself into the unevenness of its space” (102). This approach is best for places that are “rich in detail,” which threaten “to overwhelm any human presence no matter how histrionic,” which are “packed with existing ‘performance’ and narrative, florid in materials and design” (102). “After choosing such a site, making a performance with exaggerated and baroque qualities can be an entanglement with, and (paradoxically) a disappearance into the space that changes its nature,” Smith writes: “it can make ‘new space’” (102-03). 

In the Symbolist approach, the way of describing a place is “drawn from some larger corpus of symbolism”: psychological, philosophical, biological, geological, “or other organisations of categories” (106). “In relation to a particular site, this ordering can be explicit and an integral part of the space’s design—as with, say, a Freemason’s temple or with the interweaving of liturgical script with the histrionic platform of a medieval cathedral’s layout—but it can also be imposed,” Smith writes, as in the case of Slavoj Žižek’s use of Freudian symbolism in his description of the Bates’s house in Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho (106). “Any one space is always both reminiscent and symbolic of another,” Smith suggests, citing Gaston Bachelard’s account of how a deep-sea diver lost in the desert imagined that he was walking through water (106-07). “To create work in symbolic space is a process that blends the subjective with the real, the personal with the historical, in order to firm up its abstract meanings with precise, local materials and effects,” Smith writes (107). 

Like the previous chapter, Chapter 7, “Personae, Presences, Characters” begins with a statement against prescriptiveness: “There is no generic right or wrong performance mode, style or discipline for a participant in a site-specific performance” (117). However, Smith continues, “there is also some sense, stronger perhaps outside of performance-designated buildings than within them, that a performer (no matter how masked or scripted) is always performing their personal presence, even their ‘inner self,’ as much as any fiction, script or bare list of tasks” (117). In a less-controlled performance environment, in other words, “the dislocation from an authorised performance space, somehow more pointedly exposes the performer’s performance of themselves” (117). Smith refers to Erving Goffman’s 1959 book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life and Judith Butler’s notion of performativity to suggest that our identities are created, not just represented, by our performances of them (117). “Just as a place has a history, no human presence (no matter how deep within) is neutral, but is always unfolding as part of, and with, the space around it,” Smith writes. “The performer is also a landscape, or more correctly is threaded throughout, but not wholly coterminous with, one” (117-18). This idea suggests that, if you “attempt to adopt too rigid a portrayal of character and identity, as if these were fixed or given by forces independent of your site, there is a danger that you may light up a set of ideological dominances to delight an audience hungry to have its assumptions affirmed” (118). “Paradoxically, then, there is, as yet, no specific acting or performance method, particular to site-specific performance,” Smith continues. “Instead, there are many practices upon which to draw, in different combinations and with different levels of intensity” (119). 

These include autobiographical and autoethnographic presences, in which performers “choose a site that constitutes a landscape of your own life story” (119). However, the actual spaces of one’s life can be “simultaneously too close and too distant; too unmediated in terms of their location and yet too distant in terms of the events there being now in a past that is not now there and therefore no longer present,” Smith suggests. “Performers, by choice or instinct, seem to mostly avoid this tearing of space from time” (120). This avoidance “suggests that performers exploring site-based work for the first time should exercise a certain wariness about the rawness or nakedness of their performance and its place. Space is never neutral, but the spatial host of autobiographical performance may be particularly loaded” (120). The places of one’s past, he continues, “may shelter revenants that will remain dormant until stirred by the intensities of performance” (120). He cites Deidre Heddon’s notion of “autotopography,” “the landscape of autobiography,” as a way of thinking about such places (120). “In an auto-ethnographic context, failures, malfunctions, cowardice or avoidance are differently significant from other more conventional disciplinary contexts,” Smith contends. “Because the auto-ethnographer must slide between their context, their research itself and their self, when things fail they still reveal, they still count as findings of significance rather than unproductive non-events or dead ends. Indeed, at times, they constitute findings that less reflexive disciplines find difficult to identity or collect” (131). In site-specific performance “mistakes and accidents can be as expressive and precisely communicative as a smoothly run show” (131). 

Another performance practice is “ablative presences”: a non-mimetic form of “‘non-matrixed performance’” that eschews “tapping directly into the energy of a site, either by representing, reproducing or amplifying it” (132). According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “ablative” is an adjective that can mean, in languages where nouns have cases, an expression of “direction from a place . . . which is expressed in English by ‘by’, ‘with’, or ‘from’” (OED), or the destruction or subtraction of a thing from something else, particularly a diseased organ (in medicine) or processes of melting (in physical geography or astronautics). For Smith, who is drawing from Mike Pearson here, an ablative presence is a kind of “sidestepping” that suggests performance “‘in the presence of,’ ‘together with,’ ‘adjacent to’ the site” (Pearson, qtd. 132). Smith includes Allan Kaprow’s “happenings” as examples of performances that step aside from realism or mimetic representation (132-33); the separate sections of the happenings “were played out mostly alongside each other, in tune with Pearson’s suggestions . . . rather than in consequential sequences, thematic unfolding or an overlapping entanglement” (135). Stage hands doing their work in view of the audience are, according to theatre scholar Michael Kirby, another example of an ablative presence, Smith suggests (133). “Such a ‘non-performer’ is aware that they are being watched, but they are not trying to convey any message or motivation (other than completion of their task), and they certainly do not want to ‘star’” Smith writes; “they are organised, they have certain actions to carry out and they do these as efficiently as they can” (133-34). “This approach affects more than just performance presence, serving as a means to developing a relationship with a particular site,” Smith continues (134). Such subversions of naturalistic representation are related to Bertolt Brecht’s epic theatre, which “disrupts any seamless weave of occurrences and psychology in order to uncover their contexts and represent their conditions” through a process of making those events strange and interrupting their continuity (135). Given that theories of space and place, such as Doreen Massey’s emphasize that sites are unfinished and in process, “the disruption of epic acting can be an equivalence to the incompleteness of space” (137). “In such a performance, the actor betrays and outrages their site; their narrative or projection of character or persona exposes the same contingency in which the apparent material solidity of the location as in their own actions (which might partly explain the attraction of sites in ruin or of those in transition between different uses),” Smith writes (137). 

A third performance practice involves performing character is a site. Smith notes that realist acting methods, “when removed from the platform of the illuminated stage, can come over as overly contrived or, contrastingly, overwhelmed by the ‘flat,’ immense or baroque and distracting qualities of a site” (141). “Yet there is no special reason why psychological, naturalistic or expressionist techniques cannot be adapted for use in site-specific performances,” Smith writes. “The key to adaptation seems to be in finding space (and a role) for the site in the technique and, complementarily, finding the spatial aspect of the technique itself” (142). Understanding the motivation of an action, he continues, “is hugely valuable to the site-specific performance maker” (142). Stanislavskian psychological acting techniques can be used, but the challenge they present “is the entangling of psychological and geographical objectives” (142). Another way of performing character is Simon Persighetti’s “actor as signpost” concept, which “points performer and audience directly to the immediate site and its material specificies; it starts as a localist gesture, a grounding of the performing body in its immediate environment, its senses as active feelers-out of information, not from a passive environment, but from an environment ‘ready’ to feel out for the sensory-feelers of its visitors” (144). This notion “gives equal priority to site and performer, the latter of which is most valued at the sensorial edge of their being; pointing away from themselves and the internal mystery narrative of the labyrinthine subconscious” (144). “Motion is one of the signpost’s key elements: the encouragement to the spectator/participant to find their own trajectory,” Smith continues (144). “Where the focus on mobility and the here and now provokes a necessary disruption, there is also a complementary ‘healing’; resisting the privileging of some sites over others” (145). In other words, the signpost technique “is a democratising activity, enacting a social as well as an organic interdependency” through acts of collaboration that are “both social and physical” (145). “This social interweaving is a ‘connection’ of the sort that Delueze makes key to any strategy for change,” he suggests (145). 

Part 3, “Shaping a Production,” begins with chapter 8, “Dramaturgy.” “There is a temptation in site-specific art—given its usually recognised origins in modernism—to automatically embrace the fragmentary, the obscure, the conceptual and the reflexive,” Smith writes (159). However, while there is no obligation to write a play that tells a story in site-specific performance, neither is there an “absolute obligation to conform to postmodernism’s urgent abandonment of an overriding, over-determining grand narrative and its replacement by a timeless and depthless immediacy that admits no unfolding of narratives at all” (159). There are “multiple alternatives,” Smith suggests, “that need not conform to a linear structure,” although the best alternative might be to think about the site’s own dramaturgy, its “physical ‘logics’ and institutional policing,” which “may dictate the limits of what is possible dramaturgically to what the material dimensions or the security forces of the sites will allow; but they may also provide a dramaturgical structure or trajectory” (159-60). “Or you own up to the importing of patterns that you, maybe inevitably, will engage with,” Smith continues. “Embracing what a totality has to offer to a site-specific performance; the creation of an ‘alternative world’ . . . which either accumulates layers until there is a qualitative change of site-identity, or uses fictions or other asymmetrical devices to change the totality of the site’s identity” (160). This isn’t just using the site as a backdrop; rather, “it is about transforming a landscape by the sinking of an aesthetic work into it; a ‘camouflage’” (160). “Alternatively, rather than accumulate the layers in some kind of consistency, you can emphasise the quality of the layering, so that the different elements of the site, in performance, retain their discreteness,” Smith suggests (160)

“With fragmentation, in any of these dramaturgies, and any consequent loss of narrative legibility—where narrative is relevant—there can be a temptation to anchor an audience in a single, fixed space in order to provide a substitute for the formal structure that is refused in, or failed by, the dramaturgy,” Smith contends. “Sometimes a formally innovative work can end up, becalmed, in conservative space. Equally, a mobile, agentive and inquisitive audience can quickly become an anxious and dissatisfied one if it feels that it is unable to find any meaningful structure, totalised or formally fragmented; or maybe just not find the action at all” (162). The point is to align performances with the sites they are made for. “Despite any talk of high political aesthetics,” he continues, “there is nothing to be ashamed about in seeking answers to the questions around dramaturgy in technical solutions” (162). 

