Whithorn Way, Day Three

This morning, we put on our wet boots for another day of walking. There are two schools of thought here regarding wet boots: does one wear dry socks and risk getting them wet, ending up with two pairs of wet socks, or does one wear damp socks and keep the dry pair for a better day? I’m of the faction that prefers to save dry socks for later, but looking at my pruny feet, I might have to change my ways. Perhaps dry socks in wet boots is the way to go.

Those pruny feet are, not surprisingly, blistered, and I hobbled the last few kilometres into New Luce today. It’s a lovely village, but the pub is closed for renovations and our kind hosts don’t normally do suppers (without lots of advance notice). Luckily we have some food, including a can of soup donated by our hosts. Supper is covered, then, but breakfast is not. We will have to walk to the next town on empty stomachs. It’s not far–just over five miles.

It was a lovely walk here. We didn’t get lost–we couldn’t, since we followed the same road past sheep and cattle farms all day. And wind farms–several of those. We also figured out how to use the OS map references on our directions to identify where we were. Matthew even has a compass, which is invaluable.

The threatening rain held off until just after we stopped for a midday snack–a full Scottish breakfast leaves little room for lunch–and then it started to pour. This time I was smart and put my camera–which slowly came back to life over the morning–away. Eventually the sun came out. I stopped to take off my boots and socks, wondering aloud if I ought to put on a dry pair. Hardly had the words “dry socks” left my mouth than it began to rain again. It rained on and off for the rest of the day. It’s raining now.

We’re safely under a roof, though, and resting after our walk. Soon we’ll think about supper. Until then, it’s time for a nap.

Whithorn Way, Day Two

It started raining as we left the B&B. We had eaten enough to satisfy Robert the Bruce’s army at breakfast. In the town centre, we ran across the landlord from the Maybole Arms with Loki, and they posed for a photo.

Our B&B hosts had said it was a mile to Crossraguel Abbey. It was longer, a plod alongside a busy highway. The Abbey is closed for restoration work, but Christine climbed the fence and took a look inside.

Later: We walked along a country track (paved, oddly), across a ford (shallow now, but apparently the burn can get a lot deeper), and into Kirkoswald. I stumbled on the track and hurt my knee, so when we stopped at a whiskey shop for samples, I put on a brace that I bought in Spain years ago. Then we wandered into a café for scones and coffee. When we start walking again, we’ll be heading into the countryside again. I’m going to be more careful of where I put my feet.

Later: It was a gentle rain at first, the kind that seems to stop when you put on your raincoat. Then it got steadily worse, and we slowly got used to being wet. We have directions and an OS map, but the directions are sometimes cryptic and they seem to be intended to accompany route maps which we don’t have–they were lost in the mail, apparently, or sent to the wrong address. So we got lost despite following the directions as best as we could. They often referred to places that weren’t on the OS map, which was a problem. Not even on the GPS version of the map, which at least gave us an idea of where we were. That was essential–which isn’t a surprise, I suppose.

Once, the path appeared to come to a dead end at a stone barn. After much discussion and map reading, we found the way forward: an overgrown track. That was a relief. Later, the road we were following ended in a barley field. We were lost. We knew where we were–in a barley field next to an industrial park that was on the OS map. But where was our path? We thought it might be best to walk along the edge of the field. That led us to a ditch filled with brambles and nettles. I could hear the highway on the other side of the ditch, and tried to find a way through. It was impossible: on the other side of the steep-walked ditch there was a fence, covered in more brambles. I turned around and retraced my steps. It was starting to rain hard. By the time I got back out of the ditch I was scratched and bleeding–and soaked. We all were soaked. The barley field was a giant sponge filled with water. In hindsight, we should’ve just turned around when the road ended. But when you’re walking, every step costs something, and it’s hard to lose that effort–the sunk cost fallacy in action, I suppose.

Finally we found our way out and discovered we were close to where we were supposed to be–the Ayrshire Coastal Path, which essentially means the seashore, never mind the terrain or the tides. We had several miles to go and we were wet and exhausted, and without an address, we couldn’t call a cab. So we kept walking. My camera didn’t like getting so wet–it started giving strange error messages–so I put it away. Just as well–it was raining too hard for photography.

Now we’re in a pub in Girvan. My legs and hands are singing from the nettles, but it seems to have stopped raining and our B&B is close by. I’m looking forward to getting out of my wet clothes–although I’m going to be getting back into them again in the morning, unless the airing cupboard works some kind of magic. Even if it does, there’s a good chance of rain tomorrow.

Whithorn Way, Day One

We’re on the train to Ayr from Glasgow, where we’ll begin our walk on the Whithorn Way, an approximation of an old pilgrimage path to Whithorn, where the relics of St. Ninian, the first Christian missionary to Scotland, are located. Many medieval pilgrims, or at least pre-Reformation ones, including Mary, Queen of Scots, made their way to Whithorn for spiritual reasons. I’m just interested in walking in Scotland.

The Whithorn Way isn’t marked, although some of the paths it follows are, and despite our instructions I anticipate wrong turnings. We have OS maps which ought to help. And Google Maps, too–depending on reception.

I neglected to charge my camera, unfortunately. At least I can take photos with my phone. Christine is still jet lagged and hasn’t slept in days. She’s having a nap now as the train speeds towards Ayr.

John Henderson, one of the folks working to revive the Whithorn Way, drove to Glasgow from Melrose yesterday to meet us and explain logistics as well as the history of this path. His explanation of OS map references is going to come in handy.

Later: We’ve stopped for lunch beside the Irish Sea. It smells like kelp and salt. There’s a holiday camp behind us, and a dog came to visit–not because he wanted our sandwiches, but because he wanted someone to throw his slobbery ball. We’re about to set off to climb the Heads of Ayr. Wish us luck.

Later: We didn’t climb the Heads of Ayr. We missed a way marker, or the way marker was missing, and we ended up walking along the beach beneath, over boulders and through deep sand. I hadn’t realized how slippery deep drifts of kelp on the shore would be. How could I know? I live thousands of miles from the ocean. Had the tide been in, though, we wouldn’t have been able to make our way through.

Eventually we found the trail again, which led us into a cow pasture. I noted how many wildflowers here have been introduced in Canada–silverweed and thistles and sow thistle–but also how many plants are completely unknown to me. The way out took us back down to the sea again. But we could see the village of Dunure in the distance, where we are supposed to head inland.

We are in the tea shop in Dunure now, deciding whether to call a taxi to Maybole, where we’re staying, or keep walking. My phone says we’ve already walked as far as we had planned, although we did get lost a couple of times and we wandered around in the Robert Burns museum for a while.

I think the decision is to take a taxi. Just as well: it was a very hard walk today, and we have more walking tomorrow.

My camera, surprisingly, still has a little juice left–but I will have to charge it tonight.

Irn Brus are finished; time to move along–in a taxi.

Later: Our B&B is in a Charles Rennie McIntosh-designed Arts and Crafts-style home, and the town boasts a pub and a restaurant–hopefully side-by-side. Today’s walking is more or less finished; tomorrow’s is the work of another day.

Still later: We had stout at the Maybole Arms, where the landlord kindly let us bring in fish and chips from the chippy across the road (his kitchen was closed) and gave us treats to give to his handsome dog, Loki. Then back to our lodgings for wine and fantastic British cheese as a dessert. Now it’s time to turn in; the full Scottish breakfast at eight o’clock requires a good night’s sleep before it can be faced with courage and appetite.

Walking to Maynooth

When I was accepted into the Sacred Journeys conference in Maynooth, Ireland, I thought I might walk there from Dublin. My paper is on walking pilgrimages, so it seemed appropriate. Here I am, then, on the Royal Canal towpath, resting and enjoying the breeze. Maybe I’ll walk away my jet lag.

I slept in a little, still jet lagged, and left later than I had planned. I had a little trouble finding the way to the trail, which runs along the old towpath, too. So I can’t say if I’m past the halfway point or not. It doesn’t matter; one foot after another, and I’ll get there. Eventually.

This isn’t nonfunctional walking, since I have a goal, but in a way it is. The railway line is on the other side of the canal, and periodically a passing train reminds me that there are saner ways to get where I’m going. But then I wouldn’t get to know anything about the space I’m travelling through.

According to the visual and olfactory evidence, the Bin the Poo campaign is not working, despite the hefty fines involved (€150).

I stopped to chat with a cyclist this morning, and later I walked with two retired fellows for an hour or two. They filled me in on the weather here (today’s humidity is unusual) and the popularity of Gaelic football (more popular than soccer). They walk the path regularly. It’s one of their hobbies, I suppose.

Too bad there’s no pub nearby, because it’s lunchtime and I have no food (a terrible oversight). I might not find one until I get to Maynooth. That will make this walk difficult, even unpleasant. Translation: I’m hungry.

The sun is coming out. It’s turning into a lovely day.

Later: I found a pub in Leixlip, happily. Food and cold drink are coming my way. Still a way to go, and a wiser man would swallow his pride and take the train.

Later: About two kilometres back an old fellow told me that it was three more miles to Maynooth. I would guess I have another three kilometres to go. My feet are tired and blistered, but I expected that. I hope it’s not too far from the town centre to the university, where I’m staying.

Later: I made it. Now to find the campus. That can’t be too hard.

What strikes me about today’s walk? Wild poppies. The herons I surprised–two of them. The odd skunk smell along the path occasionally (are there skunks in Ireland?) Reminders of home: magpies, mallards, fireweed. The quiet water in the canal: lily pads and other water plants, a pair of swans with their babies. The friendly, grinning pit bull who squeezed through my legs as his human companion laughed. I’m sure I could come up with more. It was a grand day, as they say here.

Walking to the Glenbow

Yesterday, I played hooky from the conference I’m attending at the University of Calgary and walked downtown. It wasn’t a drift–I had Google Maps open on my phone, trying to find my way through a snarl of highways and suburban streets–nor was it nonfunctional walking, because I had a goal in mind: the Nick Cave show at the Glenbow Museum. The show–all of the work on display, including the new Kent Monkman installation–was great. So was my dinner at a tapas place on 17th Avenue SW. So was my walk: the first time I’ve been able to stretch my legs this year (I’ve spent an unhealthy amount of time at my desk, reading).