One strategy (following Doreen Massey) is to protest what is absent from the site. For instance, a performance in “an English ‘stately home’” might call attention to “those whose enslaved labour generated the wealth to build it, not as the exposure of a historical crime, but as an indictment of the site’s ongoing and living driver for continuing the exclusion of the Other (in this case the descendents of those colonised and enslaved) from spaces free from exploitation” (169). (Are there any spaces free from exploitation?) “Without the agency of people of that Other, a performance would struggle to escape from the force of ‘consistency’ implied in the time, text and building materials of the layers and palimpsest,” he continues (169). What if, then, “the agents of a site are constituted by its Other; is coevalness then possible for its performance?” Smith asks (169). He uses the example of Misha Myers relational walking performance Way from Home which, “by overlaying one place on another by inviting refugees and asylum seekers living in the UK to map a journey from ‘home’ to a ‘special place and then to walk that route, performing that journey, but in the place they are not, and in the company of walking partners,” “created a different kind of connection to a site” (169). “Through coevalness, site specific performance can look from the centre to the edges of its site, from the vertical, the digging down, to its horizon; looking for the arrival of the Other of the site from the margins,” Smith writes. “What that Other might be, and it is by definition a potential, always described within a future to which it does not have access yet, will still be specific to its site” (169). That Other will not guarantee any narrative or other kind of consistency or coherency, though: “to expect so it to de-Other it” (169): “Coevalness does not solve the technical issues, but adds one extra challenge to them” (169).

Chapter 9, “Scenographies and Enchanged Objects,” begins by suggesting that whether to introduce “recognisable scenic elements and props into a site” is “an existential issue” for site-specific scenography, because doing so “implies that the site is, by that intervention, subjected to the same aesthetics as a building-based theatre production; that the privileging of the site has been replaced by the ‘self-fascination’ of the theatre” (179). One response to that issue is scenographer Kathleen Irwin’s generation of “a sensibility that crosses between conventional stage space and what she calls ‘found space’; the site is not necessarily primary, but provides ‘a text among other texts, such as the script or musical score’” (qtd. 181-82). In Irwin’s 2002 The Weyburn Project, located in a former mental hospital in Weyburn, Saskatchewan, “Irwin worked to recruit what she calls the ‘social energies’ hidden in the materials of the site as prompts to recover the memories and stories of those who had lived and worked there” (182). Irwin’s general approach, Smith continues, is to release the site into fragments which reveal “‘the interpenetration of people, place, culture, and history’” so that the performance’s site shifts from a geographical space to “‘the space of the glance between artist and spectator’” (Irwin qtd. 182). “Rather than agents in their own right,” Smith suggests, the site becomes an ambassador, or mediator, “between human agents or between human agents and themselves” (182).

Smith advocates phenomenology as a theoretical approach to site-specific performance (a reason to read Merleau-Ponty, finally, as if I needed one), although he cautions that it, “like any kind of philosophy, is always in dancer in becoming the subject of itself; the idea of experience standing in for experiences themselves” (185). “Site-specificity is equally vulnerable to performing an idea of itself, generating, demonstrating and commodifying the thrill of immersion rather than inviting others into the immersion itself,” he continues (185). Object-Oriented Ontology, a recent development in phenomenology, “challenges the idea of a human-centred cosmos, denying that things are ever drained of their presence or significance just because humans have stopped thinking about them,” an idea which is significant for site-specific work. Object-Oriented Ontology “asserts the independence of things from human perception and from each other,” granting “some discreteness to objects,” so that part of their “thingness” is their “resistance to being swept up and immersed in human-centred ideas about ‘full sensorium,’ about the flows and currents of all things or, indeed, any advocacy for a taxonomy of spaces” (185). “There does seem to be some object-oriented autonomy at work in the regularity in which certain objects, or categories of objects, appear in site-specific performance,” Smith writes. “Just as certain categories of site have repeatedly attracted performance makers, so there is also a taxonomy of objects that are similarly attractive: flags, water, salt, boats, and even the sun” (186). Object-Oriented Ontology isn’t restricted to things in a site, but “embraces sites themselves,” and “[i]ts emergence has coincided with several new publications proposing a similar agency of objects,” which Smith lists, including Jane Bennett’s 2010 book Vibrant Matter: The Political Ecology of Things (186). One of the things I find valuable about this book, in fact, is the way it encourages further reading over a wide range of topics, including books I’ve intended to read for some time but haven’t gotten to. 

In chapter 10, “Communities, Audiences and Immersion,” Smith argues that “[a] dramaturgy is only ever likely to make sense if it is informed by an approximate idea or intuition of how it will be received by its audience; an attitude that is sure to establish some tension (creative or otherwise) with an art form that prioritises the existing site rather than a forthcoming reception” (193). This question is less important for site-specific walking performance, which tend to be private or rely on audiences that simply happen along, but it still arises, as Smith suggests: “the audience may not be arriving, but have been present for a very long time,” since “many, maybe most, sites of performance are places of belonging, home or neighbourhood” (193). Smith draws on the work of Josephine Machon, particularly her analogy that “a ‘full-sensorium’ immersion in the performance experience . . . can be like a bodily immersion in water” (203)—yet another book to read.

I skipped over chapter 11, “Technology,” because my work is deliberately low-tech, and skimmed chapter 12, “Site Etiquette,” which addresses “some of [the] disparate issues that may arise for you in making site-based performance” (223), from access to the lack of a backstage, to health and safety, duration, scale, and weather—all of which are important considerations. Clearing up after the performance is important: “[w]hat you leave behind in your site may be the most profound result of your performance,” Smith warns (226). He discusses whether performances can be adequately documented: performance theorist Peggy Phelan suggests they can’t, but Smith contends that there are forms of documentation, such as mapping, which are “something more than a residue and more like an ongoing ‘site’” (227). This chapter ought to be handed out to anyone thinking about making a site-specific performance.

Smith’s conclusion returns to the notion of mobility in site-specific performance, suggesting that “while mobility suggested that there might be some relativistic bridge between the immediacy . . . of the human cultural occasion of performance and the inhuman aeons of matter,” there is still a discrepancy that dancer and theorist Melanie Kloetzel “has discovered within the process of site-adaptation with significance for site-based performance in general” (232). “What might seem like a mutual resilience shared between its sites and a performance moving between them and adapting itself to them, obscures a ‘more disturbing’ rationale of ‘expendability,’” Smith suggests, quoting Kloetzel, who “describes how resilience often comes at the expense of the less privileged parts of a site: adaptation is applied to the site as much as to the performance,” and the “[l]ess convenient parts” of a site “are regularly dispensed with, excluded or ignored,” reducing the site to an object (232-33). For Kloetzel, this kind of “site-adaptive performance . . . re-establishes (and spreads) the conventions of the building-based institution, the ‘empty space’ of the blank theatre-designated building that returns to ‘zero’ at the end of each production’s run” beyond the theatre’s walls (233). 

“There are at least two ways for a performance maker to respond to Melanie Kloetzel’s radical critique of the practices that I have spent this book advocating,” Smith continues:

one is to accept that it brings to a stasis and sad conclusion a series of bold experiments and disastrous compromises; another is that it represents an opportunity, an edifice just waiting to be hauled down, a poisoned playing field to be navigated, a stable reading to be cleaned out with performance fire. To me, Kloetzel’s critique changes the game. I have often felt out of kilter with those predominating tendencies to take a more laissez-faire or tolerant approach to categories and practices. Now, I want to ask again: What if the qualities that have been described as the reactionary limitations of place specificity, as giving oppressive location-meaning to a site, as nailing it to its past, obsessing on its materials, disrupting its everyday life by too aggressively addressing it, are what continue to be useful about performance? While, on the other hand, theorists who sought to mobilise and accelerate the categories around “place” and “site” and thus escape specificity’s limitations have risked thinning their meanings as they expand them and adding unintentionally to a broader ideological belief that technology and globalisation have transcended borders and expunged any meaningful remnants of colonialism and genocidal nation-building, consistent with site-adaptation’s illusion that it “allows us to . . . make the changes necessary with little real alteration of the status quo.” (233-34)

That’s a rather surprising statement, given where the book begins, and it suggests how powerful Kloetzel’s critique must be, and also that I’m going to have to read it. Smith suggests “that performers and researchers need to attend to the developments in vital materialism,” Object-Oriented Ontology, “in the more cosmic reaches of geophilosophy and eco-criticism as a torque upon the impetus to dissolving specificity in technologically enhanced acceleration and the commodification of thrills and ‘experiences’” (235). Location is important, even essential, and that assertion, “with all the layers of the palimpsest, is one of the torques by which a recontextualisation, a change in the limits and orders of a space, can begin—another being the arrival in the site of those historically made absent from it, the Other of the site, coming as new agents arriving from what, for much site-specific performance, has been the margins” (235). Such “torques” “can shift the focus back to the site, in the context of thinking about the matter of the  cosmos, and add some modesty to strategic thinking about how such sites are changed by being expertly performed” (235). 