I hadn’t planned to write about the walk here. I didn’t bring my camera (my phone was occupied in giving me somewhat suspect directions) and took no notes. What do I recall of the experience now? Making a sudden shift from a down-at-heel postwar suburb (curling asphalt shingles on every house) to a prewar suburb, just by turning a corner–along with the smaller houses (no bungalows), one sidewalk slab was marked with the contractor’s name and the date: 1931. Poplar fluff drifting from an unseen tree, hidden by an apartment building. The smell of barbecues in Beltline, possibly a Friday night tradition in this city. An odd level crossing allowing pedestrians and cyclists on a recreational path to safely cross the CP line. And this strange assemblage on a telephone pole. Is it art or a sign for technicians who might be called upon to make future repairs? I can’t tell.

It was close to an epic or heroic walk–solo and longish–which I have discovered is very much out of fashion among walking artists. (“Epic” and “heroic” turn out not to be neutral descriptors but pejoratives. I can see a paper that needs to be written: “In Defence of Epic Walking.”) But then again, it wasn’t an aesthetic walk. And that’s okay.

73. Harold Cardinal and Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized As Nations

Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized As Nations (another that I read in the summer course I took last summer) is exceedingly important, because it explores the oral tradition surrounding the treaties in Saskatchewan through the words of contemporary Elders (contemporary 20 years ago, that is). That work is vital, given the differing interpretations of the treaties one sees in other writers. It was initially intended as a companion book to. Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties, by Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank Tough. The books are very different, though, and for some reason were published by two separate university presses—not that it matters. It’s clear while Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan was intended as an Indigenous perspective on the treaties, while Bounty and Benevolence was to be a standard documentary history. In my opinion, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan has aged better; Bounty and Benevolence (is the title ironic?) has been superseded by Sheldon Krasowski’s No Surrender: The Land Remains Indigenous.

Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized As Nations begins with an account of First Nations spiritual laws and traditions, which makes sense because, as other writers on the treaties point out, the treaties were negotiated in accordance with First Nations laws, traditions, ceremonies and protocol. “The Elders make it clear that, in their view, those who seek to understand Indian treaties must become aware of the significance of First Nations spiritual traditions, beliefs, and ceremonies underlying the treaty-making process,” write Cardinal and Hildebrandt (1). First Nations believe they were put on this land by the Creator, and that it is theirs collectively (3-5). Those beliefs and principles and protocols informed the objectives of First Nations in negotiating the treaties. First, they sought recognition and affirmation of their right to maintain their relationships with the Creator through the laws they had been given by him (6-7). They understood that both parties in the treaty “would conduct their relationships with each other in accordance with the laws, values, and principles given to each of them by the Creator” (7). In addition, because the treaties were performed through ceremonies, the promises and agreements that were made are irrevocable and inviolable, and breaking them can bring about divine retribution with grave consequences (7). The invocation of the sun, river, and grass in the treaties, according to Elder Lawrence Tobacco, was an appeal to their spirits, and that demonstrates the seriousness of the promises being made (8). 

Because the land and everything on it—animals, water, trees, plants, rocks—are sacred gifts from the Creator, they could not be sold or given away. “For that reason,” Cardinal and Hildebrandt write, “the Elders say that the sacred Earth given to the First Nations by the Creator will always be theirs” (10). (That doesn’t sound like the so-called surrender clause would’ve been something the Chiefs negotiating with the representatives of the Crown would have agreed to.) The Creator provided other gifts, including laws, values, principles, and mores (10). According to Cardinal and Hildebrandt, “it is this very special and complete relationship with the Creator that is the source of the sovereignty that their peoples possess” (11). The negotiations were spiritual ceremonies, and that needs to be remembered.

One of the core values of the Cree nation is miyo-wîcêhtowin, the principle of good relations and expanding the circle of individual and collective relationships (14). The circle is an important symbol of this principle. The term wâhkôhtowin refers to the laws governing all relations, whereas miyo-wîcêhtowin are the laws concerning good relations (14). “For the Elders, the relationships created by the treaties were founded on the doctrines of wâhkôhtowin and miyo-wîcêhtowin for they constituted the essential elements of an enduring and lasting relationship between the First Nations, the Crown, and her subjects,” write Cardinal and Hildebrandt (15). Those relationships were to consist of mutual and ongoing caring and sharing arrangements between both sides, including a sharing of the duties and responsibilities for the land, which would be shared with the newcomers so that they could make a living (15). The laws of wâhkôhtowin are applied by analogy to the treaty relationship (19). In other words, as Harold Johnson and Michael Asch argue, the treaties created a kinship relationship between First Nations and the Crown, and therefore also between First Nations and settlers, who are also “children” of the Crown, metaphorically.

Because the treaties and their promises are sacred due to the ceremonies performed during the negotiations, they cannot be changed or altered (25). However, in the focus sessions Cardinal and Hildebrandt held with Elders, “it became very clear that their view and understanding of the treaties differed significantly from the written text of the treaties. Indeed, their focus was on the ‘nature and character of the treaty relationship’ as opposed to the contents of the written treaty texts created by the Crown” (25). Again, one is reminded of Harold Johnson’s words, that the treaties were about relationships and are therefore not simply finalized documents. I was also reminded of the notion of treaties as a covenant chain that periodically must be polished. This is a very different perspective on treaties than the Western one, which sees them as finalized once they’ve been negotiated. 

Cardinal and Hildebrandt list several principles or irrevocable undertakings—their language shifts for no apparent reason—that are affirmed by the treaties, according to the Elders. First, the treaties were a joint acknowledgement of the supremacy of the Creator and the joint fidelity of both sides in the negotiations to that divine sovereignty (31). This affirmation took place through the use of the pipe and sweetgrass (31). Second, the parties agreed to maintain a peaceful relationship—again, through the use of ceremony (32). Peace refers to the kind of relationship symbolized by the laws governing relationships between cousins. The third undertaking involves creating and maintaining a perpetual family relationship based on concepts defined by principles of wâhkôhtowin or good relationships (33). Cree Elder Simon Kytwayhat uses the term kiciwamanawak to refer to the settlers who, he says, were adopted by his nation through treaty (33). One sees the source of Johnson’s ideas here, and I wonder if Kytwayhat is the Treaty Elder Johnson consulted. The fourth irrevocable undertaking was that sharing land with the settlers would guarantee a continuing right of livelihood to First Nations (36). The land was not sold or transferred to the Crown, but a promise was made to share it—and natural resources were not included, according to Treaty Elder Peter Waskahat (36). “The fundamental principles identified by the Elders constitute aspects of the treaty relationship that, in their view, are not subject to change or alteration between the parties,” write Cardinal and Hildebrandt. “The understanding of these principles are interwoven with and derive their existence from the spiritual and ceremonial fabric of First Nations societies. They provide the contextual framework for the Indian understanding of the collective and individual relationships created by treaty” (38).

Another key term in the book is witaskêwin, or living together on the land, which in the context of the treaties means sharing territory with the newcomers. Elder Danny Musqua points out that First Nations had a history of sharing territory with each other for various purposes (39). Each First Nation has its own spiritual relationship with the Creator through ceremonies and their connectedness to the land (41). “The treaties, through the spiritual ceremonies conducted during the negotiations, expanded the First Nations sovereign circle, bringing in and embracing the Crown within their sovereign circle,” write Cardinal and Hildebrandt. “The treaties, in this view, were arrangements between nations intended to recognize, respect, and acknowledge in perpetuity the sovereign character of each of the treaty parties, within the context of right conferred by the Creator to Indian nations” (41-42). The treaties are therefore nation-to-nation agreements (42). 

Despite the fact that the treaties cannot be changed, some aspects of them are open-ended, requiring flexibility and adaptability as times change. One example of an issue requiring flexibility and negotiation is resource extraction (42). That leads to another key term, pimâcihowin, the ability to make a living from the land (43). This is a complex term, because the wealth of the land is both spiritual and material, and pimâcihowin incorporates both dimensions (43). In material terms, “the treaty guarantees the continuing right of First Nations livelihood, and the continuing right of First Nations to maintain a continuing relationship to the land, and its resources constitute one of the irrevocable and unchanging elements of the treaty relationship negotiated by First Nations and the Crown,” according to Cardinal and Hildebrandt (46). In a long quotation, they cite Danny Musqua’s argument that First Nations were promised that they would be as wealthy as settlers (47). That, of course, has not happened.

In the chapter entitled tâpwêwin, which means the obligation to speak with truth and accuracy, Cardinal and Hildebrandt note that there is no “formal existing agreement” between First Nations and the Crown about the meaning and content of the treaties, and this problem needs to be resolved “if the spirit and intent of the treaty relationship is to be properly understood” (48). They refer to the written texts of the treaties as “purporting to be the official copies” (48)—the word “purporting” suggesting they have their doubts. Nevertheless, Canada still takes the position that only the written treaty documents, read literally, can be used to determine whether or not there is an existing treaty right (49). That approach precludes the use of other sources, including the First Nations understanding of the treaties, the reports and dispatches written by Treaty Commissioners, eyewitness accounts, and other related documents and correspondence (49). The Treaty Elders, however, believe that it’s most important to examine oral evidence and history, before turning to other documents and, last of all, the “so-called articles of treaty” (50). The Supreme Court of Canada has given guidelines through several decisions that reinforce the Treaty Elders’ perspective, but Canada apparently still does not follow those guidelines when litigating treaty rights (50, 52). Those guidelines, as reproduced in the text, are an important source, since they are drawn from several judgements. “The Elders’ presentations dealing with wîtaskêwin (living together on the land) and pimâcihowin (making a living) directly contradict the written texts of the treaties in Saskatchewan and past case law predicated on those written texts,” Cardinal and Hildebrandt write (57). First, Canada continues to refuse to acknowledge that First Nations were sovereign when the treaties were negotiated, and it continues to claim that the Crown has underlying sovereign title, which contradicts the First Nations position that they have original sovereign title (57). Second, Canada claims that Indian title was extinguished by the treaties, but the Treaty Elders maintain that this is not the case. In a shocking passage, Cardinal and Hildebrandt write:

At the focus sessions, when the “extinguishment clauses” of the written treaty texts were read, translated, and explained, the Elders reacted with incredulity and disbelief. They found it hard to believe that anyone, much less the Crown, could seriously believe that First Nations would ever have agreed to “extinguish” their God-given rights. (58)

Third, the Crown asserts exclusive ownership of and jurisdiction over all lands, wildlife, and resources, but the Elders maintain that First Nations retained ownership and jurisdiction, except for those portions of land required for agriculture—and then only to the depth of a plough blade (58). The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996) made suggestions about resolving these issues, but Canada has not implemented them (58). These disagreements don’t mean that the treaties are invalid, however; the written texts and the oral history both indicate that substantive agreements were reached (58-59). “For the Elders,” Cardinal and Hildebrandt conclude, “what is at issue is not whether or not treaties exist, but whether a mutually acceptable record of them can now be agreed upon and implemented” (59).

Next, the authors discuss livelihood in more detail. They argue that the treaties state that First Nations livelihood was not to be affected, and that freedom, independence, and economic self-sufficiency were the goals the First Nations negotiators sought to achieve (61). The Treaty Elders interviewed in the book were very clear about what the treaties do not mean in this regard. They were not a blanket transfer of First Nations lands and resources to the Crown (62). They were land-sharing arrangements for agricultural purposes only (63). Natural resources were not to be shared, and neither were water resources, fish, wildlife, or waterfowl (64). In addition, as far as Treaty 4 is concerned, the transfer of Rupert’s Land to the Crown is an outstanding issue that was not resolved during the negotiations and needs to be addressed. The authors provide a long quotation from Danny Musqua on that land transfer, in which he rejects the Crown’s claim to sovereignty (65-66). “[T]he sharing arrangements, as envisioned by the Elders, were to be fair to each of the parties, intended to enable the parties to jointly share in the prosperity of the prosperity of the land—not drive the First Nations to destitution,” Cardinal and Hildebrandt write (66).

That chapter, the penultimate in the book, is also the strongest, where the evidence from the Treaty Elders matches the argument most successfully. In fact, the book gets better with each successive chapter, until the conclusion, which is surprisingly quite weak, merely repeating what has already been said. “It has not been possible to include all the conceptual issues raised by the Elders during this process,” the authors write, without explaining what those issues were or why they could not be included (71). Nevertheless, this is, as I said at the outset, an important book, despite its flaws, because it gives a sense of what the oral history of the Saskatchewan treaties looks like. I was surprised to learn of the insistence of the Treaty Elders that the land was to be shared only to the depth of a plough blade, and that no natural resources were to be included in the treaties. I am sure that our provincial government would strongly disagree with that perspective. I was also surprised to learn that water resources were not included, either. I wonder what this province would look like now if the treaties had been implemented the way they are understood by the Treaty Elders. It would be a very different place, no doubt, and the horrors of residential schools and deliberate starvation would not be on our consciences.

In addition, the current consensus is clear: the importance of oral history, the emphasis on sharing the land rather than transferring it outright, the lack of consensus on what the treaties actually mean. I wonder is Asch’s optimism is warranted, given the gulf that divides First Nations and Canada on what the treaties mean, and I wonder if Canada will ever begin to attempt to resolve that issue. I have no doubt, though, that Tom Flanagan’s take on the treaties (as reported by Asch) is very much an outlier, at least in the academic literature on the subject, although I think many settlers would agree with his complaints. I remember reading reviews of Flanagan’s First Nations, Second Thoughts when it came out, and I wonder why a book that ignores the historical record got so much attention. Perhaps because it told some Canadians the kinds of things they wanted to hear? Certainly Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan could not be accused of that.

Works Cited

Asch, Michael. On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada, University of Toronto Press, 2014.

Cardinal, Harold and Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized As Nations, University of Calgary Press, 2000.

Johnson, Harold. Two Families: Treaties and Government, Purich, 2007.

Krasowski, Sheldon. No Surrender: The Land Remains Indigenous, University of Regina Press, 2019.

Ray, Arthur J., Jim Miller, and Frank Tough. Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties. McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000.

72. David Pinder, “Arts of Urban Exploration”

I don’t recall where I learned about David Pinder’s essay “Arts of Urban Exploration”—perhaps in Tina Richardson’s anthology on contemporary British psychogeography, or maybe in Phil Smith’s book Walking’s New Movements. Sometimes a long time elapses between reading about (and printing) an article and actually getting down to reading it. Without knowing the context that explains why I thought the article might be worthwhile, it’s hard to know what my expectations might have been or why I thought it might be interesting. I need to find a better way of keeping track of these things, perhaps by improving my note-taking, because I can foresee this happening a lot. If anyone out there has any ideas, let me know.

Anyway, Pinder’s essay is an introduction to a special journal issue on “the arts of urban exploration” (387). He begins with a 2003 event on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, a musical march of sorts, described by the organizers as “a tour, a sound riot, a parade, a junk band, a detritus band” (qtd. 383). The police were disturbed, and passersby bemused; when the group wheels noise- and fire-making “contraptions” into the site of their parade, the police move in; the parade crosses over into Brooklyn, “taking its noisy party spirit with it” (385). That event was created by a Brooklyn artist collective, Toyshop, which is centred on a street artist named Swoon; “the group . . . is concerned with public space and its democratization through what it calls ‘creative forms of productive mischief,’” Pinder writes (385). “The activities of Swoon and Toyshop signal some of the themes at the heart of this essay,” he writes:

My concern is with how artists and cultural practitioners have recently been using forms of urban exploration as a means of engaging with, and intervening in, cities. The papers sets this within the wider context of critical approaches to urban space which take it seriously as a sensuous realm that is imagined, lived, performed and contested. It argues that experimental arts and modes of exploration can play a vital role in the development of critical approaches to the geographies of cities, where they may challenge norms about how urban space is framed and represented, and where they may help to open up other possibilities. (385)

Toyshop’s intervention was part of a 2003 event in New York called Psy-geo-conflux, which “brought together artists, cultural workers, activists and urban adventurers from North America and Europe under the banner of ‘psychogeography’” (385-86). That event, he continues, 

can be seen as part of a developing concern within academic, artistic and activist circles with exploring critically the cultural geographies of cities. This includes practices of studying, representing and telling stories about cities; it also involves ways of sensing, feeling and experiencing their spaces differently, and with contesting ‘proper’ orderings of space to allow something ‘other’ to emerge. Characterizing this experimentation within academia is not only interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity, in recognition that understanding cities necessarily requires diverse perspectives and cannot be the province of one discipline alone. Also important is a growing dialogue and interconnection between academia, artists, cultural workers and activists, and between critical and creative practices. The search for tactics, spatial practices and modes of expression with which to explore urban culture is leading to an increasing turn to work traditionally associated with the creative and performing arts and with the inventiveness of activist groups, and now permeating all sorts of critical endeavour. (386-87)

This exchange between academic theory and creative practice owes a debt to the writing of Walter Benjamin, Michel de Certeau, Henri Lefebvre, the Surrealists and the Situationists, and “the long histories of attempts to transgress boundaries between art and everyday space, to explore the street and public realm through artistic practice” (387). However, Pinder is particularly interested in “the current revival of interest in urban psychogeography in relation to its political dimensions,” and intends “to focus on two main themes”: “assertions of ‘rights to the city’ and forms of ‘writing the city’” (387).

The term “urban exploration” has politically charged connotations, Pinder acknowledges:

it is associated with voyages of discovery and the construction of geographical knowledge, but it also has a disturbing history in terms of the power relations through which it has been conducted. Of particular concern are the colonial discourses and power structures that have framed much venturing into cities in both past and present. This is in terms not only of colonizers discovering and “taming” distant lands and peoples, but also of intrepid social explorers and reformers seeking to shed light on the “dark” and “undiscovered” urban geographies in the heart of exploration. (388)

At first, I thought Pinder’s use of the term “colonial” was metaphorical, but he means it seriously, even though some of his examples such as the 19th century “the language of imperial exploration” that was used in relation to places like London’s East End, which ended up being described “as part of ‘darkest England’ and its inhabitants as an ‘exotic race apart,’ in ways that had powerful material effects for mappings and constructions of the city and for projects of colonization and civilization,” are also rhetorical (388). But those linguistic constructions have power and generate nondiscursive effects. “The power of such scripting in the production of imaginative urban geographies remains evident in the colonial present,” Pinder notes, and it continues elsewhere, such as “in presentations of urban ‘pioneers’ exploring prospects in the ‘Wild West’ and on the ‘frontiers’ of the inner city” (388). This irruption of the colonial into walking practices is a problem for my own walking in Saskatchewan, where “colonial” is definitely not a metaphor, and I need to find ways to address it.

Nevertheless, the term “exploration” can be appropriated for other ends; example of the radical geographer Bill Bunge, who set out to turn around “the capitalist and colonialist language of exploration during the late 1960s and early 1970s” in “expeditions” in Detroit and Toronto, in which “he showed how progressive forms of exploring urban areas could be developed in collaboration with urban residents” (388). “These expeditionary practices brought into focus the daily problems, inequalities and structural conditions affecting the lives of residents,” Pinder states (388). Bunge’s techniques included “community mapping that addressed spaces of violence and safety, of poverty and wealth, and of starvation and abundance. This was a practice of exploration based on an ‘intimate sensing’ in contradistinction to abstract ways of knowing then promoted by advocates of spatial science” (388). Another radical tradition of urban exploration is found within the Situationist International and psychogeography, “which was from the beginning a highly politicized endeavour, one that was committed not only to studying urbanism and socio-spatial relations but also to changing them” (388). The Situationists, of course, used dérives or drifts as a way of exploring cities on foot, drawing on earlier avant-garde practices, especially those of the Dadaists and Surrealists (388). Psychogeography 

combined playful-constructive behaviour with a conscious and politically driven analysis of urban ambiences and the relationships between cities and behaviour. But they also sought out a better city, one that was more intense, more open and more liberating. This led to reimaginings and remappings of urban space, where cities were mapped according to paths, movements, desires and senses of ambience. (389)

The Situationists’ activities have been important in the recent interest in critical urban exploration (389):

As a mode of exploration, psychogeography has typically had a marginal and underground air, not least through its focus on the hidden, forgotten and obscure. Its basis lies in the settings and practices of the streets, in their fragments, everyday materials and detritus. Yet if psychogeographical explorations retain associations of the marginal and even illicit, their significance for developing critical understandings of cities has been increasingly recognized. (389)

Pinder contends that there has been an surge of interest in other artistic practices engaging with urban space related to psychogeography as well (389)—and I think he might be including the work of Toyshop in that category: 

Psychogeographical practices of exploration are additionally feeding into, and resonating with, wider current concerns with rethinking cities and urban space. The attention to mood, ambience and the possibilities of the urban are proving conducive for those seeking to develop critical understandings of urban experience and life. (390)

Theoretical influences on these practices include Doreen Massey and the importance she gives in For Space to “the potential surprise of space and to the encounter with the unforeseen, arguing for an understanding of the spatial that resists closure and stasis. It is an approach that emphasizes dynamic simultaneity, where space is in process and incomplete, where it eludes final determination and representation” (390). I was happy to read that capsule summary of Massey’s book, and I realize, once again, that I will need to read For Space a second time.