“Given the difficulties, would it be more creative if ‘specificity’—even in its ‘purist’ form—was understood more as the rigour of its attention, of its ‘attending to’ and ‘tending of’?” Smith asks. “In other words, that while the meaning of ‘site’ can speak mostly for itself (if, hopefully, in more tongues that it did when you started this book), ‘specificity’ needs to be re-thought, re-defined and re-spoken; this time much less a geographical-research term and more as an ethical one” (236). An “ethical site-specificity,” Smith continues, “would reject site-adaptive’s expending of site and embrace an obligation to add to its multiplicity,” to what Pearson calls “‘its scene of plenitude,’” “extending the way it imagines its relationship in time with a site” (236). For Smith, this ethical site-specificity 

means a more careful consideration of the choice of sites, not simply as the best containers for performance, but as actors-in-themselves (sites that are making their own demands for attention such as re-wilding spaces or spaces of abuse), with a more careful intention in leaving; not simply discarding the site after a performance is over. (236)

Kathleen Irwin gets the last word: the space of performance is left in the charge of “‘locally based spectators,’ who were always already ahead of the performance makers with ‘an enhanced kind of creative energy in . . . their knowledge of the place and its history . . . continu[ing] to frequent the place’” (qtd. 236).

Readers expecting a primer to site-specific performance—or even, as the book’s subtitle suggests, a handbook—are perhaps likely to be disappointed and/or confused by Smith’s Making Site-Specific Theatre and Performance, because it is much more than either a primer or a handbook, as the complexity of his conclusion suggests. It’s not, in other words, just a book for undergraduate students taking courses on site-specific performance. I found the chapters on mobile performance particularly useful, and the range of texts to which Smith refers—the ones I haven’t read, at least—could easily form the basis of a reading list for a comprehensive examination on the subject of site-specific theatre and performance. So this book is useful, and it encourages me to move on to read other texts about site-specific performance, from Melanie Kloetzel to Mike Pearson to Kathleen Irwin. Perhaps my earlier reading of general texts on performance was frustrating because they weren’t focused on what I’m actually interested in for my current work, which is mobile, site-specific performance. I’m not sure; that’s something to think about as I turn, inevitably, to the next book.

Work Cited

Smith, Phil. Making Site-Specific Theatre and Performance: A Handbook, Red Globe Press/Macmillan International, 2019.

90. W.G. Sebald, The Rings of Saturn

rings of saturn

Psychogeographers, Phil Smith tells us, don’t like W.G. Sebald’s The Rings of Saturn (21). Smith isn’t so keen on it himself. As he walks the route of Sebald’s pedestrian journey in Suffolk, he becomes “increasingly suspicious of Sebald’s exploration”: his assumption had been that The Rings of Saturn was supposed to be “a deep engagement” with landscape, but it isn’t, or else there is “a mismatch between Sebald’s complex intellectualism and his idea of what an embodied engagement with a landscape is. In fact, he thinks The Rings of Saturn is merely based on “cursory desk-based research” (85). Sebald, though, is neither a psychogeographer nor a mythogeographer, and rather than being a book about Sebald’s walk through Suffolk, or the landscape in which Sebald walked, or the emotional effects of that landscape on Sebald, it is a complex meditation on death and destruction. The walk, I would argue, is the occasion for that meditation, and that meditation is what’s important in the text, rather than the walk itself. I’d go so far as to say that mediation is the text.

Smith notes that Sebald is interested in catastrophe—that’s one of the key words in the book’s conclusion—but suggests that he “sees everything but the catastrophe of class” (70). Sebald, Smith contends, “is unaware of, or opposed to, the idea that there operates a system that always tends toward, and thrives upon, crisis. . . . Instead, Sebald is super-sensitised to the surprise of tragedy” (70). I’m not sure that’s entirely true, and as I write this summary I’m going to be looking for examples of Sebald’s awareness of class; I’m also not convinced that Sebald is actually interested in tragedy, unless that is a way of saying that he has a melancholic or pessimistic view of the world. Rather, I think he reads human history through the lens of the Second World War and the Holocaust, looking for similar examples of human brutality and evil and expanding those examples to an almost cosmological scope. In fact, one could argue that the actual subject of The Rings of Saturn is the Holocaust, and that it therefore prefigures Sebald’s last novel, Austerlitz.

One of the reasons I wanted to reread Sebald’s book for this project is that I’ve been casting around for models I could use to present the results of the walks I intend to take. Sebald would be one of those models, if only I could write the way he does. Over the course of his paragraphs, which go on for pages and pages, he shifts from one topic to another, from where he is walking to memories of other journeys to dreams to historical or literary figures that obsess him. It’s impossible to place The Rings of Saturn within a specific genre, either. Sometimes it’s a memoir; other times it seems to be fictional. It contains literary criticism and history and travel writing. It’s all of these things, and yet it’s none of them: it is itself, sui generis, and needs to be approached from that perspective.

The Rings of Saturn begins with two epigraphs, one from a letter written by Joseph Conrad to Marguerite Poradowska in 1890, about the time he was the captain of a river steamer in the Belgian Congo, and the other from a German encyclopedia entry on the rings of the planet Saturn. Conrad’s letter reads, in French, “Il faut surtout pardonner à ces âmes malheureuses qui ont élu de faire le pèlerinage à pied, qui côtoient le rivage et regardent sans comprehendre l’horreur de la lutte, la joie de vaincre ni le profond désespoir des vaincus” (n.p.). In English (reaching back to my fractured high-school French), that comes out as “One must pardon these unfortunate souls who have chosen to make the pilgrimage on foot, who go along the shore and regard without comprehending the horror of the struggle, the joy of subjugation and the profound despair of the defeated.” The subtitle of the first German edition of The Rings of Saturn was “Eine englische Wallfahrt,” which translates as “an English pilgrimage,” but when it was translated into English (Sebald always wrote in German, his first language) that subtitle was dropped. So the word “pèlerinage” here refers back to that (absent) subtitle, and to Sebald’s own walking journey. But I wonder if Conrad isn’t describing the genocide he witnessed in the Congo, which Sebald discusses in this text. There is something truly horrific in his words, especially in the suggestion that those who subjugate others experience joy. If I’m right, Conrad is describing human brutality and violence. Who the pilgrims are, though, I’m not entirely sure. Perhaps they were people who walked along the Congo River instead of taking a steamboat? Or is that too literal? Why use the word “pèlerinage” at all, if not to evoke an ironic disjunction against the suggestion of violence in the rest of the sentence? In Heart of Darkness, Conrad uses the word “pilgrim” to refer to European employees of the company his narrator, Marlow, is working for. Is he using the word in the same way in this letter? I’m not sure, but it seems likely. In any case, this quotation prefigures the human violence, and the recurrent references to death, that saturate The Rings of Saturn.

The description of the rings of Saturn is more straightforward and (obviously) related to the book’s title. The rings, according to the encyclopedia Sebald is quoting, “consist of ice crystals and probably meteorite particles describing circular orbits around the planet’s equator. In all likelihood these are fragments of a former moon that was too close to the planet and was destroyed by its tidal effect” (n.p.). Rather than human violence, this explanation is a description of natural violence, even cosmological violence, and we see that in Sebald’s accounts of the 1987 hurricane that destroyed forests in East Anglia, or the erosion that caused the destruction of the village of Dunwich. The catastrophes humans experience are not always of their own making, and those catastrophes affect other living beings as well. Saturn probably has mythological echoes as well; the Roman god Saturn (as Wikipedia tells me: I’m no expert on classical mythology), while associated with peace, plenty, and feasting, carried a sickle or scythe, as Death does, and was often conflated with Cronus, suggesting the passing of time (with its inevitable overtones of death). We see that association later in the text, in a passage quoted from the work of Thomas Browne, one of the writers who fascinates Sebald. He writes, “As I sat there that evening in Southwold overlooking the German Ocean, I sensed quite clearly the earth’s slow turning in the dark” (78), and this reminds him of Browne’s meditation on that phenomenon:

The huntsmen are up in America, writes Thomas Browne in The Gardens of Cyrus, and they are already past their first sleep in Persia. The shadow of night is drawn like a black veil across the earth, and since almost all creatures, from one meridian to the next, lie down after the sun has set, so, he continues, one might, in following the setting sun, see on our globe nothing but prone bodies, row upon row, as if levelled by the scythe of Saturn—an endless graveyard for a humanity struck by falling sickness. (78-79)

As an aside, it’s worth mentioning that much of The Rings of Saturn consists of long quotations from other writers, typically presented without quotation marks. More to the point, though, the conflation of passing time, death, and Saturn’s scythe suggests that the title, and the second epigraph, like the first one, refer to death and destruction. 

But I am getting ahead of myself. In this long and detailed summary—and it has to be long and detailed so that I can follow the twists and turns of the text. I wanted to walk myself through Sebald’s text in order to pick out examples of death and destruction, yes, but also to follow the drift (literally) of Sebald’s thinking. That means starting at the beginning. At the beginning of the first chapter, we learn that Sebald begins his walk in “the dogs days” of August 1992, after finishing “a long stint of work” (3), which may refer to his book The Emigrants, which was published in German that year. He goes on the walk, he writes, “in the hope of dispelling the emptiness that takes hold of me whenever I have completed a long stint of work,” and he reports that his hope “was realized, up to a point”: “for I have seldom felt so carefree as I did then, walking for hours in the day through the thinly populated countryside, which stretches inland from the coast” (3). But looking back, Sebald (or his narrator—how close Sebald is to that narrator is an open question), writes, “I wonder now, however, whether there might be something in the old superstition that certain ailments of the spirit and of the body are particularly likely to beset us under the sign of the Dog Star,” because “in retrospect I became preoccupied not only with the paralysing horror that had come over me at various times when confronted with the traces of destruction, reaching far back into the past, that were evident even in that remote place” (3). He wonders if it was because of that horror that, “a year to the day after I began my tour, I was taken into hospital in Norwich in a state of almost total immobility” (3). It seems very likely, given the way this text is saturated with examples of death and destruction, that Sebald’s breakdown occurred as a result of that “paralysing horror.” 

It was at that point that he began writing this book, he states, at a point when he was “overwhelmed by the feeling that the Suffolk expanses I had walked the previous summer had now shrunk once and for all to a single, blind, insensate spot” (3-4). All he could see was a “colourless patch of sky framed in the window” (4). He wanted to look out of that window, and that evening he dragged himself over to it, “despite the pain,” and “[i]n the posture of a creature that has raised itself erect for the first time,” he “stood leaning against the glass” (5). His posture reminds him of Kafka’s Gregor Samsa, who “climbs the armchair and looks out of his room, no longer remembering (so Kafka’s narrative goes) the sense of liberation that gazing out of the window had formerly given him” (5). Like Gregor Samsa, Sebald’s narrator states that the “familiar city” visible through the hospital room window had become “an utterly alien place”: “it was as if I were looking down from a cliff upon a sea of stone or a field of rubble,” he writes, “from which the tenebrous masses of multistorey carparks rose up like immense boulders” (5)—a description that merges Norwich with Dunwich, the village or town destroyed by the North Sea’s erosion of the cliff on which it stood. The only human figure outside is a nurse, and an ambulance with its lights flashing is approaching the hospital’s emergency ward. There was, the narrator recalls, an “artificial silence”: “All I could hear was the wind sweeping in from the country and buffeting the window; and in between, when the sound subsided, there was the never entirely ceasing murmur in my own ears” (5).

Now, a year later, Sebald’s narrator is assembling the notes he began writing in that hospital room, and he thinks of a former colleague, Michael Parkinson, “one of the most innocent people I have ver met,” a man without self-interest and with modest needs “which some considered bordered on eccentricity” (6). The previous May, Michael “was found dead in his bed, lying on his side and already quite rigid, his face curiously mottled with red blotches” (6). That death affected another colleague, Janine Dakyns, deeply. Like Michael, Janine was an eccentric scholar whose office was so filled with papers and books on Flaubert that she had to work in an easy chair in the middle of the room. Sebald’s narrator once suggested to her that “sitting there amidst her papers she resembled the angel in Dürer’s Melancholia, steadfast among the instruments of destruction,” but Janine responded that what appeared to be chaos was actually a perfect form of order (9). Janine had referred Sebald’s narrator to Anthony Batty Shaw when, after leaving the hospital, he began his research on Thomas Browne, whose skull was supposed to be kept in the museum of the Norfolk and Norwich hospital. Shaw had written an article on Browne and knew that his skull had been reburied after its disinterment in 1840. This leads the narrator into a discussion of Browne’s life and writing. What I find fascinating here is that over the course of one paragraph, covering several pages, there is a movement from a colleague who died suddenly, to another almost entombed by her books and papers, to Browne, a medical doctor and writer in the seventeenth century who attended a public dissection of the corpse of an executed thief, Aris Kindt, that is represented by Rembrandt’s painting The Anatomy Lesson. In that painting, the deceased’s hand is the wrong way around. “It seems inconceivable that we are faced here with an unfortunate blunder,” Sebald’s narrator suggests. Rather, that “unshapely hand signifies the violence that has been done to Aris Kindt,” and it indicates that Rembrandt’s sympathies lie with the victim rather than the members of the Guild of Surgeons who surround his corpse (17). Rembrandt alone, the narrator continues, “sees that greenish annihilated body, and he alone sees the shadow in the half-open mouth and over the dead man’s eyes” (17).

The narrator then recalls Browne’s contention that a white mist rises from a body that is opened after death, a mist that, while we are alive, “clouds our brain with sleep and dreaming” (17). That suggestion reminds the narrator of his own foggy consciousness as he lies in a hospital room after surgery—not the hospital visit when he began writing this book, I think, but a different one. He only became aware of his body and his surroundings around dawn. Outside the window, he saw a vapour trail in the sky. “At the time I took that white trail for a good omen, but now, as I look back, I fear it marked the beginning of a fissure that has since riven my life,” the narrator states. He seems to be troubled by the fact that the aircraft making that trail was invisible, like the passengers inside it. This takes him back to Browne, “who saw our world as no more than a shadow image of another one far beyond” (18). And, like Sebald, Browne’s writing is complex, filled with quotations and “labyrinthine sentences that sometimes extend over one or two pages, sentences that resemble processions or a funeral cortège in their sheer ceremonial lavishness” (19). Browne saw the tiniest details of things, but he believed that “all knowledge is enveloped in darkness” (19). He was particularly interested in a figure called the quincunx, a structure he saw everywhere in the natural world, a kind of unifying principle. (Sebald, who illustrates his books with various photographs he has taken and archival material, provides an example of the quincunx.) And yet, Browne “was often distracted from his investigations into the isomorphic line of the quincunx by singular phenomena that fired his curiousity,” including “beings both real and imaginary,” ranging from chameleons and ostriches to basilisks, unicorns, and amphisbaenae (snakes with two heads). “Browne refutes the existence of the fabled creatures,” the narrator tells us, “but the astonishing monsters that we know to be properly part of the natural world leave us with a suspicion that even the most fantastical beasts might not be mere inventions” (22). That suggestion leads the narrator to Jorge Luis Borges and his 1967 book Libro de los seres imaginarios, a compendium of imaginary beings, including the shapeshifting Baldanders, which change into many things, including “a mulberry tree, and a silk carpet”—one of the references to silk that litter Sebald’s text (23). Suddenly the narrator returns to Browne, who believed that “nothing endures,” that “[o]n every new thing there lies already the shadow of annihilation” (23-24). Browne wrote a book about burial urns in which he argued that little fuel is required to cremate a human body, and he details the odd objects that have been found in such urns. “For Browne, things of this kind, unspoiled by the passage of time, are symbols of the indestructibility of the human soul assured by scripture,” which Browne “perhaps secretly doubts” (26). The chapter begins with a question about a piece of purple silk found in one of the urns Browne discusses: “what does it mean?” (26).

The second chapter begins with the start of Sebald’s walk. He takes a train from Norwich towards Lowestoft, passing “some ruined conical brick buildings, like relics of an extinct civilization,” that are all that remains of windmills that were shut down after the First World War. He gets off the train at the halt for Somerleyton Hall. The narrator reflects on the fact that everything that great house would have required would have been brought by that railway, but that “now there was nothing any more. . . . It takes just one awful second, I often think, and an entire epoch passes” (31). Now Somerleyton Hall, like other country houses, is open to visitors who pay an entrance fee. Most of them arrive by car. The few who arrive by train, and who don’t want to walk all the way around to the main gate, have to “climb the wall like some interloper and struggle through the thicket before reaching the park” (32). Sebald’s narrator immediately espies “a curious object lesson from the history of evolution, which at times repeats its earlier conceits with a certain sense of irony,” because “when I emerged from the trees I beheld a miniature train puffing through the fields with a number of people sitting on it,” and the driver was “the present Lord Somerleyton” himself (32).

Sebald’s narrator relates the history of Somerleyton, which was rebuilt after 1843 by Sir Morton Peto, an entrepreneur and speculator who made his money in construction and railways. The “comfort and extravagance” of Peto’s new country residence “would eclipse everything the nation had hitherto seen” (33). It featured “incomparable glasshouses,” lit at night by gaslight, that were considered a wonder (34). However, “Somerleyton strikes the visitor of today no longer as an oriental palace in a fairy tale,” the narrator states, referring to Coleridge’s poem about Kubla Khan (35). The glass-covered walks and palm house were destroyed in a fire in 1913. The servants are gone, and “[t]he suites of rooms now make a somewhat disused, dispirited impression” (35). As he walks through the Hall, he is “variously reminded of a pawnbroker’s or an auction hall,” although the great collection of oddities it contains eventually wins him over (36). When the Hall was first constructed, and everything “was brand new, matching in every detail, and in unremittingly good taste,” the Hall must have been “uninviting,” but “how fine a place the house seemed to me now that it was imperceptibly nearing the brink of dissolution and silent oblivion” (36). The grounds, with their mature cedars and sequoias and plane trees, are a “contrast to the waning splendour of the house” (37). Sebald gets lost in the estate’s yew maze, and later he meets the gardener, William Hazel, who tells him about the 67 airfields that were built in East Anglia after 1940. In just over three years, Hazel tells him, the American Eighth Airforce alone “used a billion gallons of fuel, dropped seven hundred and thirty-two thousand tons of bombs, and lost almost nine thousand aircraft and fifty thousand men” (38). Hazel would watch the bomber squadrons heading out every evening, and before he went to sleep he pictured the burning German cities. He shows Sebald a map of Germany and points out the cities that were destroyed. When Hazel served in the army of occupation in the 1950s, he was surprised that Germans had not written about the bombings—the subject of Sebald’s book On the Natural History of Destruction. Hazel also tells him about the crash of two American fighters on the estate in early 1945; the pilots’ remains “were buried here in the grounds” (40).