A broad range of activities took place during the Psy-geo-confluxes event: activities that “sought to divert or subvert routinized spatial practices” and encouraged interactions with strangers (390-91). Other activities tried to investigate “the urban everyday, and to sense urban moods and ambiences,” by listening to the city and its multiple stories and memories, “and finding means of responding to or recounting the tales” (392). These practices didn’t only consider “meanings as currently understood” but also questioned those meanings through games, walks, events that encouraged participants to adopt different routes “or sought to defamiliarize routine paths and practices” (395). Most of the activities “involved immersion in the city specifically through walking,” in keeping with other forms of urban exploring and psychogeogrpahy (396). However, those activities set out “to displace everyday routines and habit in navigating the city” by opening walks “to chance events and encounters,” often “through instituting frameworks or rule systems for walking” (396). “Such practices to encourage dérives might recall aspects of situationist practice, and in particular Debord’s criticism of the limitations of surrealist strolls that relied on chance alone,” Pinder notes (397). 

The Situationists and their “conscious assertion of revolutionary desire in the effort to overturn dominant sociospatial relations” also “led to the assertion of what their sometime associate Henri Lefebvre later termed in 1968 ‘the right to the city,’ by which he meant the right to dwell in and to inhabit the city, the right to urban life and encounter, to the use of moments and places, to participation and socialization” (397). Much of the value of psychogeographical activities, Pinder argues, “comes from what they say about ‘rights to the city’ and practices of ‘writing the city’” (397). “To intervene through creative practice in public space today,” he continues, “is to enter into a crucial struggle over the meanings, values and potentialities of that space at a time when its democracy is highly contested. Encouragement of vitality and openness in that space is not an innocent demand” (398). Instead, it confronts “the commercialized and commodified blandness of urban space” (398). It is also “located within a tightening of surveillance measures and a hardening of the city’s surface,” in terms of increased security after 9/11 “and in relation to a landscape pitted against the already marginalized and poor” (398). “Familiar components include the proliferation of surveillance cameras and the construction of walls, embattlements and other signs to warn off and issue orders to users of space,” and “zero-tolerance” policies, moving homeless people out of public spaces (398). Related to these is the redevelopment of urban centres, which has resulted in evictions and exclusions (398). “Toyshop’s infectuously joyous Serenade and other psychogeographical explorations of cities” therefore “occupy an awkward position”: 

The games and gift economy underlying them cut against the prevailing emphasis on commercialized and controlled activity with associated demands of passivity, where the commodity is the measure of worth. From a hard-nosed political perspective, though, such activities may be easy to dismiss as irrelevant to the “real” business of political struggle, even trivial. Real estate interests can also sleep easy, with the cachet of more artistic gatherings even rubbing off on their marketing schemes. How can artists criticize and resist the remaking of public spaces by powerful interests? How can they question the complicity of the arts in socially divisive urban development programmes, where they are often used merely to add gloss to urban “renewal projects through aestheticization in the form of sculptures or individual art projects? (398)

Such questions “have been at the heart of much important critical public art over the last two decades,” and they have “led activist strands of creative practice to engage with communities and existing social struggles, to develop collaboration and dialogue with residents, and to employ different modes of address” (398). Those “activist strands” have also questioned the role of the arts in urban change and gentrification (398).

The political strategies of the psychogeographical activities Pinder has discussed are typically not overt, and they rarely involve collaborations with communities beyond “their own relatively narrow constituencies” (399). For that reason, “they are relatively detached from the kinds of day-to-day struggles of poorer local residents” (399). At the same time, however, “exploring ‘the meaning of living in a city’ at this time is crucial politically. It is not a trivial matter to find different ways of attending to the ‘quality of life’ in the city, especially when that phrase has become hijacked by authoritarian modes of policing public space . . . and used invidiously to construct public space in exclusionary ways” (399). “Nor is it insignificant to explore critically the qualities of streets, squares, parks and other aspects of the public realm in terms of how they are used, imagined and lived,” Pinder continues. “Indeed, doing so is vital given the significance of these spaces for sustaining a vibrant and democratic urban culture, and for defending rights to the city. So too is provoking debate about how they might be different, better” (399). In addition, many explorative activities have become politicized through the resistance they have received—such as police harassment (399). The importance of psychogeography is the way that it “directs attention in particular to spatial practices, undercutting assumptions that public space can be understood in static terms as a ‘thing’ whose status is fixed in advance. It can open to interrogation the means through which public space is socially produced and contested” (399). What characterizes psychogeographical strategies is their “emphasis on an active engagement with urban space where importance is attached to the act itself: to creating games in the city, to experimenting with behaviour, to experiencing urban spaces directly as an actor rather than as a passive spectator” (400). Psychogeographical activities can also include “forms of play in the streets, whose presence is testament to how space remains open to the potential for surprise and encounter, and whose actions” may loosen the rules of social conduct (400). These strategies may also “raise significant questions about how hopes, dreams and desires for a different city might be drawn out from everyday moments and events” (400).

However, the difficult question “of how resulting momentary incursions and shifts in perspective can lead to longer lasting social and spatial change” is important: “Demands for right sto the city, as Lefebvre made clear, require the production of an appropriate space; this signals a limitation of psychogeographical incursions and remains an issue in need of further address” (400). “Part of the significance of psychogeography and walking practices is nevertheless the way in which they allow encounters with apparently ‘ordinary’ and ‘unimportant’ activities in the city, against the grain of powerful discourses of the urban,” Pinder writes (400). Such discourses that constitute grand narratives about the state of city life (401). “Wandering through the city and attending to such everyday practices” means operating below the threshold (to paraphrase de Certeau) of “urbanistic, planning and geographical discourses” (401). “It is from this street-level perspective that such practices open up detours and rework understandings of cities along different lines from those scripted according to the dominant terms of the ‘Concept City,’” Pinder contends (401). He asserts the importance of de Certeau’s essay “Walking in the City” as an expression of “the endless creativity of ordinary users and walkers in cities, their tactical operations and errant movements on foot,” which resemble (de Certeau argues) speech acts in which pedestrians “enunciate” spaces rather than conform to them (401). However, there are many critiques of that essay, including the suggestion that de Certeau was talking about walking in the abstract, without rooting his essay in specific examples, which led to, among other things, a neglect of “the specific identities through which people negotiate their passage in the city” (402). 

One “important outcome” of the discussion of urban exploration, Pinder writes, has been an emphasis on the ways that 

spatial practices are constrained as well as enabled by the particular identities of the explorers involved and the context with which they are engaged. The relative ease with which some explorers move through terrains is bound up with axes of power that involve complex articulations of class, gender, ‘race,’ sexuality, disability and so on. It is therefore necessary to consider how ostensibly ‘radical’ explorations may themselves depend on privileges of power. (402)

That reality “tempers some of the enthusiasm with which walking has been embraced by many critics and cultural practitioners in recent years for enabling critical analysis, discovery and thought” (402). Indeed, part of walking’s appeal “has been the way it apparently renounces the centred, the panoptic and the hierarchical” and “provides a means of engaging with urban spaces and experiences in ways that move beyond specialized arenas, whether those of art or academic institutions”—with “apparently” being the key word in that sentence (402). 

It is important to recognize that while the city “can never be known in its entirety, and that representing space is in some cases an inevitably doomed task due to its very openness,” experimenting with ways of “writing the city” is still 

vital for developing critical studies of the urban as well as this sense of its openness. “Writing” here is understood in a wide sense as involving all kinds of media, registers and modes of performance, and may include adopting different textual strategies and voices as well as modes of (counter)mapping in an effort to find forms conducive to addressing the complexities of the urban. Such experimentation is not for its own sake but in recognition of the politics as well as poetics of representation. (403)

There is much to be learned regarding the politics of the representation of the city, Pinder argues, 

from a range of current exploratory and psychogeographical practices that includes the work of contemporary artists, urban adventurers and explorers. It is not simply an issue of asking what artists can do in a narrow instrumental sense to bring about progressive urban change, but rather of opening up through such practices the potential for collaborations, interventions, reimaginings that disrupt and expand senses of both the city and the self. This necessitates working within particular contexts, and negotiating and constructing paths through what exists. It also requires inventing different ways to address “the meaning of living in a city” and associated rights, with a continual emphasis on what is possible. (404)

Those words essentially constitute Pinder’s conclusion; what follows is a discussion of the other articles in the issue of the journal, which sound promising and helpful and certainly worth reading.

In a way, Pinder’s essay is a rather general introduction that repeats things I’ve already read. What is useful about it, though, is that it is a discussion of psychogeography that doesn’t get hung up (as I tend to do) on some of its (to me) less useful aspects—its emphasis on occult or esoteric knowledge or belief, for instance. And, while Pinder is clearly focused on urban explorations, I wonder if it would be possible to read his essay against rural explorations as well. Perhaps not: there are significant differences between the way space is constituted in the country and the way it is constituted in the city. Nevertheless, it still might be worth a try. I was also surprised at the link Pinder makes between events like Toyshop’s parade and psychogeography—perhaps the range of activities that fall beneath that rubric is wider than I had thought. And, of course, Pinder’s bibliography is a rich source of further reading, as any good research essay typically is. Each thing I read is one more piece of a larger puzzle, even if I can’t immediately see where that piece fits, and so none of it—well, almost none of it—is wasted.

Work Cited

Pinder, David. “Arts of Urban Exploration,” Cultural Geographies, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 383-411.

71. Paul Kingsnorth and Dougald Hine, Uncivilisation: The Dark Mountain Manifesto

I don’t recall where I got the idea to read this short book (or booklet) as part of my project. I think Phil Smith mentioned it somewhere in passing, but my notes are not forthcoming on the question. I’d heard of the Dark Mountain Project before but knew little about it. And I’m terrified by what climate chaos is going to mean for everything living on this planet. I just looked at Facebook and there was a Guardian article in my feed telling me that the ice in Antarctica is melting even faster than the ice in the Arctic, where it’s 90 degrees and the permafrost is turning to mush (releasing more methane, a potent greenhouse gas, as it does). And meanwhile Canadians are squabbling over a tiny carbon tax. We are in big, big trouble.

Uncivilisation: The Dark Mountain Manifesto begins with an introduction to the 2014 edition written by one of its authors, Dougald Hine. (The other author is Paul Kingsnorth.) Hine notes that when the manifesto first appeared in 2009, it received a two-page lead review in the New Statesman, and started a cultural movement that the New York Times suggested was changing the European environmental debate (vii)—quite a response to what is essentially a pamphlet. “We get emails most days from readers who have found something here that resonates with their own experience,” Hine continues. “They write about hope, recognition, a sense of feeling less alone” (vii). But there are also attacks: “We have been called all sorts of things: Romantic dreamers, crazy collapsitarians, defeatists, utopians and nihilists” (vii-viii). “Putting all these different reactions alongside each other, trying to make out the pattern that they form,” Hine writes, 

what strikes me is how little it resembles a taking of sides over a recognisable argument. Something else is going on: something that reaches into murkier corners of ourselves than are generally given space on the shores of public debate. The lines of thinking that run through this manifesto are also the contours of a dark shape, an inkblot shape of our puzzlements, doubts and fears—so that, even more than is always the case with the slippery substance of language, every reading is also a veiled reflection of the reader. There are monsters here, if you look for them; there are dead ends, but there are also slender threads of possibility waiting for someone to pick them up. (viii)

Uncivilisation: The Dark Mountain Manifesto was written in 2008, just as the financial crisis began (viii-ix). At that time, Hine contends, “we found ourselves in an age where crisis has become the new normal. An age of widening extremes and darkening horizons, when outbreaks of hope spark sporadically like broken power lines across networks and onto the streets, but the future no longer holds the promise it used to” (ix). Hine and Kingsnorth tried to make sense of their own experience, and in doing so, Hine writes, 

it seems that we put words to a feeling that others shared and that has become more widespread in the years since. A feeling that there is no way through the mess in which we find ourselves that doesn’t involve facing the darkness, and being honest about the scale of the unraveling that is underway, and the uncertainty as to where it will end. A feeling that it is time to look down. (ix-x)

At the time, the co-authors were disillusioned with the state of environmentalism: “It seemed that sustainability had come to mean sustain the western way of living at all costs, regardless of whether this was possible or desirable” (x). They were also disillusioned “with the state of literature and the cultural landscape,” feeling that the books celebrated in the Sunday newspapers “were going to look irrelevant or offensive in a generation’s time, given what we already knew about where things were headed” (x). Something different was needed, they decided—and that is what this manifesto calls for.

Uncivilisation does not offer suggestions about what to do—although the succeeding Dark Mountain books provide one possible answer (xiii). Instead, Hine writes,

at the heart of this manifesto is a hunch that sometimes it is right to walk away, to withdraw, to give up on hopes that no longer ring true, even though you have no answer to the accusing questions that will follow. Sometimes retreat is the only action left that makes sense. To give up on things you have held dear—beliefs, identities, habits—is an end, but it can also be a beginning, though it makes you no promises in advance. Only the chance that, having let go, as your eyes begin to adjust to the darkness, you may catch sight of something that your bright certainties had hidden from you” (xiv)

This manifesto was their first attempt at saying something, at working out where our society is going, and they are still discovering its “fuller significance” (xiv).

The manifesto proper begins with Robinson Jeffers’s 1935 poem “Rearmament,” which ends with the lines,

The beauty of modern

Man is not in the persons but in the

Disastrous rhythm, the heavy and mobile masses, the dance of the

Dream-led masses down the dark mountain (qtd. 1)

Its first chapter, “Walking on Lava,” begins with these words: “Those who witness extreme social collapse at first hand seldom describe any deep revelation about the truths of human existence. What they do mention, if asked, is their surprise at how easy it is to die” (3). Ordinary life is fragile, and when its pattern is broken, “by civil war or natural disaster or the smaller-scale tragedies that tear at its fabric,” many of the activities in which we are habitually engaged “become impossible or meaningless, while simply meeting needs we once took for granted may occupy much of our lives” (3). War correspondents and relief workers report on the speed with which that fabric can unravel (4). Civilization is fragile—and that realization is nothing new (4). Take, for instance, Bertrand Russell’s comment about Joseph Conrad’s writing. Russell suggested that Conrad thought of civilization as “a dangerous walk on a thin crust of barely cooled lava which at any moment might break and let the unwary sink into fiery depths” (qtd 4), a quotation that lends the chapter its title. For Kingsnorth and Hine, human civilizations are fragile, as any historian can confirm; they are “built on little more than belief: belief in the rightness of its values; belief in the strength of its system of law and order; above all, perhaps, belief in its future” (5). Once those beliefs begin to crumble, “the collapse of a civilisation may become unstoppable”—and all civilizations do fall, sooner or later (5). “What remains after the fall is a wild mixture of cultural debris, confused and angry people whose certainties have betrayed them, and those forces which were always there, deeper than the foundations of the city walls: the desire to survive and the desire for meaning,” the co-authors continue (5). They believe that it’s our civilization’s turn “to experience the inrush of the savage and the unseen; our turn to be brought up short by contact with untamed reality. There is a fall coming. “ (5). 

Our story, they write, is one of a people who believed that their actions did not have consequences, of how that people “will cope with the crumbling of their own myth” (5-6). Without the myth of progress, our efforts cannot be sustained; our civilization is the optimistic Enlightenment grafted onto Western Christianity, resulting in a belief in an earthly paradise, where each generation expects to live better than the one before: “History becomes an escalator, and the only way is up” (7). The 20th century, though, “too often threatened a descent into hell, rather than the promised heaven on earth,” and even prosperous Western societies have failed to deliver: “Today’s generation are demonstrably less content, and consequently less optimistic, than those that went before” (7). “Most significantly of all, there is an underlying darkness at the root of everything we have built”—beyond the edges of our civilization, there is something it was never able to understand (8).

The second chapter, “The Severed Hand” (the title is taken from another Robinson Jeffers’s poem), begins with a discussion of the myth of progress. That myth, they write, “ is founded on the myth of nature”—a myth that claims that greatness comes without costs (10); that we have been able to attack nature and win (10). “Outside the citadels of self-congratulation, lone voices have cried out against this infantile version of the human story for centuries, but it is only in the last few decades that its inaccuracy has become laughably apparent”: we are now surrounded with evidence that our attempts to separate ourselves from nature are “proof not of our genius but our hubris” (10). “We imagined ourselves isolated from the source of our existence”—and the result is a crisis of extinction, of overexploitation of resources (10). “Even though the deadening lens of statistics, we can glimpse the violence to which our myths have driven us,” they write (11). And, looming over everything else: “runaway climate change,” which “threatens to render all human projects irrelevant” while demonstrating that we don’t understand the world in which we live, even while we are utterly dependent upon it (11). “Climate change,” they write, “brings home at last our ultimate powerlessness” (11). 

We hear about technological solutions, about our ability to manage the situation, about our need to become “more ‘sustainable’”—but built into those suggestions is the notion that that everything will be fine and that growth and progress will continue (11-12). “We do not believe that everything will be fine,” Kingsnorth and Hine write. “We are not even sure, based on current definitions of progress and improvement, that we want it to be”; that’s because “we may well be the first species capable of effectively eliminating life on earth. This is a hypothesis we seem intent on putting to the test” (12). “We are already responsible for denuding the world of much of its richness, magnificence, beauty, colour and magic, and we show no sign of slowing down,” they continue (12). We sometimes imagined there would be a Plan B, that we might live under bubbles on the moon, but there is no Plan B, and the only bubble is our civilization (12).

That civilization is based on geological foundations—coal, oil, and gas (13). Above that are industrial abbatoirs, burning forests, and wasted soil (13). Finally, on the top layer, we stand, “unaware, or uninterested, in what goes on beneath us; demanding that the authorities keep us in the manner to which we have been accustomed; occasionally feeling twinges of guilt that lead us to buy organic chickens or locally produced lettuces; yet for the most part glutted, but not sated, on the fruits of the horrors on which our lifestyles depend” (13). “We are the first generations born into a new and unprecedented age—the age of ecocide,” they write (13). “Today, humanity is up to its neck in denial about what it has built, what it has become—and what it is in for. Ecological and economic collapse unfold before us and, if we acknowledge them at all, we act as if this were a temporary problem, a technical glitch” (15). Now, they continue, “we find ourselves, all of us together, poised trembling on the edge of a change so massive that we have no way of gauging it” (15). Their questions are these:

what would happen if we looked down? Would it be as bad as we imagine? What might we see? Could it even be good for us?

We believe it is time to look down. (15)

The shape that looking down might take is the subject of the third chapter, “Uncivilisation” (16). “If we are indeed teetering on the edge of a massive change in how we live, in how human society itself is constructed, and in how we relate to the rest of the world,” Kingsnorth and Hine write, “then we were led to this point by the stories we have told ourselves—above all, by the story of civilisation” (16). That is the story of our mastery over nature and our glorious future, a story about “human centrality” (16). “What makes this story so dangerous is that, for the most part, we have forgotten that it is a story,” they continue (17). Stories have always been important as a way of approaching reality, but, “as the myth of civilisation deepened its grip on our thinking, borrowing the guise of science and reason, we began to deny the role of stories, to dismiss their power as something primitive, childish, outgrown,” and the old tales, the ones “by which generations had made sense of life’s subtleties and strangenesses,” were abandoned  (17). “Yet for all this, our world is still shaped by stories” (17); most of them are entertainment, “a distraction from daily life” (18), which cannot “make up the equipment by which we navigate reality” (18). “On the other hand,” they continue, “there are the serious stories told by economists, politicians, geneticists and corporate leaders,” which are presented as “direct accounts of how the world is,” and not as stories at all (18). 