Sebald leaves Somerleyton and walks to Lowestoft, past Blundeston prison. When he arrives in the town centre, he is “disheartened” (41). He had been there before and found it pleasant, but “it seemed incomprehensible . . . that in such a relatively short period of time the place could have become so run down” (41). Unemployment is very high and “nearly every week some bankrupt or unemployed person hangs himself” (42). Sebald knew all of this before, but seeing it is another thing entirely. Smith objects to Sebald’s characterization of Lowestoft, stating that it’s not the wasteland Sebald makes it out to be (68), but of course things could have changed between Sebald’s visit in 1992 and Smith’s in (I think) 2011. According to Sebald’s narrator, though, “there is no sign of an end to the encroaching misery” (42), which might be an accurate description of a town devastated by Thatcherism and neoliberal economic policies, but might also be a misreading of the potential for resistance and resurgence there as well. I don’t know. It is hard, of course, to come to know a place intimately as a visitor, and it’s possible that Sebald’s melancholia, or the bad food he was served at the Albion Hotel, might have coloured his impressions of Lowestoft. The following morning, when he leaves the town, it has “reawoken to life” (44), although that life includes a hearse containing a corpse outside the train station. That hearse reminds Sebald of “that working lad from Tuttlingen” who had joined a funeral cortège in Amsterdam 200 years before, perhaps envying the wealth in that city’s port but conscious that the rich merchant ended up in the same “narrow grave” as everyone else (44-45). (I don’t know where that story comes from.) Sebald thinks of how Lowestoft has declined since its time as a society resort in the nineteenth century, as his late friend Frederick Farrar, who had been born in the town, once told him. That connection leads to a brief biography of Frederick, who had somehow set fire to his dressing gown one morning while walking in the garden and died of his burns. The connection between burning German cities and Frederick’s death is clear. Frederick had told Sebald that because “the common folk” were not admitted to the annual charity ball, they “rowed out to the end of the pier in a hundred or more boats and barges,” and “from their bobbing, drifting vantage points,” watched “as fashionable society swirled to the sound of the orchestra, seemingly borne aloft in a surge of light above the water, which was dark and at that time in early autumn usually swathed in mist” (47-48). Frederick told Sebald, “If I now look back at those times . . . it is as if I were seeing everything through flowing white veils” (48). He recalls his family walking down the beach and says he that once he “even dreamed of that scene,” and that his family seemed “like the court of King James II in exile on the coast of The Hague” (48). There is some attention to class here—Frederick’s family had servants, so they must have been wealthy, and by finding a way to watch the ball perhaps “the common folk” are engaged in a kind of envious resistance—but I think Sebald is more concerned with how things change through the passage of time, and with the distance between events and our memories of them.

At the beginning of the book’s third chapter, Sebald’s narrator sees “all manner of tent-like structures made of poles and cordage, sailcloth and oilskin, along the pebble beach” south of Lowestoft (51). These are shelters of fishermen. The narrator has heard that these men don’t speak to each other, and he imagines them watching the sea “quite alone and dependent on no one but himself” (52). Today no one makes a living fishing; the boats are abandoned and falling apart, partly because of pollution in the North Sea. He remembers films about herrings that were shown in school when he was young; in them, the herring was an “emblem . . . of the indestructibility of nature” (53). At one time, the herring nets “were made of coarse Persian silk and dyed black” (56) (another reference to silk). The purpose of the herring, it seems, is to be eaten: if not by humans, then by other fish. Huge quantities were caught, and as a result, 

the natural historians sought consolation in the idea that humanity was responsible for only a fraction of the endless destruction wrought in the cycle of life, and moreover in the assumption that the peculiar physiology of the fish left them free of the fear and pains that rack the bodies and souls of higher animals in their death throes. But the truth is that we do not know what the herring feels. (57)

One oddity of these fish is that when they die, they begin to glow. In the 1870s, two English scientists investigated this phenomenon hoping that it “would lead to a formula for an organic source of light that had the capacity to regenerate itself,” but they were disappointed (59).

In the early afternoon, Sebald reaches Benacre Broad, a brackish lake separated from the North Sea by “a bank of shingle” and that will, no doubt, disappear one night during a storm (59). “But that day, as I sat on the tranquil shore, it was possible to believe one was gazing into eternity,” the narrator recalls: 

The veils of mist that drifted inland that morning had cleared, the vault of the sky was empty and blue, not the slightest breeze was stirring, the trees looked painted, and not a single bird flew across the velvet-brown water. It was as if the world were under a bell jar, until great cumulus clouds brewed up out of the west casting a grey shadow upon the earth. (59)

That shadow reminds him of an article he had clipped from a newspaper several months before, on the death of Major George Wyndham Le Strange, whose manor house stood beyond the lake and who had been part of the liberation of Bergen Belsen in April 1945. A photograph of Bergen Belsen (I think) follows; the piled bodies resemble the mounds of herring in postcard of Lowestoft reproduced several pages earlier. Le Strange was a wealthy and eccentric man, who left his entire fortune to his housekeeper, whose job, in part, was to take meals with her employer in total silence. The narrator relates several odd stories he had heard about Le Strange; he tells us he doesn’t now what to make of them.

Sebald keeps walking south. At Covehithe, he sees dead trees by the sea; they had fallen from the cliffs years before, and their “barkless wood looks like the bones of some extinct species, greater even than mammoths and dinosaurs, that came to grief long since on this solitary strand” (64). A sailboat in the sea keeps him company. He reaches a large field where a hundred pigs are sleeping. He climbs the electric fence and strokes one of the animals: “When I stood up, it closed its eye once more with an expression of profound submissiveness” (66). The pigs remind him of the New Testament story of the Gadarene man whose evil spirits were cast by Jesus into a heard of swine, which then fell off a cliff and drowned in the sea. What, he wonders, was the point of that story? He watches the sand martins flying; in childhood, he would imagine that “the world was held together” by the swallows in flight (67). That memory leads to a mention of Borges’s book Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, in which a few birds save an amphitheatre. But it is the sand martins that engross Sebald’s attention, until he looks over the edge of the cliff and espies a couple apparently having sex: “Misshapen, like some great mollusc washed ashore, they lay there, to all appearances a single being, a many-limbed, two-headed monster that had drifted in from far out at sea, the last of a prodigious species, its life ebbing from it with each breath expired through its nostrils” (68). That association upsets him, and he leaves the place, heading along the beach towards Southwold in the distance. It begins to rain just before he reaches the town, and, the narrator tells us, “I turned to look back down the deserted stretch I had come by, and could no longer have said whether I had really seen the pale sea monster at the foot of the Covehithe cliffs or whether I had imagined it” (69).

That uncertainty brings him back to the Borges story he mentioned before. The narrator of the tale remembers “the observation of one of the heresiarchs of Uqbar, that the disturbing thing about mirrors, and also the act of copulation, is that they multiply the number of human beings” (70). The source of that story is supposedly an entry in the Anglo-American Cyclopedia, but it cannot be found there; it seems to exist only in one copy of the encyclopedia, owned by the narrator. Do any of the places the narrator is describing actually exist? In a note added to the text, the reader learns that one of those places, Tlön has, although fictional, completely changed the earth by becoming the only subject of learning. Everything else will disappear: “The world will be Tlön” (71). However, the narrator doesn’t care; he is going to continue to work on his translation of Thomas Browne’s Urn Burial. What is the link between Borges’s strange apocalypse and Browne’s text on funerary urns? What is Sebald doing? How is Borges’s tale connected to Sebald’s concerns? It’s very hard to say.

At the beginning of the fourth chapter, the rain has stopped and Sebald is taking a walk around Southwold. The town is deserted. He says that he would not have been surprised if he suddenly saw the Dutch fleet offshore, as they were on May 28, 1672, the date of a naval battle between the Dutch and the English that led to a tremendous loss of life, including that of the English commander, the Earl of Sandwich. That battle was the beginning of the Netherlands’ decline as an imperial power. Sebald thinks of the passing of time and the people lying asleep as if dead, “levelled by the scythe of Saturn,” and looks out to see at the clouds, which remind him of mountains (78-79). He recalls that years before, in a dream, he walked the length of a remote and unfamiliar mountain range, which, he realizes, was the Vallüla massif, which he had seen from a bus years before. “I suppose it is submerged memories that give to dreams their curious air of hyper-reality,” he suggests (79). But, he continues, “there is something else as well, something nebulous, gauze-like, through which everything one sees in a dream seems, paradoxically, much clearer” (80).

“Just as these things have always been beyond my understanding,” he continues, “so too I found it impossible to believe, as I sat on Gunhill in Southwold that evening, that just one year earlier I had been looking across to England from a beach in Holland” (80). What follows is an account of a rather miserable night spent in The Hague, where he looked at Rembrandt’s The Anatomy Lesson in the Mauritshuis the following morning. Governor Johann Maurits, whom the museum is named after, had lived in Brazil for seven years and, Sebald’s narrator tells us, “when “the house was opened in May 1644, three hundred years before I was born, eleven Indians the Governor had brought with him from Brazil performed a dance on the cobbled square in front of the new building, conveying to the townspeople some sense of the foreign lands to which the power of the community now extended” (83). That reference to colonial history, which enabled the art collection which was the reason for Sebald’s visit, isn’t, I think, just an aside. That evening, in Amsterdam, he makes notes on his European journey, now almost over, which includes stories about his namesake, St. Sebolt, and the miracles he had performed. The following day, at Schiphol airport, the atmosphere is “so strangely muted” that it is as if the passengers “were under sedation or moving through time stretched and expanded” (89). He comes across a description in Lévis-Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques of a street in São Paulo “where the colourfully painted wooden villas and residences, built at the turn of the century by the wealthy in a kind of Swiss fantasy style, were falling to pieces in gardens overgrown with eucalyptus and mango trees” (89). Perhap, he thinks, that’s why the airport “seemed to me that morning like an ante room of that undiscovered country from whose bourn no traveller returns” (89)—in other words, like death. The connection between that street and the eleven “Indians” is made, I think, through the story that those dancers, “about whom nothing else is known, have long since disappeared, as soundless as shadows” (83). These images of death and disrepair are linked by their geographical location.

On the small plane from Amsterdam to Norwich, Sebald looks out of the window at the ground below. He notices that one never sees human beings from the air, “only the things they have made and in which they are hiding” (91). “And yet,” the narrator continues,

they are present everywhere upon the face of the earth, extending their dominion by the hour, moving around the honeycombs of towering buildings and tied into networks of a complexity that goes far beyond the power of any one individual to imagine, from the thousands of hoists and winches that once worked the South African diamond mines to the floors of today’s tock and commodity exchanges, through which the global tides of information flow without cease. (91-92)

“If we view ourselves from a great height,” he continues, “it is frightening to realize how little we know about our species, our purpose and our end” (92). No wonder psychogeographers are frustrated by The Rings of Saturn; in this long reminiscence, Sebald’s walk has entirely disappeared, although I would argue that the themes of his text (death, decay, time) have been present throughout.