“So we find ourselves, our ways of telling unbalanced, trapped inside a runaway narrative, headed for the worst kind of encounter with reality,” Kingsnorth and Hine argue. “In such a moment, writers, artists, poets and storytellers of all kinds have a critical role to play” (18). Now it’s time for those storytellers and artists to “bust” the last taboo: “the myth of civilization” (19). “We believe that artists . . . have a responsibility to begin the process of decoupling”—the decoupling, that is, of our position on the earth and the ecocide we are creating. “We believe that, in the age of ecocide, the last taboo must be broken—and that only artists can do it” (19). The ongoing ecocide demands a response, and that response “is too important to be left to politicians, economists, conceptual thinkers, number crunchers; too all-pervasive to be left to activists or campaigners. Artists are needed” (19). “We believe that art must look over the edge, face the world that is coming with a steady eye, and rise to the challenge of ecocide with a challenge of its own: an artistic response to the crumbling of the empires of the mind,” they write (20). They call this response “Uncivilised art,” and they are particularly interested in what they call “Uncivilised writing”: “writing which attempts to stand outside the human bubble and see us as we are: highly evolved apes with an array of talents and abilities which we are unleashing without sufficient thought, control, compassion or intelligence,” who “have constructed a sophisticated myth of their own importance with which to sustain their civilising project,” which has been “to civilise the forests, the deserts, the wild lands and the seas, to impose bonds on the minds of their own in order that they might feel nothing when the exploit their fellow creatures” (20). “Uncivilised writing offers not a non-human perspective,” they continue, “but a perspective which sees us as one strand of a web rather than as the first palanquin in a glorious procession. It offers an unblinking look at the forces among which we find ourselves” (20-21). “It sets out to paint a picture of Homo sapiens which a being from another world or, better, a being from our own . . . might recognise as something approaching a truth,” and it aims “to tug our attention away from ourselves and turn it outwards” (21). “It is writing, in short, which puts civilisation—and us—into perspective,” they write (21).

Uncivilized writing, though, is not environmental writing, or nature writing; it is “more rooted than any of these” (21). “Above all, it is determined to shift our worldview, not to feed into it,” they argue. “It is writing for outsiders. If you want to be loved, it might be best not to get involved, for the world, at least for a time, will resolutely refuse to listen” (22). They offer poet Robinson Jeffers as an example, an exemplar (22). In his work, they write, we see “[t]he shifting of emphasis from man to notman: this is the aim of Uncivilised writing” (23).This is the literary challenge of our age, and few have taken it up (23), although there are those whose writing approaches the shores of the Uncivilized, such as Wendell Berry or Cormac McCarthy or W.S. Merwin (24). Uncivilized writing, they continue, is

[h]uman, inhuman, stoic and entirely natural. Humble, questioning, suspicious of the big idea and the easy answer. Walking the boundaries and reopening old conversations. Apart but engaged, its practitioners always willing to get their hands dirty . . . that keyboards should be tapped by those with soil under their fingernails and wilderness in their heads. (25)

Kingsnorth and Hine are resolute on the need for this kind of writing and of art:

We tried ruling the world; we tried acting as God’s steward; then we tried ushering in the human revolution, the age of reason and isolation. We failed in all of it, and our failure destroyed more than we were even aware of. The time for civilisation is past. Uncivilisation, which knows its flaws because it has participated in them; which sees unflinchingly and bites down hard as it records—this is the project we must embark on now. This is the challenge for writing—for art—to meet. This is what we are here for. (25)

In the fourth chapter, “To the Foothills!” they suggest that a movement needs a starting point, and while they hope their book has “created a spark,” they need others to get involved (26). “It is time to look for new paths and new stories, ones that can lead us through the end of the world as we know it and out the other side,” they proclaim. “ We suspect that by questioning the foundations of civilisation, the myth of human centrality, our imagined isolation, we may find the beginning of such paths” (26-27). They name their project after that line from Jeffers’s poem that begins the booklet: the Dark Mountain Project (27). They intend to collect Uncivilized writing (27), although they don’t know where that will lead (28). And they cannot do anything by themselves: “Uncivilisation, like civilisation, is not something that can be created alone. Climbing the Dark Mountain cannot be a solitary exercise. We need bearers, sherpas, guides, fellow adventurers. We need to rope ourselves together for safety” (28). They end with a call for others to participate: “Come. Join us. We leave at dawn” (28).

That’s the end of the manifesto, but not of the booklet. There is an appendix which outlines “The Eight Principles of Uncivilisation”; these principles are a summary of what we’ve already read. First, “[w]e live in a time of social, economic and ecological unravelling” and our way of living “is already passing into history. We will face this reality honestly and learn how to live with it” (29). Second, they reject the faith in “solutions” (technological or political) to “problems” (29). Third, they believe the root of the crises we face “lie in the stories we have been telling ourselves,” and so they intend to challenge those stories and the myths they express (29). Fourth, they assert that storytelling is not entertainment, that it is the way “we weave reality” (29). Fifth, “Our art will begin with the attempt to step outside the human bubble” and “reengage with the non-human world’ (30). Sixth, “We will celebrate writing and art which is grounded in a sense of place and of time” (30). Seventh, “We will not lose ourselves in the elaboration of theories or ideologies. Our words will be elemental” (30). And, finally, “The end of the world as we know it is not the end of the world full stop. Together, we will find in the hope beyond hope, the paths which lead to the unknown world ahead of us” (30). This edition also includes a chronology of Dark Mountain’s activities after the manifesto was published.

In an odd way, Kingsnorth’s and Hine’s belief that something will come after our civilization is rather optimistic; it’s not a belief that, even on a lovely, sunny holiday afternoon, I find it easy to entertain. I wonder if the kind of writing they call “Uncivilised” might not be represented by the essays by Jan Zwicky and Robert Bringhurst that I wrote about here some months ago. Perhaps. I saw Jan Zwicky and Randy Lundy read their poetry last week, and the conversation afterwards quickly turned to ecological grief—and let me tell you, the participants in that panel were grieving. It was moving. I wasn’t expecting such emotion to be expressed. But I don’t know. Sometimes I feel that I don’t know anything any more—except that climate change is going to bring a lot of species to and end, and ours will likely be among them–and that somehow, that needs to be part of my project. I wish I knew how.

Works Cited

Bringhurst, Robert, and Jan Zwicky. Learning to Die: Wisdom in the Age of Climate Crisis. U of Regina P, 2018.

Kingsnorth, Paul and Dougald Hine. Uncivilisation: The Dark Mountain Manifesto, Dark Mountain Project, 2019.

70. Harold Johnson, Two Families: Treaties and Government

This summary is another adaptation of one I wrote for Dr. James Daschuk in the course on treaties I took with him last summer. And it’s more than appropriate to post this on Canada Day, because Cree writer and former lawyer Harold Johnson calls what we mean by Canada into question in Two Families: Treaties and Government. It was one of the most radical books I read last summer, and I continue to return to it, perhaps for that reason.

Johnson begins his book by introducing himself and his relations: “I am of this land,” he writes, echoing the Anishinabe Chiefs Craft discusses. “I am of this earth” (11). “I do not say that I own this land; rather, the land owns me,” he continues (13). That land holds stories, including the stories of the relationship between First Nations and settlers (12-13). “They can help us to live here in a good way if we learn to listen,” Johnson states. That is the purpose of his book: to teach settlers what they need to know if they are to live in this place—in Johnson’s perspective, the Treaty 6 lands—in a good way: to explain Cree laws and history, to explain how they are different from what settlers might have been told, to explain how the Canadian Constitution fits into Cree supreme law, and to “suggest how we might live together as two families sharing the same territory” (14). He will never suggest that settlers should go home, Johnson continues, because we “have a treaty right to be here” (14). Immediately Johnson’s perspective becomes clear: the treaties subtend Canadian law because they give settlers the right to share this land.

The key term in Johnson’s discussion is a Cree word he was given by Elders: kiciwamanawak, or “our cousins.” That is the term they told him he should use when addressing or talking about settlers. The kinship term is important. “In Cree law,” Johnson writes, “the treaties were adoptions of one nation by another” (13). That’s the reason Canadian laws are subordinate—or should be subordinate—to Cree law, in Johnson’s perspective: settlers were adopted by the Cree, and not the other way around.

Before settlers arrived, Johnson argues, “[w]e lived according to the laws of the Creator, which incidentally look a lot like the laws of ecological order” (18). It is the Creator’s laws that are superior to settlers’ legal systems. Those systems are simple compared to the laws of the Creator; a student could spend a lifetime trying to understand the questions that the phrase “All My Relations” raises (18-19). In Cree society, people are equals, and that means that Cree people and whites are also equals. “We should be living as two families in the same territory,” he states (20). He continues, giving a glimpse of what the Cree might have expected when they were negotiating Treaty 6:

When your family arrived here, Kiciwamanawak, we expected that you would join the families already here, and, in time, learn to live like us. No one thought you would try to take everything for yourselves, and that we would have to beg for leftovers. We thought we would live as before, and that you would share your technology with us. We thought that maybe, if you watched how we lived, you might learn how to live in balance in this territory. The treaties that gave your family the right to occupy this territory were also an opportunity for you to learn how to live in this territory. (20-21).

It’s worth noting that one of the Cree words for reserve, iskonigan, also means “leftover” (Wolvengrey 39). More importantly, it’s clear that, according to Johnson, settlers were supposed to adapt to Cree ways of living and laws, rather than the other way around. That, of course, did not happen, and one of the central reasons (aside from the sheer number of settlers who arrived in the 1880s and 1890s) might have been the way settlers and their government(s) have (as Johnson would argue) misunderstood the treaties.

There is no coherent theory that explains the sovereignty of the Crown in this territory, Johnson argues, unless one relies on “the out-moded doctrine that you have a right to this territory because you are superior to my family”—a doctrine that rightfully belongs to the KKK or the Aryan Nations (23). “Discovery cannot be justification for your family’s occupation of this territory,” he continues. “Your family did not discover this place. It was never lost” (23). Nor were First Nations conquered in battle. Therefore, “the only right you have to occupy this territory must come from treaty. You have a treaty right to be here,” Johnson concludes. “The only coherent theory that provides for your sovereignty that is not based on supremacist ideology is that you obtained the right to be here through negotiation and agreement” (25). Notice that Johnson is shifting between the words “occupation” and “sovereignty,” words that are not synonyms. Otherwise, “[w]e are left to assume that the Crown stole sovereignty, and that certainly is not honourable” (25). 

One of the ceremonies given to the Cree by the Creator is adoption, and for Johnson that is what happened when the treaties were negotiated. “It was in accordance with the law of adoption that my family took your ancestors as relatives,” he writes. “We solemnized the adoption with a sacred pipe. The promises that my ancestors made are forever, because they were made under the Creator’s law. This adoption ceremony is what we refer to when we talk about treaty” (27). The Cree adopted the Queen, according to Johnson, rather than the reverse (29). Of course, the implementation of the treaties did not reflect this understanding, and Cree societal structures have been damaged as a result. That is because of the difference between the written text of the treaty and the oral histories about it (41-42). “I doubt the Treaty Commissioner explained the treaty in a way that conveyed the meaning the Crown assigned to the words, ‘cede, release, surrender and yield up . . . all rights titles and privileges,’ and the limits to be placed on hunting and fishing,” Johnson argues (42). Sheldon Krasowski would agree with Johnson on this point, and in No Surrender: The Land Remains Indigenous, he goes beyond Johnson’s conjecture. On the contrary, Johnson argues, Elders who are familiar with the oral histories “dispute the written record of the treaties. . . . When the written record is compared with the oral history, it is clear that much of what my family members said to the commissioner has been omitted, and that which has been recorded has been perverted” (43). The word “perverted” suggested an intentional decision to mislead or misrepresent, which is the opposite of the conclusion J.R. Miller reaches in Compact, Contract, Covenant, or that Michael Asch comes to in On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada. The cultural arrogance of the recorder, the people who write things down, is the reason for this perversion, and it’s a problem that doesn’t exist in oral history, according to Johnson, because in oral history the historians are bound by the Creator to maintain an accurate record of what was said and done, or else they will suffer negative consequences (43-44). “The written text of the treaties has no more authority than the oral histories,” Johnson continues. “The authority assigned to the written text is a subversion of what really happened,” which was that settlers “came under our law when you came to this territory. That is simple. You abide by the laws, customs, and traditions of the people in whose territory you reside (45).

Abiding by Cree law would mean abolishing hierarchies and artificial entities like corporations (46, 47, 49). It would also mean understanding that good and evil are extremes best avoided. “Our way of being is our understanding of where we are in relation to our environment,” Johnson writes. “This understanding has many more possibilities than the extremes of good and evil” (51). It would also mean abandoning adversarial ways of thinking about the world (57), as well as the belief that settler society is superior to the Cree. “As long as you insist on your doctrine of superiority, you will be in breach of that law [the law of adoption], and you will not develop your understanding,” Johnson writes. “We want to talk to you but you will not listen” (53).

Other changes would be necessary if Johnson’s understanding of the treaty became widespread, including the abandonment of the concept of property, which is inconsistent with the treaty’s promise to share the land and its resources. “The concept of property is laid over the earth like a sheet of clear plastic: invisible, sterile, and devoid of human connection,” Johnson writes (64). It would also mean that Cree nations have sovereignty, rather than the Crown. “We did not give you control over the entire territory, nor did we abdicate our responsibility to the earth,” Johnson contends. “Under our law, we did not have the right to pass off our duty to your family, to surrender our choice, our authority” (67). Also, the responsibility for resources would have to lie with First Nations, not the province—that decision violates the treaties (68). 

Moreover, the Canadian Constitution would have to be understood as secondary to the treaties. “Your acknowledgement of the treaties as first documents will begin to put us back in balance,” Johnson writes. “When your family accepts that this country’s founding families are yours and mine, then we can begin to search for other truths” (84-85). The doctrine of sovereignty would be unneeded, because settlers “have a treaty right to occupy and use this territory,” granted through the ceremony of adoption. “Sovereignty is an old excuse to deny my family’s equality with yours. Your family has sovereignty and mine does not” (89). And the written text of the treaties? “Kiciwamanawak, my family did not adopt a piece of paper; they adopted you. The paper at tre aty was ancillary to ceremony. My ancestors recognized your paper as your ceremony and participated so as not to offend” (90). The Constitution therefore becomes secondary to the oral treaty record. “I cannot accept that your constitutional documents have any power,” Johnson writes. “I cannot talk to those papers and tell them of the plight of my family. I can only talk to you, Kiciwamanawak, and remind you that you have treaty rights” (90). In fact, the Constitution is a treaty right, according to Johnson (92). He disagrees strenuously with the Constitution’s language regarding existing Aboriginal rights. “The assumption that your family can determine the rights of my family is never clearly articulated in your constitutional documents,” he writes. “Neither have your courts ever articulated a legitimate theory. Authority is merely assumed. Kiciwamanawak, I can only suspect the reason that the theory of your domination is never clearly articulated is because your family does not have one. The old theories of discovery or conquest or emptiness no longer hold true” (103). In fact, the Constitution itself “is subservient to and dependent on the treaties for its legitimacy,” Johnson argues. “There is no other legitimate basis for your occupation and use of this territory. It is only by treaty that you have any rights here at all” (105). And so Johnson returns to his starting point: “If we return to the original intention of treaty and recognize that we are relatives, Kiciwamanawak, we should be able to walk into the future in a good way” (121).

Two Families is a powerful expression of an Indigenous perspective on the treaties. It turns the standard way of thinking about Canada upside-down. I think it is definitely is one of the sources Asch uses in his discussion of treaties. There is a logic to Johnson’s argument that is difficult to deny, if you accept his claim that the treaties were ceremonies of adoption. Aimée Craft doesn’t go that far, in her book on Treaty 1, although she would agree with Johnson that the treaty was about sharing territory rather than surrendering it. And, to be honest, I can’t help thinking that our history would be less shameful if Johnson’s ideas had been shared by Victorian Canadians. There would have been no Indian Act, no residential schools, no pass system. Nevertheless, it’s hard to imagine settlers and First Nations walking into the future “in a good way” (121), even if that’s what reconciliation actually means—although when I think about Johnson’s argument, I become ever more convinced that he’s right, and settlers are wrong.

Works Cited

Asch, Michael. On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada, University  of Toronto Press, 2014. 

Craft, Aimée. Breathing Life Into the Stone Fort Treaty: An Anishinabe Understanding of Treaty One, Purich, 2013. 

Johnson, Harold. Two Families: Treaties and Government, Purich, 2007.

Krasowski, Sheldon. No Surrender: The Land Remains Indigenous, University of Regina Press, 2019.

Wolvengrey, Arok. nêhiyawêwin: itwêwina/Cree: words, vol. 1, Cree-English, University of Regina Press, 2001.

69. Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada

I’ve been thinking about Michael Asch’s On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada for a few days now—and, more to the point, wondering if its possible to square Asch’s argument that the numbered treaties were legitimate against Sheldon Krasowski’s argument in No Surrender: The Land Remains Indigenous that, because the so-called surrender clause was not mentioned during the negotiations, those treaties are illegitimate—or at least problematic. And, before I fly off later this week, I’d like to get to 70 blog posts. So please allow me to revisit a summary of Asch’s book that I wrote as part of a course I took on treaty relationships with Dr. James Daschuk last summer. If nothing else, this post will be a test of how good these summaries are—whether they allow me to remember the gist of an argument without having to reread the source text. 

Asch’s book takes its title from a statement made by Chief Justice Antonio Lamer in the 1997 Delgamuukw decision: “Let us face it, we are all here to stay” (3). For Asch, an anthropologist, that statement poses a problem: “it is wrong legally as well as morally to move onto lands belonging to others without first obtaining their permission” (vii). But, as Asch continues, that problem leads to another:  “reconciling this principle with the fact that Canada is on lands that belong to Indigenous peoples” (vii). What might permission from those peoples entail? he asks (vii). Would those treaties allow Canada to act in compliance with the 1960 U.N. Declaration on De-Colonization, from which he derives his first principle, that it is wrong to occupy territory without asking permission first?

At first, Asch writes, he believed that the representatives of the Crown acted fraudulently in negotiating the treaties, because the government of Canada failed to implement the terms of those treaties. However, given the importance of R v. Badger and the Supreme Court’s finding in that case that the Crown, legally, must be regarded as truthful regardless of its original intent, Asch adopted that perspective (viii). He began looking at correspondences between what Indigenous authorities render as the treaty terms now, and what the treaty commissioners actually said. And, for Treaty 4, at least (his test case), Asch found that it seems that Morris meant what he said. That discovery led him to “recalibrate” his interpretation of the treaties (viii). “[T]here is at least a case to be made for the proposition that there were those who acted in good faith in the past, and thus the possibility that, while to act honourably now is to depart from how we have acted in the past, it is also to keep faith with it,” he writes (ix). Moreover, there is the problem of the purported nation-to-nation relationship between First Nations and Canada. “A relationship between equals . . . requires (at least as modernity describes it) that each party is a state with sovereignty and jurisdiction over a territory,” he writes. “Yet Indigenous authorities inform us that we did not acquire sovereignty and jurisdiction over any territory. Therefore,” he continues, “we cannot be equals, for a party that does not have sovereignty and jurisdiction in a territory cannot have the same standing as one that does” (x). Here we see the influence of Harold Johnson’s argument in Two Families: Treaties and Government that Canada did not acquire sovereignty as a result of the treaties. These are the questions Asch takes up in his book.

What authorizes the presence of settlers in this territory, aside from our numbers and our power (3)? For Asch, this question needs to be answered; otherwise, Canada is in violation of the Declaration on De-Colonization. Moreover, the question of how the Crown gained sovereignty—since Canada has made it clear that although First Nations have rights that flow from the period prior to the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, it will not accept that this situation “might call into question the final legislative authority of the Crown” (10-11)—needs to be answered. How did the Crown gain its sovereignty? How can that sovereignty be reconciled with the pre-existence of Indigenous societies, and not the other way around (11)?

Asch begins his exploration of these questions by looking into the history of Aboriginal rights in Canada, at least since the Calder decision. “[T]he courts to date have adhered to the same position as the government of Canada: Aboriginal rights, whatever their content, are subordinate to the sovereignty of Canada,” he writes. “And, to reiterate, this formulation begs the most fundamental question: If Indigenous peoples had legitimate sovereignty when Europeans first arrived, how did the Crown legitimately acquire it?” (32). Clearly, recent judicial decisions have not answered this question.

Next, Asch responds to Tom Flanagan’s 2000 book, First Nations, Second Thoughts. Flanagan argues that temporal priority—essentially, the principle of first come, first served—does not apply in Canada in terms of the Crown’s sovereignty, and Asch demonstrates that it does (38). Flanagan argues that sovereignty over Indigenous peoples has legitimated itself over time, but Asch shows that because First Nations have not accepted this sovereignty, it has not legitimated itself (38). Flanagan asserts that Europeans were more civilized than Indigenous peoples, and therefore deserved to exercise sovereignty; Asch compares this position to the Declaration on De-Colonization, and suggests that Flanagan is relying “on a discredited convention that is a holdover from the colonial era” (54). “The question, then, is not whether the principle of temporal priority applies,” Asch writes, “but what are the consequences of applying it?” (58).