The evening is getting chilly, and so Sebald goes to the Sailors’ Reading Room, now primarily a maritime museum. It is his “favourite haunt” in the town, a place to read and write or just look at the sea (93). He returns the following morning to make notes on what he’d seen the preceding day. He leafs through the log of the Southwold, a patrol ship, from the autumn of 1914, and discovers a photographic history of the First World War that includes photographs of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination, which started the war. That afternoon, reading a newspaper, he runs across an article about the Croatian Ustasha, a police force that collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War. The article describes a photograph of a group of Ustasha “sawing off the head of a Serb named Branco Jungic” (96). “This happened at Jasenovac camp on the Sava,” the narrator continues. “Seven hundred thousand men, women and children were killed there alone in ways that made even the hair of the Reich’s experts stand on end, as some of them are said to have admitted when they were amongst themselves” (96-97). The Ustasha also murdered as many as 90,000 people during a campaign against Tito’s partisans. The history of these massacres is recounted in 50,000 documents abandoned by the Germans and Croats in 1945 and stored in an archive that was the headquarters of the Heeresgruppe E intelligence division in 1942. “In this connection,” the narrator continues,

one might also add that one of the Heeresgruppe E intelligence offices at that time was a young Viennese lawyer whose chief task was to draw up memoranda relating to the necessary resettlements, described as imperative for humanitarian reasons. For this commendable paperwork he was awarded by Croatian head of state Ante Pavelić the silver medal of the crown of King Zvonomir, with oak leaves. (98-99)

The postwar career of this bureaucrat of genocide led him to becoming the Secretary General of the United Nations. Of course, Sebald is talking about Kurt Waldheim. A recording of Waldheim’s voice speaking words of greeting “for the benefit of any extra-terrestrials that may happen to share our universe” is now “approaching the outer limits of our solar system aboard the space probe Voyager II” (99). The bitter ironies of that statement need little explanation. It is as if Sebald is suggesting that the best person to represent us in space is someone who participated in a genocide, because that defines what humans are and do. 

Sebald’s fifth chapter recounts a documentary about Roger Casement he fell asleep watching in Southwold. Casement was executed by the British for treason in 1916. And that documentary leads to a discussion of Joseph Conrad’s biography, especially his experience in the Belgian Congo, because both men were linked through their writing on the Belgian Congo. Conrad, born Josef Korzeniowski to Polish parents, learned English, in part, by reading Lowestoft newspapers while sailing on a coastal steamer that travelled between Lowestoft and Newcastle. In 1890, he went to work for the Société Anonyme Belge pour le Commerce du Haut-Congo as the captain of a river steamer. The Congo was then a Belgian colony, and King Leopold received the profits of “its inexhaustible wealth” through trading companies such as the Société Anonyme Belge pour le Commerce du Haut-Congo—profits “built on a system of slave labour which was sanctioned by all the shareholders and all the Europeans contracted to work in the new colony” (118-19). An estimated 500,000 people died of overwork or disease. Conrad was appalled by what he saw and turned back. “Tout m’est antipathique ici, he wrote to Marguerite Poradowska, les hommes et les chose, mais surtout les hommes,” Sebald’s narrator tells us. “Je regrette d’être venu ici” (121). When he arrived back in Brussels, he “now saw the capital of the Kingdom of Belgium, with its ever more bombastic buildings, as a sepulchral monument erected over a hecatomb of black bodies, and all the passers-by in the streets seemed to him to bear that dark Congolese secret within them” (122). Sebald recalls his first visit to that city in 1964, and suggests that “the very definition of Belgian ugliness” is “the Lion Monument and the so-called historical memorial site of the Battle of Waterloo” (123). The panorama there suggests to Sebald “the representation of history”: it ignores the dead and wounded of that battle (125). “Whatever became of the corpses and mortal remains?” he wondered then. “Are they buried under the memorial? Are we standing on a mountain of death? Is that our ultimate vantage point? Does one really have the much-vaunted historical overview from such a position?” (125).

In 1903, Roger Casement wrote a memorandum on what was happening in the Belgian Congo for Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne, giving “an exact account” the deaths of hundreds and thousands of people every year in the colony (127). Casement was praised and rewarded for his work, but under pressure from King Leopold, the British government did nothing. Later, Casement was transferred to South America, where he discovered conditions that resembled those in the Congo, “with the difference that here the controlling agent was not Belgian trading associations but the Amazon Company, the head office of which was in the city of London” (128). The Foreign Office tried to deal with the matter by knighting Casement. “But Casement was not prepared to switch to the side of the powerful,” Sebald’s narrator states; “quite the contrary, he was increasingly preoccupied with the nature and origins of that power and the imperialist mentality that resulted from it” (129). He became involved in “the Irish question”—he had been born in that country—and argued for Home Rule (129). In early 1915, he travelled secretly to Berlin “to urge the government of the German Reich to supply arms to the Irish army of liberation and persuade Irish prisoners of war in Germany to form an Irish brigade” (130). Neither effort was successful, and Casement returned to Ireland, where he was arrested. Excerpts of Casement’s diary were circulated, which indicated that he was gay. “We may draw from this the conclusion that it was precisely Casement’s homosexuality that sensitized him to the continuing oppression, exploitation, enslavement and destruction, across the borders of social class and race, of those who were furthest from the centres of power” (134). He was found guilty and hanged; his remains were not recovered until 1965, when they were exhumed “from the lime pit in the courtyard of Pentonville Prison into which his both had been thrown” (134). Devoting an entire chapter to the stories of these two men demonstrates that Sebald’s primary concern in this text is not his walk; rather, it is the human history of genocide, including colonial genocide, and war. The walk is just an excuse, I think, for a meditation on what human beings are capable of doing to each other.

Sebald’s sixth chapter, like the fifth, focuses on a violent history: this time, the wars and imperial interferences in nineteenth-century China. It begins with a bridge over the River Blyth that was constructed in 1875 for a narrow-gauge railway that had originally been built for the Emperor of China. That train leads Sebald to a recounting of Chinese history: the Taiping rebellion and its bloody suppression with the assistance of British army that had occupied China in the middle of the century, which included the destruction of “the magic garden of Yuan Ming Yuan near Peking” (144) witnessed by, among others, British engineer Charles George Gordon, “who was later to die a famous death in the seize of Khartoum,” another British imperial adventure (146). China came to be ruled by the Dowager Empress Tz’u-hsi, who cared little about her subjects, as many as 20 million of whom died of starvation and exhaustion between 1876 and 1879. All the Dowager Empress seemed to care about were her silkworms (another of the many references silk in the text). The train that crossed the River Blyth had been ordered for the child Emperor Kuang-hsu, but it was never delivered. Instead, Kuang-hsu was imprisoned in one of the moated palaces in the Forbidden City, and after his death in 1908, his doctor speculated that he had been poisoned. The Dowager Empress died the following day. As she was dying, she said that “she realized that history consists of nothing but misfortune and the troubles that afflict us, so that in all our days on earth we never know one single moment that is genuinely free of fear” (153). Sebald himself could have written that statement.

From here, the text leaps back to Borges and Tlön, where the denial of time is one of the key tenets of philosophy. And that leads back to Thomas Browne, who suggested that “[t]he night of time . . . far surpasseth the day” (154). “Thoughts of this kind were in my head too as I walked along the disused railway line a little way beyond the bridge across the Blyth, and then dropped from the higher ground to the level of the marsh that extends southward from Walberswick as far as Dunwich, which now consists of a few houses only,” Sebald’s narrator states (154). Dunwich was an important port during the Middle Ages, but “[a]ll of it has gone under, quite literally, and is now below the sea, beneath alluvial sand and gravel, over an area of two or three square miles” (155). On New Year’s Eve in 1285, a storm tide devastated the lower town and the port: “There were fallen walls, debris, ruins, broken timbers, shattered ships’ hulls, and sodden masses of loam, pebbles, sand and water everywhere” (157-58). The citizens rebuilt, and in January 1328 another powerful storm destroyed the lower town. “Over the centuries that followed, catastrophic incursions of the sea into the land of this kind happened time and time again,” Sebald’s narrator tells us, and “[l]ittle by little the people of Dunwich accepted the inevitability of the process,” moving west away from the sea (158). That westward movement, he continues, is “one of the fundamental patterns of human behaviour,” particularly in North and South America: “In Brazil, to this day, whole provinces die down like fires when the land is exhausted by overcropping and new areas to the west are opened up” (158-59). That is a description of the ecological destruction and deforestation caused by colonialism in Brazil, though, rather than something inherent in humanity, I would think. In any case, today Dunwich “has dissolved into water, sand and thin air” (159). For that reason, it “became a place of pilgrimage for melancholy poets in the Victorian Age,” including Algernon Charles Swinburne, and the chapter now shifts to become a biography of Swinburne and a description of his poetry, in which “[l]ike ashes the low cliffs crumble and the banks drop down into dust” (160). When Swinburne was old, a visitor compared him to “the ashy grey silkworm” (165) because of the way he ate or because of the way he woke from his afternoon nap. 

“It had grown uncommonly sultry and dark when at midday, after resting on the beach, I climbed to Dunwich Heath, which lies forlorn above the sea,” the seventh chapter begins (169). As Sebald turns inland, so do his thoughts, and he considers the destruction of “the dense forests that extended over the entire British Isles after the last Ice Age” (169). Similar destruction is taking place now, the narrator continues, in Borneo or the Amazon. In Europe, the trees were cut down for construction and shipbuilding, and to make charcoal, which was required to make iron. “Our spread over the earth was fuelled by reducing the higher species of vegetation to charcoal, by incessantly burning whatever would burn,” the narrator continues:

From the first smouldering taper to the elegant lanterns whose light reverberated around eighteenth-century courtyards and from the mild radiance of these lanterns to the unearthly glow of the sodium lamps that line the Belgian motorways, it has been all combustion. Combustion is the hidden principle behind every artefact we create. The making of a fish-hook, manufacture of a china cup, or production of a television programme, all depend on the same process of combustion. Like our bodies and like our desires, the machines we have devised are possessed of a heart which is slowly reduced to embers. (170)

Human civilization “has been no more than a strange luminescence growing more and more intense by the hour, of which no one can say when it will begin to wane and when it will fade away” (170). The narrator discusses both deliberate fires and accidental ones—wild fires that consume forests—suggesting this passage is both a description of a fundamental truth of our civilization, a depiction of its excesses, and, perhaps, a kind of apocalyptic vision.

Sebald gets lost crossing Dunwich Heath, and geographical confusion becomes temporal: “to my astonishment, not to say horror, I found myself back again at the same tangled thicket from which I had emerged about an hour before, or, as it now seemed to me, in some distant past” (171). He begins to panic; his surroundings “became oppressive and unnerving” (172). Suddenly he finds himself under an oak tree in a country lane, not sure how he got there, and, he states, “the horizon was spinning all around as if I had jumped off a merry-go-round” (172). Months later he dreams about Dunwich Heath, a dream which combines that dreary place with “a little Chinese pavilion” like the one in the yew maze at Somerleyton, and he knew, “with absolute certainty,” that the pattern of the maze “represented a cross section of my brain” (173). Beyond the maze, night fell. “I saw that, to the south, entire headlands had broken off the coast and sunk beneath the waves,” and “a battery of searchlights” reminded him of the War (174). Below the cliff were the shattered ruins of a house, and “a solitary old man with a wild mane of hair was kneeling beside his dead daughter” (174). This dream, or nightmare, combines almost everything Sebald has written about so far in his text.

Sebald reaches the village of Middleton, where he visits the writer Michael Hamburger. Like Sebald, Hamburger was born in Germany and emigrated to England—although he came in 1933, rather than 1966. “How little there has remained in me of my native country,” Hamburger writes in his memoirs (177). During a return visit to Berlin in 1947, Hamburger “came upon a cleared site where the bricks retrieved from the ruins had been stacked in long, precise rows, ten by ten by ten, a thousand to every stacked cube, or rather nine hundred and ninety-nine, since the thousandth brick in every pile was stood upright on top, be it as a token of expiation or to facilitate the counting” (179). Not a soul is in sight, only the millions of bricks. It is a powerful image of the aftermath of the city’s destruction. 

It is late afternoon when Sebald arrives at Hamburger’s house. They have tea. Sebald reflects on the connections between his life and Hamburger’s. In a way, he imagines that they are doubles:

The fact that I first passed through British customs thirty-three years after Michael, that I am now thinking of giving up teaching as he did, that I am bent over my writing in Norfolk and he in Suffolk, that we are both distrustful of our work and both suffer from an allergy to alcohol—none of these things are particularly strange. But why it was that on my first visit to Michael’s house I instantly felt as if I lived or had once lived there, in every respect as precisely as he does, I cannot explain. (182-83)

Sebald has a “strange feeling” in the room in which Hamburger no longer works because it is too cold, 

as if it were not he who had abandoned that place of work but I, as if the spectacles cases, letters and writing materials that had evidently lain untouched for months in the soft north light had once been my spectacles cases, my letters and my writing materials. In the porch that led to the garden, I felt again as if I or someone akin to me had long gone about his business there. (183-84)

He did not pursue these thoughts, however, “perhaps because it is not possible to pursue them without losing one’s sanity” (185). However, in Hamburger’s memoirs he learns that they both met the same man, Stanley Kerry: Hamburger in the army, and Sebald when he first arrived in England in 1966. “When I now think back to Stanley Kerry,” he states, “it seems incomprehensible that the paths of Michael’s life and mine should have intersected in the person of that extraordinarily shy man and that at the time we met him, in 1944 and 1966 respectively, we were both twenty-two” (187). Sebald’s narrator tells us, 

No matter how often I tell myself that chance happenings of this kind occur far more often than we suspect, since we all move, one after the other, along the same roads mapped out for us by our origins and our hopes, my rational mind is nonetheless unable to lay the ghosts of repetition that haunt me with ever greater frequency. . . . The physical sensation closest to this feeling of repetition, which sometimes lasts for several minutes and can be quite disconcerting, is that of the peculiar numbness brought on by a heavy loss of blood, often resulting in a temporary inability to think, to speak or to move one’s limbs, as though, without being aware of it, one had suffered a stroke. Perhaps there is in this as yet unexplained phenomenon of apparent duplication some kind of anticipation of the end, a venture into the void, a sort of disengagement, which, like a gramophone repeatedly playing the same sequence of notes, has less to do with damage to the machine itself than with an irreparable defect in its programme. (187-88)

That physical feeling, though, with its accompanying immobility, reminds me of the condition which sent Sebald to hospital a year after he walked in Suffolk. He has this feeling several times while visiting Hamburger that afternoon. Later, when Hamburger’s wife, Anne, calls a taxi for Sebald, she returns and relates a dream she had woken from after her rest: in it, Sebald had ordered a taxi for her, and as it sped through the forest, she saw everything growing in that forest “with absolute clarity and in meticulous detail impossible to put into words” (189). At the chapter ends, Sebald has his own moment of clear vision, which he finds horrifying: “by the faint light that fell from the living-room window into the well I saw, with a shudder that went to the roots of my hair, a beetle rowing across the surface of the water, from one dark shore to the other” (190). All of this is very strange, and while the image of repetition is perhaps easy to interpret (the repeated disasters and violence of human history, or the repeated movements of weavers of silk), Anne’s dream and Sebald’s horror at the sight of the beetle in the well are harder to understand. Something is definitely happening here, though, and it has nothing to do with Sebald’s walk—or, at least, the walk is the occasion for it and nothing more.

At the beginning of the eighth chapter, Sebald has returned to the Crown Hotel in Southwold (no doubt the reason for the taxi; it would seem that there were no accommodations available in Middleton). He meets a Dutchman named Cornelis de Jong there, who tells him “that many important museums, such as the Mauritshuis in The Hague or the Tate Gallery in London, were originally endowed by the sugar dynasties or were in some other way connected with the sugar trade” (194). In other words, those museums cannot be unlinked from a history of slavery and colonialism. The next morning, Sebold drives down to Woodbridge with de Jong, who is interested in buying a farm in the area. The poet Edward FitzGerald grew up nearby, at Boulge Park, and as Sebald walks around that estate, he thinks about FitzGerald’s life. The estate where he was born was destroyed by a German V-bomb in 1944. In the neglected park, the oak trees are dying, and the FitzGerald family graveyard is neglected. FitzGerald’s childhood seems to have been miserable—his nanny and tutor “tended to take out on their charges their suppressed rage at the disrespect many a time shown them by their masters” (198-99)—and it was defined by fear and boredom. The year that FitzGerald’s only finished poem, a translation of the Rubaiyat of the Persian poet Omar Khayyam, was published, his best friend, William Browne, died from injuries sustained in a hunting accident. Afterwards, FitzGerald withdrew into himself. He complained that the local landowners were cutting down trees and tearing up hedgerows. He died in 1883.

Those reflections seemed to take the entire day, or they stand in for whatever Sebald did or saw during that day’s walk, because he writes, “[t]he shadows were lengthening as I walked in from Boulge Park to Woodbridge, where I put up for the night at the Bull Inn” (207). That night, he dreams of playing dominoes with FitzGerald, although the game takes place not at the FitzGerald estate, but at a country house in Ireland where he was a guest of the eccentric owners some years before. It is the only place in the area where he can stay during what seems to have been a walking holiday. The room he is given is dusty; the walls have “traces of whitewash with bluish streaks like the skin of a dying body” (210), and he is given an army cot to sleep on. “Whenever I rested on that bed over the next few days,” he recalls, “my consciousness began to dissolve at the edges, so that at times I could hardly have said how I had got there or indeed where I was. Repeatedly I felt as if I were lying in a traumatic fever in some kind of field hospital” (210). One night his hosts show home movies of the estate during better days, and then Mrs. Ashbury, the head of the family, tells Sebald stories she had heard from her husband about the Irish Civil War, in which the rebels burned estates as a way to drive out the landowners. After the Second World War, with no income and no prospect of selling the estate, the Ashburys and their house deteriorated together. This story leaves Sebald with the sense that it was “an unspoken invitation to stay there with them and share in a life that was becoming more innocent with every day that passed” (220). Years later, Sebald thinks that he sees the daughter, Catherine, in Berlin, onstage, performing in a play by Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz. “Be still, my heart,” Sebald’s narrator concludes. “The tranquil evening will draw its mantle over our ailing senses. . . .” (222). 

Walking from Woodbridge to Orford, Sebald thinks about the way that estates used to be used almost exclusively for hunting. Animals and birds were killed in such numbers that an estate’s management “was thus governed by considerations of what was necessary to maintain and increase the stocks of game” (223). Thousands of pheasants were raised in pens and then let loose later into hunting preserves. “There were times when six thousand pheasants were gunned down in a single day, not to mention the other fowl, hares and rabbits” at just one estate, Sudbourne Hall (223). In addition, the coastal towns became holiday destinations, particularly for German tourists, and hotels and spas “mushroomed from the barren land” (225). When the First World War was declared,

the German hotel employees were sent back home, there were no more summer visitors, and one morning a zeppelin like an airborne whale appeared over the coast, while across the Channel train after train with troops and equipment rolled to the front, whole tracts of land were ploughed up by mortar fire, and the death strip between the front lines was strewn with phosphorescent corpses. (226)

Like herrings, here human dead phosphoresce as well. After the war, the hunting estates declined and either were left to fall down or were sold off for other purposes, “as boys’ homes, approved schools, insane asylums, old people’s homes, or reception camps for refugees from the Third Reich” (227). One estate became the location of the research team that developed radar. “To this day,” Sebald’s narrator continues,

the area between Woodbridge and the sea remains full of military installations. Time and again, as one walks across the wide plains, one passes barracks, gateways and fenced-off areas where, behind thin plantations of Scots pines, weapons are concealed in camouflaged hangars and grass-covered bunkers, the weapons with which, if an emergency should arise, whole countries and continents can be transformed into smoking heaps of stone and ash in no time. (227-28)

It’s fitting, then, that not far from Orford, the sky darkens and a wind blows dust “across the arid land in sinister spirals” (228). He can see nothing “for what must have been an hour” (229). When the storm lifts, he tells us, “I crawled out of the hollow that had formed around me like the last survivor of a caravan that had come to grief in the desert” (229).