Asch then turns to the question of whether Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. If not, then the Declaration on De-Colonization does not apply to Canada. He determines that yes, they do have the right of self-determination, despite the arguments of Flanagan and Alan Cairns. This fact, along with Crown sovereignty and the presence of settlers on Indigenous lands, presents Asch with a dilemma, one he believes can be solved through a focus on treaty rights.

But the treaties present another problem: there is an “extreme dissonance” (78) between the the understandings of the treaties of the two negotiating parties. For the authors of the 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, that dissonance means that there was in fact a lack of consent to the treaties, due to the cultural differences of the negotiators. “The commission suggests that the proper approach to resolving the differences is to reach a shared agreement as to the treaties’ meaning based on the assumption that both interpretations carry equal weight” (79), and this will mean considering oral evidence. Asch is following Aimée Craft’s argument in Breathing Life Into the Stone Fort Treaty: An Anishinabe Understanding of Treaty One here (although he doesn’t cite her book, probably because he wasn’t able to consult it as he was writing On Being Here To Stay since it had not yet been published). “[I]t is my view that, despite cultural differences, there is every chance that these parties could have achieved a degree of shared understanding at the time of negotiations to conclude an agreement based on mutual consent,” Asch writes. “In other words, one cannot rule out the possibility that the position advanced by one of the parties today more closely conforms to what actually transpired at the time of treaty making than does the other” (80). 

Asch’s test case is, as I’ve already mentioned, Treaty 4. After carefully examining the transcript of the negotiations in Morris’s book on the treaties he negotiated, Asch concludes that 

there is virtually nothing in the transcript that supports an interpretation of the extinguishment clause as resulting in the political subordination of the Indigenous parties to the government of Canada. Rather, it is more consistent with the evidence to conclude that the shared understanding of Treaty 4 resulted in a direct political alliance with the Queen. (90) 

He presents a complicated—some might say tortured—reading of the surrender clause that concludes that “First Nations are entering into the same relationship with the queen as between her and the Dominion” (91)—that, in other words, the negotiating parties ended up on a nation-to-nation basis. Asch concludes:

I think the evidence clearly shows that, on the balance of probabilities, the interpretation of the terms of Treaty 4 offered by our Indigenous partners today more accurately reflects the agreement we reached than does the version transmitted to us through the written text. That is, to gain their permission to settle on lands we recognized as belonging to them, we asked only to share the land with them (not take it over as by purchasing it). In return, we promised to do our utmost to ensure that our presence on these lands would result in benefits to them, and certainly would cause them no harm. Furthermore, whether or not we believed we had sovereignty, we treated our partners as independent political actors with their own leaders and with a right to make the final decision on our request, and there is nothing in the evidence to substantiate the proposition that, either in our minds or in theirs, the treaty terms were such that they would change the nature of our relationship. . . . Put succinctly, but perhaps too mechanically, the agreement was this: they would share the land, and we would treat them like our own brothers and sisters. (97)

If we accept the possibility that the version of Treaty 4 offered by First Nations was the product of good-faith negotiations, then that treaty is a remarkable achievement—a shared understanding, despite cultural differences, and one that offers a path to move beyond colonial relations (97-98). If, on the other hand, we think Morris and the other Crown negotiators lied, then the treaties become worthless pieces of paper and our right to be here disappears. Therefore, it’s better to treat them as legitimate (99). But the expediency of acting as if Treaty 4 is legitimate doesn’t make sense if, as Krasowski argues, the fact that the surrender clause was not discussed, mentioned, or explained renders the Crown’s claim on the land to be, well, specious and unfounded.

The treaties’ legitimacy means that Canada and First Nations are in a nation-to-nation relationship, Asch argues. “Indigenous peoples have spoken to us with one voice: using our conceptual frame, they had sovereignty and jurisdiction in their territories when we first arrived and they have not voluntarily relinquished this through treaties,” he writes. Therefore, “if we want to move ahead in implementing the treaty relationship in good faith, it seems reasonable to start by accepting that, no matter where our partners reside . . . they live on land that remains under their sovereignty and jurisdiction” (111-12). That argument leads him to agree with Harold Johnson’s position: “the only path for us to take is to join Indigenous polities as immigrants” (112). The Two Row Wampum, and the Cree principle of witaskewin, or living together on the land, emphasize the necessity of sharing the land and not interfering in the way First Nations manage their affairs (114). The treaties, in other words, bind us together permanently, even though settlers do not have sovereignty: “Two nations live together as partners though there is but one sovereign” (119). 

The linking principle demonstrated by the Two Row Wampum and witaskewin is central to Asch’s argument here. “Saying that the linking principle has the power to bind us to this land is one thing,” he writes. “Believing it to be possible is another. And while, at the end of the day, I know it is incumbent on us to take our partners at their word, the idea that sovereignty over a territory takes precedence is so fundamental in our thinking that it would be useful to attempt to conceptualize how linking could have that power in its absence” (119). Asch then turns more explicitly to Johnson’s claim that the treaties meant we became relatives. He suggests that the linking principle is similar to marriage, in which, to survive, two families have to come together and yet remain distinct, and compares this to the Two Row Wampum example, in which both partners have autonomy and equality, but need the other to survive (127-31). Or, to use another metaphor, the treaty is the foundation of a house we are building together with First Nations, a house in which we both can live (132). 

Using Anthony E. Smith’s concept of “ethnie,” a group with a common myth of descent, distinctive culture, association with specific territory, sense of solidarity, and identity (135),  Asch then demonstrates that in the 1870s, when the numbered treaties were being negotiated, First Nations on the prairies were living in multi-ethnie communities without a common sovereign or ethnie to bind them together (138). “One can readily imagine that our partners anticipated that we would adhere to the same principles; that is, we would not try to incorporate our partners into an ‘institutional-cum-territorial’ container of our own making but would rather link arms with them to shape a container in which we could all live together comfortably” (139). After all, that is what First Nations were already used to. “Looked at in this light,” Asch writes, “the treaties express our mutual commitment to that understanding” (139). That, of course, is precisely what did not happen, and Asch describes the results of our failure to act with kindness toward our treaty partners (142-48). “Nonetheless,” he writes, “I believe that returning to the promises we made in the treaties gives us a purchase on where to begin now” (149). “We must also act in accord with the spirit and intent of the treaties as they were negotiated,” he writes (150). Therefore, he suggests that in the future this understanding must orient our interactions not only with First Nations with which we have negotiated treaties, but also with those with which we have not (151). “My thesis comes down to this: Treaties offer us the means to reconcile the fact that we are ‘here to stay’ with the fact that there were people already here when we first arrived,” he concludes (152).

But that’s not the end of Asch’s argument. By examining biographical evidence, he suggests that Morris and Lord Dufferin, the Governor-General in the 1870s, honestly believed that the commitments they made in return to settle on the prairies would be kept (157). Morris advocated for faithful implementation of the spirit of the treaties, and as a result his authority over treaty implementation was removed in 1877 (161). When he continued to protest the breaking of the treaties, he was pushed out as lieutenant governor and Edgar Dewdney became Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the North West Territory. Dewdney implemented policies of deliberate starvation of First Nations (161). 

Harold Cardinal once described the treaties as our Magna Carta, but Asch notes that settlers don’t think of them that way, despite their fundamental importance. Canada’s historiography shows that we pay little attention to the treaties, and therefore do not understand them. However, he writes,

[w]hen we include in our history the position on the importance of treaty making offered by Commissioner Morris and Lord Dufferin, a different picture emerges. What then becomes clear is that, at the time of Confederation, the view taken by those who controlled treaty implementation was contested by a prominent leader in building Confederation and by the queen’s official representative. They believed that in Canada to be “here to stay” would mean making treaties amenable to all before settling on new lands and adhering to them. In this rendering, treaties become like the Magna Carta for us, for they are the foundation that legitimizes our settlement on these lands. As Morris suggested, to dishonour our obligations would be to call into question that legitimacy. And I think it fair to say that, were Settlers by and large to come to that view, then governments would be encouraged to act on the understanding that our treaty obligations are solemn commitments and not policy options. But this cannot happen so long as this debate is written out of our history. What I suggest is that, at the very least, we incorporate the perspective of Dufferin and Morris on treaty relations into the story we tell of Confederation and the settling of the west. (164)

Asch’s take on Morris is markedly different from J.R. Miller’s, in his 2009 book Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada, and I honestly don’t know who to believe. Perhaps that doesn’t matter. If we need to assume that the Crown behaved honourably in the treaty negotiations, then it doesn’t matter whether Morris actually did—although the historical precedent of honest dealing and shared understanding is encouraging. What we need to do is keep faith to the principles Asch finds in the treaty-making process: gaining consent from those who were here first, keeping our commitments to them, and rectifying any harm our actions have caused (165). That is what reconciliation would look like. And yet, I’m haunted by Krasowski’s claim that Morris, and the other Crown negotiators, did not behave honourably—that they lied by omission about the surrender clause.

When I first read Asch’s book, I believed his argument made sense, particularly regarding the purported source of Crown sovereignty. His argument could help us to imagine a different way of engaging with First Nations. Perhaps being allowed to imagine that a nation-to-nation relationship is logically possible (rather than simply a matter of power and numbers) would be yet another gift from Canada’s Indigenous partners. In any case, there is now no question in my mind that the treaties were intended to be about sharing the land—from the Indigenous perspective, and if Asch is right about Morris, from the Crown negotiators’ perspective as well. And yet, as I’ve suggested, Krasowski’s book throws my faith in Asch’s argument up in the air. I now find myself wondering if his complicated reading of the surrender clause in the Treaty 4 document isn’t too clever by half—that we need to acknowledge that, because that clause was never discussed or mentioned by the Crown negotiators, the treaty’s validity is in jeopardy. And if that’s the case, as Asch points out, then settlers are simply squatting on this land, and we have no right to be here. That’s a pretty big problem.

Oh, and to answer the question I asked myself at the beginning of this summary: yes, the summary is useful, although I will eventually have to revisit Asch’s interpretation of the Treaty 4 surrender clause, to parse through his reading of it again.

Works Cited

Asch, Michael. On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada, University  of Toronto Press, 2014.

Craft, Aimée. Breathing Life Into the Stone Fort Treaty: An Anishinabe Understanding of Treaty One, Purich, 2013.

Harold Johnson, Two Families: Treaties and Government, Purich, 2007.

Krasowski, Sheldon. No Surrender: The Land Remains Indigenous, University of Regina Press, 2019.

Miller, J.R. Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada, University of Toronto Press, 2009.