Orford is home to more military installations; the looming threat of conflict and death follows Sebald everywhere. There are seven martello towers on the coast between Felixstowe and Orford, defensive works built after Napoleon threatened to invade Britain. Radar was developed nearby. And there are rumours of “a horrifying incident in Shingle Street for which no government could accept public responsibility” (231): whether an accident with a biological weapon “designed to make whole regions uninhabitable,” or a malfunction with a weapon designed to make the sea boil, no one can say (231). The reason for such rumours may be that the Ministry of Defence conducted weapons research on the island of Orfordness. Those installations are now closed, and Sebald hires a local fisherman to take him across to look around. People still avoid the island, he tells Sebald, because “they couldn’t stand the god-forsaken loneliness of that outpost in the middle of nowhere” (234). On the island, Sebald’s narrator states,

The day was dull and oppressive, and there was so little breeze that not even the ears of the delicate quaking grass were nodding. It was as if I were passing through an undiscovered country, and I still remember that I felt, at the same time, both utterly liberated and deeply despondent. With each step that I took, the emptiness within and the emptiness without grew ever greater and the silence more profound. (234)

Sebald is experiencing that “god-forsaken loneliness,” it seems, which makes him think of death, that “undiscovered country.” He is “frightened almost to death” by a hare running past him: “It must have been cowering there as I approached, heart pounding as it waited, until it was almost too late to get away with its life. In that very fraction of a second when its paralysed state turned into panic and flight, its fear cut right through me” (234). There is a kind of emotional merging or transference between Sebald and the hare, which has “a curiously human expression on its face that was rigid with terror and strangely divided,” and “in its eyes, turning to look back as it fled and almost popping out of its head with fright, I see myself, become one with it” (235). It took half an hour for “the blood [to] cease its clamour in my veins,” Sebald reports (235). He stands on the bridge that leads to the former research establishment: “ahead lay nothing but destruction” (235). “From a distance, the concrete shells, shored up with stones, in which for most of my lifetime hundred of boffins had been at worked devising new weapons systems, looked (probably because of their odd conical shape) like the tumuli in which the mighty and powerful were buried in prehistoric times with all their tools and utensils, silver and gold,” he continues (235-36). Other buildings “resembled temples or pagodas” (236). “But the closer I came to these ruins,” Sebald’s narrator states,

the more any notion of a mysterious isle of the dead receded, and the more I imagined myself amidst the remains of our own civilization after its extinction in some future catastrophe. To me too, as for some latter-day stranger ignorant of the nature of our society wandering about among heaps of scrap metal and defunct machinery, the beings who had once lived and worked here were an enigma, as was the purpose of the primitive contraptions and fittings inside the bunkers, the iron rails under the ceilings, the hooks on the still partially tiled walls, the showerheads the size of plates, the ramps and the soakaways. Where and in what time I truly was that day at Orfordness I cannot say, even now as I write these words. (237)

It is as if Sebald is describing the remains of a death camp: hooks, showerheads, ramps, iron rails. Which, in a way, given the purpose of the research that was conducted there, he is. However, there is a change as he waits for the fisherman to return, as the evening sun emerges from behind the clouds and “[t]he roofs and towers of Orford showed among the tree tops, seeming to close that I could touch them. There, I thought, I was once at home. And then, through the growing dazzle of the light in my eyes, I suddenly saw, amidst the darkening colours, the sails of long-vanished windmills turning heavily in the wind” (237). He is detached from the present, adrift in memories of a time before he was born.

At the start of chapter nine, Sebald takes a bus to Yoxford, where he begins to walk northwest along an old Roman road. He walks through a deserted land for four hours, and states, “I knew then as little as I know now whether walking in this solitary way was more of a pleasure or a pain” (241). He arrives at the lane that leads to Chestnut Tree Farm, “an ancient moated house, where Thomas Abrams has been working on a model of the Temple of Jerusalem for a good twenty years” (242). He has a long conversation with Abrams, who drives him to Harleston, where he is staying at an inn called the Saracen’s Head. The next morning he walks east into an area that the locals call The Saints because each village is named after the patron saints of their churches. “My own feeling, as I walked over the featureless plain, was that I might well lose my bearings in The Saints, so often was I forced to change direction or strike out across country due to the labyrinthine system of footpaths and the many places where a right of way marked on the map had been ploughed up or was now overgrown” (249-50). He relates a story about a young French nobleman, the Vicomte de Chateaubriand, a refugee, who stayed with a local clergyman during the French Revolution. The Vicomte’s life, as related in his memoirs, “unfolded against the background of the momentous upheavals of those years: the Revolution, the Reign of Terror, his own exile, the rise and fall of Napoleon, the Restoration and the July Monarchy all were part of this interminable play performed upon the world’s stage, a play which took its toll on the privileged observer no less than on the nameless masses” (256). He recounts the Vicomte’s description of battles, and concludes, “such colourful accounts of military spectacles and large-scale operations form what might be called the highlights of history which staggers blindly from one disaster to the next” (256). 

Sebald continues walking, from Ilketshall St. Margaret to Bungay. He pauses in the churchyard at Ditchingham, “the very last stop on my walk through the county of Suffolk” (261). He decides to walk to a pub where he would be able to phone home to be picked up. He considers the park at Ditchingham, which would have been laid out about the time the Vicomte was staying in the area. Most of the trees that were planted then have since disappeared: the elms due to Dutch elm disease, which became endemic in the area in the late 1970s. The crowns of the ash trees and the oak trees are also thinning, and the beeches were suffering from drought. All the poplars had died. And the 1987 hurricane had destroyed an estimated 14 million mature hardwood trees in one night. He recalls his own experience of that storm and its aftermath: without trees in which to roost, the birds disappear, and instead of the dawn chorus and the occasional nightingale in the evenings, “there was now not a living sound” (268).

The final chapter returns to Thomas Browne and his strange book Musaeum Clausum or Bibliotheca Abscondita, an imaginary catalogue of objects and antiquities and works of art. Among the objects included are “a number of pieces delineating the worst inhumanities in tortures for the observer” (273) and a cane that was used by two Persian friars to smuggle the first eggs of the silkworm out of China and into the West. The remainder of the chapter is a history of the production of silk from ancient times. He notes that “a great number of people, at least in some places, spent their lives with their wretched bodies strapped to looms made of wooden frames and rails, hung with weights, and reminiscent of instruments of torture or cages” (282). Not surprisingly, weavers suffered from melancholy, and their eyesight suffered from looking at the complex patterns they were creating. “On the other hand,” Sebald’s narrator continues, “we should also bear in mind that many of the materials produced in the factories of Norwich in the decades before the Industrial Revolution began . . . were of a truly fabulous variety, and of an iridescent, quite indescribable beauty as if they had been produced by nature itself, like the plumage of birds” (283). One of the master dyers in Germany was Sebald’s namesake, a man named Seybolt—but that’s not the reason for his interest in silk. He watches a documentary about silk production in the Third Reich, a material that would be important “in the dawning era of aerial warfare,” since parachutes were then made of silk (293). Finally, Sebald tells us that he completed writing this book on 13 April 1995. What else happened on that day in history? Among other events, the Amritsar massacre took place in 1919; the war in Europe was drawing to an end in 1945; and it was also the exact day when his father-in-law died. “Now, as I write, and think more about our history, which is but a long account of calamities,” he states, “it occurs to me that at one time the only acceptable expression of profound grief, for ladies of the upper classes, was to wear heavy robes of black silk taffeta or black crêpe de chine” (295-96). I think that might be the reason that silk runs through this book: its importance as mourning wear. But also, Thomas Browne, the son of a silk merchant, noted that it was customary to “drape black mourning ribbons” (presumably made of silk) “over all the mirrors and all canvasses depicting landscapes or people or fruits of the field, so that the soul, as it left the body, would not be distracted on its final journey, either by a reflection of itself or by a last glimpse of the land now being lost for ever” (296). Those are the book’s last words. They are, if not hopeful, at least an expression of the earth’s beauty, which is lost to us when we die. That, I think, is as positive as Sebald gets.

So, The Rings of Saturn is about a walk, yes, but that walk is an opportunity for a meditation on death and destruction—both the result of human agency, and the result of natural forces. It’s many other things as well. If I were to read this book again (and no doubt I will), I would perhaps find other things happening in it. I might, for instance, track every single mention of silk, silkworms, or mulberry trees. I might follow up on the discussions of Borges and Sir Thomas Brown and Edward FitzGerald and Algernon Swinburne. There is so much happening in this strange text, so many layers and levels through which it can be approached. And that can only be a good thing, from my perspective.

This is also the last book on walking that I’ll be writing about, at least for a while. I need to move on to other topics, other areas of my reading list. That’s unfortunate, in a way, because I discover new books about walking almost every day. But it’s time to learn about other things.

Works Cited

Sebald, W.G. Austerlitz, translated by Anthea Bell, Vintage, 2002.

——. The Emigrants, translated by Michael Hulse, New Directions, 1997.

——. The Rings of Saturn, translated by Michael Hulse, New Directions, 1999.

Smith, Phil. On Walking . . . and Stalking Sebald: A Guide to Going Beyond Wandering Around Looking At Stuff, Triarchy, 2014.